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ABSTRACT	  	  The	  present	  essay	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  ordinary	  empirical	  judgments	  and	   our	   scientific	  worldviews.	   It	   is	   concerned	  with	   how	   ordinary	   judgments	   (and	  the	   primitive	   frameworks	   in	   which	   they	   are	   formulated)	   might	   be	   usefully	  integrated	  into	  an	  account	  of	  epistemological	  progress,	  both	  of	  our	  personal	  views	  and	  scientific	  theories,	  so	  that	  the	  sciences	  (especially	  modern	  theories	  of	  space	  and	  time)	  can	  reasonably	  be	  thought	  as	  being	  informed	  by,	  and	  evolving	  out	  of,	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  various	  pre-­‐scientific	  views	  they	  have	  replaced.	  We	  examine	  our	  normal	  perceptual	   judgments	  of	  magnitude,	  position,	  orientation,	   and	  displacement	   in	   the	  hope	   of	   uncovering	   the	   logical,	   conceptual,	   and	   empirical	   relations	   that	   exist	  between	  such	   judgments	   (as	  well	   as	   the	  views	  of	   the	  world	   they	  presuppose)	  and	  our	  sophisticated	  understandings	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  in	  physical	  theory.	  	  This	   research	   contends	   that	   experience	   and	   a	   rich	   type	   of	   conceptual	  analysis—one	  that	  examines	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  make	  possible	  the	  application	  of	  concepts	  in	  empirical	  contexts—together	  provide	  the	  framework	  within	  which	  a	  rational	  account	  of	  such	  relations	  can	  be	  proposed.	  The	  project	  thus	  defends	  a	  form	  of	   empiricism,	   but	   one	   distinct	   from	   classical	   forms	   (be	   they	   British	   empiricism,	  Russellian	  empiricism,	  or	  logical	  empiricism)—rather	  a	  slightly	  modified	  version	  of	  Anil	   Gupta’s	   “Reformed	   Empiricism”.	   This	   empiricism	   is	   capable	   of	   avoiding	   the	  logical	  excesses	  and	  errors	  of	  earlier	  forms,	  whilst	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  how	  a	  set	  of	   basic	   empiricist	   principles	   might	   be	   extended	   from	   their	   context	   in	   general	  epistemology	   to	   recalcitrant	   problems	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   such	   as	   the	  problem	   of	   our	   formal	   knowledge,	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   communicability	   of	  observation,	  and	   the	  rationality	  of	   theoretical	  progress.	  Such	  an	  extension	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  both	  of	  our	  ordinary	  and	  scientific	  knowledge.	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The	  Question	  of	  a	  Comprehensive	  Empiricism	  Construed	   broadly,	   this	   dissertation	   is	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   ordinary	  empirical	   judgments	   and	   empirical	   scientific	   knowledge.	   More	   specifically,	   it	   is	  concerned	   with	   how	   our	   ordinary	   empirical	   judgments	   (and	   the	   primitive	  frameworks	   in	   which	   they	   are	   formulated)	   might	   be	   usefully	   integrated	   into	   an	  account	   of	   epistemological	   progress,	   both	   of	   our	   personal	   views	   and	   scientific	  theories,	   so	   that	   the	   sciences	   (especially	  modern	   theories	   of	   space	   and	   time)	   can	  reasonably	  be	   thought	  as	  being	   informed	  by,	  and	  evolving	  out	  of,	   the	  various	  pre-­‐scientific	  views	  they	  have	  replaced.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  examine	  our	  normal	  perceptual	  judgments	   of	   magnitude,	   position,	   orientation,	   and	   displacement	   in	   the	   hope	   of	  uncovering	  the	   logical,	  conceptual,	  and	  empirical	  relations	  that	  exist	  between	  such	  judgments	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   views	   of	   the	   world	   they	   presuppose)	   and	   our	  sophisticated	  understandings	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  in	  physical	  theory.	  It	  is	  our	  contention	   that	   nothing	   other	   than	   experience	   and	   a	   rich	   type	   of	   conceptual	  analysis—one	  that	  examines	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  make	  possible	  the	  application	  of	  concepts	  in	  empirical	  contexts—is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  a	  rational	  account	  of	  such	  relations.	   Based	   on	   such	   considerations,	   we	   think	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   develop	   an	  empiricism	  that	  overcomes	  the	  logical	  deficiencies	  of	  classical	   forms	  of	  empiricism	  whilst	  also	  offering	  a	  unique	  characterisation	  and	  analysis	  of	  recalcitrant	  problems	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  including	  the	  aforementioned	  relation	  of	  pre-­‐scientific	  to	   scientific	   worldviews,	   and	   also	   the	   rationality	   of	   theoretical	   progress	   in	   the	  sciences.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	   these	   introductory	  remarks	   is	   to	  give	  a	  brief	  account	  of	   the	  central	   question	   that	   motivates	   the	   essay,	   and	   an	   even	   briefer	   overview	   of	   the	  arguments	   to	   come.	   Our	   claims	   here	   fall	   into	   three	   parts,	   each	   devoted	   a	   section	  below:	   §I	   addresses	   the	   question	   of	   a	   “comprehensive	   empiricism”,	   including	   the	  obstacles	  encountered	  by	  an	  empiricist	  project,	  like	  this	  one,	  that	  speaks	  to	  issues	  of	  general	   epistemology	   and	   scientific	   knowledge.	   Included	   in	   our	   discussion	   is	   an	  historical	   remark	   regarding	   the	   origins	   and	   eventual	   decline	   of	   comprehensive	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empiricism.	  §II	  offers	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  empiricism,	  namely	  Gupta’s	  “Reformed	   Empiricism”	   as	   developed	   in	   his	   [2006a],	   with	   a	   brief	   claim	   as	   to	   the	  merits	   of	   Reformed	   Empiricism,	   and	  why	   it	  may	   be	   an	   ideal	   candidate	   for	   a	   new	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  our	  (empirical)	  knowledge,	  both	  ordinary	  and	  scientific.	  The	  remarks	  here	  are	  very	  general;	   the	  technical	  details	  of	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  are	  more	  fully	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  §III	  offers	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  points	  of	  each	  chapter	  to	  follow.	  	  	  
§I:	  The	  Question	  of	  a	  Comprehensive	  Empiricism	  Can	  empiricism	  account	  both	  for	  our	  common	  sense	  and	  scientific	  knowledge?	  This	  was	  once	  a	  central	  question	  for	  empiricists	  going	  all	   the	  way	  back	  to	  Locke,	  and	   it	  was	   arguably	   the	  most	   dominant	   amongst	   philosophers	   (and	  many	   scientists)	   for	  nearly	   a	   century	   and	   a	   half:	   from	  Kant’s	   positing	   a	   single	  a	  priori	   framework	   that	  makes	   possible	   empirical	   knowledge	   both	   in	   common	   sense	   judgment	   and	   in	  science,	   to	   Helmholtz’s	   assimilation	   of	   the	   Kantian	   a	   priori	   to	   the	   psychology	   of	  perception	  and	  the	  mechanics	  of	  motion;	  from	  Mach’s	  naturalised	  phenomenalism,	  to	  the	  new	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  as	  it	  was	  explored	  by	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  in	  light	  of	   the	   considerable	   advances	   in	   19th	   century	   geometry	   and	   early	   20th	   century	  physical	  theory.	  Not	  only	  was	  a	  “comprehensive	  empiricism”	  (if	  we	  can	  call	  it	  that)	  a	  desideratum	  of	  the	  highest	  order,	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  promised	  by	  new	  developments	  in	  physics	  and	  psychology.	  	  	   Despite	  its	  central	  role	  in	  many	  past	  empiricist	  projects,	  this	  desideratum	  is	  not	  prevalent	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature.	  Empiricism	  is	  arguably	  healthier	  than	  it	  has	  ever	  been,	  considering	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  views	  that	  profess	  the	  advancement	  of	  this	   or	   that	   particular	   empiricist	   thesis,	   and	   considering	   what	   may	   be	   called	   an	  empiricist	   spirit	   in	   general	   epistemology	   and	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science.	   But	   this	  piecemeal	  empiricism	  only	  masks	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  attempt	  since	  the	  1950s	   to	   propose	   a	   comprehensive	   empiricism	   that	   offers	   a	   systematic	  understanding	   of	   all	   of	   our	   knowledge	   (common	   sense	   and	   scientific)	   on	   basic	  empiricist	   principles.	   This	   is	   perhaps	   quite	   surprising	   given	   our	   remarks	   in	   the	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previous	  paragraph,	   and	  even	  more	   surprising	  with	   a	   cursory	   investigation	  of	   the	  roots	  of	  modern	  empiricism	  and	  the	  question	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  This	  history,	  if	  traced	   back	   to	   the	   classical	   British	   empiricists,	   exhibits	   the	   great	   benefit	   of	  developing	   an	   epistemology	   which	   can	   deal	   with	   questions	   of	   a	   general	  epistemological	  sort	  (such	  as	  the	  explication	  of	  the	  way	  of	  ideas,	  and	  the	  concern	  of	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  reality	  of	  everyday	  perception,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  visual	  perception)	  and	  a	  scientific	  sort	  (such	  as	  the	  epistemic	  standing	  of	   the	  mechanical	  philosophy	  and	  Newton’s	  new	  physics,	  the	  “problems”	  posed	  by	  Newtonian	  gravity	  and	  other	  action-­‐at-­‐a-­‐distance	  phenomena,	  and	  the	  proper	  “rules	  of	  reasoning”	   for	  empiricism	  in	  light	  of	  Humean	  scepticism	  about	  the	  ultimate	  causes	  of	  things).	  	  Let	   us	   take	   Locke	   as	   our	   example	   of	   the	   fruits	   of	   congress	   between	  empiricism	   and	   the	   sciences.	   For	   Locke,	   a	   new	   epistemological	   program	   was	  required	   to	   explain	   not	   only	   our	   common	   sense	   perceptual	   judgments,	   but	   also	  (importantly)	   our	   scientific	   judgments—in	   particular,	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   new	  experimental	   sciences.	   Given	   the	   limitations	   imposed	   on	   us	   by	   our	   faculties,	   the	  Aristotelian	   paradigm	   of	   scientia	   (that	   scientific	   knowledge	   is	   only	   of	   necessary	  truths)	  seemed	  unachievable:	  if	  scientific	  knowledge	  must	  meet	  such	  high	  epistemic	  demands,	   and	  our	   senses	   (even	  when	  organized	  by	   experiment)	   seem	   to	   grant	  us	  nothing	   like	   necessary	   truths,	   then	   properly	   scientific	   knowledge	   would	   seem	   to	  escape	   our	   grasp.	   Of	   course	   we	   have	   such	   knowledge	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   formal	  matters	   (such	   as	   geometry),	   but	   the	   Aristotelian	   account	   of	   scientia	   was	   far	   too	  restrictive	   to	   provide	   a	   proper	   epistemological	   account	   of	   the	   new	   empirical	  sciences	   as	   sciences	   (especially	   Boyle’s	   radical	   corpuscularian	   mechanical	  philosophy	   and	   experimentalism,	   both	   major	   influences	   on	   Locke’s	   thought).	  Natural	  philosophy	  needed	  to	  be	  divorced	  from	  scientia,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  required	  a	  new	  epistemological	   framework:	   one	   which	   did	   not	   demand	   the	   grasp	   of	   necessary	  truths.	  	  	   Locke’s	  epistemology	  was	  deft	  in	  its	  handling	  of	  this	  problem.	  Acknowledging	  that	  scientia	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  mark	  of	  theoretical	  sciences	  (especially	  geometry	  and	  ethics),	   yet	   far	   too	   stringent	   a	  model	   for	   the	  new	  experimental	  method	   in	  natural	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philosophy,	  Locke	  preserved	  scientia	  as	  an	  ideal,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  loosened	  the	  imperative	  to	  meet	  this	  ideal	  in	  natural	  philosophy,	  which	  could	  be	  based	  on	  purely	  sensitive	  knowledge	  (experiment).	  (Kochiras	  [2009])	  Human	  knowledge	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  account	  for	  scientific	  knowledge,	  but	  only	  after	  we	  see	  that	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  
not	   a	   systematic	   understanding	   of	   necessary	   truths—of	   formal	   causes	   and	   the	  essences	   of	   things.	   Rather,	   natural	   philosophy	   has	   to	   be	   content	   with	   an	  understanding	  of	  the	  merely	  nominal	  essences,	  understood	  through	  the	  regular	  co-­‐existence	   of	   certain	   collections	   of	   perceptual	   properties	   in	   things,	   learned	   by	  repeated	  representation	  of	  those	  properties	  as	  being	  conjoined.	  (ibid)	  While	  a	  more	  complete	  analysis	  of	  Locke’s	  philosophy	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  new	  sciences	  must	  wait	  for	  Chapter	  Two,	  we	  can	  already	  sketch	  some	  of	  its	  central	  points:	   (1)	   natural	   science,	   whatever	   it	   may	   be	   in	   detail,	   is	   based	   on	   sensitive	  knowledge	  (at	  least	  for	  limited	  beings	  like	  us);	  (2)	  while	  our	  senses	  put	  us	  in	  causal	  congress	  with	   the	  world	   (says	   Locke),	   our	   epistemic	   limitations	   are	   such	   that	  we	  cannot	   arrive	   at	   universal	   and	   necessary	   truths	   about	   it;	   (3)	   since	   we	   cannot	  determine	   essences	   (outside	   of	   demonstrative	   sciences	   like	   geometry),	   and	   since	  natural	   science	   still	   avails	   itself	   of	   general	   claims	   based	   on	   particular	  experience/experiment,	  we	  can	  only	  approach	  the	  ideal	  of	  scientia	  if	  we	  are	  able	  to	  refine	  and	  better	  apply	  our	  empirical	  tests,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  trust	  our	  inductions	  more	  and	  more,	   and	   arrive	   at	   fundamental	   principles	   (like	   those	   of	   Boyle’s	   mechanics,	  Galileo’s	   natural	   philosophy,	   or	   Newton’s	   nomic	   systematisation	   of	   motion	   and	  gravitational	  effects).	  	  We	  will	  see	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  that	  there	  were	  very	  real	  philosophical	  limits	  to	  how	   far	   such	   inclusion	   of	   scientific	   concerns	  might	   go	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   classical	  British	  empiricism,	  and	  that	  certain	  parts	  of	  Newton’s	  system	  were	  rejected	  (or	  at	  least	   radically	   re-­‐contextualised)	   by	   Locke	   and	   Hume	   on	   what	   we	   would	   now	  consider	  purely	  philosophical	  grounds.	  Hence,	  we	  cannot	  anachronistically	   impose	  on	  the	  early	  modern	  empiricists	  a	  kind	  of	  naturalism	  they	  did	  not	  hold.	  However,	  for	  now,	  the	  preceding	  remarks	  suffice	  to	  make	  the	  more	  general	  point—that	  even	  in	  its	  infancy,	   empiricism	   was	   to	   account	   for	   our	   common	   sense	   and	   scientific	   beliefs	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about	   the	   world.	   Empiricism	   was	   intended	   to	   be	   comprehensive.	   This	   idea	   was	  maintained	   throughout	   later	   empiricist	   projects,	   including	   Kant’s	   transcendental	  attempts	   to	   ground	  our	   synthetic	   judgments	   in	   sensible	   intuition	   (overcoming	   the	  gap	  between	  scientia	  and	  induction	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Newton’s	  laws	  of	  motion),	  and	  the	  post-­‐Kantian	   empiricist	   attempts	   of	   figures	   like	   Helmholtz,	   Mach,	   and	   Russell,	   and	  various	  logical	  empiricists,	  to	  show	  just	  how	  much	  of	  the	  synthetic	  a	  priori	  may	  be	  replaced	  by	  purely	  empiricist	  principles	  of	  reasoning	  and	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Russell	  and	  the	   logical	   empiricists)	   the	   use	   of	   new	   logical	   tools	   which	   allowed	   for	   a	   more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  analytic—including	  how	  the	  analytic	  might	  facilitate	  our	   empirical	   reasoning	   in	   ways	   once	   thought	   to	   require	   the	   doctrines	   of	   the	  Transcendental	   Aesthetic	   and	   Transcendental	   Analytic.	   Such	   matters	   will	   be	  discussed	   in	  more	  detail	   in	  Chapter	  Two,	  but	  are	  mentioned	   in	  gloss	  here	  to	  show	  just	  how	  prevalent	  was	  the	  desideratum	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  our	  normal	  perceptual	  judgments	  and	  our	  scientific	  principles.	  	   The	  prevalence	  of	  comprehensivism	  from	  the	  17th	  century	  to	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	   20th	   century	   might	   lead	   one	   to	   think	   that	   its	   absence	   in	   contemporary	  epistemology	   is	   quite	   bizarre.	   What	   could	   have	   led	   to	   the	   demise	   of	   the	  desideratum?	   The	   real	   answer	   is	   quite	   complex,	   and	   explored	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  Chapter	   Two,	   but	   the	   quick	   answer	   is	   this:	   such	   a	   broadly	   construed	   normative	  empiricism	   became	   unpopular	   (and	   considered	   by	   many	   as	   untenable)	   by	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   last	   century	   in	   light	   of	   the	   (real	   and	   perceived)	   problems	   of	   logical	  empiricism.	  While	   empiricist	   projects	   continued	   in	   general	   epistemology	   and	   the	  philosophy	   of	   science	   (in	   fact,	   such	   projects	   flourished),	   none	   were	   ever	   so	  systematic	   in	  nature	  as	   their	  predecessors	   from	   the	  1950s	  onward.	  This	   is	  due	   to	  two	  main	   factors	   (though	   likely	   a	  whole	   host	   of	   other	   concerns	   could	   be	   cited	   as	  reasons	   for	   the	   decline	   of	   comprehensivism,	   so	  we	   propose	   these	   factors	   as	   non-­‐exhaustive).	  Firstly,	  the	  1950s	  saw	  a	  marked	  decline	  in	  the	  popularity	  of	  normative	  empiricism,	  due	   in	   large	  part	  to	  three	   immensely	   influential	  criticisms:	  (1)	  Quine’s	  critique	  of	  Carnap’s	  [1928/2003]	  and	  the	  proposal	  of	  his	  replacement	  naturalism	  (a	  naturalised	  empiricism	  based	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	  behavioural	  psychology)	   in	  Quine	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[1951/1961];	   (2)	   Wittgenstein’s	   critiques	   of	   propositional	   reductionism	   and	  ostensive	   definition	   (and	   his	   proposal	   of	   a	   natural	   language	   philosophy)	   in	  Wittgenstein	   [1953];	   and	   (3)	   Sellars’	   critique	   of	   the	   myth	   of	   the	   given	   in	   Sellars	  [1956/1997].	   These	   critiques,	   whatever	   their	   actual	   philosophical	   worth,1	  were	  decisive	   in	   bringing	   to	   an	   end	   the	   comprehensive	   stage	   of	   the	   logical	   empiricist	  tradition.	  	  Secondly,	   the	   discipline	   of	   philosophy,	   like	   all	   disciplines	   in	   the	   academy,	  came	   to	   be	   more	   and	   more	   fragmented	   after	   the	   war;	   the	   need	   for	   broad,	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  knowledge	  that	  had	  once	  seemed	  so	  central	  to	  philosophy	  were	  no	  longer	  de	  riguer.	  However,	  fragmentation	  alone	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  decline	  of	   comprehensivism.	   For	   that,	   we	   must	   discuss	   a	   more	   specific	   historical	  development.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  last	  century	  saw	  a	  parting	  of	  the	  ways	  between	  general	  epistemology	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  partially	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  specialisation	   that	   accompanied	   fragmentation,	   but	   also	   (in	   the	   specific	   case	   of	  empiricism)	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  diaspora	  of	  positivism	  out	  of	  Germany,	  Austria,	   and	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  after	  (respectively)	  the	  Nazi	  seizure	  of	  power,	  the	  Anchluß,	  and	  annexation	  of	  the	  Sudetenland.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  academy	  in	  North	  America,	  the	  specialised	  research	  projects	  of	  (especially)	  Reichenbach,	  Hempel,	  and	  Carnap	  came	  to	  define	  logical	  empiricism	  as	  a	  narrower	  project	  than	  it	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  the	  Halcyon	  Days	   of	   old	   Vienna.	   The	   comprehensive	   projects	   of	   the	   1920s	   and	   30s—here,	  Schlick’s	  [1925/1974]	  and	  Carnap’s	  [1928/2003]	  and	  [1934/2002]	  are	  prime	  examples,	  as	   is	  Russell’s	  structuralism	  as	  expressed	   in	  his	  [1927]2—were	  replaced	  by	   more	   focused	   researches	   on	   topics	   such	   as	   the	   foundations	   of	   quantum	  mechanics	  (Reichenbach	  [1944]),	  Hempel’s	  and	  Carnap’s	  development	  of	   inductive	  logic	  (Hempel	  [1945],	  Carnap	  [1950/1962],	  [1952]),	  and	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  other	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  provide	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  Quine’s	  arguments	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  2	  Schlick	   and	   Carnap	   get	   later	   mention,	   but	   we	   refer	   only	   to	   Russell’s	   phenomenalist	   program	   of	  [1914],	   not	   his	   later	   Lockean	   representationalist	   approach	   and	   structuralism	   in	   [1927]	   and	  [1948/2009].	   This	   later	   project	   does	   not	   attempt,	   as	   the	   [1914]	   project	   had	   attempted,	   to	   reduce	  scientific	   concepts	   to	   logical	   constructions	   of	   sense-­‐data.	   Rather,	   it	   attempts	   to	   show	   that	   what	  matters	   to	   our	   physical	   knowledge	   is	   not	   the	   intuitive	   contet	   given	   in	   acquaintance,	   but	   the	  mathematical	  structure	  of	  perception.	  Once	  we	  realise	  that	  physics	  only	  cares	  about	  structure,	  we	  are	  in	   a	   position	   to	   extend	  what	  we	   know	   about	   the	   causal	   structure	   leading	   from	   external	   events	   to	  percepts	  to	  find	  the	  general	  mathematical	  laws	  which	  hold	  of	  the	  world	  that	  lies	  beyond	  perception.	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more	  particular	  problems	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  mathematical	  physics.	  This	  process	  of	  specialisation	   is	   best	   seen	   as	   a	   natural	   development—a	   maturation	   of	   a	   very	  sophisticated	  brand	  of	  philosophy.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  fact	  that	  concerns	  of	  a	  general	  epistemological	  nature	  were	  often	  largely	  ignored	  in	  favour	  of	  more	  esoteric	  studies	  in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   is	   undeniable,	   and	   the	  mature	   projects	   of	   the	   logical	  empiricists	  offer	  our	  best	  example	  of	  this	  trend	  away	  from	  comprehensivism.3	  Also,	  specific	  theses	  developed	  within	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  tradition	  (about	  the	  stipulative	  nature	  of	  theoretical	  frameworks,	  and	  the	  view	  that	  basic	  judgments	  are	   at	   least	   partly	   the	   domain	   of	   psychology)	   meant	   that	   questions	   about	   the	  relationship	   between	   simple	   factual	   judgments	   and	   scientific	   theories	   were	   no	  longer	  thought	  of	  as	  in	  need	  of	  epistemological	  explanation.	  The	  logical	  empiricists	  came	   to	   think	   that	   there	  wasn’t	  much	   to	  be	   said	   about	  how	  our	  normal	   empirical	  judgments	  might	  bear	  on	  scientific	  theories.	  We	   are	   in	   the	   position	   of	   providing	   an	   account	   of	   the	   merits	   of	  comprehensivism	   in	   this	   highly	   fragmented	   and	   specialised	   context.	   But	   what	  motivates	   a	   reintroduction	   of	   comprehensivism	   in	   empiricism?	   Some	   may	   argue	  that	   the	   regulative	   ideals	   of	   simplicity,	   systematicity,	   and	   unity	   are	   goals	   in	  themselves.	  The	  more	  expansive	  the	  parts	  of	  our	  knowledge	  that	  can	  be	  brought	  under	  
a	  smaller	  and	  smaller	  set	  of	  empirical	  principles	   the	  better.	  While	   there	   is	   certainly	  value	   in	  simplicity,	   systematicity,	  and	  unity	  of	   thought,	  we	  do	  not	   think	   that	   these	  ideals	  function	  as	  the	  primary	  (much	  less	  sole)	  motivation	  for	  comprehensivism.	  We	  hold	   that	   the	   history	   of	   empiricism	   offers	   us	   our	   best	   motivation:	   the	   fruitful	  congress	  that	  has	  existed	  between	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  (of	  various	  stripe	  and	  colour)	  who	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  physical	  phenomena	  without	  recourse	  to	  extra-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Friedman	   [1999]	   and	   Carus	   [2007]	   have	   discussed	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   these	   specialised	   projects	  drew	  emphasis	  away	  from	  not	  only	  the	  essentially	  political	  character	  of	  early	  logical	  empiricism,	  but	  also	  its	  deep	  connections	  with	  the	  post-­‐Kantian	  intellectual	  traditions	  in	  European	  thought,	  including	  most	   significantly	   the	   later	   19th	   century	   and	   early	   20th	   century	   development	   of	   a	   kind	   of	   scientific	  empiricism	   in	   the	  work	  of	  Helmholtz,	  Mach,	  Avenarius,	  and	  Russell,	  but	  also	   the	  congress	  between	  logical	  empiricism	  and	  less	  empirically-­‐minded	  thinkers,	  from	  Marburg	  neo-­‐Kantians	  like	  Natorp	  and	  Cassirer	   to	   phenomenologists	   like	   Husserl	   and	   Heidegger.	   Such	   particularities	   are	   not	   of	   our	  immediate	  concern;	  we	  merely	  hope	  to	  establish	  here	  the	   final	  stages	  of	  comprehensivism,	  and	  the	  general	   conditions	   which	   led	   to	   its	   demise.	   See	   Friedman	   [2000]	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   complex	  relationship	  between	  different	   strands	  of	   the	  post-­‐Kantian	   tradition,	   through	  his	   recounting	  of	   the	  famous	  conference	  in	  Davos,	  Switzerland,	  March	  17-­‐April	  6,	  1929.	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empirical	  principles.	  These	  philosophers	  and	  scientists,	  as	  we	  shall	   see,	  developed	  nuanced	  ways	  of	  mobilising	  novel	  experiment	  and	  empirical	  data	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  the	   most	   complicated	   questions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   space,	   time,	   and	   motion—including,	   among	   other	   historical	   episodes,	   Galileo’s	   critique	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	  theory	  of	  motion	  (based	  on	  Aristotle’s	  elemental	  conception	  of	  “natural	  motion”)	  in	  his	  exposition	  of	  relativity,	  and	  Newton’s	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  account	  of	  “philosophical	   motion”	   based	   on	   dynamical	   considerations	   in	   his	   famous	   “bucket	  experiment”.	   Also,	   more	   recent	   examples	   can	   be	   explored	   in	   the	   development	   of	  relativistic	  physics,	   such	  as	  Einstein’s	   reflection	  on	   the	   role	  of	   infinite	   signaling	   in	  classical	   electromagnetic	   theory,	   leading	   to	   the	   formulation	   of	   special	   relativity.	  These	   success	   stories	   of	   empirically	   motivated	   conceptual	   analysis	   in	   physics	  highlight	  the	  ways	  simple	  experiments	  might	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  new	  scientific	  theory,	  and	  how	  our	  personal,	  and	  perspectival	  views	  of	  the	  world	  might	   therefore	   be	   better	   extended,	   with	   a	   few	   misconceptions	   and	   parochial	  excesses	   corrected	   along	   the	   way,	   to	   ever	   more	   sophisticated	   contexts.	   Such	  considerations	   of	   the	   intimate	   relationship	   between	   our	   common	   sense,	   personal	  perspectives	  and	  well-­‐organised	  scientific	  pictures	  of	  the	  world	  do	  much	  to	  motivate	  the	   reintroduction	   of	   comprehensivism,	   even	   in	   light	   of	   the	   anatomy	   of	  comprehensivism’s	  demise.	  Part	   of	   the	   present	   essay	   is	   therefore	   dedicated	   to	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  work	   of	   previous	   philosophically	  motivated	   scientists	   and	   scientifically	  motivated	  philosophers.	  Much	  of	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Three	  discuss	  the	  insights	  of	  thinkers	  like	  Helmholtz,	   Mach,	   Poincaré,	   Einstein	   (and	   a	   host	   of	   others)	   who	   saw	   the	   value	   in	  making	   philosophy	  more	   scientific	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   bringing	   a	  kind	   of	   sober	   empiricism	   to	   bear	   on	   existing	   scientific	   conceptions.	   Such	   thinkers	  are	  significant	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  but	  also	  deeply	  important	  to	  the	  current	  study	  for	  the	  influence	  they	  had	  on	  the	  development	  of	  logical	  empiricism.	  It	  is	  our	  contention	  that	  we	  can	  learn	  much	  from	  the	  logical	  empiricists’	  readings	  of	  these	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  philosopher-­‐scientists.	  While	  their	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  theory	  as	  based	   on	   a	   thorough-­‐going	   conventionalism	  may	   have	   taken	   them	   away	   from	   the	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kind	  of	   comprehensivism	  we	  wish	   to	  pursue	  here,	  we	  argue	   that	   there	   is	  much	   to	  learn	  not	  only	  from	  their	  reading	  of	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  figures,	  but	  also	  from	  their	   commitment	   to	   that	   tradition’s	   concern	   with	   the	   formal	   parts	   of	   our	  knowledge	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   empiricism.	   Further,	  we	   argue	   that	  what	  was	   really	  missing	  from	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  picture	  of	  our	  scientific	  knowledge	  was	  a	  brand	  of	   conceptual	   analysis	   that	   eschewed	   the	   Kantian-­‐cum-­‐positivist	   dichotomy	  between	  analytic	  and	  synthetic	  statements	  as	  too	  coarse	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  to	   reconstruct	   the	   “language	   of	   science”.	   This	   form	   of	   conceptual	   analysis,	   most	  pronounced	  in	  Poincaré,	  though	  operating	  in	  some	  primitive	  way	  in	  Helmholtz	  and	  Mach,	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  Demopoulos	  [2000]	  as	  “the	  practice	  of	  recovering	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  a	  concept	  in	  use	  by	  revealing	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  our	  use	  of	  the	   concept	  depends.”	   (220)	  We	  will	   see	   that	   this	   form	  of	   conceptual	   analysis	  has	  pride	   of	   place	   in	   any	   new	   proposal	   of	   an	   empiricist	   account	   of	   the	   shift	   from	  common	  sense	  to	  scientific	  accounts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  	  
§II:	  Gupta’s	  Empiricism	  as	  a	  Comprehensive	  Empiricism	  In	  this	  essay,	  we	  will	  investigate	  an	  interpretation	  of	  empiricism	  that	  may	  be	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  bridging	  the	  current	  gap	  between	  general	  epistemological	  research	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  namely	  Gupta’s	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  as	  developed	  in	  his	  [2006a].	   In	   this	   work,	   Gupta	   offers	   a	   novel	   account	   of	   the	   rational	   import	   of	  experience	  to	  knowledge.	  Gupta	  argues	  that	  experience	  (or	  more	  aptly	  “the	  given”	  in	  experience,	   i.e.	   the	   rational	   import	   of	   experience	   to	   knowledge)	  has	   traditionally	  been	   viewed	   by	   empiricists	   as	   offering,	   by	   itself,	   epistemic	   license	   to	   a	   set	   of	  perceptual	   judgments	   based	   on	   the	   special	   epistemic	   status	   given	   to	   experience.	  Gupta	   takes	  a	  general	   sense-­‐datum	  theory	  of	  knowledge	   to	  be	  an	  exemplar	  of	   just	  such	   an	   interpretation	   of	   empiricism.	   Under	   this	   classical	   account,	   experience	  acquaints	   us	   with	   a	   set	   of	   primitive	   facts	   of	   an	   essentially	   private	   and	   privileged	  sort:	  private	  in	  that	  they	  are	  facts	  about	  an	  agent’s	  occurrent	  mental	  states	  (or	  about	  subjective	   entities	   private	   to	   the	   agent)	   ,	   available	   only	   to	   the	   agent	   (at	   least	  available	  only	  in	  their	  primitive	  form	  to	  the	  agent),	  and	  privileged	  in	  that	  knowledge	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of	  such	  facts	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  prior	  to	  knowledge	  of	  other	  sorts	  of	  facts,	  such	  as	  those	  which	   describe	   an	   external	   and	   public	   world.	   It	   is	   quite	   common	  within	   classical	  empiricism	   to	   treat	   these	   private	   and	   privileged	   data	   of	   sense	   as	   the	   incorrigible	  basis	  on	  which	  all	  of	  our	  substantive	  knowledge	  rests:	  all	  of	  our	  factual	  knowledge	  is	  either	   a	   product	   of	   incorrigible	   direct	   awareness,	   or	   derivative	   of	   such—got	   by	  having	  the	  right	  kinds	  of	  logical	  connections	  with	  “basic	  empirical	  beliefs”.	  Here,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  experience	  must	  make	  its	  contributions	  to	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	   propositions,	   since	   only	  propositions	   are	   able	   to	   have	   the	   right	   kinds	   of	   logical	  relations	  with	  our	  common	  sense	  and	  scientific	  judgments,	  and	  since	  the	  given	  must	  come	  in	  the	  same	  general	  logical	  form	  as	  such	  facts	  if	  it	  hopes	  to	  justify	  them.	  This	  account	   of	   the	   given	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   ubiquitous	   in	   empiricism	   from	   Locke	   to	  Carnap.4	  Reformed	   Empiricism	   rejects	   the	   classical	   empiricist	   claim	   that	   experience	  on	   its	   own	   offers	   epistemic	   license	   to	   a	   set	   of	   perceptual	   judgments.	   While	   the	  details	   and	   mechanics	   of	   Gupta’s	   view	   must	   wait	   for	   Chapter	   One	   for	   a	   full	  explication,	  we	  may	  survey	  in	  outline	  some	  of	  its	  main	  claims	  (and	  direct	  the	  reader	  to	  Chapter	  One,	  especially	  Sections	  1	  and	  3,	  if	  this	  short	  survey	  proves	  inadequate).	  Gupta	   holds	   that	   experience	   does	   have	   a	   rational	   bearing	   on	   knowledge,	   and	   that	  experience	  is	  indeed	  “our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  3)	   However,	   from	   such	   claims,	   he	   views	   it	   as	   a	   false	   assumption	   that	   experience	  must	  make	  its	  epistemic	  contribution	  in	  the	  form	  of	  propositions.	  He	  acknowledges	  the	   naturalness	   of	   such	   an	   assumption,	   especially	   if	   one	   adopts	   (as	   the	   classical	  British	   empiricists	   did)	   the	   Cartesian	   model	   of	   experience—the	   model	   already	  hinted	   at	   in	   the	   preceding	   paragraph,	   which	   views	   experience	   as	   providing	   us	  (through	  direct	  awareness)	  not	  with	  a	  world	  of	  external	  objects	  and	  their	  relations,	  but	  only	  with	  a	  subjective	  realm	  of	  ideas	  (impressions,	  sense-­‐data,	  etc.).	  	  Gupta’s	  task	  is	  to	  show	  that	  this	  model	  of	  experience	  is	  not	  thrust	  upon	  the	  empiricist	   out	   of	   necessity,	   but	   is	   rather	   the	   result	   of	   contentious	   philosophical	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  proper	  logical	  grammar	  of	  the	  given.	  His	  work	  is	  in	  large	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  We	  challenge	  just	  how	  far	  such	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  given	  can	  be	  extended,	  arguing	  that	  it	  starts	  to	  find	  dissenting	  voices	  in	  the	  scientific	  empiricism	  of	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries.	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part	  a	  proposal	  of	  another	  model	  of	  experience,	  the	  hypothetical	  model	  of	  the	  given,	  which	  places	  experience	  in	  an	  altogether	  different	  logical	  category.	  Experience	  does	  not	  “speak”	  to	  us	  in	  propositions	  (or	  proposition-­‐like	  entities),	  rather	  it	  operates	  as	  a	   function:	   experience	   operates	   by	   taking	   one	   of	   a	   possible	   infinity	   of	  what	  Gupta	  calls	  “worldviews”	  (as	  a	  function	  takes	  an	  argument)	  to	  generate	  epistemic	   license	  to	   a	   set	   of	   perceptual	   judgments.	   This	   hypothetical	  model	   of	   the	   given	   avoids	   the	  pitfalls	   of	   empiricist	   foundationalism	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   myth	   of	   the	  propositional	   given.	   It	   assumes	   that	   epistemic	   license	   to	   a	   set	   of	   perceptual	  judgments	   is	   owed	   to	   experience	   and	   view	   (the	   epistemic	   agent’s	   current,	   yet	  revisable,	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  and	  self).	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  are	  no	  such	  things	  as	   “empirically	   basic	   beliefs”	   on	   such	   a	   model,	   nor	   does	   it	   make	   any	   sense	   to	  associate	   experience	   with	   conceptual/propositional	   contents,	   much	   less	   truth-­‐values	   (since	  experience	   is	  not	  of	   the	   right	   logical	   category	   to	  be	  attributed	   truth-­‐values).	   This	   is,	   of	   course,	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   logical	   empiricist	   view,	   which	  holds	   that	   there	   is	   such	   a	   set	   of	   beliefs,	   connected	  with	   theoretical	   structures	   via	  “meaning	  postulates”.	  	   A	  problem	  remains—one	  addressed	  by	  Gupta	  in	  his	  work,	  and	  one	  that	  will	  be	   addressed	   in	   Chapter	  One	   of	   this	   essay.	   The	   factorisation	   of	   experience	  means	  that	   the	   subjective	   character	   of	   experience,	   i.e.	   the	   way	   things	   seem	   to	   be	   to	   the	  agent,	   is	   a	   product	   of	   two	   factors:	   the	   world	   and	   the	   subject’s	   situation	   and	  constitution.	   From	   the	   subjective	   character	  of	   experience	   (say,	   the	   seeing	  of	   a	   red	  apple),	  one	  cannot	  deduce	   the	   rational	   contribution	  of	  experience.	  This	   is	  because	  many	   such	   world-­‐self	   combinations	   (in	   fact,	   perhaps	   an	   infinity	   of	   possible	   such	  combinations)	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  experience	  of	  this	  subjective	  character.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  a	  product	  of	  a	  common	  sense	  view	  that	  assumes	  (correctly)	  the	  lighting	  conditions	  are	  normal,	   and	   that	   the	   agent’s	   perceptual	   system	   is	   functioning	  well,	   etc.	   In	   such	   a	  case,	   experience	  will	   yield	   the	   expected	   judgment	   (or	   set	   of	   judgments)	   about	   the	  apple.	  But	  the	  agent’s	  current	  experience	  could	  also	  be	  of	  a	  yellow	  apple	  (though	  she	  sees	  the	  apple	  as	  red),	  as	  she	  remains	  unaware	  that	  lighting	  conditions	  are	  not	  ideal,	  or	   that	   she	   is	   wearing	   red-­‐tinted	   glasses,	   or	   that	   her	   perceptual	   system	   is	   not	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functioning	   properly,	   perhaps	   because	   of	   some	   recent	   trauma,	   etc.	   Experience	   is	  always	   open	   to	  multiple	   such	   factorisations.	   This	   does	  not,	   however,	   diminish	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  experience	  has	  a	  rational	  role,	  though	  it	  goes	  some	  way	  to	   calling	   into	   question	   its	   ability	   to	   function	   as	   our	   sole	   (or	   at	   least	   ultimate)	  epistemic	  authority,	  since	  we	  have	  (as	  of	  yet)	  no	  way	  of	  utilising	  experience	  to	  show	  that	  our	  current	  view	  of	  the	  world	  is	  correct.	  	  	   For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	   Introduction,	  we	   speak	  only	   in	   a	   rough	  way	  about	  how	   an	   empiricist	   might	   go	   about	   constructing	   her	   view	   using	   the	   hypothetical	  model	   of	   the	   given.	   It	  will	   be	   realised	   immediately	   that	   the	  possibility	   of	  multiple	  factorisations	   of	   experience	   leads	   one	   to	   a	   sceptical	  worry.	   If	   one	   has	   the	   correct	  view	   of	   the	   world,	   then	   it	   will	   easily	   be	   granted	   that	   experience	   will	   yield	   true	  perceptual	   judgments.	  However,	  how	   is	  an	  empiricist	   to	  know	  she	  has	   the	  correct	  view?	   How	   is	   she	   to	   justify	   an	   assertion	   that	   her	   view	   is	   correct,	   save	   through	  experience—the	   very	   same	   experience	   she	   knows	   to	   be	   veridical	   only	   if	   she	   is	  justified	  in	  thinking	  her	  view	  correct?	  It	  is	  out	  of	  this	  epistemic	  circle	  Gupta	  hopes	  to	  break	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   essential	   interdependence	   of	   experience	   and	   view	  does	  not	   preclude	   the	   possibility	   of	   one	   arriving	   at	   categorical	   entitlements	   from	   the	  hypothetical	  given.	  	  The	  picture	  looks	  something	  like	  this.	  Allow	  a	  number	  n	  of	  epistemic	  agents	  to	   undergo	   a	   series	   of	   experiences	   E.	   Assume	   that	   amongst	   these	   agents	   is	   an	  assortment	  of	  views	  {v1,	  v2,	  v3,	  …	  vm≤n},	  where	  each	  agent	  has	  one	  and	  only	  one	  view,	  though	  we	  need	  not	  assume	  that	  each	  agent’s	  view	  is	  distinct	  or	  unique;	  we	  merely	  need	   to	  assume	   that	  at	   least	   two	  distinct	  views	   in	   the	  set	  are	  distributed	  amongst	  our	   epistemic	   agents.	   The	   empiricist’s	   problem	   of	   extracting	   categorical	  entitlements	   from	   hypothetical	   information	   is	   then	   one	   that	   is	   solved	   by	   a	  convergence	  between	   the	   views	   in	   the	   set	   {v1,	   v2,	   v3,	  …	   vm≤n}	   (or	   the	   views	   in	   the	  relevant	   subset,	  which,	   as	  mentioned,	  must	   include	  at	   least	   two	  of	   the	  views	   from	  {v1,	  v2,	  v3,	  …	  vm≤n}).	   If	   it	   can	  be	  maintained	   that	   there	  exists	  a	   revision	  process	   for	  each	  initial	  view	  (revised	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  enquiry	  in	  light	  of	  the	  series	  of	  experiences	  
E),	   and	   that	   such	   “revision	   processes”	   converge	   on	   a	   common	   conception	   of	   the	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world	   (and	   a	   common	   core	   of	   perceptual	   judgments	   Ω),	   then	   all	   of	   the	   epistemic	  agents	  have	  categorical	  entitlement	  to	  Ω	  (assuming	  that	  {v1,	  v2,	  v3,	  …	  vm≤n}	  contains	  all	   admissible	   views),	   whilst	   we	   still	   maintain	   that	   the	   given	   in	   experience	   is	  hypothetical.	   The	   justification	   for	   one’s	   assent	   to	   the	   perceptual	   judgments	  contained	   in	   Ω	   rests	   on	   the	   dynamical	   properties	   of	   revision	   processes,	   and	   the	  convergence	   of	   all	   initial	   views	   on	   Ω.	   (Once	   again:	   we	   speak	   here	   only	   in	   broad	  outline.	  The	  details	  of	  view	  revision	   in	   light	  of	  experience,	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  revision	  process,	   and	   the	   technicalities	   of	   convergence	   are	   explored	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  Chapters	  One	  and	  Three.)	  	  The	   extension	   of	   this	   Reformed	  Empiricism	   to	   scientific	   conceptions	   of	   the	  world	  (as	  opposed	  to	  our	  common	  sense	  conceptions)	  follows	  if	  Ω	  contains	  not	  only	  “normal”	  perceptual	  judgments,	  but	  the	  sorts	  of	  empirical	  judgments	  one	  is	  used	  to	  seeing	  in,	  say,	  physics.	  Such	  an	  extension	  is	  not	  straightforward,	  and	  many	  an	  issue	  about	   the	  relationship	  between	  experience	  and	  our	   formal	  knowledge	  needs	   to	  be	  addressed.	   However,	   we	   argue	   that	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   is	   a	   basis	   for	   such	   an	  extension	   given	   the	   possible	   parallels	   that	   exist	   between	   the	   essential	  interdependence	   of	   experience	   and	   view,	   and	   the	   interdependent	   character	   of	   at	  least	   some	  of	   our	   empirical	   judgments	   and	   the	   theories	  we	  use	   to	   arrive	   at	   them.	  Further,	   since	   views	   are	   allowed	   to	   include	  principles	   of	   a	   formal	   nature	   (at	   least	  insofar	  as	  such	  views	  which	  contain	  such	  principles	  can	  converge	  with	  other	  views	  which	  may	   not),	  we	   have	   a	   novel	   response	   to	   a	   long-­‐standing	   empiricist	   problem	  that	   seemed	   to	   block	   extensions	   to	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science:	   the	   problem	   of	  offering	  an	  empiricist	  justification	  for	  formal	  principles,	  or	  at	  least	  showing	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  is	  consistent	  with	  empiricism.	  	  	   In	  spite	  of	  its	  promising	  new	  logical	  categorisation	  of	  experience,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	   new	   empiricism	   that	   Gupta	   constructs	   using	   the	   logic	   of	  interdependence,	  one	  may	  be	  concerned	  that	  we	  are	  too	  narrowly	  focusing	  on	  this	  model	  as	  a	  unique	  candidate	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism.	  Two	  comments	  must	  be	  made	  regarding	  our	  use	  of	  Gupta’s	  new	  empiricism	  in	  the	  present	  essay.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  form	  of	  empiricism	  that	  is	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  accounting	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for	   our	   common	   sense	   and	   scientific	   knowledge.	   We	   here	   only	   pursue	   it	   as	   a	  candidate	   for	   a	   comprehensive	   empiricism,	   not	   as	   the	   unique	   such	   candidate.	  Secondly,	  many	   of	   the	   other	   prominent	   forms	   of	   empiricism	   in	   the	   contemporary	  literature	   seem	   to	   have	   deficiencies	   which	   preclude	   them	   from	   the	   kind	  consideration	  we	  offer	  here	  of	  Gupta’s	  work.	  This	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise,	  given	  what	  we	  have	  said	  about	  the	  decline	  of	  comprehensivism.	  Most	  forms	  of	  empiricism	  seem	  tailored	  to	  problems	  of	  either	  a	  general	  epistemological	  sort,	  or	  a	  philosophy	  of	  science	  sort.	  For	  example,	  recent	  work	  in	  Bayesian	  Confirmation	  Theory	  seems	  to	  provide	   us	   with	   a	   probabilistic	   account	   of	   general	   claims	   based	   on	   evidence,	  whether	  such	  claims	  be	  of	  common	  sense	  or	  science,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  “evidence”	  be	   construed	   as	   simple	   observation	   of	   one’s	   surroundings,	   or	   something	   more	  restricted	  and	  formalised.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  evidence	  clearly	  is	  not	  neutral	  in	  this	   way,	   betraying	   its	   decidedly	   scientific	   origins,	   for	   the	   notion	   of	   evidence	  employed	   by	   the	   Bayesian	   comes	   far	   down-­‐stream	   from	   the	   sorts	   of	   general	  epistemological	   concerns	  we	  will	   see	   addressed	   by	   Gupta.	   Confirming	   hypotheses	  (especially	  general	  claims)	  using	  evidence	  presupposes	  that	   there	   is	  some	  rational	  account	   to	   be	   offered	   of	   how	   sense-­‐experience	  may	   yield	   observational	   evidence,	  and	  we	  wish	  to	  hold	  that	  no	  such	  assumptions	  ought	  to	  be	  made	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricist.	  One	  of	  the	  central	  features	  of	  comprehensive	  empiricism	  is	  that	  it	  offers	  us	   an	   account	   of	   how	   experience	   may	   have	   a	   rational	   import	   for	   knowledge.	  Confirmation	  Theory	  assumes	  that	  a	  probability	  approaching	  1	  ought	  to	  be	  granted	  to	   particular	   sentences	   that	   are	   confirmed	   by	   experience,	   but	   the	  more	   primitive	  question	   is	   this:	   why	   does	   seeing	   a	   white	   swan	   count	   as	   confirmation	   of	   the	  sentence,	   “That	   is	   a	   white	   swan”?	   More	   specifically,	   since	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  ways	   in	  which	  undergoing	  an	  experience	  with	   the	  subjective	  character	  of	   seeing	  a	  white	   swan	  might	   not	   be	   owed	   to	   the	   seeing	   of	   a	  white	   swan,	   the	   idea	   that	   such	  experiences	  count	  as	  evidence	  is	  perhaps	  in	  need	  of	  further	  explanation.	  	  We	   should	   note	   that	   this	   is	   no	   fault	   of	   Confirmation	   Theory.	   Even	   if	  Confirmation	   Theory	   (or	   some	   other	   variant	   of	   empiricism)	   turns	   out	   to	   be	  problematical	   as	   a	   comprehensive	   empiricism	   for	   this	   or	   that	   reason,	   we	   should	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note	   that	   it	   is	   “problematical”	   in	   a	   very	   restricted	   sense:	   only	   as	   a	   candidate	   for	  comprehensive	   empiricism,	   not	   problematical	   simpliciter.	   Using	   Confirmation	  Theory	  as	  our	  running	  example,	   it	   is	   immensely	  fruitful	   in	  the	  domain	  for	  which	  it	  was	   designed.	   It	   is	   the	   dominant	   theory	   we	   use	   when	   assessing	   the	   empirical	  adequacy	  of	   theories,	  and	   the	  relation	  of	  hypotheses	   to	   their	  evidence	  bases.	  Such	  successes	   should	   not	   be	   trivialised	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   attention	   they	   receive	   in	   the	  present	  essay.	  We	  do	  not	  presume	  here	   that	  all	  empiricist	  projects	  need	  strive	   for	  comprehensiveness,	  and	  that	  falling	  short	  of	  that	  mark	  is	  some	  inherent	  deficiency;	  such	   a	   claim	   is	   far	   too	   strong.	  We	  merely	   hold	   the	  weaker	   thesis	   that	   there	   is	   an	  important	  role	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature,	  and	  that	  this	  role	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed;	  further,	  we	  hold	  that	  Gupta	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  this	  address	  may	  occur.	  	  
§III:	  Overview	  of	  Chapters	  In	  Chapter	  One,	  we	  offer	  a	  thorough	  explication	  of	  Gupta’s	  logical	  recategorisation	  of	  experience,	  the	  mechanics	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  interdependence	  (as	  developed	  by	  Belnap	  and	   Gupta,	   principally	   in	   their	   [1993]),	   and	   Gupta’s	   minimal	   framework	   for	  normative	  empiricism	  as	  captured	  in	  a	  set	  of	  truisms	  and	  constraints.	  There	  are	  two	  truisms:	   The	   first	   is	   the	   “Insight	   of	   Empiricism”,	   which	   we	   have	   already	   seen.	   It	  states	   that	   “experience	   is	   our	   principal	   epistemic	   authority	   and	   guide.”	   (Gupta	  [2006a],	  3)	  The	  other	   truism	   is	   “Multiple-­‐Factorizability”.	  We	  have	  alluded	  to	   it	  as	  well.	   This	   is	   the	   thesis	   that	   the	   “subjective	   character	   of	   experience	   –	   how	   things	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  experience	  –	  is	  a	  product	  of	  two	  factors:	  how	  things	  are,	  and	  our	  state	  and	   position	   in	   the	   world.”	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   5)	   There	   are	   also	   four	   constraints:	  
Existence	   commits	   one	   to	   the	   rational	   contribution	   of	   experience;	   Equivalence	  asserts	   that	   subjectively	   identical	   experiences	   are	   epistemically	   equivalent;	  
Reliability	   that	   “[t]he	   given	   in	   an	   experience	   does	   not	   yield	   anything	   false	   or	  erroneous”;	   and	  Manifestation	   of	   the	   given,	   which	   ensures	   that	   a	   certain	   class	   of	  models	  of	  experience	  that	  trivially	  satisfy	  the	  first	  three	  substantive	  constraints	  are	  blocked.	  We	   examine	  how	   these	   basic	   commitments	   of	   any	  normative	   empiricism	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whatsoever	  were	   thought	   to	   force	   on	   the	   empiricist	   a	   propositional	  model	   of	   the	  given,	   but	   how	   this	  model	   follows	   from	   an	   overly	   strong	   Cartesian	   reading	   of	   the	  truisms	  and	  constraints,	  not	  the	  truisms	  and	  constraints	  themselves.	  Having	  established	  the	  basic	  machinery	  of	  Gupta’s	  view,	  we	  examine	  in	  detail	  Gupta’s	  novel	  interpretation	  of	  empiricism	  based	  on	  the	  essential	   interdependence	  of	   experience	   and	   view	   glossed	   above.	   In	   Chapter	   One,	   the	   logical	   details	   of	   the	  relevant	   notions	   (revision	   process,	   convergence)	   are	   elaborated.	  We	   also	   provide	  historical	  context	  for	  many	  of	  Gupta’s	  arguments.	  These	  historical	  forays	  more	  fully	  motivate	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  that	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  it	  solves	  are	   not	   only	   of	   a	   contemporary	   sort,	   but	   have	   been	   part	   of	   the	   philosophical	  landscape	  since	  the	  ancients.	  In	  Chapter	  Two,	  we	  examine	  a	  variety	  of	  historical	  forms	  of	  empiricism	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  showing	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  bifurcated	  taxonomy	  of	  empirical	  views:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  have	   classical	  British	  empiricism	  and	   its	  more	  modern	   sense-­‐datum	  theory	   counterparts.	   Such	   views,	  while	   in	   congress	  with	   the	   sciences	   (as	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  in	  these	  introductory	  remarks),	  were	  able	  to	  account	  for	  our	  scientific	  conceptions	  only	  to	  a	  point—only	  to	  a	  point	  where	  the	  scientific	  conceptions	  were	  consistent	  with	   the	   Cartesian	  way	   of	   ideas	   that	  was	   adopted,	   in	   some	  way,	   by	   all	  major	  British	  empiricists	  (even	  by	  those	  like	  Hume	  who	  rejected	  the	  Cartesian-­‐cum-­‐Lockean	   conception	  of	   “idea”).	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	  was	  not	   until	  Kant	   and	  post-­‐Kantian	   forms	   of	   empiricism	   began	   to	   tackle	   difficult	   problems	   in	   the	   conceptual	  analysis	   of	   some	   of	   our	   key	   physical	   claims	   that	   such	   Cartesian	   theses	   are	  challenged,	  based	   largely	  (for	  post-­‐Kantian	  empiricists)	  on	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  the	   demands	   of	   a	   better	   conceptual	   understanding	   of	   the	   key	   assumptions	  which	  govern	  the	  application	  of	  physical	  concepts	  (especially	  those	  about	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion).	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  camp	  of	  modern	  scientific	  empiricist	  thinkers	  (such	  as	  Helmholtz,	   Mach,	   and	   the	   logical	   empiricists)	   challenges	   Gupta’s	   monolithic	  conception	   of	   “classical	   empiricism”.	   We	   argue	   that	   Cartesian	   conceptions	   of	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  (as	  based	  on	  foundational	  certitude)	  were	  not	  so	  nearly	  as	   ubiquitous	   as	   Gupta	   assumes,	   and	   that	   arguments	   against	   the	   Cartesian	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conception	  of	  experience	  begin	  with	  such	   thinkers.	  We	   in	   fact	  argue	   that	  a	  proper	  understanding	   of	   logical	   empiricism	   will	   show	   that	   its	   main	   figures,	   especially	  Carnap,	   held	   views	   which,	   while	   lacking	   Gupta’s	   logical	   re-­‐categorisation	   of	  experience,	   nonetheless	   militated	   against	   Cartesian	   foundationalism	   and	   the	   idea	  that	   the	   given	   in	   experience	   is	   incorrigible.	   This	   historical	   understanding	   of	   the	  development	   of	   empiricism	   from	   Locke	   to	   Carnap	   shows	   Gupta	   that	   he	   may	  encounter	   sympathetic	   voices	   in	   the	   history	   (at	   least	   in	   regards	   to	   some	   of	   the	  commitments	  of	  modern	  scientific	  empiricism).	  In	   Chapter	   Three,	   we	   assess	   Gupta’s	   view	   against	   a	   much	   more	   complex	  historical	   picture	   of	   empiricism.	   As	   an	   alternative	   to	   a	   generalised	   sense-­‐datum	  theory	  of	  knowledge,	  his	  critical	  work	  is	  unassailable,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  it	  might	  relate	  to	  the	  more	  scientific	  empiricism	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries.	  Most	  significantly,	   it	   remains	  unclear	  how	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  might	  address	  a	  whole	  host	  of	   concerns	  which	  seem	  entirely	  divorceable	   from	   the	  Cartesian	  assumptions	  Gupta	   takes	   to	   be	   definitive	   of	   previous	   normative	   empiricism.	   In	   particular,	   we	  argue	   that	  while	  Gupta	   is	   right	   to	  say	   that	  his	  empiricism	  need	  not	  address	   issues	  regarding	   mathematical	   truth,	   what	   else	   may	   be	   said	   about	   how	   mathematical	  assumptions	  operate	  in	  our	  normal	  empirical	  judgments	  is	  not	  given	  much	  attention	  in	   Gupta	   [2006a].	   More	   precisely	   for	   our	   study,	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   cannot	   be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  candidate	  for	  comprehensive	  empiricism	  until	  such	  an	  integration	  of	  our	  formal	  knowledge	  can	  be	  proffered,	  and	  the	  account	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  extend	  to	  some	   of	   the	   critical	   questions	   associated	   with	   the	   kinds	   of	   mathematical	  assumptions	   required	   to	   even	   formulate	   a	   set	   of	   judgments	   of	   a	   mechanical	   (or	  proto-­‐mechanical)	  type,	  such	  as	  judgments	  about	  relative	  distances	  of	  objects	  or	  the	  motion	  of	  objects	  through	  space	  (however	  construed).	  We	  argue	   that	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  can	  only	  be	  extended	   to	  our	   scientific	  conceptions	  of	   the	  world	   if	  we	  add	  an	  admissibility	   criterion	   for	   initial	   views	   that	  respects	  the	  assumptions	  we	  make	  when	  applying	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  concepts	  in	  real	  contexts.	  This	  is	  captured	  in	  what	  we	  call	  the	  Principle	  of	  Scientific	  Empiricism.	  This	   principle	   blocks	   any	   purported	   initial	   view	   that	   does	   not	   have	   (as	   part)	   a	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minimal	  and	  very	  weak	  conception	  of	  a	  shared	  space	  of	  interaction	  in	  which	  simple	  empirical	  judgments	  may	  be	  embedded.	  If	  such	  a	  primitive	  space	  is	  granted,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  how	  reflection	  upon	  empirical	  evidence	  (if	  not	  experience	  itself)	  may	  lead	  us	  from	  primitive	  to	  sophisticated	  understandings	  of	  space	  and	  time.	  We	  show	  this	  by	  focusing	  on	  several	  key	  instances	  of	  theoretical	  progress	  in	  modern	  physics,	  including	   the	   development	   of	   Galileo’s	   modern	   mathematical	   physics	   (and	   its	  relation	   to	   Aristotle’s	   natural	   science);	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Newtonian	  framework	   based	   on	   an	   extension	   and	   revision	   of	   Galileo’s	   and	   Descartes’	  mathematical	  accounts	  of	  nature;	  the	  origins	  and	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  inertial	  frame;	  and	  Einstein’s	  development	  of	  special	  relativity.	  The	  rest	  of	  Chapter	  Three	  is	  devoted	  to	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  Principle	  of	  Scientific	  Empiricism	  as	  part	  of	  a	  genuinely	  empiricist	  account	  of	  knowledge.	  While	  it	  can	  be	  shown	   that	   such	   a	   principle	   is	   able	   to	   ensure	   the	  possibility	   of	   convergence	  upon	  sophisticated	   physical	   accounts	   of	   space	   and	   time,	   we	   might	   worry	   that	   such	   a	  principle	   is	   ad	   hoc,	   or	   (what	   is	   worse)	   non-­‐empirical.	   We	   allay	   such	   worries	   by	  reflecting	   on	   the	   Principle	   of	   Scientific	   Empiricism	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   truisms	   and	  constraints	  outlined	  by	  Gupta.	  Our	  Conclusion	   is	   far	   from	  a	   general	   account	   of	   terrain	   covered.	   Instead	  of	  such	   general	   remarks,	  we	   discuss	   the	   relationship	   between	  Reformed	   Empiricism	  and	   contemporary	  work	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science.	  We	   specifically	   survey	   two	  dialectical	  accounts	  of	  the	  development	  of	  theories	  of	  space	  and	  time	  from	  Newton	  to	   Einstein:	   Friedman’s	   neo-­‐Kantian	   conception	   of	   scientific	   progress	   in	   modern	  physics,	   and	  DiSalle’s	  more	   focused	  account	  of	  dialectic	  argument	  as	  based	  on	   the	  unique	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  discussed	  above.	  Friedman	  [2001]	  argues	  that	  a	  dialectical	   opposition	   regarding	   long-­‐standing	   debates	   between	   philosophical	  outlooks	   (such	   as	   the	   absolute-­‐relational	   debate)	   are	   an	   arena	   for	   the	   rational	  discussion	   of	   alternative	   theories	   which	   are	   themselves	   too	   “rigid”	   to	   host	   such	  debates.	  DiSalle	   shifts	   focus	   away	   from	   the	   central	   significance	   such	  debates	  have	  been	  given	  in	  20th	  century	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  arguing	  that	  dialectical	  analyses	  of	  connections	  between	  existing	  concepts	  and	  their	  empirical	  basis	  offer	  us	  an	  account	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Gupta’s	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  The	   conceptual	   and	   technical	   problems	   that	   have	   hampered	   canonical	  interpretations	   of	   empiricism	   are	   well	   known.	   As	   to	   what	   sorts	   of	   views	   are	  considered	  “empiricist”	  outside	  of	  this	  canon,	  and	  as	  to	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  an	  “empiricist	  tradition,”	  there	  is	  much	  less	  consensus.	  Beginning	  with	  the	  work	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	   British	   empiricists,	   namely	   Locke,	   Berkeley,	   and	   Hume,	   and	  including	  more	   recent	   positivist	   and	   post-­‐positivist	   positions	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	  science—many	  of	  which	  have	  attempted	  to	  explain	  our	  scientific	  knowledge	  without	  the	   aid	   of	   extra-­‐experiential	   or	   extra-­‐evidential	   notions—“empiricism”	   includes	   a	  rich	   class	   of	   doctrines	   indeed,	  with	   varying	   commitment,	   goals	   and	  methods.	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  present	  chapter	  is	  not	  to	  discuss	  such	  intricacies.	  Chapter	  Two	  will	  provide	  an	  historical	   account	  of	   empiricist	  doctrines	   so	   that	  we	  may	  highlight	   the	  nuanced	  differences	  between	  the	  projects	  of	  the	  British	  empiricists	  and	  their	  more	  modern	  counterparts.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	  offer	  an	  exegesis	  of	   a	  new	  proposal	  for	  empiricism,	  one	  that	  is	  based	  on	  radically	  different	  logical	  foundations	  than	  its	  predecessors.	  	  	   We	   refer	   here	   to	   Gupta’s	   Reformed	   Empiricism.	   The	   goal	   of	   Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	   to	  preserve	  many	  of	   the	  key	  empiricist	  commitments	  of	  old	  without	  recapitulating	   the	   theses	   that	   brought	   trouble	   and	   embarrassment	   to	   earlier	  empiricist	   projects,	   be	   they	   classical,	   Russellian,	   or	   logical	   empiricist.	   As	  we	   shall	  see,	  Gupta’s	  work	  is	  immensely	  fruitful	  and	  insightful,	  allowing	  one	  to	  avoid	  many	  of	  the	   criticisms	   that	   were	   characteristic	   of	   the	   mid-­‐20th	   century	   shift	   away	   from	  classical	   empiricism	   discussed	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   specifically	   those	   found	   in	   the	  work	   of	  Quine,	  Wittgenstein,	   and	   Sellars.	   But	  Gupta’s	   careful	   analysis	   of	  what	   has	  gone	   wrong	   with	   previous	   empiricist	   projects	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   that	   many	   of	   the	  errors	   highlighted	   by	   such	   critiques	   do	   not	   call	   into	   question	   the	   basic	  commitments,	   tenets	   or	   truths	   of	   empiricism,	   only	   secondary	   theses	   of	   various	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classical	   interpretations	   of	   empiricism.	   Empiricism	   is	   the	   proverbial	   baby	   thrown	  out	  with	  the	  bathwater.	  	  	  	   An	  empiricism	  that	  can	  respond	  to	  such	  critiques	  is	  already	  worth	  exploring,	  but	  we	  will	  argue	  here	   that	  Gupta’s	  proposal	   is	  most	  significant	   for	  other	  reasons.	  Firstly,	   Gupta’s	   empiricism	   explicitly	   reintroduces	   the	   fundamental	   empiricist	  commitments	  (to	  be	  studied	  in	  detail	  below)	  that	  define	  empiricism	  as	  a	  normative	  epistemology,	   making	   clear	   (unlike	   previous	   empiricist	   projects)	   what	   views	   are	  central	  to	  any	  empiricism,	  and	  what	  views	  are	  idiosyncratic	  to	  an	  individual	  thinker	  (or,	  at	  most,	  central	  only	  to	  a	  specific	  school).	  Secondly,	  Gupta’s	  proposal	  has	  a	  wide	  
prima	   facie	   scope;	   not	   only	   is	   empiricism	   thought	   to	   capture	   our	   common	   sense	  knowledge	  of	   the	  world,	  but	  our	   theoretical	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	  as	  well.	  This	  makes	  it	  ripe	  for	  our	  application	  of	  it	  to	  the	  question	  of	  comprehensive	  empiricism.	  Thirdly,	   Gupta’s	   empiricism	   shows	   great	   flexibility;	   unlike	   previous	   empiricist	  doctrines,	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  offers	  an	  epistemological	  account	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  revise	  concepts	  in	  light	  of	  experience	  (and	  therefore	  eschews	  a	  kind	  of	  “conceptual	  rigidity”	  in	  regards	  to	  fixing,	  e.g.,	  the	  concepts	  of	  “direct	  awareness”).	  For	  Gupta,	  the	  very	   concepts	   of	   a	   privileged	   realm	   of	   experience	   may	   be	   altered	   based	   on	   the	  course	  of	  experience	  itself,	   leaving	  no	  mythical	  fixed	  realm	  of	  meaning	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  rationalist	  residue	  in	  his	  empiricism.5	  Lastly,	  Gupta’s	  proposal	  builds	  on	  perhaps	  the	  greatest	   methodological	   commitment	   of	   late	   19th	   century	   and	   early	   20th	   century	  empiricism:	   the	   application	   of	   the	  most	   recent	   and	   refined	   formal	   tools	   to	   gain	   a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  our	  experience	  relates	  to	  our	  knowledge.	  	   What	   exactly	   are	   the	   reforms	   that	   Gupta	   proposes	   in	   his	   Reformed	  Empiricism?	   The	   model	   attempts	   to	   discern	   the	   logical	   relationship	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Conceptual	  rigidity	  is	  given	  its	  best	  expression	  in	  the	  empiricist	  tradition	  by	  Russell’s	  wedding	  the	  notion	   of	   the	   given	   in	   experience	   to	   his	   epistemological	   distinction	   between	   knowledge	   by	  description	   and	   knowledge	   by	   acquaintance.	   All	   knowledge	   must	   begin	   with,	   or	   be	   grounded	   in,	  knowledge	  by	  acquaintance.	  Though	  “acquaintance”	  has	  a	  common	  sense	  meaning	  in	  Russell’s	  earlier	  work,	  it	  begins	  to	  take	  on	  a	  very	  restrictive	  meaning	  when	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  developing	  sense-­‐datum	  theory	  of	  perception.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  we	  are	  only	  acquainted	  with	  sense-­‐data,	  their	  relations	  and	  their	  properties.	  Their	  non-­‐relational	  properties	  are,	  however,	   fixed	  (by	  making	  them	  akin	  to	  Platonic	  universals),	  so	  that	  we	  have	  immediate	  knowledge	  of	  a	  private	  object’s	  shape,	  colour,	  and	  size	  (relative	  to	  the	  visual	  or	  visio-­‐imaginative	  field).	  The	  moral	  of	  the	  story	  is,	  of	  course,	  that	  no	  individual	  experience	  could	  upset	  such	  Platonic	  concepts.	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experience,	   and	   what	   Gupta	   calls	   a	   “world	   view”	   (or	   “view,”	   for	   short)—the	  epistemic	  agent’s	  (often	  merely	  implied)	  understanding	  of	  the	  self	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  world,	  what	  Gupta	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  “world-­‐self	  combination.”	  Any	  experience	  can	  always	  be	   the	  result	  of	  a	  potential	   infinity	  of	  world-­‐self	   combinations.	  Given	   these	  possibilities,	   and	   given	   that	   at	   least	   some	  of	   them	   can	  be	  mutually	   inconsistent,	   a	  problem	  arises:	  we	  think	  that	  experience	  justifies	  (at	  least	  some	  of)	  our	  beliefs,	  yet	  experience	  cannot	  play	  such	  a	  role	  without	  the	  epistemic	  agent	  having	  some	  picture	  of	   the	   world.	   Empiricism	   is	   in	   the	   difficult	   position	   of	   closing	   this	   circle:	   our	  experiences	  can	  justify	  our	  beliefs	  only	   if	  we	  take	  its	  dictates	  to	  be	  true,	   i.e.	  only	   if	  we	  have	  a	  correct	  picture	  of	  the	  world;	  but	  we	  can	  only	  know	  that	  such	  a	  picture	  is	  correct	  via	  experience.	  If	  empiricism	  is	  to	  be	  viable,	  it	  must,	  therefore,	  explain	  how	  we	  can	  move	  from	  the	  conditional	  entitlements	  which	  anyone6	  can	  see	  are	  granted	  by	  an	  experience	  (given	  a	  view),	  to	  categorical	  entitlements,	  i.e.	  the	  knowledge	  that	  our	  view	  is	  correct	  and	  that	  our	  perceptual	  judgments	  are	  (by	  and	  large)	  true.	  It	  is	  this	  model	  that	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  more	  detail	  here.	  	   We	   should	   pause	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   very	   difficult	   problem	   in	   order	   to	  understand	  just	  why	  it	  has	  been	  such	  a	  hard	  philosophical	  nut	  to	  crack.	  The	  problem	  stretches	  back	   to	   the	  origins	  of	  philosophical	   scepticism,	   though	   its	  persistence	  or	  solution	  need	  not	  be	  tied	  to	  that	  family	  of	  doctrines.	  One	  popular	  problem	  posed	  by	  scepticism	  goes	  back	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  Carneades	  (214-­‐129BCE),	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Third	   Academy.7	  He	   developed	   several	   arguments	   that	   precluded	   the	   traditional	  grounds	  of	  the	  Stoic	  on	  which	  beliefs	  were	  thought	  reasonable.	  Following	  Zeno,	  the	  Stoics	  believed	  that	  one	  could	  achieve	  a	  state	  of	  wisdom	  through	  the	  cognitive	  grasp	  of	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   impressions	   that	   were	   self-­‐warranting.	   Because	   these	  impressions	   were	   self-­‐warranting,	   assent	   to	   them	   had	   a	   twofold	   effect:	   we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  note	  on	  scope:	  only	  those	  who	  think	  there	  is	  a	  rational	  given	  in	  experience	  will	  assent	  to	  such	  a	  claim.	  Many	  have	  rejected	  this	  position	  since	  Sellars’	  sustained	  attack	  against	  the	  “myth	  of	  the	  given.”	  (For	   the	  most	   straightforward	   expression	  of	   such	   a	   view,	   see	  Davidson	   [1988/2001].)	  We	  will	   see	  below	  that	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  can	  overcome	  Sellars’	  attack	  against	  this	  myth,	  establishing	  a	  different	  logical	  grammar	  for	  the	  given.	  For	  now,	  the	  remark	  that	  our	  claims	  are	  restricted	  only	  to	  those	  who	  think	  experience	  is	  rational	  will	  have	  to	  suffice.	  7	  Carneades	   did	   not	   record	   any	   of	   his	   own	   philosophy,	   engaging,	   like	   Socrates,	   in	   active	   dialogue	  instead.	  His	   students,	   especially	  Clitomachus,	  did	   record	   some	  of	  his	  doctrines.	  While	   the	  works	  of	  Clitomachus	  have	  been	  lost,	  they	  were	  discussed	  by	  Cicero	  and	  Sextus	  Empiricus.	  	  	  
	  	  	  23	  
	  
	  
expressed	  our	  belief	   that	   they	  were	  true	  while	  also	  grasping	  their	   truth	   in	  one	  fell	  swoop.	   Such	   impressions	   could	   not	   be	   the	   stuff	   of	  mere	   opinion;	   to	   possess	   them	  was	   to	   also	  have	  knowledge	  of	   them.	  Basing	  knowledge	  on	   such	   impressions,	   and	  rejecting	   any	   opinion	   (i.e.	   assent	   to	   impressions	   which	   were	   not	   self-­‐warranted)	  could	  allow	  one	  to	  arrive	  at	  certain	  knowledge	  via	  the	  senses.	  	  	   Cognitive	  impressions,	  on	  this	  model,	  are	  (a)	  true,	  (b)	  properly	  caused	  by	  the	  object(s)	   represented	   by	   them,	   and	   (c)	   very	   precise	   and	   rich	   so	   that	   they	   can	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  about	  objects	  that	  do	  not	  properly	  cause	  them.	  To	  use	   modern	   parlance,	   they	   are	   the	   principal	   component	   in	   a	   direct	   and	   causal	  representationalism	   (but,	   because	   of	   their	   direct	   and	   causal	   nature,	   such	  impressions	   need	   not	   be	   regarded	   as	   representational	   at	   all).	   Like	   Socrates	   and	  Plato,	  the	  Stoics	  assumed	  that	  epistemology	  was	  concerned	  with	  certainty,	  and	  one’s	  possession	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  wisdom	  or	  certain	  knowledge.	  Unlike	  Socrates	  and	  Plato,	  the	  Stoics	   believed	   that	   certainty	   could	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	   senses	   in	   special	  cases—cases	  in	  which	  one	  had	  cognitive	  impressions.	  	   The	  first	  sceptical	  response	  to	  such	  a	  view	  came	  from	  Arcesilaus,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Second	  Academy.8	  He	  granted	  that	  some	  impressions	  may	  be	  true	  and	  caused	  in	   the	   right	   sort	   of	   way,	   but	   he	   denied	   that	   any	   impression	   is	   ever	   so	   rich	   as	   to	  preclude	   the	   possibility	   that	   it	   was	   caused	   by	   the	   wrong	   objects.	   Carneades	  developed	   these	   sorts	   of	   arguments	   more	   fully,	   positing	   that	   perceptually	  indistinguishable	   objects	   prevent	   the	   Stoic	   from	   establishing	   (c).	   The	   richness	  criterion	   of	   the	   Stoics,	   like	   other	   proposed	   “guarantees”	   of	   certainty,	   was	   an	  academic	  chimera.	  What	  kind	  of	  representational	  precision	  could	  the	  Stoics	  grant	  to	  perception—how	  veridical	  did	  impressions	  need	  to	  be—to	  discern	  between	  nearly	  identical	  objects?9	  If	  the	  Stoics	  cannot	  satisfy	  their	  own	  richness	  criterion,	  the	  entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Although	   there	   is	   much	   debate	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   Arcesilaus’	   scepticism,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   his	  doctrine	   being	  multiply	   interpreted,	   his	   primary	   concern	  was	   formulating	   arguments	   against	   Stoic	  epistemology.	  We	  can	  happily	  leave	  aside	  differences	  in	  the	  historical	  scholarship,	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  nature	   of	   Arcesilaus’	   positive	   philosophy.	   Interpretations	   of	   his	   work	   as	   a	   critic	   are	   much	   less	  contentious.	  9	  The	  classical	  examples	  of	  nearly	   identical	  objects	  which	  challenge	  the	  Stoic	  notion	  of	  richness	  are	  eggs,	  grains	  of	  sand,	  or	  even	  multiply	  reproduced	  artifacts.	  
	  	  	  24	  
	  
	  
edifice	  of	  their	  epistemology	  collapses.10	  (Of	  course,	  one	  could	  deny	  altogether	  that	  any	   notion	   of	   richness	   could	   guarantee	   veridical	   representation.	  What	   is	   claimed	  here	  is	  much	  weaker:	  the	  sceptic	  is	  saying	  simply	  that	  the	  Stoical	  notion	  of	  richness	  is	  not	  met;	  however,	  the	  examples	  provided	  can	  be	  generalised	  so	  as	  to	  show	  that	  no	  notion	  of	  richness	  can	  guarantee	  veridical	  representation.)	  	  The	   sceptical	   insight	   operating	   here	   is	   this:	   where	   object	   and	   appearance	  aren’t	  in	  immediate	  and	  guaranteed	  correspondence,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  certainty,	  and	  
experience	   itself	   provides	   no	   indication	   whether	   this	   correspondence	   has	   been	  
established.	  The	  problem	  for	  modern	  empiricism,	  beginning	  with	  Locke	   in	   the	  17th	  century,	   thus	  becomes	  a	  problem	  of	  answering	   this	  sceptical	  charge	  regarding	  our	  experiential	   knowledge.	   How	   can	   knowledge	   be	   based	   on	   experience	   when	  knowledge	   requires	   certainty	   and	   experience	   seems	   to	   grant	   us	   nothing	   like	  certainty?	   In	   response	   to	   this	   problem,	   empiricists	   adopted	   a	   Cartesian	   view	   of	  experience:	  one	  is	  directly	  aware	  of	  one’s	  own	  impressions,	  however	  the	  objects	  of	  such	  impressions	  are	  not	  taken	  to	  be	  external,	  but	  phenomenal,	  or,	  if	  external,	  only	  known	   by	   indirect	   representation. 11 	  The	   very	   act	   of	   receiving	   an	   impression	  provides	  its	  object,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  (direct)	  representation;	  empiricism	  is	  able	  to	   respond	   to	   the	   sceptical	   problem	  by	   avoiding	   the	  Achilles’	   heel	   of	   the	   Stoics:	   a	  commitment	  to	  direct	  realism.	  However,	  the	  rejection	  of	  such	  a	  commitment	  comes	  at	  a	  cost,	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  claims	  about	  external,	  material	  objects	  (should	  we	  wish	  to	   make	   any)	   now	   rests	   on	   a	   very	   shaky	   foundation,	   for	   it	   seems	   impossible	   to	  provide	   an	   empiricist	   justification	   for	   the	   inference	   to	   external	   objects.	   The	   only	  other	   viable	   option	   is	   to	   reject	   both	   realism	   and	   scepticism	   in	   one	   fell	   swoop,	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  These	   arguments	   influenced	  different	   sceptics	   in	   different	  ways.	   Some	   sceptics	   believed	   that	  we	  needed	  to	  purge	  ourselves	  of	  any	  and	  all	  substantive	  commitments,	  since	  a	   lack	  of	  certainty	  would	  leave	  us	  forever	  frustrated	  and	  unable	  to	  act.	  Others	  denied	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  truth.	  Arcesilaus	  and	  Carneades,	  from	  what	  we	  have	  seen,	  thought	  there	  was	  a	  notion	  of	  truth	  left	  unscathed	  by	  such	  arguments	   (as	   their	  assumption	   to	  grant	   the	  Stoic	   the	   truth	  of	   impressions	   indicates),	  but	   that	  our	  access	   to	   such	   truth	  was	   at	   best	   probabilistic.	   In	   order	   to	   explain	   action	   as	   a	   result	   of	   our	   beliefs	  (without	   the	   possibility	   of	   certain	   knowledge)	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   a	   probabilistic	   epistemology	   is	  clear,	   and	   it	   was	   this	   epistemology	   that	   Carneades	   developed	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Stoic’s	   infallibly	  known	  cognitive	  impressions.	  11	  One	  is	  always	  making	  some	  sort	  of	  inference,	  whether	  sometimes	  licit	  (as	  Locke	  would	  have	  it)	  or	  always	  illicit	  (as	  it	  was	  for	  Berkeley)	  when	  she	  begins	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  material	  causes	  of	  ideas.	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Berkeley	   did,	   by	   adopting	   a	   thoroughgoing	   idealism.	   Empiricism	   is	   thus	   left	   in	   a	  dilemma:	  either	  scepticism	  or	  idealism.	  	  So	  much	   for	   the	   Stoical	   project.	   	  What	  we	   propose	   to	   study	   in	   the	   present	  essay	   is	   the	   epistemological	   legacy	   of	   such	   debates,	   and	   the	   prospects	   for	   an	  empiricism	   that,	   unlike	   British	   empiricism,	   rejects	   altogether	   any	   commitment	   to	  these	  Stoical	  themes—and	  the	  dilemma	  of	  scepticism	  or	  idealism	  to	  which	  they	  lead.	  Gupta’s	   work	   offers	   us	   just	   such	   a	   prospect.12	  In	   what	   follows,	   we	   will	   provide	   a	  close	   reading	   of	   Gupta’s	   reformed	  model	   of	   experience.	   In	   §I,	   we	  will	   look	   at	   the	  antecedent	   commitments	   that	   inform	   any	   rational	   model	   of	   experience.	   These	  commitments	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  truisms	  which	  need	  to	  be	  preserved	  by	  any	  model	  of	  experience,	  what	  Gupta	  calls	   the	  “Insight	  of	  Empiricism”	  (the	  truism	  that	  experience	   is	   epistemically	   primary	   and	   authoritative)	   and	   “Multiple-­‐Factorizability”	   (the	   truism	   that	   a	   given	   experience	   can	   be	   the	   product	   of	   many	  different	  world-­‐self	  combinations),	  and	  four	  constraints	   imposed	  by	  the	  given	  that	  must	  not	  be	  transgressed	  by	  any	  empiricist	  account	  of	  experience.	  	   In	  §II,	  we	  will	  introduce	  the	  Cartesian	  model	  of	  experience	  and	  its	  attempt	  to	  satisfy	  these	  truisms	  and	  constraints,	  and	  survey	  Gupta’s	  criticisms	  thereof.	  We	  will	  also	   examine	   some	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Descartes’	   model	   of	   experience	   was	  adopted	   by	   early	   empiricists,	   though	   a	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   such	   issues	   will	   be	  reserved	  for	  Chapter	  Two.	  	  	   §III	   offers	   a	   thorough	   recounting	   of	   the	   mechanics	   of	   Gupta’s	   model	   of	  experience,	  specifically	  focusing	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  interdependence	  and	  his	  notion	  of	  a	  “revision	   process,”	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   understand	   the	   rational	   contribution	   of	  experience.	  Gupta	  argues	  that	  experience	  plays	  a	  principal	  epistemic	  role,	  but	  that	  it	  only	   makes	   its	   “pronouncements”	   in	   an	   essentially	   interdependent	   way.	   Just	   how	  experience	   relates	   to	   a	   “view”	  will	   be	   discussed,	   as	  will	   be	   the	   formal	   framework	  within	  which	  belief	  revision	  takes	  place	  as	  a	  result	  of	  experience.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  other	  forms	  of	  empiricism	  fail	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  framework	  set	  in	  place	  by	  ancient	  scepticism	  and	  the	  Stoics.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  much	  of	  logical	  empiricism	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  simply	  ignored	  the	  pull	  of	  such	  long-­‐standing	  views	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  creating	  philosophy	  anew	  as	  a	  scientific	  discipline,	  and	  their	  position	  was	  anticipated	  (in	  some	  ways)	  by	  post-­‐Kantian	  empiricists	  like	  Helmholtz	  and	  Mach.	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   We	   should	   also	   pause	   here	   to	  make	   a	   terminological	   note.	   Any	  mention	   of	  “previous	  empiricism”	  or	  “classical	  empiricism”	  made	  in	  this	  chapter	  intends	  to	  pick	  out	   a	   general	   sense-­‐datum	   theory	   of	   perception	   wedded	   to	   a	   notion	   of	   certain	  knowledge:	   a	   sense-­‐datum	   foundationalism	   as	   it	  were.	   No	  more	   precise	   notion	   is	  required	  to	  motivate	  Gupta’s	  project.	  As	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Three	  make	  clear,	  a	  more	  precise	  and	  complete	  account	  of	  empiricism’s	  development	  in	  the	  last	  two	  centuries	  is	   required	   for	   the	   proper	   assessment	   of	   Gupta’s	   project,	   but	   such	  matters	   are	   of	  future	  concern.	  	  
§I:	  The	  Basic	  Commitments	  of	  Empiricism	  The	  following	  will	  be	  a	  gloss	  of	  the	  minimal	  commitments	  that	  are	  required	  by	  any	  empiricist	  model	   of	   experience	   that	   grants	   experience	   and	   its	   possible	   contents	   a	  normative	   role	   in	   justifying	   our	   beliefs.	   Where	   necessary,	   I	   will	   motivate	   these	  commitments	   by	   putting	   them	   in	   their	   philosophical	   context.	   We	   should	  immediately	  note	  that	  not	  all	  epistemological	  models	  afford	  such	  a	  normative	  role	  to	  experience.	  Such	  views,	  particularly	  as	  they	  have	  been	  proposed	  by	  Quine	  and	  later	  developed	  by	  Donald	  Davidson	  and	  others,	  will	  not	  be	  addressed	  in	  detail.	  In	  what	  follows,	  this	  essay	  will	  be	  concerned	  only	  with	  models	  of	  experience	  that	  attribute	  to	  experience	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  rational	  contributions	  to	  our	  knowledge.	  	  
I.1:	  Gupta’s	  Two	  Truisms	  Gupta	   starts	   his	   [2006a]	   by	   establishing	   the	   framework	   of	   commitments	   within	  which	   he	   will	   develop	   his	   reformed	   model	   of	   experience	   and	   his	   Reformed	  Empiricism.	   The	   work	   begins	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   what	   Gupta	   calls	   the	   “two	  truisms,”	  or	   two	   theses	  which	  he	   thinks	  are	   in	   tension	  with	  one	  another.	  The	   first	  truism	   is	   the	   “Insight	   of	   Empiricism,”	   the	   second	   “Multiple-­‐Factorizability.”	  According	   to	   the	   Insight	   of	   Empiricism,	   “experience	   is	   our	   principal	   epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  3)	  The	  scope	  of	  such	  authority	  and	  guidance	  is	  wide	   according	   to	   the	   Insight:	   “It	   is	   experience	   that	  pronounces	  on	   the	   validity	   of	  our	  concepts,	   conceptions	  and	   theories	  about	   the	  world.”	   (ibid)	   It	   is	  misleading	   to	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   Gupta	  draws	  a	  physical	  analogy:	  if	  two	  forces	  simultaneously	  act	  on	  a	  body,	  and	  we	  know	  those	   forces,	  we	  are	  able	   to	  determine	  the	  resultant	   force;	  however,	  given	   only	   the	   resultant	   force,	   one	   can’t	   recover	   the	   initial	   forces	   acting	   on	   the	  object.	  In	  short:	  “No	  experience	  carries	  with	  it	   its	  own	  genealogy.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  7)	   This	   may	   seem	   to	   put	   us	   in	   a	   rather	   sceptical	   position.	   Given	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	   it	  seems	  as	  though	  one	  could	  never	  be	   justified	   in	  making	  even	  the	  most	  mundane,	  everyday	  perceptual	   judgments.	  Similarly,	  one	  would	  be	  unable	   to	  justify	  even	  the	  most	  basic,	  common	  sense	  beliefs	  about	  her	  position	  in	  a	  world	  of	  medium-­‐sized	  objects.	  What	  Lewis	  called	  “Moorean	  facts”13—statements	  like,	  “Here	  is	   a	   hand,	   and	   here	   is	   another”—seem	   in	   dire	   straits	   if	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   is	  true.	   The	   prima	   facie	   truth	   of	   such	   judgments	   is	   often	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   basis	   our	  common	  sense	  view	  of	   the	  world,	   and	  such	   judgments	  are	  especially	   important	   in	  philosophical	  defenses	  of	  our	  common	  sense	  knowledge.	  	   Take	  Moore’s	  proof	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  This	  proof	  is	  based	  heavily	  on	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  following	  simple	  argument:	  	  
	  
Premise:	   “Here	   is	   one	   hand,	   and	   here	   is	   another,”	   (said	   while	   making	  particular	  gestures	  and	  looking	  in	  the	  relevant	  places).	  
Conclusion:	  	   (At	  least)	  two	  human	  hands	  exist	  at	  this	  moment.	  	  	  By	  Moore’s	  proof	  standards,	  this	  argument	  must	  (a)	  not	  beg	  the	  question,	  (b)	  have	  the	   performative	   component	   performed	   by	   someone	  who	   looks	   in	   one	   place	   and	  sees	   a	   hand,	   then	   looks	   in	   another	  place	   and	   sees	   another	  hand,	   and	   (c)	   have	   the	  conclusion	  follows	  from	  the	  premise.	  	   The	   argument,	   according	   to	   Moore,	   satisfies	   all	   three	   criteria.	   Because	   the	  conclusion	  could	  be	  true	  while	  the	  premise	  false,	  each	  clearly	  expresses	  a	  different	  proposition,	  so	  the	  non-­‐question-­‐begging	  criterion	  is	  satisfied.	  If	  the	  premise	  is	  true,	  then	  so	   is	   the	  conclusion,	  so	   the	  argument	   is	  valid	  and	  avails	   itself	  of	  an	   inference	  that	  naturally	  connects	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  premise	  to	  the	  conclusion.	  If	  the	  sceptic	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  explication	  of	  Moorean	  facts	  is	  owed	  to	  Lewis	  [1996].	  He	  says	  a	  Moorean	  fact	  is	  “one	  of	  those	  things	   that	   we	   know	   better	   than	   we	   know	   the	   premises	   of	   any	   philosophical	   argument	   to	   the	  contrary.”	  (549)	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to	   find	   fault	   in	   the	   argument,	   it	  must	   rest	  with	   criterion	   (b).	   One	  must	   show	   that	  Moore	  doesn’t	  have	  knowledge	  that	  there	  is	  one	  hand	  here,	  and	  another	  hand	  there.	  The	  sceptical	  argument	  is	  in	  the	  form	  of	  modus	  ponens:	  	   (P1)	  	   If	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  he	  is	  not	  dreaming	  (hallucinating,	  etc.),	  then	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  there	  are	  hands.	  (P2)	  	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  he	  is	  not	  dreaming	  (hallucinating,	  etc.).	  (C)	  	   Therefore,	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  there	  are	  hands.	  	  Moore	   responds	   by	   offering	   what	   has	   since	   been	   called	   a	   “Moorean	   shift.”	   One	  simply	  “reverses”	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  sceptic,	  putting	  it	  in	  the	  form	  of	  modus	  tollens:	  	   (P1)	  	   If	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  he	  is	  not	  dreaming,	  then	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  there	  are	  hands.	  (P2)	  	  A	  does	  know	  that	  there	  are	  hands.	  (C)	  	   A	  knows	  that	  he	  is	  not	  dreaming	  (hallucinating,	  etc.).	  	  The	  use	  of	  modus	  tollens	   here	   shows,	   in	   stark	   logic,	   the	   epistemic	   standing	  Moore	  gives	   to	   our	   common	   sense	   judgments.	   He	   elaborates	   this	   view	   in	   his	   [1925]	   by	  offering	  more	  than	  a	  Moorean	  shift,	  rather	  a	  sustained	  dialectical	  argument	  against	  the	  sceptic.	  Moore	  starts	  the	  argument	  by	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  perfectly	  reasonable	  to	  assert	   simple	   judgments	   about	   external	   objects,	   and	   to	  hold	   the	   relevant	   common	  sense	   beliefs	   on	   which	   such	   judgments	   rest;	   however,	   one	   must	   rely	   on	   various	  philosophical	  intuitions,	  implausible	  thought	  experiments,	  and	  idealistic	  theories	  of	  perception	   if	  one	   is	   to	  be	   in	  a	  position	   to	   found	  any	  sceptical	  belief	  which	  can	  call	  our	   common	   sense	   judgments	   into	   question.	   All	   of	   these	   sceptical	   pre-­‐conditions	  and	   arguments	   are	   far	   more	   contentious	   and	   epistemologically	   suspect	   than	   the	  common	  sense	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  that	  Moore	  defends.	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  hands	  is	  more	  evident	  than	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  am	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat,	  a	  deceived	  Cartesian	  ego,	  etc.14	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  What	   Moore	   has	   really	   done	   is	   set	   the	   standard	   for	   knowledge	   much	   lower	   than	   philosophical	  certitude.	  The	  Cartesian	  tradition	  is	  based	  on	  the	  foundational	  notion	  that	  belief	  not	  based	  ultimately	  on	  certain	  knowledge	  is	  epistemically	  suspect.	  Moore	  is	  giving	  us	  common	  sense	  grounds	  on	  which	  we	  can	  establish	   the	  reasonableness	  of	  doubt.	  Wittgenstein	   [1969/1972]	  develops	   these	   ideas.	  For	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   The	   sceptic	   to	   whom	   Moore	   is	   speaking	   is	   employing	   an	   argument	   from	  
assumption:	   the	   demonstration	   offered	   in	   the	   premise	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  external	  world	  is	  not	  a	  proof	  based	  on	  certain	  foundations.	  Thus,	  the	  sceptic	  will	  not	  grant	   Moore	   knowledge	   of	   the	   “fact”	   that	   he	   sees	   two	   hands.	   Moore	   relaxes	   the	  restraints	  on	  demonstration,	  arguing	  that	  the	  sceptic	  can	  provide	  no	  reason	  for	  him	  not	  so	  to	  relax	  them.	  	  	   We	  ought	  not	  dwell	  on	  such	  matters	  further.	  This	  debate	  about	  our	  common	  sense	   judgments	   has	   already	   done	   the	   job	  we	  want	   it	   to	   do,	  which	   is	   to	   highlight	  three	   important	   facts	   about	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	   Firstly,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   is	   independent	   of	   all	   of	   the	   ancient	   sceptical	   modes.	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   does	   not	   avail	   itself	   of	   the	   mode	   from	   assumption,	   as	  Moore’s	  sceptic	  does.	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  merely	  states	  the	  fact	  that	  judgments	  about	   one’s	   hands,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   antecedent	   rationality,	   are	   not	   rational	   come	  
what	  may.	  The	  sceptical	  mode	  from	  assumption	  says	  that	  such	  judgments	  are	  never	  reasonable,	   but	   this	   is	  much	   too	   strong.	   There	   is	   a	   superficial	   similarity	   between	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  and	  the	  sceptical	  mode	  from	  relativity	  that	  should	  be	  noted.	  According	   to	   this	  mode,	   the	  object—for	  example,	  one	  of	  Moore’s	  hands—“appears	  thus	  or	  thus	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  thing	  judging	  and	  the	  things	  perceived	  along	  with	  it,”	  (Sextus	  Empiricus	   [2002],	   372)	   and	   therefore	   one	   should	  not	   judge	   regarding	   the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  object.	  But,	  as	  Gupta	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  9),	  the	  relativity	  of	  sense	  perception	  holds	  that	  one	  object	  can	  lend	  itself	  to	  many	  different	  kinds	   of	   experiences,	   whereas	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   states	   that	   one	   experience	  can	   have	   many	   different	   objects.	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   is	   logically	   independent	  from	   the	  sceptical	  mode	   from	  relativity,	  or	   its	  more	   recent	   reincarnations,	   e.g.	   the	  relativity	  of	  sense	  perception.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Wittgenstein,	  doubt	   is	  something	  that	  can	  only	  arise	   in	  a	   language-­‐game,	   in	  which	  the	  speakers	  are	  using	  the	  words	  with	  a	  constant	  meaning.	  The	  sceptic	  is	  in	  the	  odd	  position	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  her	  notion	  of	  doubt,	  for	  she	  can’t	  say	  what	  it	  means	  to	  doubt	  if	  she	  can’t	  also	  say	  what	  it	  means	  not	   to	  doubt	   something.	  A	  doubt	   can	  only	  make	  sense	   if	   an	  example	  can	  be	  given	  of	  a	  non-­‐doubt,	  i.e.	  “doubt”	  has	  a	  sense	  only	  when	  its	  negation	  has	  a	  sense,	  but	  the	  sceptic	  has	  set	  up	  the	  game	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  negation	  cannot	  have	  a	  sense,	  and	  we	  are	  merely	  to	  assume	  with	  the	  sceptic	  what	  it	  would	  be	  like	  to	  doubt	  at	  such	  a	  point.	  (See	  §24,	  and	  also	  §§354-­‐375.)	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   Secondly,	  Moore’s	  response	  assumes	  a	  stark	  dichotomy.	  Either	  the	  sceptic	  is	  correct	  or	  common	  sense	  realism	  is	  correct.	  What	  Gupta	  hopes	  to	  show	  is	  that	  this	  dichotomy	   is	   falsely	   thought	   to	  be	  exclusive.	   In	   fact,	  one	  can	  believe	   (with	  Moore)	  that	   one’s	   regular,	   present	   experiences	   can	   rationally	   entitle	   one	   to	   make	   such	  judgments,	  but	  this	  in	  no	  way	  contradicts	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability:	  	   	  What	   we	   call	   “ordinary	   judgments	   of	   perception”	   do	   not	   issue	   from	  experience	  alone.	  They	  are	  founded	  in	  experience	  and	  conception.	  Ordinarily,	  we	  have	  no	  need	  in	  our	  discourse	  to	  question	  or	  to	  vary	  the	  conception,	  and	  we	   speak	   as	   if	   the	   justification	   for	   perceptual	   judgments	   lies	   solely	   in	  experience.	   The	   truth	   is,	   however,	   that	   every	   experience	   has	   multiple	  factorizations,	   and	   no	   experience	   by	   itself	   provides	   any	   justification	   for	  ordinary	  judgments	  of	  perception.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  7)	  	  	  	   Given	   that	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   ancient	   sceptical	  modes,	   and	  given	   that	   it	   is	  not	   inconsistent	   for	  one	   to	  hold	  both	   a	   common	   sense	  view	  of	  the	  rationality	  of	  simple	  perceptual	  judgments	  and	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  third	  important	  fact	  about	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability:	  the	  problem	  of	  providing	   an	   account	   of	   the	   rational	   import	   of	   experience	   is	   independent	   of	   any	  sceptical	  philosophy	  or	  classical	  common	  sense	  alternative.	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  one	  of	  scepticism,	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  §II,	  empiricism	  was	  for	  far	  too	  long	  wedded	  to	  the	   following	   two	   Cartesian	   views:	   (a)	   the	   sceptic	   had	   to	   be	   neutralised	   and	  responded	  to,	  and	  (b)	  the	  problem	  of	  experiential	  knowledge	  is	  solved	  once	  one	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  such	  a	  response	  to	  the	  sceptic.	  	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  many	  ways	  of	  building	   a	   philosophy	   that	   side-­‐steps	   the	   sceptic.	  One	  way,	   favoured	  by	  Davidson,	  Rorty,	   and	   others,	   is	   to	   tell	   the	   sceptic	   to	   “buzz	   off.”	   Gupta	   wants	   to	   show	   that	  empiricist	  commitments	  do	  not	  force	  one	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  sceptic	  on	  the	  sceptic’s	  own	  terms,	  but	  neither	  should	  we	  completely	  ignore	  what	  the	  sceptic	  has	  to	  say.	  We	  can	   learn	  much	   about	   how	   to	   view	  empirical	   rationality	   by	   reflecting	   on	   sceptical	  positions.	  	   We	  are	  thus	  left	  with	  a	  very	  serious	  problem	  if	  we	  hope	  to	  offer	  an	  empiricist	  account	  of	  how	  our	  knowledge	  can	  be	  adjudicated	  and	  guided	  by	  experience.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   Insight	   gives	   broad	   berth	   and	   scope	   to	   the	   normative	   role	   of	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experience	   in	   all	   epistemic	   matters.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  seems	   to	   undercut	   the	   Insight.	   Experience	   alone	   cannot	   adjudicate	   our	   claims	   to	  knowledge.	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   10)	   If	   one	  had	   a	   true	   conception	  of	   the	   self,	   then	  one	  could,	   based	   on	   experience,	   arrive	   at	   true	   perceptual	   judgments.	   However,	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  enquiry,	  we	  have	  no	  guarantee	  that	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  self	   is	  true,	  and	  no	  guarantee	  that	  experience	  is	  providing	  us	  with	  such	  truths.	  	   	  
I.2:	  Four	  Constraints	  on	  Any	  Normative	  Account	  of	  Experience	  Whatsoever	  A	  model	   of	   experience	   need	   not	   only	   contend	  with	   the	   two	   truisms,	   it	   must	   also	  satisfy	   four	   minimal	   constraints—constraints	   which	   express	   the	   content	   of	   an	  analysis	  of	  what	  one	  could	  possibly	  mean	  by	  “the	  given”.	  	  	   The	   first	   constraint,	  Existence,	   commits	   one	   to	   the	   rational	   contribution	   of	  experience.	   “Something	   is	   given	   in	   each	   experience;	   that	   is,	   each	   individual	  experience	  makes	  a	  rational	  contribution	  to	  knowledge.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  19)15	  This	  commitment	   is	   in	   one	   sense	   very	   strong.	   It	   blocks	   from	   consideration	   all	   purely	  causal	   accounts	   of	   experience,	   i.e.	   all	   accounts	   within	   which	   experience	   plays	   no	  rational	  or	  normative	  role	  in	  our	  knowledge.	  In	  another	  sense,	  it	  is	  very	  weak.	  Aside	  from	  acknowledging	  the	  rational	  contribution	  of	  experience	  to	  knowledge,	  it	  makes	  no	   commitments	   as	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   experience,	   nor	   does	   it	   commit	   itself	   to	   the	  magnitude	   (or,	   as	   Gupta	   puts	   it,	   the	   “logical	  weightiness”)	   of	   such	   a	   contribution.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  19-­‐20)	  Experience,	  as	  far	  as	  this	  constraint	  is	  concerned,	  may	  make	  its	   pronouncements	   in	   the	   form	   of	   propositions,	   or	   may	   bring	   before	   the	   mind	  external	   objects	   or	   representations	   of	   those	   objects,	   or	   merely	   raw,	   formless	  contents	  which	  the	  mind	  must	  categorise	  (the	  so	  called	  “bricks	  and	  mortar”	  view	  of	  experience),	   etc.	   The	  motivation	   for	   imposing	   such	   a	   constraint	   is	   to	   capture	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  A	  related,	   though	   independent,	   thesis	   is	  held	  by	  empiricists:	   “the	  given	  in	  experience	  can	  logically	  
force	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world.”	   (Gupta	  [2006a],	  21	  –	   italics	   in	  original)	  This	  thesis	   is	  obviously	  a	  strengthening	   of	   the	   Existence	   constraint	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   developing	   a	   specifically	   empiricist	  account	   of	   our	   knowledge.	   This	   should	   not	   be	   confused	   with	   other	   empiricist	   theses,	   such	   as	   the	  classical	  psychological	   thesis	   of	  British	   empiricists	   that	   all	   of	   our	  knowledge	  has	   a	   causal	   origin	   in	  experience,	   the	   more	   modern	   verificationist	   version	   of	   that	   classical	   thesis	   that	   states	   all	   of	   our	  
substantial	  knowledge	  is	  based	  in	  experience,	  or,	  as	  Gupta	  notes,	  methodological	  theses	  regarding	  the	  primacy	  of	   empirical	   data	   in	   the	   sciences.	   It	   is	  merely	   a	   logical	   thesis	   about	   the	   rational	   import	   of	  experience.	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minimal	   rational	   role	   of	   experience	   on	   any	   model	   of	   experience	   that	   affords	   a	  rational	  role	  to	  experience.	  	   The	  second	  constraint	  is	  Equivalence.	  This	  constraint	  asserts	  that	  subjectively	  identical	   experiences	   are	   epistemically	   equivalent.	   “If	   e	   and	   e’	   are	   subjectively	  identical	  experiences	  of	  an	  individual,	  then	  the	  given	  in	  e	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  given	  in	  
e’.”	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   22)	   This	   constraint	   is	   agnostic	   about	   the	   veracity	   of	   such	  experiences;	   e	  may	   be	   veridical,	   e’	   hallucinatory.	   As	   Gupta	   says,	   the	   constraint	  “places	   a	   restriction	  only	  on	   the	   epistemology	  of	   experience,	  not	   its	  metaphysics.”	  (ibid)	  Gupta	  is	  quick	  to	  note	  two	  interesting	  features	  of	  this	  constraint.	  The	  first	   is	  that	  it	  speaks	  only	  to	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  a	  subject’s	  beliefs	  based	  on	  the	  course	  of	  her	  experience,	  not	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  those	  beliefs.	  Such	  a	  constraint	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  internal	  perspective	  of	  the	  cognitive	  subject,	  not	  an	  external	  evaluation	  of	  the	   beliefs	   one	   is	   warranted	   to	   have	   given	   what	   facts	   hold	   about	   that	   subject’s	  environment.16	  This	   feature	   of	   the	   constraint	   is	  motivated	   by	   the	   basic	   empiricist	  commitment	   that	   two	   relevantly	   similar	   rational	   agents	   undergoing	   the	   same	  experiences	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  have	  radically	  different	  views	  of	  the	  world.	  (Gupta	  [2006b],	  184)	  If	   this	  were	  the	  case	  then	  something	  other	  than	  experience	  must	  be	  referenced	   to	   account	   for	   the	   difference	   between	   their	   views.	   Rationalism	   can	  countenance	  such	  a	  scenario,	  empiricism	  cannot.	  	  	   The	  second	   interesting	   feature	  of	  Equivalence	   is	   its	  applicability	   to	  possibly	  subjectively	   identical	   experiences	   in	   different	   subjects.	   While	   Gupta	   prefers	   to	  individuate	   experiences	   by	   building	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   experience	   into	   the	  experience	   itself,	   meaning	   that	   e	   and	   e’	   cannot	   be	   identical	   if	   experienced	   by	  different	   subjects,17	  he	   thinks	   we	   can	   modify	   Equivalence	   so	   that	   two	   “similarly	  endowed”	  subjects	  will	  have	  the	  same	  set	  of	  reasonable	  beliefs	  based	  on	  subjectively	  identical	   experiences.	   One	   may	   think	   that	   such	   claims	   contradict	   each	   other.	   If	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Gupta’s	  notion	  of	  reasonableness	  is	  an	  internalist	  one,	  though	  not	  contentiously	  so.	  As	  he	  states	  on	  pg.	  29,	  fn.	  17,	  the	  debate	  between	  internalists	  and	  externalists	  is	  really	  about	  epistemic	  warrant,	  and	  his	  account	  of	  reasonableness	  can	  be	  happily	  agnostic	  about	  such	  matters.	  Gupta	   is	  only	  concerned	  about	  the	  rational	  relationship	  of	  experience	  to	  knowledge,	  which	  need	  not	  avail	  itself	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  warrant.	  17	  See	  Gupta	  [2006a],	  footnote	  16.	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experiences	  are	  individuated	  in	  the	  first	  place	  by	  the	  subjects	  that	  experience	  them,	  then	  how	  could	   two	  subjects	   share	  a	   subjectively	   identical	   experience?	  To	  answer	  this	  question	  we	  should	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  priority	  relation	  that	  is	  implied	  in	  Gupta,	  but	   never	   explained	   in	   detail,	   which	   dissolves	   the	   seeming	   contradiction.	   The	  following	  argument	  hopes	  to	  make	  matters	  explicit:	  	   (1)	  	   Represent	  “e	  	  is	  an	  experience	  of	  subject	  X”	  (for	  any	  value	  of	  X)	  as	  ex.	  	  (2)	  	   If	  e	  is	  experienced	  by	  A,	  then	  eA.	  	  (3)	  	   If	  A≠B,	  then	  eA	  cannot	  be	  an	  experience	  of	  B,	  i.e.	  eA≠eB.	  	   	  Together,	  (1)-­‐(3)	  represent	  the	  subject-­‐relative	  identity	  condition	  on	  experiences.	  	   (4)	  	   For	  any	  subject	  X,	  if	  Ree’	  (where	  R	  is	  an	  identity	  relation	  ranging	  over	  experiences	   and	   e	   and	   e’	   are	   experiences),	   then	   if	   e	   makes	   a	   set	   of	  judgments,	  Γ,	  reasonable	  for	  X,	  then	  e’	  will	  make	  Γ	  reasonable	  for	  X.	  	  It	   should	   be	   noticed	   that	   (4)	   is	   of	   the	   form	   of	   Equivalence,	   though	   the	   nature	   of	  identity	   in	   relation	  R	   is	   left	   undefined.	   This	   is	   important	   for	   the	   next	   part	   of	   our	  explication.	  	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Gupta	  allows	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  different	  subjects	  to	  be	  subjectively	   identical;	   insofar	   as	   those	   subjects	   are	   similarly	   endowed	   (with	  relevantly	   similar	   sensory	   organs,	   cognitive	   systems,	   and	   views),	   subjectively	  identical	  experiences	  will	  yield	  the	  same	  entitlements	  to	  the	  same	  set	  of	  judgments	  Γ	  for	   both	   subjects.	   Such	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	  meets	  Equivalence.	  We	   represent	   this	   as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	   (5)	  	   For	   any	   two	   subjects	  A	   and	  B	   (where	  A≠B),	   if	  R’eAeB	   (where	  R’	   is	   an	  identity	   relation	   ranging	   over	   experiences,	   and	   eA	   and	   eB	   are	  experiences)	  then,	  by	  (3),	  the	  relation	  R≠R’.	  	  What	   (5)	   tells	   us	   is	   that	   there	   is	   an	   asymmetry,	   or	   better	   yet	   a	   priority	   relation,	  between	   the	   identity	   relations	   R	   and	   R’.	   Call	   R	   “identity	   of	   experience”	   and	   R’	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“subjective	   identity	   of	   experience.”	   These	   relations	   must	   satisfy	   the	   following	  conditions:	  	   	  (6)	  	   Ree	  implies	  R’ee	  
	  (7)	  	   R’ee	  does	  not	  imply	  Ree	  	  Thus,	   while	   the	   experiences	   of	   different	   subjects	   can	   never	   be	   identical	   (in	   the	  broader	  sense),	  they	  can	  be	  subjectively	  identical	  to	  one	  another.	  As	  to	  what	  sorts	  of	  other	  conditions	  in	  addition	  to	  subjective	  identity	  R	  would	  have	  to	  satisfy,	  we	  make	  no	  claim	  here.	  Such	  matters	  are	  entirely	  avoided,	  for	  R’,	  i.e.	  subjective	  identity,	  is	  the	  only	  relation	  required	  to	  establish	  Equivalence	  or	  its	  intersubjective	  variant.	  	   The	   third	   constraint	   is	   the	  Reliability	   of	   experience,	   or	   the	   view	   that	   “[t]he	  given	   in	  an	  experience	  does	  not	  yield	  anything	   false	  or	  erroneous;	   in	  particular,	   it	  does	  not	  yield	  a	  false	  proposition.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  27)	  Gupta	  is	  quick	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  this	  constraint	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  rational	  given	  in	  experience,	  not	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  experience.	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  our	  false	  beliefs	  are	  
caused	  by	  experience,	  but	  this	  is	  no	  fault	  of	  the	  given	  in	  experience.	  But	  even	  when	  properly	   construed	   as	   an	   epistemological	   claim,	   purged	  of	   any	   causal	   notions,	   the	  constraint	  is	  strong.	  Often,	  such	  a	  constraint	  has	  been	  thought	  too	  strong.	  A	  model	  of	  experience	  which	  can	  satisfy	  this	  constraint	  must	  make	  clear	  how	  it	  can	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  given	  can	  never	  be	  “wrong”.	  We	  will	  see	  how	  the	  Cartesian	  model	  attempts	  to	  meet	  this	  constraint	  along	  with	  the	  philosophically	  troublesome	  theses	  it	  musters	  for	  the	  task	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  In	  the	  fourth	  and	  final	  section,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  Gupta	  offers	   a	   novel	   re-­‐characterisation	   (or	   re-­‐categorisation)	   of	   the	   logical	   grammar	   of	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  this	  constraint	  in	  a	  much	  more	  plausible	  way,	  avoiding	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  the	  “framework	  of	  givenness,”	  as	  Sellars	  called	  it,	  and	  remaining	  true	  to	  Reliability.	  	   These	  constraints,	  if	  followed,	  are	  sufficient	  enough	  on	  their	  own	  to	  account	  for	  a	  great	  many	  philosophical	  views.	  However,	  as	  they	  stand,	  too	  many	  an	  absurd	  model	   could	   be	   devised	   under	   their	   auspices,	  meaning	   that	   the	   set	   of	   constraints	  must	   be	   strengthened.	   The	   fourth	   constraint	   does	   just	   this.	   Gupta	   refers	   to	   it	   as	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Manifestation	   of	   the	   given:	   “The	   given	   in	   experience	   must	   be	   manifested	   in	   that	  experience;	   that	   is,	   it	  must	  depend	  systematically	  upon	  the	  subjective	  character	  of	  the	  experience.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  30)	  This	  constraint	  is	  necessary	  to	  block	  a	  family	  of	  models	  which	  would	  simply	  assign	  some	  material	  truth	  to	  every	  given	  in	  experience.	  Gupta	   uses	   the	   example,	   “The	   Earth’s	   core	   is,	  was	   or	  will	   be	   hot.”	   A	  model	  which	  employs	  this	  proposition	  (or	  others	  like	  it),	  assigning	  this	  content	  to	  the	  given	  of	  any	  experience	   whatsoever,	   will	   satisfy	   Existence,	   Equivalence,	   and	   Reliability.	   The	  proposition	  exists;	  everyone	  with	  the	  same	  subjectively	  identical	  experience	  will	  be	  able	   to	   make	   the	   same	   judgments	   and	   inferences	   (supported	   as	   they	   are	   by	   this	  measly	  content);	  and,	  since	  the	  proposition	  is	  always	  true,	  it	  is	  reliable—no	  given	  in	  experience	   will	   ever	   yield	   a	   falsehood.	   Manifestation	   is	   required	   to	   block	   such	  assignments,	  and	  to	  make	  real	  our	  commitment	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  experience	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  world	  that	  cannot	  be	  captured	  by	  the	  arbitrary	  coordination	  of	  meaning.	  (We	  do	  often	  engage	  in	  arbitrary	  meaning	  assignments,	  especially	  in	  the	  sciences,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  experiences	  can	  be	  related	  to	  meanings.)	  	   One	   “natural”	   way	   of	   satisfying	   these	   constraints	   is	   found	   in	   the	   work	   of	  Descartes,	   who,	   applying	   the	   methods	   of	   the	   sceptics	   surveyed	   above,	   arrives	   at	  unmistakable	   impressions	   of	   the	   sort	   that	   the	   Stoics	   once	   sought.	   This	   model	   is	  indeed	   a	   powerful	   one.	   It	   bases	   itself	   on	   a	   foundationalism	   that	   assumes	   that	   a	  rational	  insight	  can	  guarantee,	  prior	  to	  any	  experience	  whatsoever,	  that	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  (at	  least	  by	  and	  large)	  true,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  most	  foundational	  of	  them	  known	  with	  complete	  certainty.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  will	  not	  examine	  in	  depth	  Descartes’	  rationalist	   arguments,	   but	   rather	   his	   view	   of	   experience.	   The	   model	   of	   Cartesian	  experience,	   it	  will	  be	   seen,	  was	  a	  potent	   instrument	   in	   the	  development	  of	  British	  empiricism,	   and	   completely	   divorceable	   from	   Descartes’	   rationalism.	   One	   could	  reject	   the	   rational	   foundations	   of	   that	   view	   and	   still	   preserve	   the	   model	   of	  experience	   as	   privileged	   access	   to	   a	   realm	   of	   indubitable	   subjective	   data.	   To	   that	  model	  we	  now	  turn.	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§II:	  A	  Cartesian	  Model	  of	  Experience	  When	  one	  describes	  this	  or	  that	  philosophical	  position	  as	  “Cartesian,”	  two	  concerns	  should	  always	  be	  present.	  Firstly,	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  such	  a	  description	  pejorative	  as	  opposed	   to	  historically	  and	  philosophically	  accurate?	  Secondly,	   in	  what	  way	   is	   the	  position	  Cartesian—or,	  in	  other	  words,	  what	  part	  of	  Descartes’	  philosophy	  is	  being	  recapitulated	  or	  replicated?	  We	  will	  see	  Gupta’s	  account	  of	  how	  the	  principal	  British	  empiricists—Locke,	  Berkeley,	  and	  Hume—adopted,	  without	  significant	  alteration,	  a	  Cartesian	   model	   of	   experience.	   In	   this	   section	   we	   will	   examine	   these	   Cartesian	  themes	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  development	  of	  early	  empiricism.	  We	  shall	  also	  see	  how	  such	  themes	  culminated	   in	  a	  general	  sense-­‐datum	  theory	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  and	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  that	  theory.	  	   	  
II.1:	  Cartesian	  Doubt	  and	  the	  Subjectivity	  of	  Experience	  Descartes’	  epistemological	  program	   in	  many	  ways	  sets	   the	  stage	   for	  all	  of	  modern	  epistemology,	   establishing	   in	   the	   modern	   period	   the	   program	   of	   indirect	  representationalism,	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  certainty	  and	  doubt,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	   empirical	   claims	   within	   a	   system	   of	   justification	   that	   eschews	   the	   sort	   of	  treatment	  such	  claims	  received	  under	  the	  old	  Scholastic	  and	  Platonic	  models.	  On	  the	  Aristotelian	  model	  of	  human	  knowledge,	  empirical	  claims	  require	  the	  potentiality	  of	  the	  mind	   to	   be	   actualised	   by	   the	   senses.	   The	   senses	   are	   essential	   to	   the	  mind.	   As	  Aristotle	  wrote,	  “What	  [thought/mind]	  thinks	  must	  be	  in	  it	  just	  as	  characters	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  on	  the	  writing-­‐table	  on	  which	  as	  yet	  nothing	  actually	  stands	  written:	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  happens	  with	  thought.”	  (Aristotle	  [1984],	  III.4.	  430a1)	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	   to	   the	   view	   of	   the	   mind	   held	   by	   Plato.	   For	   Plato,	   the	   mind	   (as	   perfect,	  unchanging	   and	   eternal)	   is	   essentially	   divorceable	   from	   the	   senses;	   in	   fact,	   the	  senses	  function	  only	  as	  epistemic	  barriers	  to	  achieving	  true	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Forms	  via	   dialectic.	   For	   Plato,	   all	   sensory	   experience	   is	   “imperfect,”	   and	   our	   empirical	  judgments	   only	   have	   sense	   (though	   are	   not	   true	   or	   certain)	   relative	   to	   a	   set	   of	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perfect	  concepts	  known	  through	  Anamnesis—i.e.	  held	  innately	  and	  eternally	  by	  the	  soul.18	  	  	   The	   Cartesian	   “method	   of	   doubt”	   attempts	   to	   establish	   the	   certainty	   of	   at	  least	   some	   of	   our	   beliefs	   by	   rationally	   discerning	   them	   from	   beliefs	   that	   can	   be	  subject	   to	   doubt.	   Insofar	   as	   this	   part	   of	   the	   project	   is	   of	   primary	   importance	   for	  Descartes,	   he	   follows	   in	   the	   rational	   tradition	   of	   Plato	   regarding	   the	   innate	  possession	   of	   certain	   knowledge.	   However,	   Descartes’	   rationalism	   is	   intended	   to	  buttress	  an	  account	  of	  experiential	  knowledge	  so	  that	  information	  from	  the	  senses	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  more	  than	  a	  barrier	  to	  pure	  rational	  insight.	  The	  method	  of	  doubt	  thus	  serves	  a	  twofold	  purpose:	  firstly,	  it	  establishes	  those	  propositions	  about	  which	  we	   cannot	   be	   mistaken,	   and,	   secondly,	   it	   shows	   how	   such	   rational	   insights	   also	  secure	  for	  us	  an	  account	  of	  how	  our	  normal	  and	  dubitable	  empirical	  judgments	  are,	  notwithstanding	  their	  defeasible	  nature,	  trustworthy.	  The	  first	  purpose	  is	  Platonic,	  and	   betrays	   Descartes’	   commitment	   to	   the	   mind	   as	   (pace	   Scholasticism)	   fully	  actualised	   without	   the	   senses.	   The	   second	   purpose	   is	   decidedly	   non-­‐Platonic;	   it	  establishes	   empirical	   beliefs	   as	   genuine	   (though	   not	   foundational)	   parts	   of	   our	  knowledge.	  This	   is	  done	   in	   two	   steps:	   firstly,	   the	  cogito	  establishes	  a	   foundational	  basis	  for	  knowledge	  that	  cannot	  be	  doubted	  (even	  by	  the	  most	  enthusiastic	  sceptic),	  and	   secondly	   by	   the	   ontological	   argument,	   which	   establishes	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  omni-­‐benevolent	   deity,	   corresponding	   to	   (though	   strictly	   “greater	   than”)	   my	  concept	   of	   such	   a	   deity.	   Since	   such	   a	   deity	   is	   good,	   He	  would	   not	   allow	  me	   to	   be	  globally	  deceived:	  while	  any	  specific	  empirical	  belief	  I	  possess	  may	  be	  incorrect,	  the	  deity	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  global	  error.	  	   We	  rehearse	  these	  Cartesian	  arguments	  here	  not	  to	  establish	  their	  validity	  or	  accuracy.	   Rather,	  we	   hope	   to	   tease	   out	   of	   them	   some	   key	   epistemological	   themes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Plato’s	   “equality	  argument”	   in	   the	  Phaedo	  establishes	   this	  epistemology,	   though	  earlier	  dialogues	  (such	  as	  the	  Meno)	  present	  similar	  positions.	  For	  Plato,	  all	  empirical	  judgments	  of	  “equality”	  between	  two	   objects	   are	   imperfect	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   no	   two	   objects	   are	   actually	   equal.	   We	   recognise	   this	  imperfection	  in	  our	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  when	  asked	  to	  reflect	  upon	  such	  judgments.	  Thus,	  the	  empirical	   relation	   of	   equality	   is	   (by	   our	   own	   recognition)	   imperfect,	   yet	   grasp	   of	   an	   imperfect	  concept	   implies	   that	   we	   also	   have	   a	   grasp	   of	   a	   corresponding	   perfect	   concept.	   Since	   this	   perfect	  concept	  can’t	  have	  come	  from	  experience,	  it	  must	  be	  possessed	  by	  the	  mind	  prior	  to	  experience,	  and	  accessed	  by	  some	  faculty	  other	  than	  empirical	  perception,	  e.g.,	  direct	  rational	  insight.	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which,	   when	   taken	   out	   of	   the	   context	   of	   Cartesian	   rationalism,	   capture	   many	  commitments	  we	  have	  to	  the	  study	  of	  knowledge	  more	  generally,	  but	  especially	  to	  the	   study	   of	   empirical	   knowledge—including	   its	   nature,	   its	   sources,	   and	   its	  justification.	   For	  Descartes,	   knowledge	  must	  have	   a	   certain	   source.	   Like	  Plato	   and	  the	  ancient	  sceptics,	  Descartes	  holds	  that	  no	  measure	  of	  certainty	  can	  be	  granted	  to	  the	   information	   that	   comes	   to	   us	   via	   the	   senses	   (at	   least	   not	   thought	   of	  independently	   from	   rationally	   arrived	   at	   guarantees).	   No	   sensory	   impression	   is	  apodictically	  certain.	  From	  this	  tenet,	  however,	  he	  does	  not	  infer,	  as	  did	  Plato,	  that	  experience	  is	  in	  some	  way	  epistemologically	  suspect.	  Within	  the	  correct	  framework,	  our	  “normal”	  experiences	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  veridical,	  and	  our	  empirical	  judgments	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  at	   least	  not	   in	  global	  error.	  Even	  sceptical	  presuppositions	   lead	  one	  to	  accept	   the	   very	   same	   account	   of	   empirical	   judgment	   that	   would	   accompany	   a	  common	  sense	  understanding	  of	  our	  experiential	  interaction	  with	  the	  world.	  	   Very	   much	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   these	   commitments	   is	   the	   Cartesian	   model	   of	  experience	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   subjective	   theatre	   within	   which	   representations,	   perhaps	  accurate	   but	   perhaps	   merely	   illusory	   (or	   delusory),	   take	   centre-­‐stage.	   (We	   here	  focus	   on	   Descartes’	   model	   of	   experience,	   but	   the	   theatre	   also	   houses	   imaginings,	  memories,	  and	  representational	  beliefs	  of	  a	  non-­‐experiential	  kind,	  such	  as	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  self	  or	  God.)	  As	  the	  Cartesian	  picture	  has	  it,	  experiences	  fail	  to	  carry	  with	   them	   any	   indication	   of	   their	   veracity,	   and	   thus	   any	   subjective	   episode	  may	  be	  the	  product	  of	  any	  number	  of	  factors.	  Take	  an	  experience	  of	  looking	  at	  what	  (at	   least	   seems	   to	   be)	   a	   red	   apple.	   The	   episode	   could	   be	   the	   product	   of	   actually	  seeing	  a	  red	  apple	  in	  the	  environment.	  Call	  this	  a	  “veridical	  experience”.	  The	  episode	  could	   be	   the	   product	   of	   seeing	   something	   in	   the	   environment	   that	   looks	   like	   an	  apple,	  but	   is	  not—e.g.	   a	   large	  plum,	  or	  a	  plastic	  decorative	  apple,	  etc.	   Call	   such	  an	  experience	  a	   “semantically	   imprecise	  experience”.	  Lastly,	   the	  episode	  could	  be	   the	  product	   of	   a	   dream	   (or	   even	   just	   simple	   illusion).	   Call	   such	   an	   experience	   an	  “illusory	   experience”.	  What	   Descartes	   is	   committed	   to,	   and	  what	   empiricists	   after	  Descartes	   are	   also	   committed	   to,	   is	   the	   assumption	   that	   there	   is	   no	   immediate	  epistemological	  difference	  between	  these	  episodes	  because	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  us	  to	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discern	  the	  differences	  between	  them	  by	  mere	  introspection.	  Given	  that	  knowledge	  is	   principally	   a	  matter	   of	   our	   introspective	   access	   to	   experience	   on	   the	   Cartesian	  model,	   this	   follows	   almost	   as	   a	   corollary	   from	   the	  way	  of	   ideas.	   Such	   distinctions,	  whatever	  their	  metaphysics,	  are	  epistemologically	  	  (representationally)	  neutral.	  	  	   The	   subjective	   nature	   of	   experience	   in	   Cartesian	   (and	   Cartesian	   inspired)	  epistemology	   rests	   on	   two	   distinct	   arguments.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   “dream	   argument,”	  with	   a	   rich	   philosophical	   history	   going	   back	   to	   the	   ancients,19	  and	   given	   several	  modern	   re-­‐statements.20	  The	   dream	   argument	   exploits	   our	   supposed	   inability	   to	  distinguish	   between	   veridical,	   semantically-­‐imprecise,	   and	   illusory	   experiences	  when	   said	   experiences	   are	   subjectively	   identical.	   According	   to	   this	   argument,	   our	  normal	  perceptions	  (and	  perceptual	  beliefs)	  are	  possible	  products	  of	  a	  dream-­‐state,	  one	   in	   which	   the	   subject	   is	   undergoing	   the	   sorts	   of	   perceptual	   states	   as	   if	   she	   is	  awake	  (and	  in	  “normal”	  contact	  with	  reality	  via	  her	  senses).	  Because	  we	  could	  never	  say	  that	  such	  a	  scenario	  is	  an	  impossibility,	  we	  must	  be	  suspicious	  of	  the	  senses	  and	  their	  ability	   to	  give	  us	  certain	  knowledge	  (i.e.	   the	  sort	  of	  knowledge	   that	  does	  not	  admit	  of	  such	  possibilities).	  	   The	   second	   argument	   is	   the	   “argument	   from	   illusion,”	   used	   to	   reach	   an	  independent	  conclusion.	  The	  argument	  from	  illusion	  asks	  us	  to	  take	  some	  example	  of	   a	   perceptual	   illusion—for	   example,	   the	   apparent	   bending	   of	   a	   stick	   when	   it	   is	  partially	  submerged	   in	  water.	  Now	  we	  suppose	  that	  a	  stick	  does	  not	  actually	  bend	  when	  placed	  in	  water,	  and	  ask	  why	  it	  appears	  to	  bend	  (and	  what	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  apparent	  bending	  may	  be).	  Since	  we	  have	  assumed	  that	  the	  actual	  stick	  (whatever	  that	   may	   be)	   did	   not	   bend,	   we	   conclude	   that	   the	   thing	   being	   bent	   is	   some	  representative	   (or	   perceptual	   proxy)	   of	   the	   stick	   (an	   idea,	   sense-­‐datum,	   etc.).	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Both	  Plato	   and	  Aristotle	  mention	   the	   dream	  argument.	   In	   Plato	   [2004],	  Socrates	   talks	   about	   not	  only	  dreams,	  but	  disease	  and	  madness,	  as	  instances	  where	  our	  senses	  cannot	  be	  trusted,	  leading	  to	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  Heraclitean	  theory	  of	  flux	  entailed	  by	  Theaetetus’	  proposal	  that	  knowledge	  is	  nothing	  other	   than	   perception.	   Aristotle	   mentions	   dreams	   in	  Metaphysics	   1011a6	   during	   his	   discussion	   of	  truth	  and	  appearance,	  and	  chastises	   those	  that	  use	  the	  dream	  argument	   for	  “seek[ing]	  a	  reason	  for	  that	  for	  which	  no	  reason	  can	  be	  given.”	  	  20	  There	  are	  far	  too	  many	  sceptical	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  modern	  literature	  to	  cover	  here,	  but	  such	  a	  list	  would	  surely	  include	  simulation	  hypotheses	  (such	  as	  Nozick’s	  experience	  machine	  and	  its	  variants),	  evil	  demon	  or	  scientist	  scenarios	  (including	  ones	  where	  brains	  end	  up	  in	  vats),	  and,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  recent	  variation	  of	  the	  dreamer	  sceptical	  hypothesis	  (proposed	  by	  Ernst	  Sosa	  in	  his	  [2007])	  in	  which	  dream	  contents	  are	  not	  beliefs	  but	  imaginings.	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argument	   concludes	   by	   asserting	   that	   our	   perception	   of	   the	   world	   is	   always	  mediated	  by	  indirect	  representations.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  conclusion	  than	  the	  one	  reached	  by	  the	  dream	  argument.	  The	  dream	  argument	  has	  as	   a	  premise	   the	  proposition	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   our	   current	  mental	   states	   are	  nothing	   but	   the	   product	   of	   dreams.	   In	   conjunction	  with	   the	   presupposition	   of	   the	  way	   of	   ideas	   we	   arrive	   at	   the	   conclusion	   that	   our	   senses	   cannot	   be	   the	   basis	   of	  certain	  knowledge	  (because	  certain	  knowledge	  cannot	  admit	  of	  even	  the	  possibility	  of	   illusion/semantic	   imprecision).	   It	   does	   not	   establish,	   nor	   even	   attempt	   to	  establish,	  the	  way	  of	  ideas.	  The	  argument	  is,	  therefore,	  only	  attempting	  to	  speak	  to	  those	   who	   already	   adopt	   something	   like	   a	   Cartesian	   epistemology	   and	   model	   of	  experience.	  The	  argument	  from	  illusion	  attempts	  to	  establish	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  way	  of	  ideas	  to	  the	  uninitiated	  or	  unconvinced.	  On	  this	  score,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  as	  successful	  in	   the	   past	   fifty	   years,21	  during	   which	   time	   the	   dream	   argument	   and	   its	   many	  modern	   variants	   have	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	   not	   only	  epistemology,	  but	  externalist	  semantics	  and	  anti-­‐individualist	  philosophies	  of	  mind.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 	  Such	   commitments	   were	   central	   for	   almost	   all	   epistemologists	   until	   the	   ordinary	   language	  philosophers	   of	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s.	   As	   we	   have	   already	   seen	   in	   footnote	   14,	   Wittgenstein	  challenged	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   a	   global	   scepticism,	   for	   it	   makes	   no	   sense	   to	   doubt	   all	   things.	  Similarly	   for	   Ryle,	   the	   argument	   from	   illusion	   in	   the	   Meditations	   relies	   on	   something	   of	   an	  inconsistency.	   For	   Ryle,	   “just	   as	   it	   makes	   no	   sense	   to	   talk	   of	   counterfeit	   coins	   when	   there	   are	   no	  genuine	  ones	  to	  contrast	  them	  with,	  so	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  talk	  of	  illusory	  experiences	  like	  dreams	  without	  waking	   and	   veridical	   ones	   to	   contrast	   them	  with.”	   (Ryle	   [1954/1960],	   94-­‐95)	   The	   dream	  argument	  concludes	  that	  there	  is	  no	  subjective	  comparison	  to	  be	  made	  between	  dreams	  and	  waking	  experiences,	   but	   its	   premises	   ask	  one	   to	   imagine	   that	   all	   of	  what	   one	  perceives	   is	   a	   dream.	  Austin	  likewise	  thinks	  an	  inconsistency	  is	  lurking	  in	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  we	  can’t	  discern	  normal	  from	  illusory	  experience	  in	  his	  posthumous	  [1962].	  In	  that	  same	  text,	  he	  is	  also	  sceptical	  regarding	  our	  supposed	  inability	   to	   recognise	   the	   difference	   between	   dreams/illusions	   and	   normal	   experiences.	   Regarding	  the	  distinct	  argument	  from	  illusion,	  taken	  to	  establish	  the	  perceptual	  primacy	  of	  ideas	  or	  sense	  data,	  Austin	  attacks	   the	  key	   inference	   (from	  the	  proposition	   that	  during	   illusory	  states	  of	  perception	  we	  are	   only	   acquainted	   with	   our	   sense-­‐data	   to	   the	   proposition	   that	   we	   are	   only	   ever	   perceptually	  acquainted	  with	  our	  sense-­‐data).	  	   Contemporary	  disjunctivists	  grant	  the	  Cartesian	  idea	  that	  nothing	  in	  introspection	  will	  settle	  whether	   an	   experience	   is	   illusory/semantically-­‐imprecise	   or	   veridical.	  However,	   they	  do	  not	   agree	  with	   Descartes	   that	   the	   veridical	   experience	   has	   the	   same	   rational	   content	   as	   non-­‐veridical	  experience.	  For	  disjunctivists,	  the	  relevant	  object	  (or	  external	  state	  of	  affair)	  enters	  into	  the	  content	  of	  veridical	  experience,	  but	  not	  into	  the	  content	  of	  the	  non-­‐veridical	  experience.	  See	  Hinton	  [1973],	  McDowell	   [1982],	  and	  Martin	   [2006].	  We	  address	  McDowell’s	  disjunctivism	   in	  Chapter	  Three,	  with	  particular	   attention	   to	   this	   contention	   that	   veridical	   and	   non-­‐veridical	   perceptions	   have	   different	  givens	  (an	  idea	  which	  runs	  contrary	  to	  Gupta’s	  Equivalence	  constraint).	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   Setting	   aside	   the	   contemporary	   role	   of	   the	   dream	   argument	   or	   argument	  from	   illusion,	   we	   can	   establish	   a	   more	   modest	   (yet	   still	   very	   interesting)	   thesis.	  Early	  empiricists,	  namely	  Locke,	  Berkeley	  and	  Hume,	  adopt	  much	  of	  this	  Cartesian	  outlook	   in	   the	   development	   of	   their	   doctrines.	  While	   a	  more	   thorough	   analysis	   of	  those	  doctrines	  must	  wait	  for	  the	  next	  chapter,	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  foundationalism,	  the	  transparency	   of	   ideas	   to	   the	   mind,	   the	   fundamentally	   indirect	   representational	  nature	  of	  ideas,	  and	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  experience	  are	  all	  commitments	  that	  form	  a	  central	  core	  of	  early	  British	  empiricism.	  	  
II.2:	  A	  Cartesian	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Truisms	  and	  Constraints	  Utilising	  the	  truisms	  and	  the	  constraints	  offered	  by	  Gupta	  (glossed	  in	  §I	  above),	  we	  can	   see	   why	   the	   empiricist	   may	   be	   drawn	   to	   these	   Cartesian	   themes.	   Firstly,	   if	  knowledge	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   foundational	   in	   character,	   and	   based	   on	   a	   string	   of	  reasoned	  justifications,	  then	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  assume	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  propositions	  and	   their	   contents.	   All	   of	   our	   claims	   to	   knowledge,	   from	   the	   lowliest	   and	   simple	  judgments	  of	  perception	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  sophisticated	  science,	  are	  propositional	  in	  form,	   and	   we	   take	   justification	   to	   be	   a	   rational	   procedure	   of	   showing	   how	   such	  claims	   are	   known.	   However,	   if	  we	   take	  Reliability	   as	   a	   serious	   constraint	  we	   also	  notice	  that	  the	  sorts	  of	  perceptual	  judgments	  that	  may	  serve	  as	  empirical	  bases	  for	  such	   procedures	   must	   be	   of	   a	   different	   character	   than	   simple	   judgments	   about	  objects	  in	  our	  environment	  and	  their	  relations.	  Because	  normal	  judgments	  such	  as,	  “That	  apple	  is	  red,”	  “The	  CN	  Tower	  is	  taller	  than	  my	  house,”	  or,	  “This	  coffee	  mug	  is	  currently	  warmer	  than	  this	  water	  glass,”	  are	  all	  judgments	  about	  which	  we	  may	  be	  mistaken,	  either	   through	  mistaken	  reference	  (and	  here,	  dreams	  and	   illusions	  need	  not	   be,	   though	   perhaps	   sometimes	   are,	   the	   culprits),	   or	   as	   a	   result	   of	   other	  contingent	   factors	   (e.g.	   perhaps	   lighting	   conditions	   are	   not	   ideal	   to	   establish	   the	  colour	  of	  apples	  in	  a	  definitive	  way,	  or	  a	  new—and	  surprisingly	  tall!—addition	  has	  been	  added	  to	  my	  house	  without	  my	  knowing	  it,	  etc.).	  	  	   The	  real	  concern	   is	  not	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  such	   judgments	  can	  be	  given	  a	  sense,	  or	  can	  be	  found	  to	  be	  true;	  the	  real	  concern	  stems	  from	  an	  empiricist	  version	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of	   foundationalism	   which	   adheres	   to	   two	   distinct	   principles,	   one	   of	   which	   is	   an	  interpretation	   of	   the	   Insight,	   the	   other	   a	   substantive	   account	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  given—an	  account	  which	  forces	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  all	  of	  the	  constraints,	  but	  here	  we	  will	  especially	  examine	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Equivalence	  and	  Reliability.	  The	   Insight,	   as	   we	   may	   recall,	   encapsulates	   the	   truism	   that	   “experience	   is	   our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide”.	  However,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  this	  truism	  (when	  wedded	   to	   foundationalism	   and	   the	  way	   of	   ideas)	   is	   slightly	   different.	   It	   is	  represented	  by	  the	  following	  thesis:	  	  
The	  Principle	  of	  Empiricist	  Foundationalism:	   Knowledge	   is	   immediately	   given	  in	   experience	   (or	   derived	   from	   experience	   in	   a	   way	   that	   preserves	   the	  certainty	   of	   the	   immediately	   given	   in	   experience).	   Such	   knowledge	   is	  unassailable.22	  	  Firstly	  we	  should	  note	  that	  this	  principle	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  Gupta’s	  Insight.	  The	  Principle	   of	   Empiricist	   Foundationalism,	   like	   the	   Insight,	   grants	   the	   given	   in	  experience	   a	   primary	   epistemic	   role,	   but,	   unlike	   the	   Insight,	   commits	   us	   to	   the	  position	  that	  such	  knowledge	  is	  certain,	  unassailable,	  and	  unrevisable.	  	  	   The	   classical	   empiricist	   response	   to	   the	   Equivalence	   and	   Reliability	  constraints	  makes	  sense	  only	  when	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  far	  weaker	  Insight	  by	  the	  Principle	  of	  Empirical	  Foundationalism.	  Because	  experience	  is	  thought	  to	  do	  all	  of	  the	  epistemic	  heavy	  lifting,	  the	  following	  argument	  leads	  one	  to	  a	  rather	   substantive	   thesis	   regarding	   the	   metaphysical	   nature	   of	   the	   given	   in	  experience:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  This	   is	   a	   purely	   epistemological	   version	   of	   a	   fairly	   common	   thesis.	   Some	   empiricists,	   Schlick	   for	  example,	  held	  a	  very	  closely	  related	  epistemological/semantic	  hybrid	  version	  of	  this	  thesis:	  that	  the	  truth	   of	   statements	   about	   the	   “immediately	   perceived”	  was	   given	  with	   the	   understanding	   of	   such	  statements.	   If	   one	   understands	   a	   statement	   such	   as,	   “I	   (seem	   to)	   see	   a	   blue	   patch,	   now,”	   one	   also	  knows	   the	   statement	   to	   be	   (certainly)	   true.	   While	   such	   statements	   are	   the	   “ultimate	   origin	   of	   all	  knowledge”	  (381)	  they	  ought	  not	  be	  “designated	  as	  its	  foundation”	  (ibid).	  Schlick	  thus	  held	  that	  there	  was	   a	   difference	   between	   statements	   about	   the	   immediately	   given	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   “protocol	  sentences”	   or	   “protocol	   propositions”	   that	   were	   thought	   foundational	   for	   science	   by	   the	   Vienna	  Circle.	   As	   far	   as	   Schlick	   was	   concerned,	   statements	   about	   direct	   observation	   –	   which	   he	   called	  “affirmations”	   (Konstatierungen)	   -­‐	   were	   distinct	   from	   the	   foundational	   claims	   of	   science.	   Where	  nothing	   could	   lead	   one	   to	   give	   up	   her	   own	   “observation	   propositions	   under	   any	   circumstances,”	  (380)	  one	  could	  very	  well	  come	  to	  reject	  a	  foundational	  scientific	  claim.	  We	  will	  explore	  such	  matters	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	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   (1)	  	   Experience,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  epistemically	  significant,	  justifies	  our	  beliefs;	  	  (2)	  	   beliefs	  are	  propositional	  in	  form;	  	  (3)	  	   only	  a	  proposition	  can	  justify	  another	  proposition;	  	  (C)	  	   the	  given	  is	  propositional	  in	  form.	  	  	  We	  represent	  this	  conclusion	  as	  a	  thesis,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  central	  thesis	  of	  classical	  empiricism:	  	  
Propositional	  Given:	  the	  rational	  import	  of	  experience	  is	  propositional	  in	  form.	  	  The	   thesis	   of	   the	   Propositional	   Given	   satisfies	   the	   Equivalence	   and	   Reliability	  constraints,	   but	   only	   by	   restricting	   the	   sorts	   of	   objects	   of	   which	   one	   may	   have	  immediate	  awareness,	  and	  thus	  restricting	  the	  type	  of	  propositions	  which	  may	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  empirical	  foundationalism.	  By	  Equivalence,	  any	  two	  rational	  agents	  who	  have	  the	  same	  experiences	  must	  be	  provided	  with	  the	  same	  propositional	  contents	  (perceptual	   facts)	   by	   experience.	   If	   one	   is	   hallucinating	   while	   the	   other	   is	  undergoing	   veridical	   experience,	   then	   the	   propositions	   that	   are	   attached	   to	  experience	  must	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  special	  sort.	  By	  Reliability,	  the	  truth	  of	  propositions	  given	  in	  experience	  must	  be	  known	  with	  certainty.	  As	  with	  Equivalence,	  only	  a	  very	  special	   class	   of	   propositions	   (ones	   that	   are	   warranted	   when	   grasped)	   can	   be	  accepted.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  empiricist	  is	  calling	  upon	  something	  akin	  to	  the	  cognitive	  impressions	  of	  the	  Stoics.	  But,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  the	  sceptic	  has	  a	  response	  to	  the	  positing	  of	  such	  entities;	  no	  epistemic	  temple	  can	  be	  built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  something	  akin	  to	  cognitive	  impressions.	  The	  classical	  empiricist	  seems	  in	  no	  better	  position	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  sceptic	  than	  were	  the	  Stoics.	  	   The	  empiricist’s	  response	  to	  the	  Stoical	  problem	  is	  to	  take	  refuge	  in	  a	  theory	  of	   indirect	   representationalism	   of	   the	   Cartesian	   variety	   surveyed	   above.	   What	   is	  immediately	   given	   is	  not	   a	  proposition	   to	   the	  effect	   that	   just	  anything	   is	   such	  and	  such.	  What	  is	  given	  to	  the	  mind	  is	  a	  very	  narrow	  kind	  of	  content,	  one	  that	  need	  not	  (and,	  from	  the	  normative	  epistemology	  that	  supports	  classical	  empiricism,	  ought	  not	  to)	   make	   reference	   to	   any	   state	   of	   affair	   in	   a	   world	   separate	   from	   the	   ideas	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immediately	   given	   to	   the	  mind.	  The	   empiricist	   response	   to	   the	   sceptic	   is	   to	   argue	  that	  the	  Stoics	  went	  wrong	  not	  in	  their	  epistemic	  aims,	  but	  only	  in	  their	  assumption	  that	   they	   could	   establish	   with	   certainty	   a	   class	   of	   beliefs	   that	   went	   beyond	   the	  representations	   immediately	   given	   to	   the	  mind.	  The	   sceptic	   found	  a	  way	   to	  doubt	  even	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  unassailable	  of	  cognitive	  impressions	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  Stoic	   could	  always	  be	  mistaken	  about	   subjectively	   similar	   (even	   “identical”)	   states	  which	   nonetheless	   failed	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   same	   objects	   or	   states	   of	   affair.	   The	  empiricist	   simply	   restricts	   the	   class	   of	   terms	   from	   which	   empirically	   basic	  statements	   may	   be	   culled,	   allowing	   reference	   only	   to	   the	   subjective	   qualities	   of	  experience	   (the	   ideas	   themselves)	   and	  not,	   as	   the	   Stoics	   allowed,	   terms	  of	  normal	  discourse	  with	  their	  natural	  reference.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	   certainly	   does	   offer	   a	   response	   to	   the	   sceptic.	   However,	   in	   so	  responding,	  the	  empiricist	  has	  inadvertently	  given	  far	  too	  much	  to	  the	  sceptic.	  Such	  an	  epistemology	  will	  have	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  the	  credence	  we	  give	  to	  normal	  and	   scientific	   judgments	   that	   go	   beyond	   the	   narrow	   contents	   from	  which	   certain	  judgments	  about	  one’s	  private	  mental	  space	  may	  be	  made.	  Such	  judgments	  stand	  in	  merely	  inferential	  relation	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  judgments	  that	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  our	  ideas,	   and	   scepticism	   here	  wins	   the	   day	   (by	   the	   empiricist’s	   own	   strict	   Cartesian	  standards),	  or,	  empiricism	  radically	  re-­‐thinks	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  non-­‐subjective.	  The	  first	   horn	   yields	   so	   much	   to	   the	   sceptic	   that	   it	   is	   tantamount	   to	   scepticism	   itself	  (though	  scepticism	  not	  about	  experience,	  but	  about	  inference);	  the	  other	  horn	  leads	  one	   to	   an	   idealism	   of	   a	   Berkeleyan	   variety.	   Neither	   scepticism	   nor	   idealism	  establishes	  what	  the	  empiricist	  originally	  sought	  to	  establish:	  an	  empirical	  basis	  for	  our	   naturally	   interpreted	   claims	   to	   knowledge,	   both	   of	   a	   common	   sense	   and	  scientific	  variety,	  for	  they	  permit	  such	  knowledge	  to	  be	  justified	  only	  with	  recourse	  to	   theories	   arguably	   even	   more	   radical	   than	   the	   scepticism	   they	   are	   thought	   to	  replace.	  	   We	  have	  yet	  to	  even	  address	  the	  conceptual	  problems	  exposed	  by	  the	  typical	  Wittgensteinian,	  Quinean,	  and	  Sellarsian	  critiques	  (critiques	   that	  call	   into	  question	  the	   semantic	   and	   epistemic	   assumptions	   of	   the	   thesis	   of	   the	  Propositional	  Given).	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Can	   the	   basic	   beliefs	   of	   an	   empiricist	   framework	   be	   generated	   without	   a	   rich	  conceptual	  framework?	  How	  would	  such	  concepts	  be	  justified	  so	  as	  to	  be	  palatable	  to	  an	  empiricist?	  How	  do	  languages	  based	  on	  terms	  that	  refer	  only	  to	  private	  objects	  (ideas,	  sense-­‐data)	  get	  a	  public	  meaning?	  Does	  the	  empiricist’s	   infallible	  semantics	  capture	   what	   we	   really	   mean	   by	   such	   locutions	   such	   as	   “…	   looks	   like…”	   or	   “it	  appears	   to	  me	   that…”—or	   do	   such	   claims	   have	   a	   sense	   only	   because	   our	   normal	  reports	   on	   our	   internal	   episodes	   cannot	   always	   be	   trusted?	  We	   need	   not	   address	  these	  arguments	   in	  detail,	  but	   it	   is	  worth	  mentioning	  them	  here	   if	  only	  so	   that	  we	  can	  establish	  how	  cumbersome	  the	  propositional	  given	  can	  be,	  and	  how	  beneficial	  it	  might	  be	  to	  find	  another	  interpretation	  of	  empiricism	  that	  does	  not	  succumb	  to	  such	  conceptual	  difficulties.	  Any	  theory	  of	  the	  given	  that	  can	  preserve	  the	  basic	  empiricist	  commitment	   that	   experience	   is	   epistemically	   primary	   and	   authoritative	   without	  succumbing	   to	   these	   historical	   and	   conceptual	   concerns	   is	   one	   worthy	   of	   further	  exploration.	  	  
	  
§III:	  Gupta	  and	  the	  Given	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  said	  little	  about	  the	  positive	  program	  Gupta	  offers,	  except	  to	  say	  that	  it	  satisfies	  the	  truisms	  and	  constraints.	  Just	  how	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  able	  to	  do	  this	  requires	  an	  examination	  of	  some	  of	  its	  key	  technical	  innovations,	  based	  largely	  on	   the	   logic	   of	   interdependence	   developed	   by	  Gupta	   and	  Belnap	   in	  Gupta	   [1982],	  Belnap	  [1982],	  and	  Gupta	  and	  Belnap	  [1993].	  	  
	  
III.1:	  Gupta’s	  Logic	  of	  Interdependence	  The	  logic	  of	  interdependence	  attempts	  to	  develop	  fundamental	  tools	  (revision	  rules	  and	   revision	   processes)	   for	   “dealing	   with	   phenomena	   containing	  interdependencies”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  73).	  Their	  original	  application	  in	  Gupta	  [1982],	  Belnap	   [1982],	   and	   Gupta	   and	   Belnap	   [1993]	   models	   the	   kind	   of	   reasoning	   we	  encounter	   when	   confronted	   by	   the	   liar’s	   paradox	   (whilst	   staying	   within	   a	   two-­‐valued	  semantic	  system).	  The	  Revision	  Theory	  of	  Truth	  attempts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	   circularity	   of	   the	   truth	   concept	   by	   showing	   how	   both	   the	   intuitive	   and	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paradoxical	  features	  we	  associate	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  truth	  can	  be	  countenanced	  for	  languages,	   such	   as	   natural	   English,	   which	   contain	   their	   own	   truth-­‐predicate,	   and	  therefore	  do	  not	  admit	  of	  the	  solution	  proposed	  by	  Tarski	  for	  artificial	  languages.	  	   The	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  Revision	  Theory	  of	  Truth	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	   work.	   Nonetheless,	   a	   basic	   understanding	   of	   the	   key	   ideas	   in	   the	   theory	   is	  required	  if	  we	  are	  to	  see	  how	  Gupta	  utilises	  the	  logic	  of	  interdependence	  to	  account	  for	  epistemic	  (as	  opposed	  to	  semantic)	  interdependence.	  	   Firstly,	   we	   must	   understand	   what	   it	   means	   for	   there	   to	   be	   “phenomena	  containing	   interdependencies”.	   In	   brief,	   such	   phenomena	   exhibit	   the	   frightening	  logical	  property	  of	  circularity.	  Gupta	  proposes	  mutually	  dependent	  definitions	  as	  a	  sort	   of	   simple	   and	   neutral	   “setting”	   for	   studying	   the	   phenomenon	   of	  interdependence,	   and	   we	   here	   follow	   suit.	   Gupta	   asks	   the	   reader	   to	   imagine	   a	  conversation	  regarding	  arithmetic	  where	  we	  can	  assume	  the	  universe	  of	  discourse	  to	  be	  the	  natural	  numbers	  between	  0	  and	  6	  (i.e.	  {1,	  2,	  3,	  4,	  5}).	  The	  conversation	  is	  between	   the	   reader	   and	   an	   interlocutor,	   in	  which	   the	   interlocutor	   establishes	   the	  following	  definition	  for	  a	  new	  general	  term	  G:	  	  	  	   (1)	  	   x	  is	  G	  =Df	  x	  is	  an	  even	  number	  and	  x	  is	  H.	  	  Unfortunately,	   the	   interlocutor	   is	   interrupted	   and	   must	   leave	   before	   providing	   a	  definition	  for	  H.	  Definition	  (1)	  is	  incomplete,	  and	  the	  meaning	  (or	  the	  extension)	  of	  G	  is	   not	   known.	   Nonetheless,	   you	   do	   have	   some	   “significant	   information”	   about	   G.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  60)	  What	  you	  have	  is	  conditional	  information	  of	  the	  extension	  of	  G	  given	   the	   extension	   of	  H.	   Gupta	   introduces	   the	   terms	   “antecedent	   extension”	   of	  H	  and	  “consequent	  extension”	  of	  G	  to	  show	  that	  fixing	  the	  extension	  of	  H	  will,	  given	  the	  information	  in	  definition	  (1),	  fix	  (or	  at	  least	  home	  in	  on)	  the	  extension	  of	  G.	  We	  have	  hypothetical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  meaning	  (extension)	  of	  G.	  	   But	  what	  about	  systems	  in	  which	  the	  meaning	  of	  H	  is	  not	  only	  unknown,	  but	  dependent	  upon	  the	  meaning	  of	  G	  (which	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  H)?	  	  Such	  a	  system	  is	  produced	  by	  taking	  (1)	  and	  adding	  to	  it	  the	  following	  definition	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   (2)	  	   x	  is	  H	  =Df	  x	  >	  3	  or	  x	  is	  G	  	  to	  arrive	  at	  	  	   (3)	   x	  is	  G	  =Df	  x	  is	  an	  even	  number	  and	  x	  is	  H	  	   	   x	  is	  H	  =Df	  x	  >	  3	  or	  x	  is	  G.	  	  Such	  a	  system	  shows	  how	  the	  meaning	  of	  G	  can	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  H,	  and	   the	   meaning	   of	   H	   on	   the	   meaning	   of	   G,	   yet	   we	   still	   have	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  information	   that	   helps	   us	   to	   fix	   our	   understanding	   of	   G	   (and	   H).	   Such	   a	   system	  exhibits	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   interdependence.	  Logically,	   it	   is	  no	  different	   from	   the	  epistemic	  circle	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  when	  we	  admit	  that	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  is	   dependent	   on	   our	   conception	   of	   the	   world,	   and	   our	   conception	   of	   the	   world	  dependent	  on	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  self.	  Neither	  is	  fixed,	  and	  both	  are	  dependent	  on	  one	  another.	  Rather	   than	  seek	   to	  remove	  ourselves	   from	  these	  sorts	  of	   circles,	  we	  should	   welcome	   them,	   and	   the	   kinds	   of	   information	   they	   can	   give	   us	   about	   the	  concepts	  entangled	  therein:	  	   	  When	  terms	  belong	  to	  a	  system	  of	  interdependent	  definitions,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  determine	   in	  any	  direct	  way	  the	  objects	  of	  which	  they	  are	   true.	  With	  the	  system	   in	   (3),	   for	   example,	   to	   determine	   the	   objects	   of	  which	  G	   is	   true,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  the	  objects	  of	  which	  H	  is	  true;	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  objects	  of	  which	  H	   is	   true,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  that	  which	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  determine	   in	  the	   first	   place—namely,	   the	   objects	   of	  which	  G	   is	   true.	  We	   are	   caught	   in	   a	  circle.	   Interdependent	   definitions	   get	   us	   entangled	   in	   circles	   such	   as	   these.	  They	   also	   yield,	   however,	   vital	   information—information	   that	   allows	   us	   to	  exploit	  the	  circles	  in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  63-­‐64)	  	  We	  can	  exploit	  this	  entangled	  information	  by	  taking	  as	  hypotheses	  not	  our	  original	  assumptions	  about	  the	  extension	  of	  G	  and	  H,	  but	  the	  consequent	  extensions	  of	  G	  and	  
H	   given	   our	   original	   assumptions.	   Consequent	   extensions	   are	   better	   (or	   at	   least	  equally	  good)	  hypotheses	  regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  general	  terms	  introduced	  by	  the	  system	  than	  are	  the	  antecedent	  extensions.	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   Now	  assume	  for	  system	  (3)	  the	  antecedent	  extension	  of	  G	  and	  H	  to	  be	  〈{},	  {}〉.	  If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   the	   consequent	   extension	  will	   be	   〈{},	   {1,	   2,	   3,	   4,	   5}〉.	   Gupta	  holds	   that	   the	   consequent	   extension	   of	   G	   and	   H	   〈{},	   {1,	   2,	   3,	   4,	   5}〉	   is	   a	   better	  hypothesis	  than	  〈{},	  {}〉.	  But	  the	  true	  power	  of	  the	  account	  developed	  by	  Gupta	  is	  that	  we	   need	   not	   stop	   here.	   We	   can	   capture	   this	   move	   from	   antecedent	   extension	   to	  consequent	  extension	  as	  a	  “revision	  rule”—a	  rule	  which	  can	  now	  be	  applied	  to	  our	  system	  again.	  	  Using	  Gupta’s	  notation,	  call	  a	  hypothesis	  h,	  and	  a	  revision	  rule	  ρ,	  then	  	  	   ρ(h)	  	  is	  a	  better	  (or	  equally	  good)	  hypothesis	  than	  (as)	  h.	  But,	  applying	  rule	  ρ	  to	  ρ(h)	  will	  yield	  	  	   ρ(ρ(h)).	  	  as	   a	   better	   hypothesis,	   and	   so	   on.	   The	   repeated	   application	  of	   the	   revision	   rule	   is	  called	  a	  “revision	  process”,	  and	  it	  is	  revision	  processes	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  enquiry	  here.	  	   This	   account	   of	   revision	   shows	   us	   that	   information	   in	   any	   system	   of	  interdependencies	  can	  be	  exploited	  so	  as	  to	  develop	  more	  sophisticated	  hypotheses	  regarding	  meaning.	  But	  how	  can	  we	  use	  revision	  to	  arrive	  at	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  general	  terms	  (or,	  for	  our	  purposes,	  the	  epistemic	  standing	  of	  views)	  if	   all	   we	   know	   is	   conditional	   on	   our	   original	   assumptions?	   Here,	   Gupta	   wants	   to	  point	  to	  certain	  features	  of	  revision	  processes.	  We	  turn	  our	  attention	  not	  to	  Gupta’s	  treatment	  of	  interdependent	  definitions,	  but	  to	  the	  matter	  more	  closely	  at	  hand:	  the	  revision	  of	  epistemic	  views	  in	  light	  of	  experience.	  	  
III.2:	  Gupta’s	  Account	  of	  Epistemic	  Revision	  Rather	   than	   search	   for	   arguments	   to	   fix	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   interdependence	   of	  experience	   and	   belief	   (i.e.	   Cartesian	   “guarantees”	   via	   rational	   argument	   or	   mere	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assumption	  that	  one’s	  experiences	  are	  veridical	  because	  one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  is	   known	   to	   be	   true),	   one	   merely	   embraces	   the	   flexibility	   and	   multiplicity	   that	  interdependence	  brings	  to	  the	  table.	  Only	  relative	  to	  a	  view	  is	  one	  entitled	  to	  make	  (or	   hold	   as	   true)	   perceptual	   judgments	   in	   light	   of	   experience.	   For	   any	   single	  experience	  we	  have	  only	  a	  conditional	  entitlement	  to	  the	  beliefs	  that	  are	  a	  result	  of	  that	  experience.	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  unsurprising.	  If	  I	  am	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  my	  eyes	   are	   working	   properly,	   that	   the	   lighting	   conditions	   are	   optimal,	   and	   that	   no	  particularly	  odd	  conditions	  hold,	  then	  my	  perceptual	   judgments	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  I	  am	  now	  seeing	  black	  type	  on	  a	  white	  paper	  will	  be	   justified.	  Even	  a	  sceptic	  would	  have	  to	  yield	  this	  conditional	  claim,	  assuming,	  of	  course,	  that	  she	  does	  not	  yield	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  antecedent.	  	   The	   logical	   machinery	   surveyed	   in	   §III.1	   does	   not	   yet	   solve	   the	   problem	  posed	   by	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   Insight	   and	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	   nor	   the	  interdependence	  of	  our	  conceptions	  of	  the	  self	  and	  of	  the	  world.	  Whereas	  the	  Insight	  tells	  us	  that	  experience	  has	  a	  broad	  epistemic	  scope,	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  seems	  to	  preclude	  experience	   from	  being	  able	   to	  play	  such	  an	  epistemic	  role.	  Experience	  can	  only	  provide	  us	  with	  true	  judgments	  if	  our	  view	  of	  the	  self	  is	  correct;	  our	  view	  of	  the	  self	  can	  only	  be	  considered	  correct	   if	   justified	  by	  true	  judgments.	  Given	  a	  view,	  one	   can	   see	   how	   an	   experience	   can	   take	   one	   from	   that	   view	   onto	   a	   new	   view.	  However,	  this	  set	  of	  perceptual	  judgments	  is	  only	  rational	  (justified,	  warranted,	  etc.)	  
if	   the	   initial	   view	   one	   holds	   is	   rational	   (justified,	   warranted,	   etc.).	   Given	   that	   any	  individual	  experience	  gives	  the	  epistemic	  agent	  only	  conditional	  entitlements	  to	  her	  beliefs,	   conceptions,	   and	   theories,	   how	   could	   the	   agent	   ever	   be	   in	   the	   position	   of	  saying	   that	   her	   perceptual	   judgments	   are	   absolutely	   or	   categorically	   justified?	   In	  other	   words,	   our	   epistemic	   predicament	   requires	   us	   to	   into	   account	   the	  interdependency	  of	  view	  and	  (perceptual)	  judgment.	  	   Empiricists	  specifically,	  but	  epistemologists	  more	  generally,	  have	  been	  guilty	  of	  thinking	  that	  a	  belief	  (set	  of	  beliefs/entire	  view)	  is	  justified	  by	  some	  experience	  in	  a	   fundamentally	   synchronic	   way.	   No	   belief	   is	   up	   to	   this	   task.	   If	   there	   are	   genuine	  epistemic	  interdependencies,	  then	  such	  “solutions”	  would	  be	  akin	  to	  fixing	  (without	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warrant)	  our	  hypothetical	  antecedent	  extensions	  in	  the	  definitional	  example	  glossed	  in	   §III.1.	   Just	   as	  we	  have	  no	   grounds	  based	  on	   the	   theory	  of	   definitions	   to	  posit	   a	  privileged	  antecedent	  extension	  for	  a	  general	  term,	  we	  have	  no	  epistemic	  grounds	  to	  privilege	   a	   particular	   conception	   of	   the	   self	   so	   that	   the	   dictates	   of	   the	   senses	   get	  their	   “natural”	   meaning.	   This	   would	   be	   to	   utterly	   ignore	   the	   truism	   of	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	  	   Gupta’s	   solution	   is	   to	   think	   of	   the	   justification	   of	   our	   beliefs	   as	   a	  fundamentally	  dynamical	  matter—as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  very	  process	  of	  revision	  itself.	  No	  single	  experience	  justifies	  the	  view	  of	  the	  world	  we	  hold	  (or	  even	  some	  part	  of	  it,	  such	  as	  an	  individual	  belief),	  but	  the	  revision	  of	  our	  views	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  we	   have	   (in	   a	   stepwise	   and	   cumulative	   way)	   can	   lead	   us	   from	   any	   number	   of	  mistaken	  (though	  antecedently	  rational)	  views	  to	  a	  true	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  and	  world.23	  Even	   if	  we	  all	  begin	   from	  radically	  different	   (perhaps	  even	  contradictory)	  conceptions	   of	   the	   self	   and	   world,	   we	   can,	   given	   a	   relevantly	   similar	   course	   of	  experience,	  come	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  stable	  view.	  If	  all	  initial	  views,	  no	  matter	  their	  initial	  differences,	  converge	  on	  the	  same	  view	  (given	  a	  sequence	  of	  experiences	  E),	  then	  we	  can	  take	  ourselves	  as	  more	  than	  conditionally	  entitled	  to	  hold	  such	  views.	  In	  other	  words,	   certain	   dynamical	   properties	   of	   revision	   processes	   allow	   us	   to	  move	   from	  merely	   conditional	   to	   categorical	   entitlements—from	   mere	   hypothesis	   to	  knowledge.	  	   The	   following	   is	   a	   toy	   example.	   Imagine	   two	   individuals,	   Fred	   and	   Jesse,	  admiring	  Sally’s	  new	  car.	  Fred	  believes	  that	  Sally’s	  car	   is	  purple	  (P),	   Jesse	  believes	  Sally’s	   car	   is	   red	   (R).	   Both	   reasonably	   believe	   that	   their	   respective	   viewing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Some	   of	   Gupta’s	   critics	   still	   make	   this	   error.	   Peacocke	   [2009]	   argues	   that	   Gupta’s	   experience	  function	  produces	  a	  rational	  connection	  between	  old	  and	  revised	  views,	  but	  argues	  that	  the	  function	  does	  not	  meet	  a	  “Ratifiability	  Condition.”	  This	  condition	  has	  it	  that,	  “[w]henever	  a	  mental	  transition	  is	  rational,	  there	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  soundness	  that	  it	  meets.	  This	  soundness	  condition	  involves	  the	  notion	  of	   truth,	  and	   it	   is	  a	   condition	   that	   concerns	   the	  correctness	  or	   fulfillment	  of	   the	  contents	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  mental	  states	  involved	  in	  the	  transition.”	  Thus,	  we	  only	  know	  that	  a	  transition	  from	  true	  premises	  to	  a	  true	  conclusion	  in	  deductively	  valid	  inference	  is	  rational	  because	  it	  is	  truth-­‐preserving.	  Because	  Gupta	  gives	  no	  content	  to	  experience,	   it	  cannot	  meet	  this	  condition.	  However,	  Gupta	  never	  argues	  that	  an	  experience	  makes	  a	  mental	  transition	  rational,	  only	  that	  a	  revision	  of	  a	  view	  is	  rational	  if	  such	  revision	  converges.	  This	  means	  that	  any	  version	  of	  the	  Ratifiability	  Condition	  would	  need	  to	  apply	  to	  full	  revision	  processes,	  not	  primitively	  to	  each	  experientially	  motivated	  step	  in	  the	  revision	  process.	   Gupta	   shows	   that	   the	   process	   of	   revision	   can	   be	   ratifiable	   in	   this	   way.	   We	   offer	   a	   more	  complete	  response	  to	  Peacocke	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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conditions	  are	  ideal,	  having	  seen	  the	  car	  from	  the	  comfort	  of	  their	  respective	  living	  rooms	  through	  their	  front	  windows	  in	  what	  they	  both	  believe	  to	  be	  normal,	  well	  lit	  conditions.	   Both	   rightly	   believe	   that	   their	   respective	   sense	   organs	   are	   working	  properly.	  Fred	  has	  had	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  car	  as	  purple,	  Jesse	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  car	  as	  red.	  Fred	  has	  a	  conditional	  entitlement	  to	  (P),	  Jesse	  a	  conditional	  entitlement	  to	   (R).	  Now	   imagine	   Fred	   leaves	   his	   house	   after	   having	   a	   conversation	  with	   Jesse	  about	  Sally’s	  car.	  He	  thinks	  Jesse	  is	  wrong	  to	  hold	  (R).	  Upon	  a	  closer	  viewing,	  Fred’s	  experience	   matches	   Jesse’s.	   The	   car	   is	   red.	   Fred	   remembers	   he	   just	   had	   new	  windows	  put	  in	  his	  home,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  a	  subtle,	  blue	  UV-­‐blocking	  tint	  on	  them.	  His	  initial	  view	  was	  incorrect.	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  very	  different	  initial	  views,	  Fred	  and	  Jesse	  now	  agree	  on	  the	  colour	  of	  the	  car.	  	   Using	   Gupta’s	   notation,	   let	   us	   represent	   in	   symbols	   the	   general	   epistemic	  contribution	  of	  an	  experience	  e	  as	  	  	   Γe	  	  and	  the	  perceptual	  judgments	  one	  is	  entitled	  to	  hold	  in	  light	  of	  Γe	  	  given	  some	  view	  v	  as	  	  	   Γe(v).	  	  Now,	   imagine	   a	   rational	   agent	   at	   stage	   0	   of	   a	   revision	   process.	   At	   stage	   1	   of	   the	  revision	   process—the	   first	   link	   in	   a	   chain	   of	   constant	   revisions	   of	   view	   v	   (or	   the	  “input	   view”)	   given	   the	   set	   of	   perceptual	   judgments	  Γe(v)	   indexed	   to	   the	  previous	  revision	   level—a	   new	   view	   is	   generated	   based	   on	   some	   new	   experience.	   More	  formally,	   Γe(v)	   is	   the	   class	   of	   perceptual	   judgments	   generated	   at	   stage	   0	   by	   the	  combination	  of	  experience	  and	  world	  view.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  our	  first	  revision:	  
	  
	   New	  View1	  =	  R(v*,	  (Γe(v)).	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New	  View1	   is	   the	  result	  of	  revising	  v	   in	   light	  of	  Γe(v).	   It	   is	  also	  the	  “output	  view”	  of	  stage	  0	  and	  the	  view	  the	  rational	  agent	  brings	  to	  stage	  1,	  where	  the	  rational	  agent	  undergoes	  experiences	  and	  will	  need	  to	  revise	  this	  view	  to	  
	  
	   New	  View2	  =	  R(R(v*,	  (Γe(New	  View1)))).	  	  There	  may	  not	  be	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  New	  View1	  and	  New	  View2;	  there	  are	  no	  epistemic	  guarantees	  that	  each	  experience	  will	  force	  a	  rational	  change	  in	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  only	  the	  commitment	  that	  experience	  can	  force	  a	  rational	  change	  in	   view.	   If	   the	   process	   continues,	   it	   can	   be	   represented	   in	   the	   following	   way.	   A	  sequence	  of	  views	  
	  
	   V	  =	  <v0,v1,	  v2,...	  vn,…>	  	  is	  revised	  (starting	  with	  v0)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  experiences	  
	  
	   E	  =	  <e0,	  e1,	  e2,	  …en,…>	  	  to	  generate	  
	  
	   v1	  =	  R’(v0,	  e0)	  	  and	  on	  up	   to	   value	  n	   for	   the	  definiendum	  occurrence	  of	   “v”,	   and	  value	  n-­‐1	   for	   the	  definiens	  occurrence	  of	  “v”	  and	  “e”.	  	   If,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  revision,	  the	  epistemic	  agent	  arrives	  stably	  at	  a	  belief	  Q	  as	  part	   of	   view	   vx	   (as	   a	   result	   of	   revising	   V	   in	   light	   of	   E),	   and	   if	   all	   other	   revision	  processes	  with	  alternative	   initial	  views	  also	  converge	  on	  Q	  (in	  spite	  of	   their	   initial	  differences)	  in	  light	  of	  E,	  then	  we	  have	  categorical	  entitlement	  to	  Q.24	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  A	   sequence	   of	   views	   V	   is	   stable	   iff	   there	   is	   s	   stage	   n	   such	   that,	   for	   all	   stages	   m	   ≥	   n,	   Vm	   is	  fundamentally	  equivalent	  to	  Vn.	  Views	  are	  fundamentally	  equivalent	  just	  in	  case	  they	  are	  “the	  same	  in	  all	  relevant	  respects.”	  (See	  Gupta	  [2006a],	  91.)	  Two	  revision	  sequences,	  V	  and	  V’,	  converge	  iff	  there	  is	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   The	   strength	   of	   such	   a	   view	   should	   be	   apparent.	   The	   Insight	   is	   now	  preserved,	  since	  the	  revision	  process	  itself	  can	  yield	  categorical	  knowledge,	  utilising	  experience	  as	  our	  “principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide.”	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  is	  preserved	  because	  no	  view	  has	  been	  privileged	  without	  being	  properly	  guided	  by	  experience.	   The	   constraints	   are	   also	   met.	   Existence	   is	   satisfied;	   we	   have	   actually	  gone	   beyond	   this	   constraint	   to	   offer	   a	   full	   logical	   characterisation	   of	   the	   given	   in	  experience.	  Equivalence	  is	   satisfied	  even	  when	   two	  agents	  may	  disagree	  about	   the	  meaning	   of	   their	   experience	   because	   we	   can	   make	   sense	   of	   such	   disagreements	  while	   keeping	   the	   rational	   import	   of	   experience	   fixed.	   Reliability	   is	   satisfied	  vacuously.	  Since	  the	  given	  in	  experience	  is	  logically	  characterised	  as	  a	  function,	  it	  is	  not	   of	   the	   right	   logical	   category	   to	   be	   truth-­‐evaluable,	   and	   therefore	   it	   does	   not	  provide	   us	   with	   false	   propositions.	   Lastly,	   Manifestation	   is	   respected;	   rational	  changes	   of	   view	   are	   based	   on	   the	   subjective	   character	   of	   experience,	   not	   some	  semantic	  trick	  that	  simply	  assigns	  the	  desired	  content	  to	  experience	  in	  an	  arbitrary	  or	  ad	  hoc	  fashion.	  	  	   Gupta	  places	  only	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  admissibility	  criteria	  on	  initial	  views:	  they	  may	   not	   be	   pathological,	   i.e.	   you	   cannot	   genuinely	   begin	   an	   epistemic	   revision	  process	   with	   a	   rigid	   view	   that	   is	   immune	   to	   epistemic	   revision;	   they	   must	   be	  
receptive,	   i.e.	  they	  must	  yield	  different	  perceptual	  judgments	  when	  experiences	  are	  subjectively	   distinct;	   and,	   lastly,	   they	   must	   be	   internally	   coherent.	   Solipsism	   and	  scepticism	  (where	  “scepticism”	  refers	  to	  some	  severe	  form	  of	  the	  doctrine,	  one	  that	  does	   not	   allow	   any	   experience	   to	   produce	   any	   perceptual	   judgments,	   and	   which	  does	  not,	  therefore,	  allow	  for	  revision	  of	  view	  in	  light	  of	  experience)	  are	  blocked	  as	  initial	  views	   in	  a	   revision	  process	  because	  no	  possible	  experience	  can	  upset	   them.	  (Gupta	   [2006a],	   172-­‐175)	   Notice,	   though,	   that	   solipsism	   and	   scepticism	   are	   not	  blocked	   entirely,	   only	   as	   initial	   views	   in	   a	   revision	   process.	   The	   sceptic	   is	   free	   to	  show	  how,	  from	  some	  innocent	  and	  revisable	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  we	  can	  converge	  on	  the	  view	  that	  we	  are	  brains	  in	  vats.	  This,	  however,	  is	  a	  much	  harder	  task	  (and	  not	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  stage	  n	  such	  that,	  for	  all	  stages	  m	  ≥	  n,	  Vm	  is	  virtually	  identical	  to	  V’m.	  The	  relation	  of	  virtual	  identity	  holds	  between	  two	  views,	  V	  and	  V’,	  just	  in	  case	  an	  agent	  with	  V	  and	  an	  agent	  with	  V’	  have	  nearly	  the	  same	  view.	  (See	  Gupta	  [2006a],	  93.)	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very	  sceptical	  conclusion,	  anyway).	  Merely	  highlighting	  the	  possibility	  does	  nothing	  to	  mitigate	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   our	   non-­‐sceptical	   views.	   Like	  Moore,	   Gupta	   has	  shown	   that	   the	   ball	   really	   is	   in	   the	   sceptic’s	   court—it	   is	   the	   sceptic	  who	   owes	   us	  reasons	  for	  agreeing	  with	  her,	  not	  vice	  versa.	  Unlike	  Moore,	  Gupta	  is	  able	  to	  arrive	  at	  this	   point	   in	   the	   dialectic	   with	   the	   sceptic	   whilst	   still	   observing	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	  	  	   	  
§IV:	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Gupta	   has	   taken	   up	   a	   reasonable	   position	   against	   the	   sceptic,	   avoided	   the	  propositional	  given,	  and	  remained	  true	   to	   the	   Insight,	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	  and	  the	  constraints.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  a	   full	  appreciation	  of	  his	  account.	   In	  Chapter	   Three,	   we	   will	   examine	   some	   of	   the	   main	   criticisms	   of	   Gupta’s	   account,	  specifically	   the	   criticisms	   offered	   by	  Neta,	   Peacocke,	   Berker,	   and	   Schafer.	  We	  will	  isolate	  certain	  common	  themes	  in	  these	  criticisms	  (to	  the	  effect	  that	  Gupta’s	  system	  is	   rationalism	   hiding	   in	   empiricist’s	   clothing),	   and	   dispel	   common	   assumptions	   at	  the	  heart	  of	  such	  mis-­‐readings.	  	  Before	   we	   get	   to	   such	   concerns,	   we	   will	   stop	   in	   Chapter	   Two	   to	   discuss	  Gupta’s	   characterisation	   of	   “classical	   empiricism”,	   which,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   he	  identifies	  with	   the	  general	  sense-­‐datum	  account	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Chapter	  Two	  will	  show	  that	  Gupta’s	  alternative	  to	  classical	  empiricism	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  insights	   of	   earlier	   post-­‐Kantian	   criticisms	   of	   classical	   empiricism.	   Our	   critical	  analysis	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  which	   follows	   the	  survey	  of	  existing	  critiques	   in	  Chapter	  3,	  makes	  sense	  only	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  extension	  of	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  into	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  The	  late	  stages	  of	  post-­‐Kantian	  empiricism	  surveyed	  in	   Chapter	   Two	   motivate	   our	   contention	   that	   exigencies	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	  (particularly	   its	   inherently	  formal	  character)	  demand	  slight	  alterations	  be	  made	  to	  Gupta’s	  new	  interpretation	  of	  empiricism.	  The	  proposed	  extension	  (and	  subsequent	  assessment	  of	  Gupta’s	  account	  in	  light	  of	  that	  extension)	  will	  comprise	  the	  final	  two	  sections	  of	  Chapter	  Three,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  Conclusion.	  
	  





An	  Historical	  Taxonomy	  of	  Empiricism	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  we	  were	  introduced	  to	  a	  new	  interpretation	  of	  empiricism,	  
viz.	   Reformed	  Empiricism.	  The	  details	   of	   this	   interpretation	  were	   characterised	   in	  relation	   to	   an	   idealisation	   of	   what	   Gupta	   refers	   to	   as	   “classical	   empiricism”,	  specifically	   a	   generalised	   sense-­‐datum	   theory	   of	   perception	   and	   perceptual	  knowledge—one	  that	  is	  wedded	  to	  a	  propositional	  model	  of	  the	  given.	  We	  saw	  that	  the	   adoption	   of	   the	   propositional	  model	   of	   the	   given	  was	   the	   outcome	   of	   certain	  Cartesian	   theses	   and	   themes	   that	   came	   to	   influence	   particular	   strands	   of	   British	  empiricism	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centuries,	  including	  the	  commitment	  to	   indirect	   representationalism,	   idealism,	   the	   significance	   of	   sceptical	   arguments	  (and	   the	   need	   to	   address	   such	   arguments),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   epistemological	  commitment	  to	  foundational	  certitude.	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   we	   will	   examine	   more	   closely	   this	   Cartesian	   model	   of	  experience,	   and	   its	   historical	   significance	   to	   empiricism.	   In	   §I,	   we	   will	   attempt	   a	  limited,	   though	   illuminating,	   overview	   of	   the	   Cartesian	   legacy	   in	   empiricism—an	  examination	   of	   the	   principal	   British	   empiricists	   (especially	   Locke)	   in	   regard	   to	  Cartesian	   representationalism	   and	   the	   Cartesian-­‐cum-­‐Lockean	  way	  of	   ideas.	   In	   §II	  we	  will	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  developing	  sciences	  (in	  particular,	  the	  mechanical	   philosophy,	   optics,	   and	   Newton’s	   physics)	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  development	  of	  empiricism	   in	   the	  17th	  and	  18th	   centuries.	   In	  §III	  we	  will	   look	  at	  a	  
break	  in	  empiricism	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  partly	  as	  a	  response	  to	  new	  developments	  in	  non-­‐Euclidean	  geometries,	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  developments	  in	  physics,	  and	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  new	  empirical	  sciences	  of	  perception	  (in	  particular	  the	  physiology	  of	  visual	  perception).	  We	  will	   focus	  on	  Helmholtz’s	   and	  Mach’s	   turn	   to	  naturalism	   in	  the	   19th	   century,	   paying	   special	   attention	   to	   Helmholtz’s	   characterisation	   of	   our	  mathematical	   knowledge	   as	   based	   on	   basic	   mechanical	   “facts”,	   and	   Mach’s	  empiricist	   critique	   of	   Newton’s	   notion	   of	   absolute	   motion.	   We	   will	   argue	   that	  Helmholtz	  and	  Mach	  offer	  us	  an	  insight	  into	  just	  how	  different	  post-­‐Kantian	  forms	  of	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empiricism	  were	   from	   their	   classical	   British	   counterparts.	   In	   §IV,	  we	   examine	   the	  influence	   of	   such	   considerations	   on	   later	   forms	   of	   empiricism,	   particularly	   the	  relationship	   between	   Helmholtz’s	   naturalism	   and	   conventionalism,	   with	   a	   brief	  examination	  of	  Poincaré’s	   interpretation	  of	   the	  convex	  mirror	   thought	  experiment	  in	  Helmholtz	  [1868/1977a].	  We	  then	  survey	  the	   impact	  of	  conventionalism	  on	  the	  early	   Vienna	   Circle.	  We	  will	   argue	   that	  what	   are	   often	   taken	   to	   be	   the	  most	   clear	  expressions	   of	   Cartesianism	   (or	   classical	   empiricism)	   in	   the	   logical	   empiricist	  tradition,	   specifically	   the	   reliance	   on	   protocol	   sentences,	   and	   Carnap’s	  phenomenalist	   reduction	   of	   scientific	   concepts	   in	   his	   [1928/2003,	   hereafter	  
Aufbau],	   are	   best	   viewed	   as	   non-­‐Cartesian	   (perhaps	   even	   anti-­‐Cartesian)	   in	  character.	   Carnap’s	   “construction	   of	   the	   world”	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	   radical	  rethinking	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   empirical	   concepts	   and	   formal/theoretical	  concepts,	   one	   that	   Carnap	   developed	   in	   various	  ways	   throughout	   his	   career.	   	   The	  Quinean	  misinterpretation	  of	  Carnap’s	  “external	  world	  project”,	  which	  Quine	  sees	  as	  the	  culmination	  and	  epitomous	  expression	  of	  Cartesianism-­‐cum-­‐empiricism,	  will	  be	  critiqued.	   We	   will	   argue	   that	   Quine’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Aufbau	   and	   its	  significance	  to	  epistemology	  since	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  last	  century	  (a)	  belies	  the	  very	  new	   course	   for	   philosophy	  which	   Carnap	   (and	   the	   Vienna	   Circle	  more	   generally)	  pursued,	  and	  (b)	  has	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  number	  of	  misconceptions	  regarding	  logical	  empiricism	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature.	  	  In	   spite	   of	   the	   historical	   scope	   of	   this	   chapter,	   its	   purpose	   is	   narrow	   and	  focused	   in	   light	   of	   our	   studies	   thus	   far:	   we	   hope	   to	   get	   clear	   on	   Gupta’s	  characterisation	   of	   “classical	   empiricism”	   as	   being	   definitively	   committed	   to	   the	  propositional	  character	  of	  the	  given,	  especially	  if	  that	  model	  is	  thought	  (in	  its	  ideal	  case)	  to	  be	  akin	  to	  a	  sense-­‐datum	  theory	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  We	  are	  arguing	  for	  a	  decisive	  break	  between	  what	  we	  may	  call	  “Classical	  British	  Empiricism”	  (“CBE”,	  for	   short),	   including	   the	   principal	   British	   empiricists,	   Locke,	   Berkeley,	  Hume,	   and,	  what	   may	   best	   be	   called	   “Modern	   Scientific	   Empiricism”	   (“MSE”,	   for	   short),	   a	  tradition	   beginning	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   and	   culminating	   in	   the	  work	   of	   the	   logical	  empiricists;	   what	   can	   be	   said	   about	   CBE	   regarding	   a	   commitment	   to	   Cartesian	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themes	   can	   very	   rarely	   be	   said	   about	   MSE.	   In	   fact,	   MSE	   is	   often	   very	   hostile	   to	  Cartesian	  accounts	  of	  experience,	  perception,	  and	  knowledge;	  it	  is	  rather	  an	  attempt	  to	   conceive	   of	   empiricism	   anew—as	   a	   branch	   of	   philosophy	   concerned	   with	  understanding	  how	  our	   scientific	   knowledge	   could	   inform	  philosophical	   concerns,	  not	  merely	   the	  vice	  versa.	  While	  Gupta	   rightly	   sees	   the	   need	   to	   reform	   the	   logical	  confusions	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   CBE,	   his	   taxonomical	   category	   of	   “classical	   empiricism”	  blurs	   the	  distinction	  here	  proposed	  and	  obscures	   just	  how	  much	  of	  his	  account	  of	  Reformed	   Empiricism,	   specifically	   its	   critical	   part,	   finds	   similar	   expression	   in	   the	  careful	   work	   of	   scientifically	   minded	   philosophers	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	  centuries.	  	  
§I:	  Epistemology	  as	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  Representation	  The	  idea	  that	  Cartesianism	  is	  central	  to	  modern	  epistemology	  is	  not	  novel	  in	  Gupta,	  though	   his	   characterisation	   of	   Cartesianism	   (based	   on	   its	   logical	   categorisation	   of	  experience)	   is.	   Critical	   examinations	   of	   the	   Cartesian	   influence	   in	   empiricism	   are	  due	  mostly	  to	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  critiques	  of	  empiricism,	  beginning	  with	  veiled	  remarks	   in	   Wittgenstein	   [1953,	   1969/1972],	   Quine’s	   sustained	   attack	   on	  phenomenological	  reductionism	  in	  his	  [1951/1961]	  and	  [1969/2004],	  as	  well	  as	  his	  attribution	   of	   Cartesian	   epistemology	   to	   Carnap’s	   Aufbau	   in	   the	   introduction	   of	  Quine	  [1936/2004].	  Gupta	  focuses	  much	  of	  his	  attention	  on	  Sellars’	  analysis	  of	  the	  mythical	   aspects	   of	   the	   given—the	   given	   as	   a	   pure	   and	   neutral	   conceptual	   realm,	  free	   from	   the	   concepts	   and	   categories	  we	   employ	   in	   common	   sense	   and	   scientific	  discourse.25	  The	   argument	   from	  Sellars	   is	   that	   such	  a	  myth	   extends	   as	   far	  back	   as	  Descartes,	   and	   as	   far	   forward	   as	   sense-­‐datum	   theories	   of	   perception.	   However,	  Gupta	  is	  mostly	  silent	  regarding	  just	  how	  far	  the	  “classical	  empiricist”	  tradition	  is	  to	  extend.	  The	  work	  of	  Russell	  is	  often	  mentioned,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  key	  Cartesian	  themes	  (direct	  awareness,	  reductionism,	  and	  scepticism),	  though	  other	  20th	  century	  figures	   are	   little	   discussed	   in	   the	   book.	   Reichenbach	   is	   well	   (though	   limitedly)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Gupta	  surveys	  Sellars’	  criticism	  of	  the	  classical	  view	  of	  experience	  in	  a	  subsection	  of	  the	  5th	  chapter	  of	   his	   [2006a],	   “5B	   The	   Sellarsian	   Criticism”.	   For	   Gupta’s	   critiques	   of	   the	   Sellarsian	   position,	   see	  especially	   124-­‐130.	   For	   a	   full	   account	   of	   the	   overview	   of	   Sellars’	   theory	   of	   perception,	   see	   Gupta	  [2012].	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utilised	  to	  give	  full	  expression	  to	  Hume’s	  “empiricist	  principle”	  (that	  reason	  can	  only	  make	  analytic	  contributions	   to	  our	  knowledge),	  but	  nothing	   is	   said	  of	  his	  nuanced	  account	   of	   the	   “neutrality”	   of	   experience,	   a	   view	   which	   seems	   (at	   least	   on	   the	  surface)	  to	  be	  amenable	  to	  Gupta’s	  own	  project.	  	  Carnap	  too	  is	  sparsely	  dealt	  with.	  He	  is	  encountered	  in	  only	  three	  footnotes:	  the	   first	   of	   which	   expresses	   Quine’s	   indebtedness	   to	   phenomenalism	   of	   the	   sort	  thought	   to	   be	   expressed	   in	   Carnap’s	  Aufbau	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   47fn);	   the	   second,	   a	  reference	   to	   §64	   of	   the	  Aufbau,	  which	  Gupta	   takes	   to	   be	   Carnap’s	   expression	   of	   a	  phenomenalist	   foundationalism	  (akin	   to	  Russell’s	   sense-­‐datum	  basis	  of	  knowledge	  in	   his	   [1914/2009])	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   109fn);	   the	   third	   and	   final	   reference	   to	   the	  similarity	  between	  Quine	  and	  the	  mature	  Carnap	  regarding	  the	  commitment	  to	  see	  ontological	  questions	  as	   largely	  reducible	  to	  “manners	  of	  speaking”	  (Quine	  [1981],	  474)	  or	  acceptance	  of	  a	   “certain	   form	  of	   language”	   (Carnap	   [1950],	   §2).	  While	   the	  footnote	  on	  page	  47	  does	  make	  reference	  to	  recent	  work	  that	  has	  challenged	  Quine’s	  misreading	   of	   Carnap’s	   Aufbau—citing	   Friedman	   [1999],	   Richardson	   [2003],	   and	  Sauer	  [1989]—,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  Gupta	  comes	  at	  the	   logical	  empiricist	   tradition	  only	  obliquely	   through	   Sellars	   and	   Quine.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   assumption	   that	   Carnap	  (especially	   the	   Carnap	   of	   the	   Aufbau)	   fits	   well	   into	   the	   Cartesian	   tradition	   goes	  unchallenged.	  We	  wish	   to	   call	   attention	   to	   the	  Quinean	  misreading	  as	   it	   relates	   to	  Gupta’s	  taxonomy.	  	  	  	  As	  we	  shall	   see	  below,	   the	  common	  thread	  Gupta	   finds	  running	   throughout	  Cartesian	   models	   of	   experience	   is	   an	   account	   of	   direct	   awareness	   of	   an	   internal,	  subjective	   realm.	   CBE,	   and	   a	   strain	   of	   British	   empiricism	   coming	   into	   the	   20th	  century,	  surely	  did	  hold	  such	  a	  view.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  it	  played	  little	  to	  no	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  MSE,	  and	  is	  not	  the	  source	  of	  modern	  variants	  of	  classical	  projects	  (in	  particular,	  Carnap’s	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  external	  world	  in	  the	  Aufbau).	  	  
	  
I.1:	  Classical	  Empiricism—Beyond	  Aristotle	  and	  Descartes	  As	   Jesse	   Prinz	   [2002]	   has	   noted,	   the	   imagistic	   basis	   of	   our	   conceptual	   knowledge	  runs	   deep	   in	   the	   philosophical	   tradition,	   from	  Aristotle	   to	   the	   British	   empiricists.	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(See	   especially	   Prinz	   [2002],	   Chapter	   2,	   section	   2.1)	   Prinz	   is	   explicitly	   concerned	  with	   discussing	   the	   nature	   of	   our	   concepts;	   from	   the	   context	   of	   our	   inquiry,	   this	  focus	  is	  somewhat	  tangential.	  From	  what	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  our	  concerns	  are	  much	   less	  with	   the	  nature	  of	  concepts	   than	  with	  our	  account	  of	  how	  they	  are	  known,	  and	  how	  they	  may	  relate	  to	  the	  more	  primary	  matter	  at	  hand:	  our	  knowledge	   of	   (empirical)	   judgments.	   Nonetheless,	   imagism	   was	   a	   central	  component	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	   picture	   that	   Descartes	  was	   looking	   to	   replace,	   and,	  almost	   paradoxically,	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	   Lockean	   view	   of	   experience	   that	  Descartes	   inspired.	   Because	   of	   its	   centrality	   to	   British	   empiricism,	   imagism	   is	  worthy	  of	  some	  discussion	  here.	  It	  was	  Aristotle	  who	  first	  argued	  that	  thinking	  is	  essentially	  imagistic:	  “To	  the	  thinking	  soul	  images	  serve	  as	  if	  they	  were	  contents	  of	  perception…	  That	  is	  why	  the	  soul	  never	  thinks	  without	  an	  image.”	  (Aristotle	  [1984],	  431a15)	  The	  view	  is	  that	  all	  thinking	  is	  at	   least	  mediated	  by	  images,	   if	  not	  directed	  upon	  images	  present	  to	  the	  mind	  (as	  actualised	  by	  the	  senses).	  This	  imagism	  was	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  Plato’s	  formal	   theory	   of	   knowledge;	   for	   Plato,	   images	   could	   not	   perform	   the	   central	  epistemic	   role	   attributed	   them	   by	   Aristotle.	   This	   is	   for	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   we	  simply	   have	   no	   relevant	   images	   to	   associate	   with	   many	   of	   the	   most	   significant	  abstract	   concepts	   we	   use,	   such	   as	   virtue,	   justice,	   the	   good,	   etc.	   Secondly,	   images	  always	  carry	  with	  them	  a	  particularity,	  and	  an	  empirical	  genealogy.	  How	  could	  we	  ever	  come	  to	  understand	  (and	  think	  with/about)	  universal	  concepts	  based	  on	  such	  a	  meager	   empirical	   basis?	   (For	   Plato’s	   most	   sustained	   disagreements	   with	   the	  empirical	   theory	   of	   concepts	   see	   the	  Meno	   and	   Phaedo.)	   Moreover,	   how	   could	   a	  particular	  come	   to	  stand	   in	   for	   the	  general	  class	  of	   things	   the	  universal	  concept	   is	  thought	  to	  capture?	  Aristotle’s	  response	  was	  essentially	  to	  allow	  some	  images	  to	  be	  abstractions	  from	  particular	  cases,	  so	  that	  we	  may	  arrive	  at	  a	  general	  or	  universal	  idea	  based	  on	  abstracted	   similarities	  of	   the	  particular	   instantiations	  of	   the	   concept	   that	  we	  have	  come	  across	  in	  experience.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  pronounced	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mathematics	  and	  “first	  philosophy”,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  case	  of	  physics.	  For	  Aristotle,	  physics	   is	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concerned	   with	   all	   of	   the	   characteristics,	   active	   and	   passive,	   of	   bodies.	   (Aristotle	  [1984],	   403b12)	   Physics	   thus	   requires	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   abstraction	   to	   get	   its	  proper	   object,	   though	   Aristotle	   does	   note	   that	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   physics	   is	  relatively	  more	  abstract	  than	  the	  subject	  matter	  in,	  say,	  carpentry	  or	  even	  medicine.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Aristotle	   views	   mathematics	   as	   concerned	   with	   number	   and	  geometrical	  shape,	  each	  “inseparable	  [from	  bodies]	  in	  fact,	  but…	  separable	  from	  any	  particular	   kind	   of	   body	   by	   an	   effort	   of	   abstraction”.	   (Aristotle	   [1984],	   403b13)	  Metaphysics,	  because	   it	   is	  associated	  with	  general	  knowledge	  and	  wisdom,	  cannot	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  sensual	  experience,	  since,	  for	  Aristotle,	  “sense-­‐perception	  is	  common	  to	  all,	  and	  therefore	  easy	  and	  no	  mark	  of	  wisdom”.	  (Aristotle	  [1984],	  982a11)	  The	  true	  mark	  of	  knowledge	  and	  wisdom	  is	  for	  Aristotle	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Plato:	  formal	  and	  universal.	  Aristotle	  writes:	  	  	  Such	  and	  so	  many	  are	   the	  notions,	   then,	  which	  we	  have	  about	  wisdom	  and	  the	  wise.	  Now	  of	  these	  characteristics	  that	  of	  knowing	  all	  things	  must	  belong	  to	  him	  who	  has	  in	  the	  highest	  degree	  universal	  knowledge;	  for	  he	  knows	  in	  a	  sense	  all	  the	  subordinate	  objects.	  And	  these	  things,	  the	  most	  universal,	  are	  on	  the	  whole	  the	  hardest	  for	  men	  to	  know;	  for	  they	  are	  furthest	  from	  the	  senses.	  (Aristotle	  [1984],	  982a20)	  	  	  But	   Aristotle	   only	   agrees	   with	   Plato	   superficially;	   yes,	   knowledge	   and	  wisdom	  are	  associated	  with	  universals,	  but	  such	  knowledge,	  while	  furthest	  from	  the	  senses,	   nonetheless	   finds	   its	   genesis	   in	   the	   images	   actualised	   in	   the	  mind	   by	   the	  senses	  (as	  opposed	  to	  some	  rational	  faculty	  of	  recollection).	  He	  responds	  to	  Plato’s	  criticism	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   get	   a	   universal	   from	   particulars	   by	   taking	   full	  advantage	   of	   a	   broad-­‐scope	   conception	   of	   abstraction:	   since	   one	   of	   the	  characteristics	   of	   any	   body	   is	   that	   it	   is	   perceptible,	   we	  merely	   abstract	   from	   our	  perception	   of	   the	   particular	   its	   perceptibility.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   how	   mathematical	  objects	   can	  be	   countenanced	  by	   a	   theory	   of	   abstraction:	   some	   “images”	   of	   objects	  are	  not	  perceptible,	  for	  the	  perceptibility	  of	  the	  object	  has	  been	  abstracted	  away	  by	  an	   action	   of	   mind—in	   particular,	   an	   action	   of	   the	   mathematician’s	   mind.	   The	  metaphysician	  goes	  one	  abstraction	  further,	  according	  to	  Aristotle—by	  discovering	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what	  is	  separate	  from	  body,	  i.e.	  the	  universal	  which	  it	  instantiates.	  Call	  this	  “Broad-­‐Scope	  Abstractionism”.	  We	  will	  see	  below	  that	  Locke,	  availing	  himself	  of	  a	  notion	  of	  abstraction	   much	   more	   narrow	   in	   scope,	   is	   able	   to	   avoid	   some	   of	   the	   pitfalls	   of	  ancient	  epistemology	  by	  moving	   toward	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  modern	   imagism:	   the	  
way	  of	  ideas.	  	  Before	  making	  such	  comparisons,	  we	  should	  stop	  to	  note	  that	  while	  we	  have	  attributed	  to	  Descartes	  the	  general	  theory	  of	  representationalism	  adopted	  by	  Locke	  (“the	  way	  of	  ideas”),	  Descartes’	  theory	  of	  representation	  is	  a	  hybrid	  of	  imagism	  and	  descriptivism,	  attributing	  to	  the	  human	  mind	  a	  distinct	  intellectual	  faculty	  which	  can	  address	   concepts	   directly.	   This	   faculty	   operates	   when	   we	   conceive	   of	   things	   that	  cannot	  be	  represented	  to	  us	  as	  such.	  God	   is	  obviously	  such	  a	  concept	  for	  Descartes,	  but	  the	  faculty	   is	  operating	  more	  subtly	   in	  the	  Wax	  Argument	  of	  Meditation	  II	  and	  Descartes’	  comments	  about	  the	  impossibility	  of	   imagining	  (representing	  in	  sensual	  imagination)	  a	  chillagon.	  Ayers	  has	  noted	  that	   “[h]ostility	   to	  Descartes’	  conception	  of	   intellect	  pervades	   the	  Essay,”	   (Ayers	   [1991],	  48),	  but	   this	  does	  not	  yet	  establish	  for	  us	  that	  Locke	  was,	  as	  Ayers	  makes	  him	  out	  to	  be,	  an	  unequivocal	  imagist	  (of	  an	  Aristotelian	  sort).	  	  Imagism	  can	  best	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  beholden	  to	  three	  theses:	  (1)	  objects	  are	  presented	   in	   thought	   as	   they	   are	   presented	   in	   sensation;	   (2)	   there	   is	   no	   rational	  faculty	   which	   mediates	   this	   presentation;	   (3)	   only	   memory	   and	   sensation	   are	  required	  to	  explain	  the	  acquisition	  and	  character	  of	  ideas.	  Locke	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  he	  holds	  theses	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  Book	  II	  of	  the	  Essay,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  via	  Locke’s	  method	  of	  abstraction	  that	  (1)	  is	  established,	  and	  only	  tenuously	  at	  that.	  In	  Book	  II,	  1,	  3,	  Locke	  comes	  closest	  to	  conveying	  (1)	  when	  introducing	  the	  faculty	  of	  sensation:	  “First,	  Our	  Senses,	  conversant	  about	  particular	  sensible	  Objects,	  do	  convey	  
into	  the	  mind,	  several	  distinct	  Perceptions	  of	  things,	  according	  to	  those	  various	  ways,	  wherein	  those	  Objects	  do	  affect	  them…”	  But	  what	  then	  of	  complex	  ideas,	  which	  seem	  to	  fail	  to	  be	  “conveyed”	  or	  presented	  to	  the	  mind	  in	  sensation—what	  of	  our	  abstract	  idea	  of	  whiteness	  (to	  use	  one	  of	  Locke’s	  examples)	  as	  that	  property	  which	  is	  shared	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  milk,	  the	  idea	  of	  snow,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  chalk	  (much	  less	  ideas	  such	  as	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uncle-­‐ness,	  perfect	  justice,	  or	  virtue)?	  Like	  Aristotle’s	  imagism,	  Locke’s	  imagism	  must	  countenance	  such	  ideas,	  as	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  present	  to	  the	  mind	  (often	  in	  ways	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  simple	  ideas),	  and	  their	  genesis	  may	  not	  be	  located,	  by	  theses	  (2)	  and	  (3),	   in	   an	   intellectual	   faculty.	   (Other	   problematic	   ideas	   include	   “the	   powers”	   of	  material	   things	   to	   cause	   in	   us	   simple	   ideas,	   non-­‐hedonic	   ideas	   pertaining	   to	  morality,	  ideas	  of	  existence,	  etc.)	  	  	  Locke’s	   account	   of	   abstraction,	   like	   Aristotle’s,	   is	   meant	   to	   explain	   how	   at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  ideas	  may	  be	  present	  before	  the	  mind	  whilst	  not	  seeming	  to	  be	  images.	   In	   the	  Essay,	   Locke	   argues	   for	   a	   principle	   of	   abstraction	  whereby	   a	   given	  idea	  is	  separated	  from	  all	  other	  ideas	  that	  accompany	  it	  in	  existence.	  (Book	  II,	  11,	  9)	  So	   far,	  Locke	  shares	  with	  Aristotle	  an	  account	  of	  abstraction	   that	  classifies	  certain	  ideas	  (namely	  abstract	  ideas)	  as	  those	  that	  are	  free	  from	  the	  full	  reality	  and	  context	  of	   their	   original	   sensation.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   first	   class	   of	   complex	   ideas,	   ideas	   of	  
Substance—“…	   the	   combination	  of	   simple	   Ideas,	   as	   are	   taken	   to	   represent	  distinct	  particular	   things	   subsisting	   by	   themselves”	   (Book	   II,	   12,	   5)—there	   is	   still	   an	  attachment	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  real	  essence	  as	  distinct	  from	  nominal	  essence	  of	  the	  thing.	  Another	  class	  of	  complex	  ideas,	  the	  Modes,	  is	  populated	  by	  ideas	  separable	  from	  the	  context	   of	   their	   original	   sensation—ideas	   which	   “contain	   not	   in	   them	   the	  supposition	  of	  subsisting	  by	  themselves,	  but	  are	  considered	  as	  Dependencies	  on,	  or	  Affections	  of	  Substances…”	  (Book	  II,	  12,	  4)	  	  As	   Emily	   Carson	   [2006]	   has	   noted,	   the	   key	   distinction	   between	  Modes	   and	  Substances,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   Modes	   best	   exemplify	   the	   free	   activity	   of	   the	   mind	  exhibited	   in	   all	   construction	   of	   complex	   ideas	   from	   simple	   ideas,	   since,	   unlike	  Substances,	  such	  constructions	  are	  not	  restricted	  in	  any	  way	  to	  the	  original	  context	  of	   the	   simple	   ideas—the	   context	   of	   “real	   being”	   presupposed	   by	   Substances.	  Whereas	   Substances	   are	   complexes	   of	   ideas	   that	   we	   know	   are	   in	   constant	  conjunction	   in	   experience,	   Modes	   are	   voluntary	   and	   free	   activities	   of	   the	   mind,	  constructed	  “without	  the	  help	  of	  any	  extrinsical	  Object,	  or	  any	  foreign	  suggestion”.	  (Book	  II,	  13,	  1;	  quoted	  in	  Carson	  [2006],	  5)	  Carson	  introduces	  an	  analogy	  to	  make	  clearer	  the	  distinction	  between	  Substances	  and	  natural	  kinds	  (on	  the	  one	  hand),	  and	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Modes	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  construction	  of	  which	  owes	  nothing	  to	  “the	  reality	  of	  things”	  (as	   Locke	   puts	   it),	   and	   very	   much	   to	   the	   “Thoughts	   of	   men”.26	  Modes	   are	   not	  beholden	   to	  being	   (or	   even	   its	   supposition),	   but	   are	   rather	   the	   free	   association	  of	  ideas	  (so	  long	  as	  those	  ideas	  are	  consistent	  to	  the	  understanding).	  Locke’s	  paradigm	  examples	  are	  beauty,	  triangle,	  gratitude,	  and	  murder	  (“murther”).	  Unlike	  Substances,	  which	  have	  (or	  at	  least	  may	  have)	  a	  distinct	  and	  separate	  real	  essence	  and	  nominal	  essence,	  Modes	  are,	  as	  it	  were,	  entirely	  nominal:	  they	  are	  nothing	  more,	  nor	  do	  they	  purport	  to	  be	  anything	  more,	  than	  abstract	  categories	  based	  on	  appearance.	  	  However,	   it	   is	  entirely	  unclear	  whether	  Locke	  would	  accept	  something	  akin	  to	   the	  Aristotelian	   level	  of	   abstraction	   that	  we	  saw	  earlier	  was	  necessary	   to	  make	  certain	   types	   of	   very	   abstract	   knowledge	   (e.g.	   mathematics	   and	   metaphysics)	  possible	  within	  Aristotle’s	  imagism.	  Recall	  that	  Aristotle	  allowed	  for	  an	  abstraction	  from	   the	  perceptibility	  of	   the	  original	   image	   (as	  a	  mere	  property)	   so	   that	  we	  may	  arrive	   at	   perfectly	   general	   conceptions	   of	   number	   and	   figure	   (as	   required	   by	  arithmetic	  and	  geometry).	  Locke,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  takes	  advantage	  of	  his	  division	  of	  complex	   ideas	   between	   Substance	   and	   Mode	   to	   explain	   our	   mathematical	  knowledge	   (as	  distinct	   from	  metaphysics).	  Whereas	  natural	   philosophy	   (including	  metaphysics)	   presupposes	   a	   notion	   of	   Substance	   which	   it	   cannot	   demonstrate	  (because	  of	   the	   cleavage	  between	   the	   real	   essence	  of	   a	   Substance	  and	   its	  nominal	  essence),	  mathematics	   is	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  Modes	  (whose	  real	  and	  nominal	  essences	  must	  coincide).	  Therefore,	  because	  mathematics	   is	  “only	  of	  our	  ideas”,	   its	  propositions	  can	  be	  certainly	  demonstrated.	  This	  foray	  into	  mathematical	  knowledge	  will	  not	  only	  inform	  the	  discussion	  of	   mathematical	   concerns,	   a	   dominant	   theme	   in	   what	   is	   to	   follow	   later	   in	   this	  chapter	   and	   the	   next;	   it	   also	   calls	   to	   our	   attention	   a	   key	   point	   of	   Locke’s	  epistemology,	   specifically	   his	   notion	   of	   foundational	   certitude.	   For	   Locke,	   certain	  knowledge	  rests	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  purely	  ideal.	  There	  are	  three	  standards	  by	  which	   ideas	   can	  be	   judged	  as	   certain	  or	  uncertain:	   their	   reality	   (as	  opposed	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Strictly	  speaking,	  Locke	  holds	  that	  all	  ideas,	  even	  Modes,	  have	  some	  attachment	  to	  real	  being,	  since	  they	   are	   complexes	   of	   simple	   ideas	  which	   are	   always	   “real”	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   “represent”	   the	  powers	  in	  external	  objects	  to	  cause	  them.	  More	  will	  be	  said	  regarding	  such	  matters	  below.	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illusoriness),	   their	   adequacy	   (as	   opposed	   to	   inadequacy),	   and	   their	   truth	   (as	  opposed	  to	  falsehood).	  Simple	  ideas	  of	  sense	  are	  real	  (in	  that	  they	  are	  passive	  and	  always	   effects	   of	   the	   powers	   of	   external	   causes),	   adequate	   (in	   that	   they	   always	  faithfully	  represent	  the	  powers	  of	  objects	  which	  are	  their	  causes),	  and	  true	  (in	  that	  they	  are	  in	  the	  mind	  as	  they	  are	  because	  of	  the	  powers	  in	  objects	  that	  cause	  them).	  Ideas	  of	  Substance,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  always	  make	  reference	  to	  an	  external	  reality,	  and	   can	   be	   fantastical	   (because	   substances	   require	   activity	   of	   the	  mind	   and	   such	  combinations	  may	  not	  refer	   to	   the	  reality	  of	   things),	   inadequate	  (because	   they	  are	  mere	   “Copies	   of	   those	   Originals,	   and	   Archetypes…”	   and	   are	   thus	   imperfect	   and	  inadequate),	   and	  untrue	   (since	   they	   cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	   the	   simple	   ideas	  whose	  combinations	  we	  come	  to	  know	  them	  by).	  Modes	  are	  the	  other	  paradigm	  of	  certain	  knowledge.	   Because	   of	   their	   ideality,	   they	   are	   real	   (in	   that	   their	   real	   and	  nominal	  essences	   correspond	   to	   one	   another),	   adequate	   (in	   that	   they	   are	   not	   copies,	   but	  originals	  and	  archetypes	  unto	  themselves)	  and	  they	  cannot	  be	  referentially	  false	  (in	  that	   they	   refer	   to	   nothing	   but	   their	   own	   nature).	   Here	   we	   have	   the	   essentials	   of	  Locke’s	  way	  of	  ideas	  (his	  indirect,	  causal	  theory	  of	  representation):	  all	  knowledge	  is	  of	   ideas,	  and	  all	  certain	  knowledge	  comes	  either	   from	  simple	   ideas	  of	  sense	  or	  the	  arbitrary	  and	  voluntary	  constructions	  of	  the	  mind	  (using	  only	  simple	  ideas),	  which	  purport	   no	   reference	   to	   reality.	   Simple	   ideas	   and	   Modes	   are	   the	   benchmark	   for	  knowledge,	  for	  they	  are	  either	  the	  stuff	  that	  is	  immediately	  given	  to	  the	  mind	  or	  the	  innocent	  fabrications	  of	  the	  mind	  based	  on	  what	  is	  immediately	  given.	  We	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  about	  either	  category.	  	  Unlike	  Aristotle,	   then,	  Locke	   countenances	   two	  kinds	  of	   certain	  knowledge:	  the	   ideas	   of	   immediate	   sensation,	   and	   the	   Modes	   that	   are	   abstracted	   from	   them.	  Lockean	   abstraction,	   in	   a	   sense,	   reverses	   the	   Aristotelian	   epistemic	   order	   while	  remaining	  within	  an	  imagistic	  framework:	  certainty	  is	  not	  gotten	  by	  moving	  further	  away	  from	  the	  data	  of	  sense,	  rather	  by	  only	  trusting	  the	  data	  of	  sense	  and	  the	  free	  and	  voluntary	  actions	  of	   the	  mind	   to	   combine	   said	  data	   into	   complex	   ideas	  which	  make	   no	   reference	   to	   a	   reality	   beyond	   themselves.	   It	   is	   here	   where	   modern	  empiricism	  makes	   its	  greatest	   turn	   from	  the	  ancients.	  Whether	  simple	  or	  abstract,	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ideas	  may	  be	  the	  foundational	  stuff	  of	  certain	  knowledge;	  but	  they	  must	  not	  attempt	  
to	  represent	  any	  externalities	  if	  we	  wish	  them	  to	  maintain	  this	  epistemic	  status.	  Simple	  ideas	   are	   representationally	   connected	   to	   reality,	   of	   course;	   but	   only	   in	   the	   sense	  that	   they	  “represent”	   the	  powers	   in	  objects	   to	  cause	   them.27	  Modes	  have	  even	   less	  attachment	   to	  external	   reality,	   and	  are	   certainly	  known	  by	   the	  mind	  because	   they	  are	  pure	  fabrications	  of	  the	  mind.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  new	  way	  of	  ideas,	  the	  Stoical	   reliance	   on	   “cognitive	   impressions”	   (highlighted	   in	   the	   first	   chapter)	   can	  easily	  be	  remedied.	  The	  new	  empiricist	  version	  of	  “cognitive	  impressions”	  make	  no	  reference	   to	   the	   “real”	   (at	   least	   no	   reference	   to	   a	   material	   world	   of	   things),	   no	  reference	  to	  a	  world	  which	  might	  be	  different	  from	  the	  representations	  of	  it	  that	  are	  present	  to	  the	  mind.	  The	  basic	  “facts”	  of	  modern	  empiricism	  are	  thus	  purged	  of	  such	  references,	  and	  thus	  rendered	  immune	  to	  classical	  sceptical	  attacks.	  	  
I.2:	  Empiricism—after	  Locke	  This,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story.	  Problems	  with	  Locke’s	  imagism	  (and	  his	  causal	  theory	  of	  simple	  ideas	  of	  sense)	  are	  not	  essential	  to	  empiricism.	  Berkeley	  was	  the	  first	  to	  call	  into	  question	  all	  abstract	  ideas	  whatsoever,	  arguing	  that	  any	  and	  all	  ideas	   that	   can	   be	   present	   to	   the	  mind	  must	   be	   particular	   ideas—a	   strict	   form	   of	  imagism	   that	   Prinz	   calls	   “picturism”.	   	   Also,	   Hume	   attacked	   the	   very	   notion	   of	  causation	   required	  by	  Locke’s	   theory	  of	   representation	  as	  a	  mysterious	   something	  that	   could	   not	   be	   represented	   by	   the	  mind	   (and	   therefore	   could	   be	   no	   part	   of	   an	  empiricist	   account	   of	   knowledge	   which	   wished	   to	   avoid	   all	   commitments	   which	  leave	   room	   for	   the	   sceptic).	   Both	   Berkeley	   and	   Hume	   rejected	   Locke’s	   ideas	   of	  Substance	  as	  well;	  we	  may	  have	  ideas	  that	  purport	  to	  be	  about	  an	  external	  material	  realm,	   but	   nothing	   in	   these	   ideas	   could	   ever	   represent	   the	  materiality	   of	  material	  objects	  (even	  inexactly	  and	  imperfectly).28	  But	  these	  paraphernalia,	  as	  important	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Of	   course,	   Berkeley	   offers	   a	   purely	   idealist	   interpretation	   of	   this	   Lockean	   view,	   holding	   that	  nothing	  but	  an	  idea	  can	  be	  like	  an	  idea.	  Hume	  rejects	  at	  least	  two	  of	  its	  fundamental	  assumptions:	  1.	  That	  the	  mind	  can	  come	  to	  distinguish	  between	  real	  and	  fantastical	  ideas.	  2.	  That	  there	  exists	  a	  causal	  relationship	   between	   external	   powers	   and	   impressions	   (which	   Locke	   requires	   to	   get	   his	  representationalist	  theory	  off	  the	  ground).	  28	  Hume	   seems	   to	   be	   in	   general	   agreement	  with	   Berkeley	   on	   such	  matters.	   This	   passage	   from	   the	  
Treatise	  is	  telling	  of	  such	  agreement:	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they	   are	   to	   Locke’s	   philosophy,	   mask	   the	   essential	   shift	   we	   have	   here	   isolated.	  Descartes’s	   sceptical	   philosophy	   made	   for	   modern	   epistemology	   a	   framework	   of	  foundational	  certitude.	  His	  focus	  on	  the	  immediate	  contents	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  any	  epistemology	   introduced	   the	  way	  of	   ideas.	  However,	   it	   is	  Locke	  who	   takes	  these	  Cartesian	   themes	  and	  makes	  of	   them	  a	   radical	  and	  new	   form	  of	  empiricism,	  wedded	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  two	  sources	  of	  knowing:	  sense,	  and	  free	  and	  voluntary	  operations	   of	   the	   mind.	   It	   is	   Locke	   who	   divorces	   certainty	   from	   intellect,	   relying	  merely	   on	   sensation	   and	   memory	   (pertaining	   to	   internal	   representations)	   to	  reconstruct	  our	  claims	  to	  knowledge—a	  reconstruction	  that	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Stoics	  never	  achieved.	  Leaving	   aside	   the	  particulars	  of	   Locke’s	   view,	  we	  may	  now	  briefly	   examine	  some	   of	   the	   key	   commonalities	   holding	   together	   the	   CBE	   tradition—principal	  among	   them	   the	   Cartesian	   conception	   of	   knowledge	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   access	   to	   a	  subjective	  realm.	  As	  we	  saw	  with	  Locke,	  the	  way	  of	  ideas	  emerges	  from	  the	  classical	  empiricist	  critique	  of	  Descartes’	  rationalism	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  acting	  as	   a	   foundation	   for	   our	   knowledge	   without	   positing	   any	   extra-­‐sensory	   faculties	  other	   than	   memory	   and	   (limited)	   imagination.	   As	   Gupta	   notes,	   Locke	   gives	   best	  expression	  to	  his	  Cartesianism	  in	  the	   introductory	  remark	  of	  Book	  IV	  of	  the	  Essay:	  “Since	  the	  Mind,	  in	  all	  its	  Thoughts	  and	  Reasonings,	  hath	  no	  other	  immediate	  Object	  but	  its	  own	  Ideas,	  it	  is	  evident,	  that	  our	  Knowledge	  is	  only	  conversant	  about	  them.”	  This	   reliance	  on	   the	   immediately	  given	  objects	  of	   sensory	  awareness—as	   the	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Now	  since	  nothing	  is	  ever	  present	  to	  the	  mind	  but	  perceptions,	  and	  since	  all	  ideas	  are	  deriv’d	  from	   something	   antecedently	   present	   to	   the	   mind;	   it	   follows,	   that	   ’tis	   impossible	   for	   us	   so	  much	   as	   to	   conceive	   or	   form	   an	   idea	   of	   any	   thing	   specifically	   different	   from	   ideas	   and	  impressions.	   Let	   us	   fix	   our	   attention	  out	   of	   ourselves	   as	  much	   as	  possible:	   Let	   us	   chace	  our	  imagination	  to	  the	  heavens,	  or	  to	  the	  utmost	  limits	  of	  the	  universe;	  we	  never	  really	  advance	  a	  step	  beyond	  ourselves,	  nor	  can	  conceive	  any	  kind	  of	  existence,	  but	   those	  perceptions,	  which	  have	  appear’d	   in	   that	  narrow	  compass.	  This	   is	   the	  universe	  of	   the	   imagination,	  nor	  have	  we	  any	  idea	  but	  what	  is	  there	  produc’d.	  (Hume	  [1739/2000],	  1.2.6.8)	  Many	  have	  challenged	  the	  once	  dominant	  idea	  that	  Hume	  is	  an	  idealist,	  stressing	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  
Treatise	  and	  Enquiry	  where	  Hume	  is	  in	  a	  more	  naturalist	  mood.	  Recently,	  Stephen	  Buckle	  [2007]	  has	  argued	  that	  Hume	  is	  best	  characterised	  as	  a	  “sceptical	  materialist”,	  stressing	  that	  Hume’s	  scepticism	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  modern	  variant	  of	   the	  ancient	  rejection	  of	  claims	   to	   the	  essence	  of	   things.	   It	   is	  thus	   amenable,	   he	   argues,	   to	   materialism	   (which	   “denies	   any	   special	   status	   to	   human	   rational	  powers”).	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primitive	   epistemic	   entities—holds	   together	   the	   British	   empiricist	   tradition,	   even	  amongst	  those	  (like	  Hume)	  who	  challenge	  the	  Cartesian-­‐Lockean	  (and	  Berkeleyan)	  conception	   of	   ideas.	   We	   call	   this	   common	   bond	   of	   classical	   empiricism	   the	  “Subjectivity	  Thesis”:	  	  
Subjectivity	   Thesis:	   sensual	   experience	   furnishes	   the	   mind	   with	   subjective	  entities,	  or	  brings	  about	  in	  the	  mind	  certain	  states,	  of	  which	  the	  self	  is	  directly	  aware.	  The	  relationship	  of	  direct	  awareness	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Even	   when	   Hume	   rejects	   the	   fundamental	   Lockean	   position	   that	   simple	   ideas	   of	  sense	  are	  causally	  related	  to	  their	  objects,	  he	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis,	  as	  the	  following	  passage	  makes	  clear:	  	  Nothing	  can	  ever	  be	  present	   to	   the	  mind	  but	  an	   image	  or	  perception,	  and…	  the	   senses	   are	   the	   only	   inlets,	   through	   which	   these	   images	   are	   conveyed,	  without	  being	  able	  to	  produce	  any	  immediate	  intercourse	  between	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  object.	  (Hume	  [1748/1999],	  12.1—quoted	  in	  Gupta	  [2006a],	  16)	  	  There	   are,	   of	   course,	   many	   disagreements	   regarding	   the	   particular	  interpretations	   of	   the	   Subjectivity	   Thesis,	   particularly	   (as	   Gupta	   notes)	   regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subjective.	  Gupta	  points	  to	  several	  such	  disagreements:	  Are	  ideas	  (sense-­‐data,	   impressions,	   etc.)	   identical	   with	   appearances?	   Are	   we	   only	   directly	  aware	  of	  universals,	  or	  particulars	  as	  well?	   Is	   the	  self	  an	  object	  of	  awareness?	  Are	  we	  aware	  of	  things,	  or	  merely	  states?	  Are	  phenomenal	  properties	  merely	  adverbial,	  or	  do	  they	  have	  a	  more	  primitive	  place	  in	  our	  ontology?	  Nonetheless,	  the	  idea	  that	  knowledge	  (especially	  at	  its	  most	  certain)	  is	  direct	  awareness	  of	  mental	  entities	  or	  states	   is	   the	  common	  thread	  running	   throughout	  Cartesian	  accounts	  of	  experience	  and	  sensual	  imagination.	  Gupta	  says	  that	  this	  commonality	  allows	  us	  to	  pass	  happily	  over	   the	   various	   differences	  we	   encounter	  within	   Cartesianism.	   These	   differences	  do	  not	  challenge	  the	  basic	  Cartesian	  model	  of	  experience	  as	  “direct	  awareness”.	  	  We	  are	  thus	  in	  a	  position	  to	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  peculiar	  constellation	  of	  interpretations	  of	  empiricism	  known	  as	  “British	  empiricism”.	   In	  spite	  of	   their	  very	  real	   differences,	   they	   seem	   to	   hold	   two	   distinct	   commitments:	   the	   view	   that	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knowledge	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   direct	   awareness	   (the	   Subjectivity	  Thesis),	   and	   the	   view	  that	  there	  is	  some	  cleavage	  between	  the	  world	  as	  given	  in	  direct	  awareness	  and	  the	  world	  as	   it	  does	   (or	  may)	  exist	   independently	   from	   the	  mind.	  As	  Gupta	   says,	   “[i]n	  direct	  awareness,	  the	  self	  has	  transparent	  and	  immediate	  access	  to	  a	  special	  realm	  of	  facts,	  distinct	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  familiar	  public	  facts…	  The	  facts	  revealed	  by	  direct	  awareness	  are	  subjective	  and	  internal;	   familiar	  public	   facts,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  objective	   and	   external.”	   (Gupta	   [2006a],	   17-­‐18).	   Further,	   as	   Gupta	   notes,	   the	  primary	  problem	  for	  any	  Cartesian	  account	  of	  knowledge	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  wide	  gulf	  that	  exists	  between	   internal	   facts	  and	  external	   facts—to	   justify	  our	  common	  sense	  knowledge	  using	  only	  those	  propositions	  licensed	  by	  direct	  awareness.	  	  The	   problem	   is	   therefore	   not	   one	   of	   discerning	   how	   it	   is	   we	  may	   come	   to	  represent	  an	  external	  world,	  rather	  the	  problem	  of	  discerning	  the	  truth	  of	  ordinary	  claims	   based	   on	   a	   class	   of	   very	   peculiar	   and	   restricted	   claims	   about	   a	   subjective	  realm.	  This	  grand	  empiricist	  project,	  the	  “problem	  of	  the	  external	  world”	  (as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  known),	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  defining	  concern	  of	  what	  Gupta	  calls	  “classical	  empiricism”,	   a	  project	  he	   sees	  as	   common	   to	  Locke,	  Berkeley,	  Russell,	   and	  Carnap	  (among	  many	  others).	  As	   is	   clear	   from	  the	   introduction,	  we	  wish	   to	  challenge	   this	  claim,	  arguing	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  external	  world	  is	  separable	  from	  Cartesianism	  and	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis.	  In	  what	   follows,	  we	  will	   look	  more	  closely	  at	   the	  historical	  progression	  of	  a	  certain	  strain	  of	  empiricism,	  dominant	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries.	  We	  will	  show	   that	   this	   brand	  of	   empiricism	   turns	   away	   from	   the	  program	  of	   foundational	  certitude	   alive	   in	   Descartes,	   Locke,	   Berkeley	   and	   Hume,	   putting	   in	   its	   place	   a	  particular	  brand	  of	  naturalism	  and	  deference	  to	   the	  formal	  and	  empirical	  sciences.	  Firstly,	   we	  will	   look	   at	   the	   reception	   of	   Newton’s	   physics	   in	   the	   CBE	   tradition	   to	  show	   that	   there	   were	   limitations	   to	   how	   far	   CBE	   would	   extend	   itself	   to	  accommodate	  the	  new	  sciences.	  Following	  that,	  we	  will	   look	  at	  Mach’s	  empiricism,	  and	  his	  critique	  of	  Newton’s	  notions	  of	  absolute	  space	  and	  absolute	  time,	  comparing	  his	  rejection	   to	  Berkeley’s.	  The	  similarities	  are,	  of	  course,	   informative;	  but	   the	  key	  differences	   between	  Mach	   and	   Berkeley	   are	   telling	   of	   a	   radical	   shift	   in	   empiricist	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thought	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	  We	  will	   then	   examine	  Helmholtz’s	   attempt	   to	   ground	  our	  conceptions	  of	  space	  and	  time	  in	  basic	  “facts”	  of	  perception—primarily	  the	  free	  mobility	   of	   objects	   in	   space.	   Lastly,	   we	   will	   examine	   how	   these	   naturalist	  considerations	   informed	   the	   conventionalism	   of	   Poincaré	   and	   the	   logical	  empiricists,	   with	   special	   focus	   on	   Carnap’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   external	   world	  project,	  and	  the	  rather	  anti-­‐classical	  commitments	  of	  the	  Aufbau.	  	  Of	   course,	   this	   history	   will	   be	   brief,	   leaving	   out	   many	   significant	   details;	  directions	   for	   further	   information	   will	   be	   offered	   when	   a	   more	   full	   explication,	  explanation,	  or	  analysis	  of	  matters	  under	  discussion	  are	  made	  impossible	  by	  space	  limitations.	   However,	   even	   a	   rough	   and	   very	   selective	   history	   of	   various	   forms	   of	  empiricism	   will	   offer	   us	   an	   account	   of	   the	   bifurcation	   between	   CBE	   and	   MSE	  mentioned	  above.	  	  
	  
§II:	  CBE	  and	  the	  New	  Sciences	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   CBE	   had	   as	   its	   main	   focus	   a	   delimitation	   of	   that	   part	   of	   our	  knowledge	  about	  which	  we	  can	  be	  sceptical	  from	  that	  part	  of	  our	  knowledge	  about	  which	  we	  can	  be	  certain.	  While	  the	  lines	  were	  drawn	  differently	  for	  each	  empiricist,	  the	   broad	   idea	  was	   Cartesian	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   any	   epistemology	  worthy	   of	   (and	  useful	   for)	   study	   must	   make	   clear	   its	   notion	   of	   foundational	   certitude,	   and	   must	  have	  a	  response	  to	  the	  sceptic	  based	  on	  that	  notion	  and	  its	  consequences.	  The	  focal	  point	  of	   such	  views	  was	   the	   individual	  knowing	   subject,	  with	   certain	  assumptions	  about	   her	   position	   in,	   and	   relation	   to,	   the	   world,	   the	   epistemological	   virtues	   of	  certainty,	   the	  epistemic	   transparency	  of	   ideas,	  and	  a	  commitment	   to	  some	  form	  of	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis.	  	  Part	  of	   the	  project	  of	  CBE	  was	   to	  offer	   stable	  epistemic	   foundations	   for	   the	  new	   sciences,	   or	   to	   show	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   parts	   of	   these	   sciences	   could	   not	   be	  justified.	  Of	  course,	  Locke	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  corpuscularian	  mechanics	  and	  Berkeley	   by	   developments	   (many	   of	   them	   his	   own)	   in	   optics,	   but	   such	   sciences	  played	   a	   central	   part	   in	   empiricism	  only	   insofar	   as	   they	   could	   be	  made	   to	   cohere	  with	   the	   way	   of	   ideas.	   Newton’s	   surprising	   results	   in	   physics	   were,	   quite	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interestingly,	  received	  with	  great	  suspicion	  by	  Berkeley,	  and	  ambivalence	  by	  Hume;	  even	  Locke,	  who	  trumpeted	  the	  “incomparable	  Mr.	  Newton”,	  was	  sceptical	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  Newton’s	  laws	  and	  forces,	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  knowledge.	  To	  be	   clear:	   the	  CBE	  principals	  were	   all	  willing	   to	   take	  up	  parts	  of	   the	  new	  scientific	  philosophy,	   even	   parts	   of	   Newton’s	   system,	   but	   only	   insofar	   as	   the	   new	   sciences	  could	  be	  made	   consistent	  with	   their	   philosophical	   views.	  That	   Locke	   adopted	   and	  defended	  a	   rather	   radical	   form	  of	  mechanics	   is	   indicative	  of	   the	  point	  being	  made	  here:	   it	  was	   such	  a	  mechanics	  which	  could	  offer	  a	  bridge	  between	   the	  qualities	  of	  material	  things	  and	  the	  ideas	  which	  they	  caused.	  Only	  because	  external	  objects	  were	  reasonably	   stable	   (i.e.	   exhibited	   nomic	   behavior),	   and	   only	   because	   our	   ideas	   of	  sensual	   perception	   (unlike	   memory	   or	   imagination)	   were	   caused	   without	   our	  volition,	  could	  we	  even	  begin	   to	  consider	  bridging	   the	  gap	  between	   ideas	  as	  given	  and	  a	  material	  world	  beyond	   them.	  Locke	  had	  philosophical	   reasons	   to	  accept	   the	  mechanical	  philosophy:	  philosophical	  reasons	  which	  precluded	  his	  accepting	  fully	  a	  science	   which	   made	   central	   a	   notion	   of	   force	   as	   action	   at	   a	   distance.	   (Of	   course,	  Hume’s	   scepticism	   about	   the	   external	   world	   allowed	   him	   to	   adopt	   aspects	   of	  Newton’s	  empiricism,	  but	  here	  only	  to	  a	  point	  as	  well.	  See	  below.)	  	  Berkeley’s	  hostility	  to	  Newton’s	  use	  of	  absolute	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  in	  his	  physics	   is	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   the	   primacy	   of	   idealism	   over	   Newtonian	   science	  within	   CBE.	   (Berkeley	   [1721/1993],	   especially	   52-­‐65)	   Likewise	   Hume,	   though	   he	  agrees	   substantially	   with	   Newton’s	   “rules	   of	   reasoning”,	   and	   adopts	   Newtonian	  principles	  of	  gravitation,	  elasticity,	  cohesion	  of	  parts,	  and	  impulse	  as	  “probably	  the	  ultimate	   causes	   and	   principles	   which	   we	   shall	   ever	   discover	   in	   nature”	   (Hume	  [1748/1999]	   4.1.12),	   nonetheless	   thinks	   none	   of	   these	   “causes”	   real.	  While	  Hume	  respected	  Newton’s	   form	  of	  empiricism,	   thinking	   it	  superior	   to	  Boyle’s	  mechanical	  philosophy,	   at	   least	   in	   regard	   to	   its	   more	   careful	   characterisation	   of	   laws,	   which	  Newton	  based	  only	  on	  experiment	  and	  not	  mechanical	  assumption	  (see	  volume	  6	  of	  Hume	   [1778/1983]),	   and	   while	   he	   appreciated	   Newton’s	   reticence	   to	   commit	  himself	   (Newton)	   to	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ultimate	   cause	   of	   what	   such	   laws	  described,	  for	  Hume,	  the	  laws	  are	  nothing	  but	  a	  mathematical	  contrivance,	  helping	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us	  to	  organise	  the	  appearances,	  but	  themselves	  unverifiable.	  As	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	   subtitle	   of	   the	   Treatise	   (“Attempt	   to	   Introduce	   the	   Experimental	   Method	   of	  Reasoning	  into	  Moral	  Subjects”)	  exposes	  Hume’s	  Newtonianism,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  by	   Eric	   Schliesser	   [2008]	   that	   Hume’s	   education	   was	   actually	   more	   heavily	  influenced	  by	  Boyle’s	  mechanical	  view,	  and	  that	  “experiment”	  in	  the	  subtitle	  has	  far	  less	  to	  do	  with	  Newtonian	  experiment	  (restrained	  as	  it	  was	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  connection	   between	   properly	   organised	   observation	   and	   mathematical	   structure,	  see	  Smith	  [2002]),	  and	  much	  more	  to	  do	  with	  Boyle’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  titles	  of	  several	   of	   his	   writings.	   “Experiment”	   holds	   no	   reference,	   therefore,	   to	   Newton’s	  methodology—a	   methodology	   to	   which	   Hume	   only	   sparingly	   subscribed	   when	   it	  suited	  his	  scepticism.	  	  	  	  Locke,	  of	  all	  the	  CBE	  principals,	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  sensitive	  to	  the	  close	  relationship	   between	   theoretical	   advances	   in	   the	   sciences	   and	   traditional	  epistemology	  and	  metaphysics.	  His	  remarks	  in	  the	  “Epistle	  to	  the	  Reader”	  from	  the	  
Essay	  make	  clear	  his	  reverence	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  scientific	  theory:	  	  The	   commonwealth	  of	   learning	   is	   not	   at	   this	   time	  without	  master-­‐builders,	  whose	   mighty	   designs,	   in	   advancing	   the	   sciences,	   will	   leave	   lasting	  monuments	  to	  the	  admiration	  of	  posterity:	  but	  every	  one	  must	  not	  hope	  to	  be	  a	  Boyle	  or	  a	  Sydenham;	  and	  in	  an	  age	  that	  produces	  such	  masters	  as	  the	  great	  Huygenius	   and	   the	   incomparable	   Mr.	   Newton,	   with	   some	   others	   of	   that	  strain,	  it	  is	  ambition	  enough	  to	  be	  employed	  as	  an	  under-­‐labourer	  in	  clearing	  the	  ground	  a	  little,	  and	  removing	  some	  of	  the	  rubbish	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  way	  to	  knowledge	  …	  (Locke	  [1690/1959],	  14)	  	  Early	   18th	   century	   Newtonians	   were	   happy	   to	   view	   Locke	   as	   a	   “card-­‐carrying	  Newtonian	   sans	   the	   math”29	  because	   of	   such	   statements.	   In	   fact,	   it	   was	   quite	  common	  (until	  recently)	  to	  find	  Newtonian	  readings	  of	  Locke	  in	  the	  literature.30	  In	  the	   last	   25	   years,	   this	   view	   has	   been	   challenged.	   Downing	   [1997]	   has	   proposed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  This	  pithy	  phrase	   is	  due	  to	  Michael	   J.	  White.	  As	  of	  yet,	  he	  has	  not	  used	  it	  (to	  my	  knowledge)	   in	  a	  published	  essay.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Michael	  J.	  White	  (2010)	  “Locke	  on	  Newton's	  Principia:	  Mathematics	  
or	  Natural	  Philosophy?”	  from	  HOPOS	  2010:	  The	  International	  Society	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  (Budapest,	  24-­‐27	  June).	  (The	  conference	  paper	  is	  available	  through	  PhilSci	  Archive.)	  30	  In	  her	   [1997],	  Downing	   cites	   some	  examples	  of	   this	   reading	  of	   Locke,	   including	  Feingold	   [1988]	  and	  Buchdahl	  [1961].	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(along	  with	   Alexander	   [1985],	  McCann	   [1985],	   and	   Atherton	   [1991])	   that	   Locke’s	  commitments	   to	   Boyle’s	   radical	   and	   reductive	   corpuscularianism	   prevented	   him	  from	  accepting	  certain	  key	  tenets	  of	  Newton’s	  physics,	  most	  significantly	  action	  at	  a	  distance.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  Locke	  thought	  of	  Newton’s	  treatment	  of	  gravity	  (as	  a	   prime	   example)	   to	   be	   a	  mathematical	   feature,	   not	   a	   real	   quality	   of	  matter,	   and	  therefore	  not	  a	  natural	  quality.	  From	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  our	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  Locke’s	   abstractionist	   account	   of	  mathematics,	   a	   central	   part	   of	   Newton’s	   physics	  (the	  law	  of	  gravitation)	  is	  nothing	  but	  an	  arbitrary	  construction	  of	  the	  mind.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  may	  help	  us	  to	  organise	  the	  phenomena,	  but	  is	  not	  true	  in	  any	  substantive	  (read:	  mechanical)	  way.	  The	  natural	  philosophy	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  Essay	  remained	  a	   radical	   corpuscularianism,	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   traditional	   reading	   of	   Newton’s	  natural	  philosophy	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  gravitation	  is	  real,	  in	  spite	  of	  our	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  its	  underlying	  cause.	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  too	  simple,	  we	  can	  take	  from	  such	  details	  the	  conclusion	  that	   Locke’s	   excitement	   about	  Newton’s	   new	  physics	  never	  had	   the	   impact	   on	  his	  epistemology	   and	   metaphysics	   it	   was	   thought	   to	   have.	   Far	   from	   being	   a	   card-­‐carrying	  Newtonian,	  Locke	  reverted	  to	  a	  (meta)physics	  which	  better	  explained	  his	  causal	   account	   of	   empirical	   knowledge	   (a	   mechanical	   cause	   of	   indirect	  representation	  via	   the	   “Powers”	  of	   external	   things)	   and,	   for	   almost	   all	   intents	  and	  purposes,	   reserved	   his	   admiration	   for	   Newton’s	   development	   of	   the	   physics	   to	  remarks	   like	   the	   those	  of	   the	  Epistle.	  High	  reverence	   in	  rhetoric	  did	  not	   transform	  itself	   into	   philosophical	   integration	   of	   Newton’s	   physics,	   even	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  Hume	  adopted	  Newton’s	   rules	  of	   reasoning	  and	  rules	   for	  constructing	   “principles”	  or	  causal	  laws,	  leaving	  Locke’s	  epistemology	  firmly	  entrenched	  in	  the	  Cartesian	  way	  of	  ideas	  (supported	  by	  a	  familiar,	  if	  non-­‐Cartesian,	  mechanistic	  physics).	  Speaking	  more	   generally,	   then,	  many	   of	   the	   scientific	   advancements	   of	   the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  failed	  to	  be	  integrated	  by	  the	  British	  empiricists	  –	  failed	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  genuine	  parts	  of	  our	  knowledge.	  The	  fundamental	  problem	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  Cartesian	  commitment	  to	  epistemology	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  our	  knowledge,	  including	  the	   sciences,	   and	   therefore	   a	   methodological	   wedge	   between	   what	   can	   be	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established	  philosophically	  (from	  first	  principles)	  and	  what	  cannot	  be	  so	  established	  (i.e.	  the	  sciences—at	  least	  certain	  central	  parts	  of	  Newton’s	  physics).	  While	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	   to	   characterise	   this	   distinction	   as	   following	   from	   “first	   philosophy”	   (i.e.	  speculative	  metaphysics	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  sort),	  the	  distinction	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	   following	   from	  a	   “philosophy-­‐first”	  principle:	  because	   the	  empiricists	  had	  made	  clear	   their	   commitment	   to	   foundational	   certitude	   based	   on	   purely	   subjectivist	  grounds,	   and	   because	   it	   was	   thought	   that	   parts	   of	   the	   new	   physics	   could	   not	   be	  represented	  to	  the	  mind	  (e.g.	  the	  cause	  of	  gravitation),	  the	  reality	  (material	  or	  ideal)	  of	  physics	  was	  put	  aside.	  We	  do	  not	  here	  presuppose	  that	  empiricism	  must	  have	  something	  positive	  to	  say	  about	  the	  sciences	  as	  particular	  bastions	  of	  knowledge	  and	  method	  that	  must	  be	  integrated	   into	   any	   proper	   epistemology.	   Such	   claims	   would	   be	   naïve,	   both	  historically	  and	  philosophically.	  However,	  we	  should	  pause	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  so	  far	  regarding	  the	  historical	  and	  conceptual	  development	  of	  the	  way	  of	   ideas.	   The	   empiricists	   received	   the	   way	   of	   ideas	   through	   an	   admixture	   of	  Aristotelian	  and	  Cartesian	  influences.	  Both	  Aristotle	  and	  Descartes	  used	  the	  way	  of	  ideas	   to	   explicate	   the	   nature	   of	   our	   mathematical	   and	   physical	   knowledge.	   For	  Aristotle,	   images	   formed	   the	   stuff	   in	  which	   all	   of	   our	   thought	   (even	  non-­‐imagistic	  thought)	   found	   its	   origins.	   It	   was	   those	   images	   before	   the	   actualised	   mind	   that	  allowed	  for	  the	  relevant	  abstractions	  to	  take	  place,	  facilitating	  the	  ever	  more	  general	  studies	  of	  physics,	  mathematics,	   and	  metaphysics.	   For	  Descartes,	   the	  way	  of	   ideas	  was	  at	  once	  both	  an	  epistemic	  limitation	  and	  epistemic	  boon	  for	  embodied	  creatures	  like	  us;	  Descartes	   embraced	   this	  duality	   of	   embodiment.	  Unlike	  Plato’s,	  Descartes’	  rationalism	  is	  not	  an	  attempt	  to	  show	  how	  far	  knowledge	  can	  progress	  when	  we	  free	  ourselves	  from	  our	  bodies	  and	  our	  senses,	  but	  rather	  how	  much	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  empirical	  phenomena	  once	  the	  data	  of	  sense	  has	  been	  put	  on	  the	  terra	  firma	  of	  the	  cogito	  and	  ontological	  arguments.	  In	  short,	  both	  Aristotle	  and	  Descartes	  constructed	  their	   respective	   epistemological	   systems	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   our	   mathematical	   and	  scientific	  knowledge.	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While	   this	   desideratum	   is	   not	   necessarily	   inherited	   by	   the	   wholesale	  adoption	  of	  the	  way	  of	  ideas,	  one	  popular	  reason	  why	  empiricism	  fell	  out	  of	  favour	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  was	  because	  of	  its	  inability,	  or	  at	  least	  unwillingness,	  to	   account	   for	   key	   parts	   of	   Newton’s	   physics.	   Given	   the	   widespread	   success	   of	  Newton’s	  system,	  which	  had	  become	  unassailable,	  philosophical	  reticence	  to	  regard	  the	   epistemic	   centrality	   of	   physics,	  much	   less	   the	   occasional	   aggressive	   attack	   on	  Newton’s	   ideas	   based	   on	   “dogmatic	   empiricism”,	   ceased	   to	   be	   attractive.	   Kant’s	  critical	  work	   became	  de	  rigueur	   at	   least	   in	   part	   for	   its	   ability	   to	  more	   adequately	  characterise	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   new	   physics	   than	   did	   Locke’s	   or	   Hume’s	  empiricism.	  In	  spite	  of	  Locke’s	  and	  Hume’s	  adoption	  of	  those	  parts	  of	  Newton’s	  work	  that	  found	  an	  a	  priori	  “fit”	  with	  their	  philosophies,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  passages	  in	  both	  of	  their	  work	  which	  show	  reverence	  for	  Newton	  and	  Newton’s	  philosophy,	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  by	  either	  to	  engage	  in	  anything	  more	  than	  what	  we	  may	  call	  “piecemeal	  Newtonianism”.	   Newton’s	   project	   to	   put	   knowledge	   of	   the	   world	   on	   a	   secure	  mathematical	   footing,	   following	   principles	   gained	   from	   induction	   from	   the	  phenomena,	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  Kant	  for	  a	  full	  philosophical	  explanation.	  With	  Kant,	  and	  with	  the	  post-­‐Kantian	  return	  to	  empiricism,	  this	  piecemeal	  Newtonianism	  had	  to	  be	  addressed;	  no	  longer	  could	  empiricism	  fail	  to	  incorporate	  the	  sciences.	  	  	  
§III:	  The	  break	  with	  CBE	  The	  main	  bifurcation	  in	  the	  empiricist	  tradition	  occurs	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  During	  this	  period,	  empiricism	  becomes	  ever	  more	  associated	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  methodological	  naturalism,	  breaking	  with	  the	  Cartesianism	  of	  CBE.	  The	  idea	  that	  traditional	   philosophical	   views	   (usually	   pertaining	   to	   the	  Kantian	  a	  priori)	   can	   be	  amended	  using	  more	  sophisticated	  scientific	  theory	  (be	  it	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	   formal	  sciences,	  or	   individual	  sciences	   like	  physics,	  physiology,	  or	  psychology)	  replaces	  the	  way	  of	  ideas.	  What	  we	  see	  in	  MSE	  is	  an	  increasingly	  vigorous	  attempt	  to	  divorce	   empiricism	   from	   its	   Cartesian	   commitments.	   No	   longer	   is	   foundational	  certitude	  the	  over-­‐arching	  epistemic	  virtue,	  and	  we	  find	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	   idea	  that	  one	   must	   have	   a	   clear	   philosophical	   picture	   of	   knowledge	   before	   one	   assumes	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commitments	  of	  a	  scientific	  nature.	  Facts	  of	  physics,	  biology,	  psychology	  and	  optics	  can	   (and	  perhaps	  even	  need)	  be	  employed	   to	  explain	  our	  empirical	  knowledge,	   to	  upset	  what	  were	  once	  thought	  to	  be	  necessary	  and	  a	  priori	  philosophical	  points	  of	  view.	  Of	  course,	  each	  modern	  empiricist	  tackled	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  in	  different	  ways.	  Some	  held,	  with	  Kant,	  that	  formal	  principles	  were	  essential	  to	  our	  epistemological	   situation,	   though	   such	  principles	  were	   no	   longer	   transcendentally	  given	   by	   the	   structure	   of	   our	   sensible	   intuition	   (see	   Helmholtz	   in	   the	   section	   to	  follow),	   while	   others	   proposed	   epistemologies	   that	   gave	   no	   special	   standing	   to	  formal	  or	  scientific	  principles	  (e.g.	  Mill,	  and	  associationists	  working	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Mill	  and	  Bain).	  The	  latter	  maintained	  most	  of	  the	  commitments	  of	  CBE	  (though,	  as	  was	   the	   case	   with	   Mill,	   foundationalism	   and	   deductivism	  were	   often	   replaced	   by	  inductivism).	   The	   former	   produced	   a	   collection	   of	   views	   that	   comprise	   the	   MSE	  tradition,31	  with	  its	  distinct	  philosophical	  outlooks	  and	  epistemological	  programs.	  	  
III.1	  Mach’s	  Naturalised	  Phenomenalism	  Various	   forms	   of	   the	   post-­‐Kantian	   MSE	   tradition	   turned	   to	   a	   naturalised	  understanding	   of	   the	   preconditions	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   experience.	   Perhaps	   the	  best	   example	   of	   this	   sort	   of	   shift	   to	   naturalism	   is	   found	   in	   Mach’s	   “Anti-­‐Metaphysical”	  introductory	  remarks	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  [1897]:	  	  The	  splendid	  results	  achieved	  by	  physical	  science	  in	  modern	  times,	  a	  success	  which	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  its	  own	  sphere	  but	  embraces	  that	  of	  other	  sciences	  which	  employ	  its	  help,	  has	  brought	  it	  about	  that	  physical	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  
physical	  modes	  of	  procedure	  enjoy	  on	  all	  hands	  unwonted	  prominence,	  and	  that	  the	   greatest	   expectations	   are	   associated	   with	   their	   employment.	   (Mach	  [1897],	  1)	  	  In	  this	  book,	  we	  are	  given	  a	  promise	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  physical	  analysis	  of	  sensation	  to	   answer	   traditional	   philosophical	   questions	   about	   knowledge.	   Mach’s	   meta-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  As	  with	  all	  naming	  conventions,	  this	  one	  has	  its	  weaknesses.	  One	  should	  not	  assume	  that	  because	  we	  place	  Mill	  in	  the	  CBE	  tradition,	  for	  example,	  that	  he	  did	  not	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  impact	  on	  MSE,	  or	  that	  he	  wasn’t	  a	  “scientific	  empiricist”	  of	  a	  sort.	  Of	  course	  his	  work	  on	  inductive	  methodology	  and	  his	  empiricist	  treatment	  of	  number	  are	  but	  two	  examples	  of	  his	  deeply	  scientific	  commitments.	  The	  line	  between	  CBE	  and	  MSE	  is	  a	  blurry	  one	  –	  but	  no	  less	  useful	  or	  correct	  for	  that	  fact.	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philosophical	  position	  is	  not	  a	  rejection	  of	  philosophical	  notions	  such	  as	  the	  a	  priori,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  marked	  shift	  from	  first	  philosophy	  (or	  philosophy-­‐first)	  to	  naturalism—in	  Mach’s	  case,	  a	  biological	  account	  of	  how	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  is	  made	  possible	  for	  an	  evolving	  organism.	  As	  Paul	  Pojman	  has	  put	  it,	  “[i]n	  as	  much	  as	  Kant	  used	  the	  a	  priori	  to	  explain	  how	  knowledge	  is	  possible,	  Mach	  uses	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  new	  sciences	  to	  explain	  how	  an	  a	  priori	  is	  possible.	  One	  more	  patch	  of	  philosophy,	  it	  was	  thought,	  yielded	  to	  science.”	  (Pojman	  [2011])	  	  Science	   was	   not	   taken	   as	   an	   unproblematic	   epistemic	   starting	   point,	   as	  evidenced	  (for	  example)	  by	  Mach’s	  criticisms	  of	  Newtonian	  physics,	  or	  his	  rejection	  of	  the	  atomic	  theory	  as	  mere	  “dogma”.32	  Rather,	  what	  we	  see	  in	  this	  period	  is	  a	  move	  to	   discern	  what	   parts	   of	   physical	   theory	   ought	   to	   be	   expunged	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  perspicuity	   and	   simplicity	   (economy)	   based	   on	   the	   information	   coming	   from	   the	  sciences	   themselves,	   and	   a	  desire	   to	  pursue	  only	   those	   scientific	   theories	   that	   are	  empirically	  motivated—i.e.	  only	  those	  theories	  that	  are	  nothing	  but	  an	  expression	  of	  empirical	   relations.	   Whether	   the	   object	   of	   such	   empirical	   study	   be	   scientific	   or	  philosophical	  (or,	  as	  was	  mostly	  the	  case,	  some	  admixture	  of	  the	  two),	  the	  desire	  to	  purge	  a	  theory	  of	  any	  unnecessary	  or	  unwarranted	  parts,	  getting	  to	   its	  descriptive	  core,	  was	  prevalent.33	  	  What	   counted	   as	   a	  more	   “simple”	   and	   “perspicuous”	   theory	  was,	   of	   course,	  determined	   relative	   to	   Mach’s	   own	   empiricism,	   and,	   of	   course,	   his	   account	   of	  sensation.	  For	  Mach,	   the	  picture	  starts	  off	  very	  much	   in	   the	  CBE	   tradition:	   (1)	  our	  
ideas	   are	   nothing	   more	   than	   the	   combination	   of	   sensory	   elements,	   and	   (2)	  everything	  we	  know	  is	  known	  through	  sensation.	  The	  first	  thesis	  commits	  Mach	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  For	  Mach,	   theorising	   is	   replaced	  by	  a	   thorough-­‐going	  “descriptionism”.	  The	   job	  of	   the	  scientist	   is	  not	   to	   give	   an	   ultimate	   account	   of	   reality,	   but	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   world	   impinges	   on	   her	   senses.	  Theories	   really	   help	  us	  do	  nothing	  more	   than	   capture	   and	  describe	   the	   relations	   existing	  between	  phenomena.	  Mach	  rejects	  the	  atomic	  hypothesis	  for	  going	  beyond	  the	  mere	  expression	  of	  empirical	  relations	  allowed	  by	  his	  descriptionism,	  since	  it	  posits	  unobservables	  rather	  than	  merely	  stating	  the	  laws.	  33	  That	   descriptionism,	   in	   some	   variant	   form,	   became	   popular	   by	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  number	  of	  learned	  congresses	  which	  devoted	  time	  –	  often	  keynote	  addresses	  –	  to	  descriptionist	  themes,	   including	  the	  famous	  1900	  International	  Congress	  of	  Physics,	  held	  in	  Paris—devoted	   to	   taking	   stock	   of	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	   For	   a	   brief	   history	   of	  descriptionism	  as	  originating	   in	  the	  work	  of	  Gustav	  Kirchhoff,	   its	  popularity,	   its	  detractors,	  and	  the	  debate	   between	   Planck’s	   development	   of	   a	   “world	   picture”	   and	   Mach’s	   descriptionist	  phenomenalism,	  see	  J.L.	  Heilbron	  [1986],	  47-­‐60.	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phenomenalism,	   the	   second	   to	   a	   form	   of	   empiricism,	   and	   together	   (1)	   and	   (2)	  commit	  him	  to	  something	  very	  much	  like	  the	  Cartesian-­‐cum-­‐Lockean	  way	  of	   ideas.	  However,	   the	   affinities	  with	   the	   classical	   picture	   are	   only	   superficial;	   the	   sensory	  elements	  at	  the	  “bottom”	  of	  this	  picture	  can	  be	  (and	  are)	  given	  a	  scientific	  account	  based	   on	   the	   findings	   of	   experimental	   psychology.	   No	   more	   is	   the	   way	   of	   ideas	  mysterious,	  or	  in	  any	  way	  Cartesian	  (i.e.	  founded	  on	  first	  principles);	  ideas	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  some	  metaphysical	   insight,	  nor	  need	  we	  posit	  a	  Cartesian	  theatre	   of	   consciousness.	   In	   this	   way,	   Mach	   ensured	   that	   a	   causal	   account	   of	  perception	  did	  not	  need	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  theory	  of	  indirect	  representation	  and	  the	  way	   of	   ideas,	   as	   it	   did	   for	   Locke.	   Contrary	   to	   Locke,	   sensation	   is,	   for	   Mach,	   fully	  naturalised,	   and	   causal	   through-­‐and-­‐through.	   The	   last	   vestiges	   of	   Cartesianism	  (indirect	  representationalism)	  are	  jettisoned.	  	   	  Mach’s	  naturalism	  did	  not	  stop	  with	  his	  physiological	  theory	  of	  sensation.	  He	  also	   held	   a	   “biologised”	   scientific-­‐pragmatic	   conception	   of	   the	   sciences.	   For	  Mach,	  physical	   theorising	   should	   be	   based	   on	   sensible	   things	   only,	   and	   should	   reduce	  unobservables	   in	   previous	   theories	   to	   observables	   in	   a	   new	   theory	   (or	   eliminate	  such	   superfluities	   altogether).	   Theories	   should	   be	   as	   economical	   as	   possible,	   and	  should	   only	   describe	   the	   functional	   dependencies	   that	   exist	   between	   facts;	   and	  science	  too	  should	  exhibit	  an	  economy	  through	  naturalism—as	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  variant	  of	   the	  sorts	  of	   connections	  made	  between	  sensations	  by	  primitive	  men,	  or	  even	  animals.	  This	  contiguity	  with	  the	  sensual	  ability	  of	  animals	  also	  helps	  us	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  it	  is	  that	  our	  abilities	  to	  negotiate	  our	  environment	  are	  not	  mysterious	  at	  all;	  in	  fact,	  contiguity	  of	  sensation	  in	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  preserves	  the	  economy	  of	   science,	   and	   fits	   well	   with	   Mach’s	   professed	   “biological-­‐economical	   theory	   of	  knowledge”	  (Mach	  [1910],	  30-­‐31),	  or	  the	  “anti-­‐metaphysical”	  commitment	  to	  purge	  science,	  in	  all	  of	  its	  forms,	  of	  any	  unnecessary	  vestiges	  of	  past	  philosophical	  views.	  It	  is	   clear	   here	   that	   Mach	   is	   interested	   in	   pruning	   our	   account	   of	   perception	   to	   its	  minimal	  physiological	  core.34	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Mach	   makes	   the	   connection	   between	   his	   minimal	   (descriptionist)	   accounts	   of	   physical	   and	  physiological	   knowledge	   explicit:	   “One	   and	   the	   same	   view	   underlies	   both	   my	   epistemological-­‐physical	   writings	   and	   my	   present	   attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   physiology	   of	   the	   senses—the	   view,	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This	  general	  methodological	  naturalism	  became	  manifest	  especially	  in	  Mach’s	  critique	  of	  the	  Newtonian	  conception	  of	  absolute	  space.	  It	  was	  thought	  by	  Mach	  that	  Newton’s	   absolute	   notions	   could	   be	   replaced	   by	   a	   theory	   of	   completely	   relative	  motion,	   and	   phenomena	   thought	   to	   be	   explained	   only	   by	   the	   positing	   of	   absolute	  space,	   time,	   and	   motion	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   emerging	   from	   the	   large-­‐scale	  distribution	  of	  mass	   (and	  energy)	   in	   the	  universe.35	  The	  sorts	  of	   criticisms	   leveled	  by	  Mach	  against	  Newton	  have	  an	  affinity	  with	  those	  provided	  by	  the	  CBE	  tradition	  (especially	  Berkeley’s	   criticisms	  of	   absolute	   space),	   but	  with	  Mach	   such	   criticisms	  find	   their	   origins	   in	   the	   naturalised	   conception	   of	   sensation	   introduced	   above.	  Firstly,	  unlike	  Berkeley,	  Mach	  held	  that	  all	  sensation	  is	  spatial	  in	  character,	  based	  on	  the	   extension	   of	   the	   sensory	   organs	   in	   space.	   (Mach	   [1901/1906],	   13-­‐15)	   Like	  Berkeley,	  Mach	   held	   that	   there	  were	   no	   significant	   coincidences	   between	   sensory	  spaces	   (for	   Mach,	   “physiological	   spaces”),	   though,	   unlike	   Berkeley,	   the	   inherent	  spatiality	  of	   tactual	  sensation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  disparity	  of	  binocular	  visual	  sensation	  allowed	   for	   associations	   to	   be	  made	   between	   the	   senses,	   especially	   regarding	   the	  spatiality	   of	   sensation.	   (Mach	   [1901/1906],	   15-­‐16)	   So,	   like	   Berkeley,	   Mach	   holds	  that	   the	  space	  of	  normal	  experience	   is	  essentially	  a	  matter	  of	   correlation	  between	  tactual	  and	  visual	  sensation	  (which	  are	  not	  physiologically	  correlated),	  but	  he	  views	  each	   sensory	   organ	   as	   exhibiting	   its	   own	   peculiar	   spatiality.	   The	   skin	   is	   a	  particularly	   good	   example	   of	   an	   organ	   that	   is	   itself	   extended	   in	   space,	   though	   all	  organs	   have	   this	   feature.	   Our	   spatial	   understanding	   is	   thus	   more	   than	   just	   the	  discovery	  of	  correlations	  between	  non-­‐spatial	  visual	  and	  tactual	  signs	   (as	  Berkeley	  has	   it	  with	  his	   semiotic),	  but	   the	  development	  of	   the	  more	  primitive	  sensations	  of	  space	   inherent	   in	   physiological	   spaces	   to	   a	   space	   of	   experience.	   In	   short,	   Mach’s	  account	  of	  sensation	  characterises	  it	  as	  a	  species	  of	  physical	   interaction,	  subject	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  namely,	  that	  all	  metaphysical	  elements	  are	  to	  be	  eliminated	  as	  superfluous	  and	  as	  destructive	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  science.”	  (Mach	  [1886/1897]).	  	  35	  Of	   course,	   as	   Stein	   was	   the	   first	   to	   point	   out,	   Mach	   offered	   no	   real	   solution	   to	   the	   “problem	   of	  rotation”,	  and	  we	  now	  understand	  (after	  Weyl)	   that	  even	  general	   relativity	  avails	   itself	  of	  a	   “world	  structure”	   without	   which	   even	   the	   idea	   of	   relative	   motion	   would	   be	   meaningless	   –	   i.e.	   general	  relativity	   is	   not	   thoroughly	   relativised.	   In	   fact,	   much	   of	   what	   Mach	   thought	   to	   make	   Newton’s	  framework	  an	  “abusive	  empiricism”	  can	  also	  apply	  to	  general	  relativity.	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the	   laws	  of	  physics	  and	  biology,	  completely	  contrary	   to	  Berkeley’s	  purely	  semiotic	  view.	   Mach’s	   naturalism	   is	   also	   committed	   to	   studying	   space	   within	   its	   proper	  “biological	   relationship”	  of	   sensation	   to	   the	   function	  of	   an	  organism,	   including	   the	  irritation	   of	   an	   organism’s	   sense	   organs	   relative	   to	   conscious	   and	   unconscious	  bodily	   movement	   and	   the	   organism’s	   memory	   of	   previous	   similar	   irritations	   and	  movements.	   Central	   to	   this	   biologised	   account	   are	   “feelings	   of	   motion,”	   i.e.	  proprioception.36	  Without	   such	   sensations	   of	   motion,	   our	   understanding	   of	   space	  would	  be	  greatly	  diminished.	  Other	   factors	   that	   inform	  our	  view	  of	  external	   space	  include	  “biological	  needs”	  and	  (most	  especially)	  “willed	  movement”	  of	  the	  organism,	  through	   which	   we	   arrive	   at	   our	   robust	   notion	   of	   space	   (as	   an	   arena	   of	  transformations	  and	  interactions).	  Mach’s	  critique	  of	  Newton’s	  conceptions	  of	  absolute	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  in	  Mach	  [1901/1960]	  can	  be	  read	  either	  phenomenalistically	  (as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	   project	   in	   Mach	   [1886/1897]	   just	   glossed),	   or	   as	   fairly	   independent	   of	   his	  phenomenalism.	   Taking	   the	   first	   option	   as	   an	   interpretive	   framework	   for	   Mach’s	  critique	  makes	  it	  seem	  much	  more	  akin	  to	  other	  phenomenalist	  critiques,	  especially	  Berkeley’s.	   Since	   absolute	   space,	   time,	   and	   motion	   make	   no	   difference	   to	   the	  phenomena	   (i.e.	   since	   all	   we	   can	   perceive	   are	   relative	   motions),	   they	   are	   not	  empirical	  notions,	  and	  ought	   to	  be	  removed	  from	  our	  physics.	  Physics	  should	  only	  avail	   itself	  of	  what	   is	   found	   in	   sensation.	  But	   far	   from	  being	  a	   crude	  attack	  of	   this	  sort,	  Mach’s	  critique	  is	  (a)	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  absolute	  space	  played	  (or	  did	  not	   play)	   in	   Newton’s	   own	   physics,	   and	   (b)	   a	   critique	   of	   Newton’s	   abstract	  formulation	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  motion	  (a	  critique	  based	  not	  on	  a	  dogmatic	  reductionism	  as	   many,	   since	   Stein	   [1977],	   have	   maintained,	   but	   on	   a	   careful	   dialectic	   with	  Newton’s	   own	  physics	   regarding	   an	   illicit,	   empirically	   unmotivated,	   abstraction	   in	  Newton’s	  laws	  of	  motion).	  Mach	  held	  that	  insofar	  as	  Newton’s	  concept	  of	  inertia	  was	  empirical,	   i.e.	   insofar	   as	   the	   laws	   of	  motion	   had	   an	   empirical	   content,	   it	  was	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  Mach	  [1906],	  pp.	  25-­‐30.	  Mach	  was	  responsible	  for	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  pioneering	  work	  done	  on	  balance	  and	  the	  inner	  ear.	  Independently	  of	  one	  another,	  Mach	  and	  Josef	  Breuer	  discovered	  in	  1873	  how	  fluid	  in	   the	   semicircular	   canals	  of	   the	   inner	  ear	   function	   to	  produce	  a	   sense	  of	  balance.	  The	   theory	  now	  goes	  by	  the	  name	  “Mach-­‐Breuer	  Theory	  of	  Endolymph	  Shift”.	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relative	   to	   the	   largest	   frame	   of	   reference	   within	   which	   measurements	   could	   be	  made.	   For	   Mach,	   the	   most	   general	   (yet	   empirically	   motivated)	   spatial	   frame	   of	  reference	  is	  that	  provided	  by	  the	  fixed	  stars,	  and	  the	  most	  general	  (yet	  empirically	  motivated)	   reference	  by	  which	   time	   can	  be	  measured	   is	   the	   rotation	  of	   the	  Earth.	  Mach’s	   real	   bug-­‐bear	   is	   not	   the	   Newtonian	   conception	   of	   absolute	   space	   as	   a	  metaphysical	  entity.	  Rather,	  Mach’s	  concern	  is	  that	  Newton	  privileges	  one	  of	  a	  set	  of	  dynamically	   equivalent	   inertial	   frames—a	   move	   that	   is	   empirically	   unmotivated	  
within	   Newton’s	   own	   system.	   For	   Newton,	   empirical	   reasoning	   could	   only	   ever	  countenance	  relative	  motions.	  Absolute	  space	  and	  time	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  helping	  us	   conceptualise	   what	   it	   is	   we	   are	   doing	   when	   we	   measure	   relative	   spaces	   and	  times.	  They	  help	  us	  conceive	  of	  the	  “aims	  of	  measurement”	  (As	  George	  Smith	  has	  put	  it):	   in	   other	   words,	   they	   help	   us	   to	   conceive	   what	   our	   preferred	   measurements	  approximate,	  though	  they	  do	  not	  enter	  into	  empirical	  reasoning,	  as	  do	  the	  preferred	  measurements.	  The	  phenomenal	  and	  reductive	  reading	  of	  Mach’s	  critique	  thus	  loses	  sight	  of	   the	  careful	  dialectical	  position	  that	  Mach	  takes	  up	   in	  his	  Mechanics.	   It	  also	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  nuances	  in	  Mach’s	  mature	  empiricism.	  	  Neumann	  was	  the	  first	  to	  observe	  that	  in	  order	  to	  give	  any	  kind	  of	  empirical	  content	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  motion,	  one	  must	  first	  postulate	  a	  reference	  frame	  and	  time	  scale	  in	  order	  to	  express	  the	  law	  of	  inertia.	  Neumann	  posited	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  rigid	  body	  (or	  point	  system)	  somewhere	  in	  the	  universe,	  relative	  to	  which	  a	  given	  particle	  moves	   in	   a	   straight	   line.	   Such	   a	   body	   would	   privilege	   a	   reference	   frame,	   but	   the	  definition	  was	  regarded	  as	  obscure,	  and	  thus	  replaced	  by	  the	  laws	  themselves.	  Mach,	  however,	   questions	   such	   counterfactual	   speculation.	   All	   of	   our	   empirical	  measurements,	  and	  all	  of	  our	  experiences	  of	  motion,	  have	  been	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  the	  fixed	  stars	  (and	  the	  mass	  distribution	  they	  realise).	   For	   Mach,	   the	   laws	   of	   physics	   do	   not	   necessarily	   rest	   on	   phenomenal	  grounds;	  however,	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  in	  those	  laws,	  and	  therefore	  the	  laws	  themselves,	  must	  not	  engage	  in	  empirically	  unmotivated	  forms	  of	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abstraction,	   no	  matter	   how	   natural	   and	   useful	   such	   abstractions	  may	   be.37	  If	   one	  joins	  Mach	  in	  reading	  the	  laws	  as	  expressions	  of	  empirical	  relations,	  then	  one	  needs	  only	   the	   most	   general	   frame	   (the	   one	   in	   which	   the	   most	   phenomena	   reasonably	  fit)—that	  of	  the	  fixed	  stars.	  The	  relative	  motions	  described	  in	  Mach’s	  law	  of	  inertia	  are	  elaborate	  constructions,	  though	  the	  evidence	  for	  them	  is	  reducible	  (in	  principle)	  to	  basic	  sensory	  elements—in	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  relative	  motions	  as	  they	  impact	  the	  sensorium,	  and	  no	  extra-­‐experiential	  entities	  need	  be	  admitted.	  	  But	   if	   Mach’s	   critique	   of	   Newtonian	   absolute	   space	   is	   not	   indebted	   to,	   but	  merely	   consistent	   with,	   his	   phenomenalism,	   and	   is	   nonetheless	   motivated	   by	   his	  mature	   empiricism,	   then	   what	   does	   this	   tell	   us	   of	   his	   empiricism?	   Mach’s	  phenomenalism	  is	  clearly	  indebted	  to	  the	  general	  framework	  of	  the	  Cartesian-­‐cum-­‐Lockean	   view;	   there	   still	   remains	   an	   individualistic,	   almost	   solipsistic,	   view	   of	  knowledge,	  and	  one	  may	  certainly	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  Mach’s	  phenomenalism	  is	   merely	   a	   naturalised	   expression	   of	   the	   Subjectivity	   Thesis.	   However,	   certain	  aspects	   of	   Mach’s	   mature	   view	   challenge	   this	   categorisation.	   Firstly,	   as	   we	   have	  seen,	  Mach’s	  key	  critiques	  of	  our	  received	  theories	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  show	  a	  sensitivity	   to	   empirical	   considerations	   which	   are	   not	   solipsistic,	   which	   can	   be	  characterised	   relative	   to	   physical	   constructions	  which	   are	   not	   a	   species	   of	   coarse	  phenomenalism.	   Secondly,	   even	   Mach’s	   phenomenalism	   fails	   to	   share	   one	   key	  characteristic	  with	  its	  CBE	  counterparts,	  since	  Mach	  rejects	  the	  a	  priori	  grounds	  on	  which	   one	   may	   posit	   sensations	   as	   the	   basic	   stuff	   of	   an	   epistemological	   theory.	  Instead,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  he	  considers	  sensations	  central	  to	  such	  a	  picture	  because	  
we	   have	   a	   scientific	   (physiological,	   biological,	   and	   physical)	   understanding	   of	   them.	  Mach	  remained	  some	  kind	  of	  phenomenalist	  throughout	  his	  career,	  surely;	  but	  this	  phenomenalism	   never	   seeks	   to	   reduce	   science	   to	   the	   phenomena,	   nor	   does	   it	  pretend	  to	  be	  able	  to	  characterise	  the	  phenomenal	  realm	  from	  first	  principles	  (the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 	  See	   DiSalle	   [2002c].	   Mach	   was,	   according	   to	   DiSalle,	   not	   attempting	   to	   reduce	   complex	  constructions	  of	  relative	  motion	  to	  phenomenalist	  elements,	  but	  rather	  attempting	  to	  reformulate	  the	  law	  of	  inertia	  so	  that	  it	  reflected	  the	  real	  historical	  conditions	  in	  which	  motions	  had	  been	  measured.	  DiSalle	  argues	  that	  for	  Mach,	  “[e]xpressing	  the	  laws	  more	  abstractly	  might	  enable	  us	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  imaginary	  situations,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  increase	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  functional	  dependence	  among	  phenomena.”	  (DiSalle	  [2002c],	  173)	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phenomena	   are	   never	   viewed	   as	   an	   unanalysable	   starting	   place).	   We	   know	   that	  sensations	   are	   the	   sole	   gateway	   to	   knowledge	   because	   the	   empirical	   sciences	   of	  physiology	  and	  psychology	  have	  established	  them	  so.	  Further,	   recall	   that	   Gupta	   argues	   that	   “classical	   empiricism”	   is	   best	  understood	  as	  beholden	  to	  a	  view	  of	  direct	  awareness	  and	  the	  gap	  between	  internal	  “facts”	   of	   perception	   and	   the	   external	  world.	  While	  Mach	   does	   hold	   a	   naturalised	  version	  of	   the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis	   (and	   therefore	  a	  notion	  of	  direct	  awareness),	  he	  does	   not	   “mind	   the	   gap”,	   as	   it	  were.	  His	   phenomenalism	   is	   rather	   based	   on	   there	  being	   no	   gap	   between	   sensations	   and	   the	   sciences—between	   sensations	   and	   the	  empirical	   sciences	  which	  organise	  and	  describe	   the	  phenomena.	  Where	  Locke	  and	  Berkeley	   erred,	   by	   Mach’s	   standards,	   was	   in	   thinking	   that	   sensation	   was	   able	   to	  provide	  for	  us	  a	  “picture”	  of	  the	  external	  world	  (either	  as	  material	  thing,	  or	  as	  mind	  of	   God),	   and	   that	   such	   a	   picture,	   as	   formulated	   by	   science,	   was	   in	   some	   way	  separable	   from,	   though	   hopefully	   reducible	   to,	   sensation.	   Naturalised	  phenomenalism	  rejects	   the	  gap	  altogether.	  The	  scientist’s	   job	   is	  not	   to	   construct	  a	  “blue-­‐print	   for	   reality”	   (seeing	   if	   such	   a	   blue-­‐print	   can	   be	   made	   from	   sensory	  elements,	  or,	  what	  amounts	  to	  the	  same	  thing,	  seeing	  if	  the	  blue-­‐print	  matches	  our	  intuition),	   but	   to	  be	   aware	  of	   how	   it	   is	   she	   can	  have	   a	   conception	  of	   the	  world	  of	  objects,	   including	   scientific	   objects,	   based	   on	   sensation.	   Science	   need	   not	   be	  phenomenalistic	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  must	   be	   reduced	   to	   phenomena—it	  must	   be	  phenomenalistic	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  every	  abstraction	  it	  makes,	  every	  construction	  it	  performs,	   and	   every	   law	   it	   utilises	   must	   be	   conceived	   relative	   to	   the	   sorts	   of	  observations	   we	   have	   made	   and	   continue	   to	   make.	   (Science,	   in	   short,	   must	   be	  empirically	  motivated	  and	  empirically	  sensitive;	  it	  must	  be	  economical.)	  But	  already	  we	  see	  a	  nuanced	  view	  of	  empiricism	  that	  falls	  outside	  of	  Gupta’s	  characterisation	   of	   “classical	   empiricism”.	   Holding	   a	   variant	   of	   the	   Subjectivity	  Thesis	   need	   not	   entail	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   external	   world.	   We	   have	   to	   be	   more	  precise.	   What	   produces	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   external	   world	   is	   a	   non-­‐naturalised	  notion	   of	   direct	   awareness	   (non-­‐naturalised	   in	   that	   it	   is	   necessarily	   pre-­‐scientific	  and	   necessary	   for	   the	   study	   of	   science),	   along	  with	   the	   assumption	   that	   scientific	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laws	  purport	   to	  make	   reference	   to	  more	   than	   the	   functional	  dependencies	  we	   see	  between	  the	  phenomena.	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Locke,	  Berkeley,	  and	  Hume	  held	  all	  of	  these	   positions	   in	   combination,	   we	   must	   recognise	   that	   such	   a	   constellation	   of	  theses	   is	   in	   no	   way	   definitive	   of	   empiricism.	   As	   we	   see	   with	   Mach,	   there	   are	  alternative	   interpretations	   of	   empiricism	  which	   reject	   the	   subaltern	   status	   of	   the	  sciences	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   first	  philosophy,	  and	  which	  reject	  altogether	  “the	  problem	  of	   the	  external	  world”.	  To	  reject	  either,	  it	  seems,	  is	  enough	  to	  challenge	  the	  framework	  of	  CBE,	  and	  to	  fail	  to	  fall	  under	  Gupta’s	  category	  of	  “classical	  empiricism”.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   Mach	   was	   certainly	   not	   the	   only	   (nor	   the	   first)	   modern	  scientific	  empiricist	  to	  challenge	  such	  a	  categorisation.	  	  
III.2:	  Helmholtz’s	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Space	  A	   different	   kind	   of	   naturalised	   empiricism	   operated	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Helmholtz	   as	  well,	  especially	  in	  his	  empiricist	  critique	  of	  the	  Kantian	  Transcendental	  Aesthetic.38	  The	  Transcendental	  Aesthetic	  aims	  to	  establish	  the	  pure	  intuitions	  of	  space	  and	  time	  as	  the	  necessary	  structures	  of	  our	  intuition.	  Our	  spatial	  intuition	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  Aesthetic,	  necessarily	  Euclidean,	  allowing	   for	  only	   those	  geometrical	  constructions	  which	   accord	  with	   the	  postulates	   of	   Euclid’s	   geometry.	  The	   alternative	  hyberbolic	  and	  elliptical	  geometries	  that	  were	  developed	  throughout	  the	  19th	  century	  would	  be	  regarded	  by	  Kantians	  and	  neo-­‐Kantians	  as	  mere	  technical	  elaborations	  of	  consistent	  mathematical	  systems,	  and	  therefore	  would	  be	  seen	  by	  Kantians	  and	  neo-­‐Kantians	  as	   offering	   no	   reason	   to	   overturn	   the	   privileged	   position	   of	   Euclidean	   geometry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  I	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   gloss	   over	   here	   the	   very	   real	   differences	   between	   Mach’s	   and	   Helmholtz’s	  programs	  by	   focusing	  on	   their	   common	  move	   toward	  naturalism.	  For	  one,	  Helmholtz	  was	  more	   in	  line	  with	   traditional	   empiricism	   in	   assuming	   that	   the	   human	  mind	  was	   a	   tabula	   rasa.	   Mach	   often	  flirted	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  nativism.	  For	  Mach,	  certain	  autonomic	  actions	  are	  hard-­‐wired	  into	  the	  organism	  that	   allow	   for	   the	   eventual	   correlation	   of	   tactual	   and	   visual	   space	   required	   for	   our	   full	   notion	   of	  space.	  Mach’s	  example	   in	  his	  [1906/1943]	   is	  of	  a	  newly	  born	  chick.	  The	  chick	  will	  notice	  an	  object,	  and	  peck	   at	   it.	   From	   this	   correlation	  of	   visual	   space	   and	   tactual	   space	   the	  organism	   can	  develop	   a	  system	  of	  spatial	  sensation	  on	  what	  Mach	  calls	  “powerful	  impressions”.	  (19-­‐20)	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  picture	   here	   is	   not	   unlike	   Berkeley’s	   semiotic,	   in	  which	   visual	   sensation	   lacks	   the	   optico-­‐geomtric	  properties	  attributed	  to	  it	  by	  Descartes	  and	  Malebranche.	  See	  Descartes’	  Optics	  in	  Descartes	  [1985],	  and	   Malebranche’s	   [1980],	   Book	   1,	   Chapters	   6-­‐9.	   Berkeley	   also	   rejected	   the	   Lockean	   idea	   that	  sensations	  of	  space	  belong	  to	  more	  than	  one	  modality.	  For	  Berkeley,	  we	  must	  come	  to	  coordinate	  the	  modalities	  in	  a	  way	  to	  better	  predict	  the	  course	  of	  sensation	  through	  the	  active	  association	  of	  sensual	  signs	  from	  which	  our	  notion	  of	  space	  arises.	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(amongst	  the	  growing	  family	  of	  possible	  geometries)	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  spatial	  intuition.	   Helmholtz	  was	   the	   first	   to	   challenge	   this	   privileged	   status	   based	   on	   the	  mutual	  sensibility	  of	  alternative	  geometries.	  Rather	   than	  suppose,	  as	  did	  Kant,	   the	  necessity	  of	  Euclidean	  space	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  sensibility,	  Helmholtz	  develops	  a	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  that	  finds	  as	  its	  basis	  not	  the	  pure	  intuitions	  of	  space	  and	  time	  but	  our	  empirical	  observations	  of	  the	  spatial	  displacement	  of	  rigid	  bodies.	  	  After	   discussing	   at	   length	   the	   properties	   of	   spherical	   and	   pseudo-­‐spherical	  geometries	  in	  his	  [1868/1977a],	  Helmholtz	  turns	  to	  spaces	  of	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  zero	  constant	  curvature.	  However,	  rather	  than	  following	  Riemann’s	  abstract	  account	  of	  such	  spaces	  (and	  the	  metric	  tensors	  that	  determine	  their	  geometries),	  Helmholtz	  begins	   from	   “facts”	   about	   our	   perception	   of	   objects	   in	   space,	   and	   notes	   that	   the	  displacements	  of	  rigid	  bodies	  can	  act	  as	  representations	  of	  ideal	  physical	  processes	  for	   spaces	   of	   constant	   curvature.	   Riemann	   was	   concerned	   with	   a	   large	   class	   of	  possible	   geometries,	   and	   therefore	   had	   to	   countenance	   a	   large	   class	   of	   possible	  physical	   processes	   which	   empirically	   determined	   the	   physical	   geometry.	   A	  Riemannian	   metric	   defines	   geometrical	   notions	   for	   a	   space,	   such	   as	   angle,	   area,	  length	  and	  curvature.	  However,	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  mobility	  operates	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	   way	   for	   homaloidal	   spaces	   and	   other	   spaces	   of	   constant	   curvature.	  Determining	  which	  of	   the	   relevant	   spaces	  we	  are	   in	  becomes	  an	  empirical	  matter.	  From	  the	  observation	  that	  bodies	  are	  rigid	  through	  spatial	  relocation	  we	  are	  able	  to	  establish	  the	  isometries	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  homaloid	  space,	  a	  notion	  of	  congruence)	  that	  make	  measurement	  possible.	  	  Whereas	  Riemann	  began	  his	  inquiry	  from	  the	  most	  general	  account	  of	  space,	  asking	  what	  conditions	  must	  be	  in	  place	  for	  us	  to	  consider	  something	  a	  space	  at	  all,	  Helmholtz	   begins	   with	   the	   elementary	   experiences	   that	   acquaint	   us	   with	   space,	  asking	  what	  conditions	  these	  experiences	  impose	  upon	  the	  structure	  of	  space	  once	  the	  experiences	  have	  been	  given	  the	  appropriate	  mathematic	  formulation:	  “if	  one…	  adheres	  from	  the	  outset	  to	  the	  demand	  that	  figures	  fixed	  in	  themselves	  should	  have	  unconditionally	   free	   mobility,	   without	   distortion,	   in	   all	   parts	   of	   space,	   then	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Riemann’s	   initial	  hypothesis	   is	  derivable	  as	  a	   consequence	  of	  much	   less	   restricted	  assumptions.”	  Helmholtz	  continues:	  	  	  My	   starting	   point	   was	   that	   the	   primary	   measurement	   of	   space	   is	   entirely	  based	   upon	   the	   observation	   of	   congruence…	   However,	   one	   cannot	   at	   all	  speak	  of	  congruence	  unless	  fixed	  bodies	  or	  point	  systems	  can	  be	  moved	  up	  to	  one	  another	  without	  changing	  form,	  and	  unless	  the	  congruence	  of	  two	  spatial	  magnitudes	   is	   a	   fact	   whose	   existence	   is	   independent	   of	   all	   motions.	   So	   I	  presupposed	   from	   the	   outset	   that	   the	   measurement	   of	   space	   through	  ascertaining	  congruence	  was	  possible,	  and	  set	  myself	  the	  task	  of	  looking	  for	  the	  most	   general	   analytical	   form	  of	   a	   severally	   extended	  manifold	   in	  which	  motions	  of	  the	  kind	  thus	  demanded	  are	  possible.	  (Helmholtz	  [1868/1977b],	  41)	  	  From	  this	  observational	   fact,	  we	  have	  the	  basis	   from	  which	  measurement	  of	  space	  can	  occur,	  and	   thus	   the	  general	  geometrical	   features	  of	   those	  spaces	   that	  admit	  of	  rigid	   bodies	   (i.e.	   spaces	   of	   constant	   curvature)	   are	   established.	   The	   trick	   is	   to	   see	  that	   no	   special	   transcendental	   feature	   of	   spatial	   intuition	   is	   required	   to	   arrive	   at	  these	  general	  geometrical	  features	  of	  actual	  space.	  Surely	  we	  must	  intuit	  space	  (i.e.	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  it	  to	  ourselves),	  but	  its	  geometry	  owes	  nothing	  to	  the	  structure	   of	   our	   cognition:	   rather,	   its	   structure	   is	   owed	   to	   a	   very	   simple	   fact	   of	  mechanics	  observable	  by	  anyone	  (even,	  Helmholtz	  argues,	  the	  blind).	  The	   distinctions	   between	   Riemann’s	   general	   and	   algebraic	   method	   and	  Helmholtz’s	   empirical	  method	   are	   not	   of	   immediate	   concern	   here.	   Our	   concern	   is	  with	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   Helmholtzian	   considerations	   on	   Kant’s	   transcendental	  philosophy	   and	   their	   subsequent	   impact	   on	   the	   development	   of	   MSE.	   Helmholtz	  thinks	   these	  considerations	   from	  the	  observation	  of	   rigid	  bodies	   force	   the	  Kantian	  into	   a	   dilemma.	   Either	   such	   discoveries	   are	   truly	   empirical,	   in	  which	   case	  we	   can	  explain	   our	   spatial	   perception	   (and	   measurement	   of	   objects	   therein)	   without	  reference	   to	  necessary	  a	  priori	   claims,39	  or	   the	   “Kantian	  might	   certainly	   look	  upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Helmholtz	   always	   maintained	   that	   sensation	   itself	   was	   synthetic	   a	   priori.	   His	   argument	   only	  extends	   to	   the	   geometrical	   structure	   of	   space,	  which	   is	   not	   determined	  uniquely	  by	   any	  necessary	  feature	  of	   our	   sensible	   faculty.	  Determining	   that	   space	  has	   an	   external	   structure	   (and	  determining	  the	  structure	  it	  has)	  requires	  us	  to,	  over	  long	  stretches	  of	  experience	  in	  early	  childhood,	  make	  certain	  unconscious	  inferences,	  based	  primarily	  on	  what	  we	  learn	  as	  we	  move	  through	  space.	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the	   geometrical	   axioms	   as	   propositions	   given	   a	  priori	   by	   transcendental	   intuition	  which	  no	  experience	  could	  either	  confirm	  or	  refute,	  because	  it	  must	  first	  be	  decided	  by	  them	  whether	  any	  natural	  bodies	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  rigid.”	  (Helmholtz	  [1876],	  320)	   But,	   says	   Helmholtz,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   nothing	   synthetic	   about	   such	  propositions:	   “they	   would	   merely	   define	   what	   qualities	   and	   deportment	   a	   body	  must	  have	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  rigid.”	  (Ibid40)	  Neither	  horn	  in	  the	  dilemma	  can	  save	  the	   specific	   geometry	   thought	   to	   be	   secured	   by	   the	   Transcendental	   Aesthetic	   and	  both	  are	  thus	  acceptable	  to	  an	  empiricist.	  More	   specifically,	   what	   makes	   Helmholtz’s	   philosophy	   of	   geometry	   an	  
empiricist	   philosophy	  of	   geometry	   is	   his	   commitment	   to	   the	   view	   that	  mechanical	  facts	   can	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   normal	   course	   of	   visual	   (and	   perhaps	   tactile)	  perception,	  and	  that	  such	  facts	  (which	  establish	  for	  us	  a	  notion	  of	  “rigid	  body”)	  can	  act	   as	   the	   foundation	   of	   geometry.	   Because	   we	   know	   certain	   facts	   of	   mechanics	  (specifically,	   that	   there	  are	  sufficiently	  rigid	  bodies	   in	   the	  world	   that	  allow	   for	   the	  measurement	   of	   space),	   geometry	   follows	   from	   mechanics,	   and	   not	   some	  transcendental	  source.	  Kant	  and	  many	  Kantians	  (before	  Helmholtz),	  thought	  such	  a	  transcendental	   source	   was	   necessary	   to	   move	   beyond	   the	   belief,	   held	   by	   Locke,	  Berkeley,	  and	  Hume,	   that	  geometry	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  contrivance	  of	  mind,	  established	  at	  best	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  system	  to	  bring	  order	  to	  the	  appearances.	  Helmholtz,	  like	  Mach,	  takes	  full	  advantage	  of	  his	  naturalism	  to	  attack	  both	  the	  CBE	  tradition	  and	  Kant:	  what	  we	  know	  (if	  we	  know	  anything)	  are	  facts	  about	  the	  motion	  of	  medium-­‐sized	  bodies	  in	  immediate	  space,	  and	  the	  congruence	  of	  some	  of	  these	  objects	  allows	  measurement	  of	  space	  to	  occur.	  The	  CBE	  principals	  were	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  space	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  In	  the	  original	  version	  of	  this	  paper,	  Helmholtz	  [1868/1977a],	  the	  matter	  is	  stated	  in	  basically	  the	  same	  terms:	  “One	  could	  admittedly	  also	  take	  the	  concepts	  of	   fixed	  geometrical	  spatial	  structures	  to	  be	   a	   transcendental	   concept,	  which	   is	   formed	   independent[ly]	   of	   actual	   experiences	   and	   to	  which	  [these	  structures]	  need	  not	  necessarily	  correspond,	  as	  in	  fact	  our	  natural	  bodies	  are	  already	  not	  even	  in	  wholly	  pure	   and	  undistorted	   correspondence	   to	   those	   concepts	  which	  we	  have	   abstracted	   from	  them	  by	  way	  of	  induction…	  [A]	  strict	  Kantian	  certainly	  could	  then	  regard	  the	  axioms	  of	  geometry	  as	  propositions	  given	  a	  priori	  through	  transcendental	  intuition,	  ones	  which	  could	  be	  neither	  confirmed	  nor	  refuted	  by	  any	  experience,	  because	  one	  would	  have	  to	  decide	  according	  to	  them	  alone	  whether	  any	   particular	   natural	   bodies	   were	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   fixed	   bodies.	   But…	   the	   axioms	   of	   geometry	  would	   certainly	   not	   be	   synthetic	   propositions	   in	   Kant’s	   sense.	   For	   they	   would	   then	   only	   assert	  something	  which	  followed	  analytically	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  fixed	  geometrical	  structures	  necessary	  for	  measurement…”	  (Helmholtz	  [1868/1977a],	  24-­‐25)	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was	  a	  mere	  contrivance;	  Kant	  was	  wrong	  to	  think	  it	  was	  necessarily	  established	  by	  the	   structure	   of	   our	   cognition,	   and	   wrong	   to	   think	   that	   we	   could	   not	   intuit	   non-­‐Euclidean	   spaces.	   Space	   is,	   for	  Helmholtz,	   an	   existing	   structure	   (or	   set	   of	   possible	  structures)	   constrained	   (though	   not	   uniquely	   determined)	   by	   our	   observation	   of	  rigid	  bodies	  (or	  Lie	  group	  of	  free	  motions).	  	  Helmholtz’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   space	   has	   established	   that	   it	   is	   not	  synthetic	  a	  priori	  in	  Kant’s	  sense	  by	  showing	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  a	  priori	  about	  the	  geometrical	  structure	  of	  space.	  More	  precisely,	  while	  spatial	  awareness	  given	  to	  us	  in	  intuition	  (the	  amorphous	  and	  as	  yet	  undifferentiated	  two-­‐dimensional	  manifold)	  may	  be	  considered	  synthetic	  a	  priori,	  this	  intuition	  is	  separate	  from	  the	  geometrical	  structure(s)	  of	  space	  (pace	  Kant).	  In	  his	  reply	  to	  Land	  in	  Mind,	  Helmholtz	  explicates	  the	  narrow	  focus	  of	  his	  critique:	  	  …	  it	  is	  a	  misunderstanding	  on	  Prof.	  Land's	  part	  if	  he	  thinks	  I	  wished	  to	  raise	  any	  objection	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  space	  as	  being	  for	  us	  an	  a	  priori	  and	  necessary,	  or	  (in	  Kant's	  sense)	  transcendental,	  form	  of	  intuition.	  I	  had	  no	  such	  intention.	  It	   is	   true,	   my	   view	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   this	   transcendental	   form	   and	  reality…	   does	   not	   quite	   coincide	   with	   that	   of	   many	   followers	   of	   Kant	   and	  Schopenhauer.	  But	  space	  may	  very	  well	  be	  a	  form	  of	  intuition	  in	  the	  Kantian	  sense,	  and	  yet	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  the	  axioms.	  (Helmholtz	  [1878],	  213)	  	  The	  geometrical	  structure	  of	  space	  is	  formed	  from	  this	  amorphously	  given	  intuitive	  manifold	   through	  movement	   in	   space,	   tactile	   perception,	   and	   the	   coordination	   of	  visual	  sensation	  with	  certain	  facts	  about	  medium-­‐sized	  objects	  in	  our	  environment	  (as	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  environment	  through	  interaction).	  	  Ultimately,	  Helmholtz’s	  empiricism	  hinges	  on	  our	  ability	   to	   found	  geometry	  on	   a	   domain	   of	   geometrical	   objects	   with	   which	   we	   have	   acquaintance.	   However,	  Helmholtz	  calls	   into	  question	  such	  acquaintance,	  perhaps	  nowhere	  more	  explicitly	  than	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  [1868/1977a]:	  	  …	   in	   geometry	   we	   deal	   constantly	   with	   ideal	   structures,	   whose	   corporeal	  portrayal	   in	   the	   actual	  world	   is	   always	   only	   an	   approximation	   to	  what	   the	  concept	  demands,	  and	  we	  only	  decide	  whether	  a	  body	   is	   fixed,	   its	  sides	   flat	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and	   its	   edges	   straight,	   by	   means	   of	   the	   very	   propositions	   whose	   factual	  correctness	  the	  examination	  is	  supposed	  to	  show.	  	  As	  DiSalle	  points	  out,	  this	  comment	  (and	  similar	  remarks	  regarding	  the	  definitional	  character	   of	   arithmetical	   concepts	   and	   the	   definitional	   character	   of	   arithmetical	  propositions	  in	  Helmholtz	  [1887/1977])	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  synthetic	  nature	  of	  the	  axioms	  of	  geometry:	  	  	  If	   geometry,	   like	   arithmetic,	  merely	   explores	   the	   consequences	   of	   a	   certain	  set	   of	   fundamental	   concepts,	   if	   its	   application	   to	   the	   world	   consists	   not	   in	  providing	   empirical	   evidence	   for	   its	   basic	   principles,	   but	   merely	   in	  identifying	   instances	   of	   its	   fundamental	   concepts,	   then	   Helmholtz’s	  empiricism	   and	   the	   synthetic	   a	   priori	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   in	   the	   same	  difficulty.	  (DiSalle	  [2006b],	  132)	  	  Both	  Kant	  and	  Helmholtz	  attribute	  to	  geometry	  a	  synthetic	  character:	  Kant	  finds	  the	  basis	   of	   geometry	   in	   sensible	   intuition,	   Helmholtz	   finds	   it	   in	  what	   he	   takes	   to	   be	  simple	  mechanical	   judgments	  about	   the	  behaviour	  of	  bodies.	  Neither	   saw	   that	   the	  certainty	  of	  geometrical	  principles	  resides	  in	  their	  role	  as	  criteria	  for	  the	  application	  of	  geometrical	  concepts.	  In	   the	   same	  paper	   in	  which	  Helmholtz	   introduces	  his	   empiricist	   account	   of	  geometry	   (Helmholtz	   [1868/1977a]),	   he	   also	   proposes	   his	   famous	   convex	  mirror	  thought	  experiment.	  In	  this	  thought	  experiment,	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  a	  convex	  mirror	  in	  which	  we	  find	  the	  images	  of	  several	  objects	  placed	  in	  front	  of	  the	  mirror,	  diminished	   and	   flattened	   the	   further	   the	   corresponding	   object	   is	   placed	   from	   the	  mirror.	  Now	   consider	   a	  man	   in	   front	   of	   the	  mirror	  measuring	   the	   length	   of	   a	   line	  with	  a	  trustworthy	  measuring	  rod;	  as	  the	   line	  stretches	  away	  from	  the	  mirror,	   the	  image	  of	  the	  line	  will	  “shrivel	  up”	  (diminish	  in	  the	  dimension	  of	  depth),	  but	  so	  will	  the	   image	   of	   the	   man	   measuring,	   along	   with	   his	   measuring	   rod.	   (Helmholtz	  [1868/1977a],	   20)	   The	   diminution	   in	   the	   dimension	   of	   depth	  will,	   in	   the	  mirror-­‐world,	   yield	   the	   same	   results,	   and	   all	   of	   the	   same	   congruence	   relations,	   that	   exist	  between	  objects	  in	  the	  object-­‐world.	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In	  short,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  the	  men	  in	  the	  mirror	  could	  bring	  it	  out	  that	  their	  bodies	  were	  not	   fixed	  bodies	   and	   their	   experiences	   [not]	   good	  examples	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	  Euclid’s	  axioms.	  But	  if	  they	  could	  look	  out	  into	  our	  world,	  as	  we	   look	   into	   theirs,	  without	  being	  able	   to	   cross	   the	  boundary,	   then	   they	  would	  have	  to	  pronounce	  our	  world	  to	  be	  the	  image	  of	  a	  convex	  mirror,	  and	  speak	  of	  us	  just	  as	  we	  of	  them.	  And	  as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  if	  the	  men	  of	  the	  two	  worlds	  could	  converse	  together,	   then	  neither	  would	  be	  able	  to	  convince	  the	  other	  that	  he	  had	  the	  true	  and	  the	  other	  the	  distorted	  situation.	  I	  cannot	  even	  recognise	  that	  such	  a	  question	  has	  at	  all	  any	  sense,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  introduce	  no	  mechanical	  considerations.	  (ibid)	  	  	  What	  separates	  the	  men	  in	  the	  mirror	  from	  those	  of	  us	  outside	  of	  the	  mirror,	  then,	  is	  the	   final	   set	   of	   considerations	   about	   the	  mechanics	   of	   objects	   in	   the	   actual	  world.	  Without	  such	  mechanical	  considerations,	  both	  worlds	  are	  not	  only	  equally	  intuitable	  (contra	  Kant),	  but	  equally	  right	  to	  proclaim	  their	  geometry	  correct.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Helmholtz	   holds	   that	   mechanics	   provides	   us	   with	   an	   empirically	   verifiable	  understanding	  of	  rigid	  bodies—it	  establishes	  that	  the	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  in	  front	  of	  the	  mirror	  are	  rigid	  (at	  least	  approximately	  so),	  and	  that	  the	  empirical	  criteria	  used	  to	   determine	   this	   fact	   are	   not	   satisfied	   by	   the	   objects	   in	   the	   mirror	   (unless	   the	  mirror	  people	  possess,	   after	   all	   and	   to	   our	   surprise,	   the	   right	  mechanical	   notions,	  and	  we	  do	  not).	  The	  broader	  message	  is	  this:	  given	  a	  single	  world,	  with	  a	  single	  set	  of	  mechanical	  laws,	  the	  situation	  couldn’t	  arise	  of	  two	  equally	  good	  interpretations	  of	  geometry.	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	   the	   way	   that	   Helmholtz	   presents	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  relevant	   facts	  and	  geometry	   leaves	   the	  view	  open	  to	   two	  different	   interpretations:	  the	  first	  interpretation	  sees	  Helmholtz	  as	  flirting	  with	  the	  obvious	  conventionalism	  in	   his	   account	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   free	   mobility	   within	   homogenous	   geometry.	  Congruence	   (based	  on	   free	  mobility)	   constrains	   the	  possible	   spaces	   to	   only	   these,	  but	  does	  not	  determine	  a	  privileged	  member	  among	   them,	   i.e.	  does	  not	  determine	  Euclidean	   space	   as	   the	   space	   over	   non-­‐Euclidean	   spaces	   (of	   constant	   curvature).	  This	   interpretation	   begins	   with	   Poincaré,	   and	   is	   heavily	   influential	   on	   the	   logical	  empiricists,	  as	  well	  as	  later	  thinkers	  like	  Coffa	  and	  Friedman.	  Interpretations	  of	  this	  sort	   hold	   that	   Helmholtz’s	   empiricism	  was	   taken	   to	   the	   brink	   of	   conventionalism	  (which	  is	  implicitly	  in	  the	  theory),	  but	  that	  he	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  final	  “move”	  in	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the	  dialectic.	   If	  we	  look	  more	  carefully	  at	  Helmholtz’s	  remarks,	  we	  see	  that	  he	  was	  coming	   to	   terms	   (or,	   rather,	   not	   quite	   coming	   to	   terms)	   with	   the	   constitutive	  principles	  of	  modern	  geometry,	  which	  had	  neither	  an	  empirical	  nor	  a	  transcendental	  content.	  They	  exhibit	  all	  of	  the	  markings	  of	  stipulative	  conventions.	  As	  DiSalle	  puts	  it,	  Helmholtz,	   according	   to	   this	   interpretation,	   merely	   “stopped	   short	   of	   recognizing	  the	   principle	   of	   free	   mobility	   as	   a	   convention”	   (DiSalle	   [2006b],	   132)	   though	   its	  conventionality	   is	   clearly	   exhibited	   by	  Helmholtz.	   On	   this	   interpretation,	   Poincaré	  completes	  the	  move	  to	  an	  explicit	  conventionalism	  by	  showing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  determining	  (empirically	  or	  otherwise)	  between	  geometries	  (all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  made	   to	   describe	   our	   experience,	   so	   long	   as	   one	   produces	   the	   stipulations	   that	  define	   congruence	   and	   straightness),	   and	   therefore	   there	   is	   a	   free	   choice	   among	  them.	  All	  geometries	  are	  “relative”,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  question	  as	  to	  which	  is	  “correct”,	  so	   other	   considerations	   (such	   as	   simplicity	   of	   the	   geometry	   itself,	   or	   the	  preservation	  of	  mechanical	   laws)	  determine	  pragmatically	  which	  geometry	  will	  be	  chosen.	  This	  interpretation	  surely	  captures	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  convex	  mirror	  thought	  experiment.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  privilege	  our	  mechanical	  laws,	  there	  really	  is	  no	  way	  of	   speaking	  across	   the	  divide	   created	  by	   the	   convex	  mirror—no	  way	  of	  settling	   who	   is	   in	   a	   “normal”	   and	   who	   is	   in	   a	   distorted	   space.	   However,	   such	   an	  interpretation	   has	   much	   to	   explain.	   Firstly,	   though	   less	   interestingly,	   why	   did	  Helmholtz	  not	  characterise	  conventionalism	  explicitly?	  We	  set	  aside	  this	  question	  in	  the	   interest	   of	   brevity.	   Secondly,	   and	   more	   interestingly,	   it	   ignores	   two	   central	  aspects	  of	  the	  paper:	  (1)	  Helmholtz	  is	  attempting	  in	  the	  paper	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	   a	   non-­‐Euclidean	   space,	   and	   therefore	   that	   the	   question	  whether	   space	   is	  Euclidean	   or	   not	   has	   an	   empirical	   sense,	   and	   (2)	   that	   Helmholtz	   did	   not	   think	  geometry	  a	  matter	  of	  conventional	  choice	  because	  that	  would	  mean	  that	  mechanical	  laws	  are	  not	  decisive.	  Thorough-­‐going	  conventionalism	  was	  far	  too	  arbitrary	  on	  this	  front;	   Helmholtz	   did	   not	   think	   mechanics	   was	   a	   matter	   of	   arbitrary	   choice,	   as	  neither	   group	   of	   geometers	   has	   any	   choice	   but	   to	   base	   their	   geometry	   on	   the	  behaviour	  of	  bodies	   that	   seem	   to	  be	   rigid.	   If	   they	   live	   in	   the	   same	  physical	  world,	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then	  there	  would	  be	  a	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  as	  to	  what	  geometry	  was	  correct.	  Helmholtz	  seems	  to	  be	  making	  this	  further	  assumption,	  though	  for	  him	  it	  is	  not	  an	  assumption:	  mechanics	  gets	  its	  privileged	  role	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  role	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  geometry.	  Further,	  as	  DiSalle	  has	  noted,	  that	  we	  can	  even	  make	  the	  sorts	  of	  distinctions	  required	  to	  formulate	  the	  convex	  mirror	  thought	  experiment	  presupposes	  that	  the	  same	  mechanical	  laws	  are	  operating	  for	  folks	  both	  outside	  and	  inside	  of	  the	  mirror.	  DiSalle	   thus	   offers	   us	   our	   second	   interpretation	   of	   the	   thought-­‐experiment.	  Helmholtz	  is	  not	  pursuing	  a	  thorough-­‐going	  conventionalism,	  he’s	  pursuing	  rather	  a	  novel	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  space.	  This	  analysis	  does	  not	  conventionally	  assume	  the	   principle	   of	   free	   mobility;	   that	   is	   far	   too	   arbitrary.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   a	   conceptual	  analysis	   	   “of	   what	   is	   implicit	   in	   our	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   judgments	   about	  geometrical	   measurement.	   In	   this	   respect	   it	   precisely	   follows	   the	   pattern	   of	  Helmholtz’s	  analysis	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  ‘imagine’	  a	  non-­‐Euclidean	  world.”	  (DiSalle	  [2006b],	  136-­‐137)	  When	  we	  say	  that	  Euclidean	  space	  can	  be	  imagined	  or	  visualised,	  we	  also	  admit	  that	  non-­‐Euclidean	  space	  can	  be	  imagined	  or	  visualised.	  Our	  ability	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  our	  world	  would	   look	   to	   those	   living	   inside	  of	   the	  mirror,	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  imagine	  how	  they	  could	  see	  themselves	  as	  living	  in	  a	  Euclidean	  space	  (even	   though	   our	   mechanical	   laws	   determine	   they	   live	   in	   distorted	   conditions)	  establishes	  this	  point.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  Helmholtz’s	  naturalism	  was	  focused	  on	  producing	  an	  adequate	  analysis	  of	  the	  central	  concepts	  required	  by	  our	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  space,	  showing	  that	  without	  such	  concepts	  one	  could	  not	   have	   an	   understanding	   of	   space	   as	   an	   external	   realm	   of	   interaction	   in	   which	  empirical	   judgments	   could	   be	   embedded.	   This	   form	   of	   conceptual	   analysis	  would	  have	  been	  entirely	  foreign	  to	  the	  British	  empiricists,	  since	  geometrical	  acquaintance	  was,	   for	   them,	   a	   matter	   of	   direct	   awareness	   of	   ideas	   of	   certain	   sorts,	   and	   not	   a	  condition	   on	   external	   objects	   (and	   which	   of	   them	   could	   be	   privileged	   as	  “geometrical	   objects”).	   Something	   here	   of	   Kant’s	   transcendentalism	   survives	   the	  day,	   beyond	   the	   mere	   agreement	   that	   there	   is	   a	   synthetic	   spatial	   intuition:	   our	  “ideal”	  notion	  of	  geometrical	  objects	  is	  not	  satisfied	  in	  fact	  or	  in	  image,	  but	  as	  what	  is	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presupposed	   by	   our	   application	   of	   formal	  mathematical	   systems	   in	  measurement,	  and	  empirical	  judgments	  involving	  space.	  Thus,	   while	   Helmholtz	   agrees	   with	   Kant	   that	   we	   bring	   certain	   synthetic	   a	  
priori	  principles	  to	  experience,	  and	  while	  he	  (like	  Mach)	  is	  committed	  to	  some	  form	  of	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  external	  world	  is	  for	  him	  (as	  it	   is	   for	  Mach)	   completely	   separable	   from	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Subjectivity	   Thesis.	  Once	  again,	  it	  is	  a	  naturalised	  conception	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  (in	  this	   case	   as	   having	   a	   specific	   geometrical	   structure	   based	   on	   mechanical	  considerations)	  that	  seems	  to	  prevent	  the	  move	  from	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis	  to	  the	  problem	   of	   the	   external	   world.	   Naturalised	   empiricism	   is	   in	   the	   position	   to	   take	  certain	   facts	   as	   primary	   to	   inquiry,	   even	   when	   preserving	   the	   view	   that	   what	   is	  given	  in	  experience	  is	  something	  fixed.	  As	  we	  can	  see	  with	  Helmholtz	  and	  his	  use	  of	  the	   fact	   of	   rigid	   bodies,	   this	   fixed	   experience	   can,	   nonetheless,	   admit	   of	  multiple-­‐factorisations	  based	  on	  what	  bodies	  we	  take	  to	  be	  rigid	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact.	  In	  a	  way,	  we	  see	  in	  Helmholtz	  that	  the	  Insight	  of	  Empiricism	  and	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  can	  both	  be	  respected	  by	  a	  view	  of	  experience	  that	  also	  observes	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis.	  	  
§IV:	  Conventions,	  Protocols,	  and	  the	  Logical	  Construction	  of	  the	  World	  	  Even	  though	  we	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  may	  have	  misinterpreted	  Helmholtz,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  their	  thorough-­‐going	  conventionalism	  was	  also	  a	  very	  decisive	  move	  away	   from	   the	   commitments	  of	  CBE.	  No	   longer	  did	  one	  need	   to	   find	   the	   epistemological	   “grounds”	   in	   order	   to	   say	   that	   some	   body	   of	  knowledge	   (whether	   empirical	   or	   formal/mathematical)	   was	   properly	   founded.	  “Foundations”	  for	  one’s	  formal	  framework	  (including	  the	  relevant	  concepts)	  are	  not	  established,	   but	   stipulated.	   The	   first	   task	   of	   philosophy	   is	   to	   discern	   how	   such	  stipulations	  are	  to	  be	  made	  so	  as	  to	  accurately	  capture	  our	  pre-­‐theoretical	  intuitions	  about	   what	   parts	   of	   our	   knowledge	   are	   factual,	   and	   what	   parts	   are	   non-­‐factual	  	  (since	  different	  stipulative	  decisions	  may	  draw	  this	  line	  differently).	  The	  second	  task	  of	  philosophy	  is	  examine	  the	  consequences	  of	  our	  choice	  of	  theoretical	  framework,	  including	  its	  conceptual	  commitments	  and	  empirical	  application.	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Theories	   allow	   us	   to	   define	   a	   given	   concept	   only	   relative	   to	   a	   theoretical	  framework;	   the	   task	   of	   epistemology	   is,	   first	   and	   foremost,	   the	   isolation	   of	   those	  theoretical	   principles	   that	   allow	   one	   to	   employ	   the	   theory	   to	   make	   empirical	  predictions	   and	   explanations	   of	   natural	   phenomena.	   One	   can	   empirically	   justify	   a	  concept,	   but	   only	   relative	   to	   the	   fruitfulness	   and	   empirical	   success	   of	   the	  (conventionally	   chosen)	   theory	   as	   a	   whole.	   This	   presupposes	   that	   the	   concept	   in	  question	  can	  be	  implicitly	  defined	  relative	  to	  the	  theory	  itself,	  and	  therefore	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  complete.	  However,	  this	  procedure	  is	  inadequate	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  justify	  the	  initial	  generation	  or	  substantial	  revision	  of	  concepts	  (via	  experience	  and	  analysis)	  as	  Helmholtz	   seems	   to	   be	   doing	   in	   the	   DiSalle	   interpretation	   of	   the	   convex-­‐mirror	  thought	   experiment.	   The	   logical	   empiricists	   thought	   that	   any	   such	   explanation	   of	  how	  such	  a	  concept	  is	  gained	  must	  exceed	  epistemology,	  at	  least	  partially,	  requiring	  recourse	   to	   some	   psychological	   faculty	   such	   as	   imagination,	   representation,	  intuition,	   etc.	   Helmholtz’s	   analysis	   of	   space	   necessitates	   a	   move	   beyond	   the	  framework	  of	  a	  given	  theory	  since	  it	  attempts	  to	  analyse	  the	  concept	  of	  space	  that	  is	  contained	  within	  Euclidean	  as	  well	  as	  alternative	  geometries	  of	  constant	  curvature.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  is	  nothing	  flawed	  or	  “external”	  about	  such	  a	  breed	  of	   conceptual	   analysis.	   We	   would	   do	   well	   to	   preserve	   it	   rather	   than	   the	   logical	  empiricist	  view	  that	  conceptual	  analysis	  can	  only	  occur	  once	  we	  have	  become	  clear	  on	  which	  theory	  the	  concept	  being	  analysed	  belongs	  to.	  	  	  
IV.1:	  From	  Protocols	  to	  the	  Logical	  Construction	  of	  the	  World	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  MSE	  thinkers	  may	  hold	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis	  while	  disregarding	  the	  classically	  conceived	  problem	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  But	  are	  they	  wedded	  to	  the	  propositional	   given?	   	   That	   the	   logical	   empiricists	   held	   that	   the	   given	   entered	   into	  scientific	  arguments	  through	  representation	  via	  propositions	  is	  undeniable.	  But	  this	  is	   certainly	   not	   akin	   to	   the	   general	   sense-­‐datum	   view	   that	   the	   given	   makes	   its	  pronouncements	   in	  the	  form	  of	  propositions.	  The	  famous	  protocol	  sentence	  debate,	  which	   dominated	   discussion	   in	   the	   Vienna	   Circle’s	   final	   public	   phase,	   shows	   that	  much.	  We	  must	  therefore	  be	  careful	  to	  note	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  logical	  empiricist	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conceptions	   of	   protocols	   differ	   from	   the	   generalised	   sense-­‐datum	   view,	   for	   the	  departures	  are,	   in	  many	  a	  surprising	  way,	  anti-­‐Cartesian.	  We	  start	  by	  noting	  three	  interesting	   characteristics	  of	   the	  most	  popular	   theories	  of	  protocols	   in	   the	  Vienna	  Circle.	  	  	  (1) 	  The	   basic	   statements—“protocol	   statements”—were	   often	   not	   considered	  indubitable	  and	  certain	  (Neurath	  and	  Carnap).	  	  (2) 	  They	  were	  certainly	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  subjective	  reports	  in	  the	  first-­‐person	  (Schlick,	  Neurath,	  Carnap).	  	  (3) 	  As	  a	  result	  of	  1	  and	  2,	  basic	  statements	  tended	  to	  avoid	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  world	  by	  allowing	  the	  very	  concepts	  of	  the	  sciences	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  basic	  statements.41	  	  	  These	   features	   seem	   to	   challenge	   the	   received	   view	   that	   the	   Circle	   was	   mainly	  concerned	  with	   foundational	   issues	   in	   epistemology.	   This	   is	  with	   good	   reason.	   In	  regard	   to	   foundational	   certitude,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Schlick’s	   notion	   of	  affirmations	  (Kontstatierungen)—“statements”	  about	   the	   immediately	  perceived—,	  the	  early	  logical	  empiricists,	  particularly	  Neurath	  and	  Carnap,	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  basic	   sentences	  of	   the	   sciences	  were	   certainly	  known.	   (It	   should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	   Schlick	   agreed	   with	   Carnap	   and	   Neurath	   that	   protocols—which	   were	   not	  identical	   with	   affirmations	   in	   his	   philosophy—were	   refutable	   and	   revisable.42)	  Schlick	  comes	  closest	  to	  embodying	  the	  sort	  of	  caricature	  of	  logical	  empiricism,	  and	  comes	   closest,	   therefore,	   to	   offering	   a	  modern	  variant	   on	  our	  Cartesian	   themes	  of	  the	   primacy,	   privacy,	   and	   foundational	   character	   of	   the	   given.	   But	   even	   here,	   the	  Cartesian	  label	  holds	  only	  to	  a	  degree.	  Firstly,	  affirmations	  are	  “statements”	  of	  sorts	  for	   Schlick,	   but	   they	   are	   essentially	   ineffable	   and	   fleeting	   (“momentary”),	   and	  therefore	  only	  loosely	  thought	  of	  on	  the	  model	  of	  statements.	  Affirmations	  are	  “not	  identical	  with	  statements	  written	  or	  remembered.	  i.e.,	  with	  what	  could	  properly	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  We	  use	  phrases	   such	  as	   “often”	   and	   “tended	   to”	   in	   recognition	  of	   the	  very	   long	  debate	   that	   took	  place	   in	   the	  Vienna	  Circle	   from	  Carnap’s	  entry	   into	   the	  Circle	   (1926)	   to	   the	  end	  of	   its	  public	  phase	  (1935-­‐36).	   During	   this	   period,	   a	   number	   of	   Circle	   members	   entered	   the	   debate,	   and	   held	   very	  nuanced	   views	   that	   need	   to	   be	   ignored	   here.	   For	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   multiple	   and	   interconnected	  changes	  within	  the	  Circle,	  see	  Uebel	  [2007].	  42	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Schlick’s	  “affirmations”,	  their	  distinction	  from	  protocols,	  and	  the	  debate	  between	  Neurath	  and	  Schlick	  regarding	  radical	  physicalism,	  see	  Uebel	  [2007],	  304-­‐315.	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called	   ‘protocol	   propositions’…”	   (Schlick	   [1934/1979b],	   381)	   This	   position	   is	  already	  at	  odds	  with	  Gupta’s	  characterisation	  of	  a	  canonical	  sense-­‐datum	  view.	  Secondly,	  we	  can	  see	   that	  a	   sense-­‐datum	  model	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	   is	  far	   too	   simple	   to	   account	   for	   Schlick’s	   complex	   (even	   convoluted)	   epistemology.	  Affirmations,	  like	  sense-­‐data	  reports,	  are	  foundational,	  but	  unlike	  such	  reports	  they	  are	  not	   really	   statements	   at	   all.	   Protocols,	   like	   sense-­‐data	   reports,	   are	   statements,	  but	   not	   really	   foundational.	   We	   can	   see,	   here,	   Schlick’s	   tenuous	   Cartesianism	   at	  work—his	  desire	  to	  “utilize	  stretches	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  road”	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	   to	   be	   “immediately	   observed”	  without	   “losing	   ourselves	   in	   the	   cogito	   ergo	  sum	  and	  similar	  absurdities”.	   (Schlick	   [1934/1979b],	  380)	  Schlick	  was	   looking	   for	  an	   unshakeable	   foundation	   on	   which	   the	   edifice	   of	   knowledge	   could	   be	   built—a	  Cartesian	   program	   indeed;	   but	   even	   if	   we	   assume	   that	   Schlick’s	   views	   regarding	  affirmations	  were	  canonical	  within	   the	  Circle,	  and	  even	   if	  we	  also	  establish	  by	   fiat	  (for	   history	   is	   no	   friend	   here)	   that	   affirmations	   were	   able	   to	   be	   expressed	   as	  statements	   simpliciter,	   Schlick	   still	   radically	   breaks	   with	   the	   sort	   of	   generalised	  sense-­‐datum	   theory	   that	   Gupta	   takes	   to	   be	   the	   paradigmatic	   interpretation	   of	  classical	   empiricism	   for	   two	   reasons:	   (a)	   Schlick	   argues	   that	   affirmations	   are	   not	  really	   foundational	   at	   all,	   rather	   the	   “framework”	   within	   which	   foundational	  statements	  can	  be	  generated,43	  and	  (b)	  Schlick’s	  epistemology	  seems	  to	  come	  closest	  of	   all	   of	   the	   principal	   protocol	   sentence	   debaters	   to	   the	   Cartesian	   model	   (since	  affirmations	  are	  absolutely	  certain,	  undeniable,	  and	  subjective),	  though	  even	  here	  he	  inverts	  the	  Cartesian	  epistemological	  order—affirmations	  play	  their	  vital	  epistemic	  role	  at	  the	  end	  of	  inquiry	  (in	  verification),	  not	  in	  giving	  us	  the	  first	  principles	  which	  make	  inquiry	  possible	  and	  its	  dictates	  true:	  	  Observation	   plays	   the	   part	   of	   absolutely	   certain	   knowledge,	   not	  when	   it	   is	  taken	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  and	  stands	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  science,	  but	  when	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Schlick	  never	  faced	  head	  on	  the	  Cartesian	  conundrum	  in	  which	  he	  found	  himself:	  if	  affirmations	  are	  to	  be	  foundational,	  then	  they	  cannot	  be	  so	  fleeting	  and	  so	  ineffable,	  yet	  if	  our	  knowledge	  is	  to	  be	  given	  a	   proper	   and	   unshakeable	   foundation,	   then	   it	   must	   come	   from	   affirmations	   (the	   only	   proper	   and	  unshakeable	  bits	  of	  knowledge	  we	  have).	  Neurath	  and	  Carnap	  avoided	  the	  Cartesian	  conundrum	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  protocols	   is	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  sufficient	  evidentiary	  basis	   for	  science,	  not	  to	  express	  our	  incorrigible	  epistemic	  beliefs	  (if	  such	  things	  even	  exist).	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arrived	   through	   science…	   These	   ultimate	   propositions	   stand,	   not	   at	   the	  beginning,	   but	   at	   the	   end.”	   (Schlick	   [1986/1987],	   92—quoted	   in	   Uebel	  [2007],	  308)	  	  For	  these	  reason,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  consider	  even	  affirmations	  (let	  alone	  protocols)	  as	   fitting	   into	   the	   Cartesian	   model,	   at	   least	   not	   without	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   gerry-­‐mandering.	   As	   a	   received	   historical	   view,	   even	   Schlick’s	   affirmations	   (as	  we	   have	  seen)	  run	  contrary	  to	  the	  Cartesian	  conception	  of	  experience	   in	  significant	  ways—ways	   that	   do	   not	   call	   into	   question	   Schlick’s	   foundationalist	   aims,	   but	   rather	   the	  limited	  sense	  in	  which	  such	  aims	  were	  “Cartesian”	  (in	  both	  Schlick’s	  and	  our	  senses	  of	  the	  term).	  	  The	  attribution	  of	  Cartesianism	  to	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  tradition	  as	  a	  whole	  is	   even	   more	   dubious.	   Such	   an	   attribution	   ignores	   the	   central	   desideratum	   of	  intersubjective	  agreement	   in	  scientific	  and	  epistemological	  matters,	  a	  desideratum	  which	   was	   central	   to	   Neurath’s	   and	   Carnap’s	   development	   of	   physicalism	   and	  “liberalised	  empiricism”	  from	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle’s	   public	   phase.	   This	   desire	   to	   account	   for	   the	   essential	   communicability	   of	  scientific	  knowledge	  was	  a	  motivating	  factor	  for	  Neurath	  and	  Carnap	  throughout	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  the	  protocol	  sentence	  debate,	  and	  on	  up	  through	  Carnap’s	  syntactic	  and	   then	   semantic	   turns.	   In	   its	   first	   guise,	   physicalism,	   intersubjective	  communicability	   of	   scientific	   results	   was	   taken	   as	   a	   matter	   that	   could	   not	   be	  ignored.	  The	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  increasingly	  more	  fragmented	  and	  disparate	  scientific	  projects,	  from	  fundamental	  physics	  to	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Given	  the	  radically	  different	  languages	  used	  by,	  for	  example,	  chemists	  and	  economists,	   how	   were	   common	   problems	   to	   be	   effectively	   discussed	   and	  ameliorated?	  Less	  important	  than	  the	  desire	  to	  unify	  science	  for	  unity’s	  sake,	  or	  the	  desire	   to	   reduce	   the	   softer	   sciences	   to	   the	   harder	   ones,	   unification	  was	  meant	   to	  further	   the	   sciences	   as	   a	   collective	   body	   of	   knowledge,	   and	   allow	   for	   particularly	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difficult	  and	  often	  recalcitrant	  problems	   to	  be	  solved	  by	  mutual	  congress	  between	  the	  sciences.44	  	  But	  surely	  unification,	  even	  if	  laudable,	  committed	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  to	  a	  form	   of	   phenomenal	   reductionism	   and	   the	   Subjectivity	   Thesis.	   As	   Friedman	   has	  noted,	   the	  so-­‐called	   “First	  Vienna	  Circle”,	  with	   its	   focus	  on	  Mach’s	  phenomenalism	  and	  mechanism,	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   the	   Circle’s	   revival	   under	   Schlick	   as	   principally	  concerned	  with	  phenomenalism.	  Carnap’s	  entrance	  (through	  Schlick)	  into	  the	  Circle	  in	  1926,	  and	  the	  warm	  reception	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  in	  1928,	  are	  best	  understood	  relative	  to	  this	  backdrop	  of	  Machian	  phenomenalist-­‐empiricism.45	  Under	  this	  view,	  the	  Circle	  was	   so	   taken	   by	   Carnap’s	   research	   precisely	   because	   it	   realised	   a	   long-­‐standing,	  classical	  empiricist	  project:	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  external	  world	  based	  purely	  on	  the	   data	   of	   sense.	   Where	   Locke,	   Mach,	   Avenarius,	   and	   Russell	   had	   made	   only	  promises	   and	   piecemeal	   progress,	   Carnap	   was	   developing	   a	   pure	   system	   of	  construction,	   within	   which	   the	   method	   of	   “quasi-­‐analysis”	   could	   be	   employed	   to	  construct	   ever	   more	   sophisticated	   classes	   of	   objects	   from	   the	   elementary	  experiences	  of	  a	  single	  cogniser,	  up	   through	   the	  development	  of	  sense	  classes	   (i.e.	  the	   construction	   of	   individual	   sense	   modalities	   based	   on	   dimensionality	  considerations),	  to	  colour	  classes,	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  sense-­‐data	  themselves,	  and,	  eventually,	   their	  coordination	  with	  space-­‐time	  points	  external	   to	   the	  cogniser.	  The	  project	   of	   phenomenal	   reductionism,	   it	   was	   shown,	   was	   possible;	   what	   was	  required—what	  was	  not	  available	  to	  earlier	  empiricists—was	  a	  proper	  logic	  for	  the	  enterprise:	  Russell’s	  theory	  of	  relations.	  	  This	  is	  certainly	  the	  received	  view	  of	  the	  Aufbau.	  However,	  the	  Aufbau	   itself	  tells	   a	   different	   story	   about	   knowledge,	   one	   that	   is	   decidedly	   against	   the	  phenomenalist-­‐reductionism	  and	   foundationalism	  of	   Schlick	   and	  Waismann’s	   neo-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Carnap	  states	  in	  his	  Intellectual	  Autobiography	  that	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  advantages	  of	  the	  physicalistic	  language	  is	  its	  intersubjectivity…”	  ([1963],	  52)	  Further,	  Carnap	  says	  on	  the	  same	  page	  (in	  the	  following	  pargraph),	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  science	  “says	  that	  the	  different	  branches	  of	  empirical	  science	  are	  separated	  only	  for	  the	  practical	  reason	  of	  division	  of	  labor,	  but	  are	  fundamentally	  merely	  parts	  of	  one	  comprehensive	  unified	  science.”	  45	  Friedman	   [1992/1999],	   section	   IV,	   141-­‐152	   (especially	   146	   onwards).	   Friedman	   gives	   a	   brief	  (though	  accurate)	  account	  of	  the	  Aufbau’s	  reception	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  phenomenalistic	  foundationalism	  by	  Schlick	   and	  Waismann,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   non-­‐phenomenal	   and	   non-­‐foundational	   defense	   of	   its	  ideas	  by	  the	  growing	  “left	  wing”	  of	  the	  Circle	  (including	  Carnap	  himself).	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Machianism,	  while	   preserving	   a	   form	   of	   phenomenal	   reductionism	   that	   Friedman	  perhaps	   too	   quickly	   rejects	   in	   his	   [1987/1999]	   and	   [1992/1999].	   The	   Aufbau	  establishes	   a	   construction	   system	   in	   which	   all	   concepts	   can	   be	   defined	   either	   by	  their	   phenomenal	   character	   or	   the	   step-­‐wise	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   can	   be	   derived	  from	  more	  basic	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  However,	  this	  is	   just	  one	  of	  many	  different	  possible	   construction	   systems.	   Carnap	   also	   mentions	   (though	   does	   not	   pursue	   in	  detail)	   the	   construction	   of	   psychological	   objects	   using	   only	   a	   physical	   or	  material	  basis,	  reversing	  what	  a	  classical	  empiricist	  (fully	  entrenched	  in	  the	  way	  of	  ideas)	  or	  phenomenalist	  (such	  as	  Mach)	  would	  deem	  an	  irreversible	  order.	  (See	  §§57-­‐60.)	  In	  fact,	   Carnap	   discusses	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   constructional	   system	   can	   have	   a	  hetero-­‐psychological,	   i.e.	   a	   non-­‐solipsistic	   psychological	   basis	   (§§58,	   63);	   physical	  bases	   (§59),	   for	   which	   Carnap	   offers	   three	   possible	   starting	   points:	   1.	   an	   atomic	  basis	   (atoms	   and	   their	   relations),	   2.	   a	   basis	   of	   space-­‐time	   coordinates	   (and	   their	  relations),	   and	  3.	  a	  basis	  of	  world	   lines	   in	  Minkowski	   space-­‐time.	   (§62);	  or	  even	  a	  possible,	   though	   “problematic”,	   construction	   system	   with	   cultural	   objects	   at	   its	  base—reducing	  psychological	  and	  material	  objects	  to	  cultural	  ones.	  (§62)	  While	   phenomenal	   reductionism	   is	   pursued,	   the	   only	   explicitly	   Cartesian	  aspect	   of	   this	   project	   is	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   epistemically	   significant	  constructional	   system	  will	   reconstruct	   the	   material	   system	   of	   concepts	   using	   the	  auto-­‐psychological	   concepts.	   (This	   amounts	   to	   nothing	   more	   than	   the	   claim	   that	  those	   interested	   in	   the	   theory	   of	   knowledge	   are	   primarily	   interested	   in	   how	   the	  individual	   knower	   comes	   to	   construct	   physical	   concepts	   based	   on	   those	   concepts	  available	   in	   experience—as	   a	   matter	   of	   historical	   record,	   this	   is	   plainly	   true.)	  Because	  the	  constitution	  of	  knowledge—its	  rational	  reconstruction—can	  be	  done	  in	  any	  way	  we	  please,	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau,	  far	  from	  being	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  version	  of	  phenomenal	  reductionism,	  and	  the	  realisation	  of	  an	  ancient	  empirical	  project,	   is	  actually	   anti-­‐foundationalist,	   or	   rather	  multi-­‐foundationalist,	   since	   any	   system	   of	  concepts—insofar	   as	   it	   has	   a	   significantly	   rich	   internal	   structure—can	   be	   used	   to	  reconstruct	   any	   other	   (adequately	   structured)	   set	   of	   concepts.	   The	   Aufbau	   is	   an	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  great	  flexibility	  we	  exhibit	  in	  conceptual	  matters,	  not	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an	  attempt	  to	  rigidly	   fix	  through	  some	  reduction	  scheme	  all	  of	  our	  concepts	   in	  the	  immediately	  given.	  That	  such	  a	  project	  fails	  for	  technical	  reasons	  is	  not	  our	  concern	  here;	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  historical	  fact	  that,	  in	  their	  earliest	  guise	  in	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  tradition,	  the	  so-­‐called	  “basic	  phenomenal	  elements”	  of	  “auto-­‐psychology”	  fail	  to	  be	  Cartesian.	  Firstly,	  the	  basic	  auto-­‐psychological	  elements	  in	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau	  system	  are	   not	   akin	   at	   all	   to	   the	   canonical	   sense-­‐data	   of	   other	   empiricists,	   such	   as	  Mach,	  Russell,	  or	  Ayer.	  For	  Carnap,	  sense-­‐data	  must	  be	  constructed	  (using	  the	  method	  of	  “quasi-­‐analysis”)	   from	   “elementary	   experiences”.	   Elementary	   experiences	   are	  unanalysed	   cross-­‐sections	   of	   experience,	   which	   are	   basic,	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  Carnap	   takes	   them	   to	   be	   immediately	   known,	   or	   unquestionable,	   but	   in	   the	   strict	  technical	   sense	   that	   they	   are	   the	   primitive	   stuff	   out	   off	   which	   higher-­‐order	  constructions	   (“quality	   classes”,	   “sense	   classes”,	   and,	   later	   in	   the	   construction,	  “sensory	  data”)	  are	  made,	  using	  only	  the	  single	  two-­‐place	  predicate	  “recollection	  of	  similarity”.	   Their	   “elementarity”	   is	   understood	   through	   their	   role	   in	   the	  constitutional	   system.	   As	   Friedman	   has	   noted	   ([1987/1999],	   91),	   Carnap	   was	  heavily	   influenced	   by	   holistic	   and	   Gestalt	   psychology	   at	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   the	  
Aufbau	   (§§67,	   75),	   rejecting	   the	   sensory	   “atoms”	   at	   the	   base	   of	   CBE	   models	   of	  experience	   (i.e.	   Locke	  and	  Berkeley’s	   ideas,	  Hume’s	   impressions,	   or	  Mach,	  Russell,	  and	  Ayer’s	  sense-­‐data).	  	  Further,	   Carnap	   seems	   in	   his	   very	   methodology	   (his	   constructional	  voluntarism)	  to	  be	  rejecting	  the	  way	  of	  ideas,	  and	  therefore	  the	  Subjectivity	  Thesis.	  Similarly	   to	   Mach’s	   principled	   phenomenalism,	   Carnap’s	   voluntaristic	  phenomenalism	  begins	  with	  the	  best	  scientific	  understanding	  of	   the	  day	  regarding	  our	  experience,	  and	  not	  some	  Cartesian	  notion	  about	  the	  epistemic	  primacy	  of	   the	  immediately	  given.	  In	  this	  way,	  even	  though	  Carnap	  is	  reconstructing	  the	  concepts	  of	  physics	  using	  elementary	  experiences,	  he	  is	  not	  attempting	  to	  “ground”	  physical	  concepts	   in	   the	   immediately	  given.	   Strictly	   speaking,	   the	  Aufbau,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	  countenances	  no	  notion	  of	  “immediate	  object	  of	  experience”,	  and	  certainly	  no	  talk	  at	  all	   of	   direct	   awareness—its	   elementary	   experiences	   are	   nothing	   like	   the	   stuff	   of	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which	  we	   take	   ourselves,	   in	  moments	   of	   empiricist	   naiveté,	   to	   be	   aware,	   such	   as	  colour	  patches,	  visual	  shapes,	  auditory	  “images”,	  particular	  smells,	  or	  even	  worldly	  objects,	   etc.	   Carnap	   receives	   his	   notion	   of	   “basic	   elementary	   experience”	   from	  Gestalt	   psychology,46	  not	   from	   a	   priori	   reasoning,	   so	   it	   should	   perhaps	   be	   no	  surprise	  that	  we	  see	  none	  of	  the	  typical	  Cartesian	  arguments	  to	  buttress	  the	  sort	  of	  representationalism	  we	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
IV.2:	  Sources	  of	  the	  Confused	  Reading	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  From	  where	   do	   the	   confusions	   about	   Carnap’s	   commitments	   in	   the	  Aufbau	  arise?	  One	   candidate	   for	   the	   source	   of	   the	   confusion	   is	   certainly	   Carnap	   himself.	   In	   the	  
Aufbau	   §3,	   Carnap	   adopts	   Russell’s	   “supreme	  maxim	   in	   scientific	   philosophizing”,	  the	   methodological	   principle	   which	   guided	   Russell’s	   external	   world	   program:	  “Wherever	  possible,	  logical	  constructions	  are	  to	  be	  substituted	  for	  inferred	  entities.”	  In	   fact,	  Carnap	   tells	  us	   that	  he	  will	   “employ	   this	  principle	   in	  an	  even	  more	   radical	  way	   than	  Russell”,	  offering	  a	  construction	  of	  unobservable	  entities	  based	  on	   those	  which	   are	   observable.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   Russell’s	   external	  world	   program	  was	   a	  continuation	   of	   the	   grand	   empiricist	   project	   begun	   by	   Locke,	   Carnap	   seems	   to	   be	  inducted	  into	  the	  tradition	  as	  well.	  Further,	   in	  the	  same	  passage,	  Carnap	  compares	  his	   construction	   theory	   to	   earlier	   forms	   of	   phenomenal	   reductionism	   (specifically	  Mach	  and	  Avenarius’	  strict	  descriptionism)	  which	  reduce	  scientific	  concepts	  to	  the	  given	  in	  experience.	  From	  the	  mention	  of	  such	  earlier	  projects,	  one	  could	  certainly	  be	   forgiven,	  especially	   if	  one	  were	  to	  view	  the	  Aufbau	   from	  the	  context	  of	   the	   first	  Vienna	  Circle,	  for	  adopting	  a	  straightforwardly	  phenomenalist	  reading	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  (and	  the	  auto-­‐psychological	  construction	  system	  expanded	  upon	  within	  its	  pages).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  A.W.	   Carus	   [2007]	   has	   challenged	   the	   idea	   that	   it	   was	   Gestalt	   psychology	   acting	   as	   a	   primary	  influence	  on	  Carnap	  while	  writing	  the	  Aufbau.	  Gestalt	  thinking	  did	  influence	  Carnap	  throughout	  the	  mid-­‐20s,	   but	   it	   is	   far	  more	   likely	   that	   Carnap	  was	  much	   better	   acquainted	  with	   the	   philosophical	  criticisms	   of	   associationist	   psychology,	   especially	   the	   work	   of	   Husserl,	   Natorp,	   Cassirer,	   and	  Vaihinger.	  (See	  fn.	  7	  on	  147.)	  Carus	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  actually	  Carnap’s	  Kantianism	  that	  led	  him	  away	  from	   classical	   empiricism	   to	   a	   “structural	   empiricism”	   or	   “logical	   empiricism”,	   applying	   Russell’s	  theory	  of	  relations	  and	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  to	  Vaihinger’s	  “chaos	  of	  sensations”	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	   of	   possible	   construction	   systems	   (what	   Vaihinger	   called	   “fictions”)	   to	   something	   more	  manageable,	   eventually	   just	   the	   auto-­‐phenomenological	   and	   hetero-­‐phenomenological	   systems	  discussed	  in	  the	  Aufbau.	  (145-­‐148)	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Moreover,	  in	  his	  Preface	  to	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  the	  Aufbau,	  Carnap	  focuses	  much	  of	   his	  discussion	  on	  phenomenal	  matters.	   In	  his	  description	  of	   the	  book,	   he	  isolates	   as	   its	   main	   concern	   “the	   possibility	   of	   the	   rational	   reconstruction	   of	   the	  concepts	   of	   all	   fields	   of	   knowledge	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   concepts	   that	   refer	   to	   the	  immediately	  given.”	  (Preface,	  v)	  In	  response	  to	  the	  technical	  problem	  with	  his	  choice	  of	  basic	  element	  and	  basic	  relation,	  Carnap	  says,	  “I	  should	  now	  consider	  for	  the	  use	  as	   basic	   elements,	   not	   elementary	   experiences…	   but	   something	   similar	   to	   Mach’s	  elements,	  e.g.	  concrete	  sense	  data,	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  red	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  at	  a	  certain	  visual	   field	   place	   at	   a	   certain	   time”,	   (vii)	   and	   the	   choice	   of	   basic	   relations	   the	  relations	   existing	   between	   such	   data,	   such	   as	   “earlier	   than”.	   Nonetheless,	   even	  though	  Carnap	  is	  offering	  here	  a	  particularly	  phenomenalist	  reading	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  in	  retrospect,	  he	  still	   includes	  a	   lengthy	  section	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  alternative,	  non-­‐auto-­‐psychological	   forms	   the	  construction	  of	   concepts	  may	   take,	  with	  reference	   to	  the	   relevant	   passages	   (already	   discussed	   above).	   Such	   considerations	   make	   a	  completely	  phenomenalist	  reading	  of	  the	  Aufbau	  untenable;	  if	  we	  base	  our	  readings	  of	  the	  book	  solely	  on	  Carnap’s	  interpretation	  of	  his	  own	  work,	  at	  least	  something	  of	  the	  nuanced	  constitutionalism	  (as	  opposed	  to	  narrow	  phenomenalism)	  of	  the	  work	  becomes	   undeniable,	   as	   does	   the	   notion	   that	   Carnap	   held	   anything	   like	   the	  Subjectivity	   Thesis,	   for	   direct	   awareness	   is	   never	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	   basis	   of	   our	  knowledge	   of	   physical	   things,	   only	   one	   of	   the	   possible	   frameworks	   for	   the	  reconstruction	  of	  physical	  concepts.	  The	   real	   source	   of	   confusion	   seems	   rather	   to	   lie	   in	   Quine’s	   reading	   of	   the	  
Aufbau	   in	   Quine	   [1936/2004],	   [1951/1961],	   and	   [1969/2004].	   The	   massive	  influence	  of	  each	  of	  these	  works,	  especially	  the	  latter	  two,	  on	  analytical	  philosophy	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (and	  even	  today),	  account	  for	  the	  scope	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  misreading	  of	  Carnap	  as	  a	  phenomenal	  reductionist	  and	  classical	  empiricist.	  	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency,	  beginning	  with	  Quine,	  to	  over-­‐state	  the	  similarity	  between	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau	  and	  previous	  incarnations	  of	  the	  external	  world	  program,	  particularly	   Russell’s	   (from	   Russell	   [1914/1963],	   and,	   especially,	   Russell	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[1914/2009]).	   Quine	   conflates	   the	   two	  when	   he	   views	   the	   projects	   as	   essentially	  similar.	  Here	  is	  a	  taste	  of	  Quine’s	  “Two	  Dogmas”	  view:	  	  Radical	  reductionism,	  conceived	  now	  with	  statements	  as	  units,	  set	   itself	   the	  task	  of	  specifying	  a	  sense-­‐datum	  language	  and	  showing	  how	  to	  translate	  the	  rest	   of	   significant	   discourse,	   statement	   by	   statement,	   into	   it.	   Carnap	  embarked	  on	  this	  project	  in	  the	  Aufbau…	  He	  was	  the	  first	  empiricist	  who,	  not	  content	   with	   asserting	   the	   reducibility	   of	   science	   to	   terms	   of	   immediate	  experience,	   took	   serious	   steps	   toward	   carrying	   out	   the	   reduction.	   (Quine	  [1951/1961],	  39)	  	  And,	  here	  is	  an	  example	  from	  “Epistemology	  Naturalized”:	  	  To	  account	   for	   the	  external	  world	  as	  a	   logical	   construct	  out	  of	   sense-­‐data	  –	  such,	   in	  Russell’s	  terms,	  was	  the	  program.	  It	  was	  Carnap,	   in	  his	  Der	  logische	  
Aufbau	   der	   Welt	   of	   1928,	   who	   came	   nearest	   to	   executing	   it.	   (Quine	  [1969/2004],	  262)	  	  	  Others	   have	   pointed	   to	   such	   passages	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   show	   that	   Quine	  misunderstood	  the	  Aufbau	  as	  (a)	  a	  piece	  of	  radical	  phenomenological	  reductionism,	  and	  (b)	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  CBE	  project	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  external	  world	  using	  only	  the	  objects/concepts	  of	  immediate	  experience.47	  While	  this	  is	  certainly	  true,	  it	  often	   goes	   unrecognised	   that	   such	   a	   reading	   of	   Carnap	   is	  merely	   a	   symptom	   of	   a	  much	  deeper	  Quinean	  misunderstanding	  of	  Carnap’s	  work,	  a	  misunderstanding	  that	  began	   in	  Quine	   [1936/2004]:	   the	  mis-­‐interpretation	  of	  Carnap	  as	   following	   in	   the	  Cartesian	   tradition	   of	   epistemological	   foundationalism.	   Quine	   makes	   this	  interpretive	  error	  when	  he	  asserts	  that	  Carnap’s	  project	  is	  essentially	  a	  completion	  of	   the	   Tractarian	   (and	   Cartesian)	   attempt	   to	   answer	   the	   question,	   “How	   is	   logical	  certainty	  possible?”	  (Quine	  [1936/2004],	  64).	  However,	  Carnap	  never	  adopted	  such	  a	  project	  as	  his	  own.	   In	  a	   sense,	  Carnap	  was	  concerned	   (as	  were	  other	   “left	  wing”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	   Friedman	   [1987/1999],	   [1992/1999],	   and	   [2007];	   Richardson	   [1990],	   [1992],	   and	   [1998]	  (especially	   Chapter	   One,	   “Reconstructing	   the	   Aufbau”).	   For	   a	   view	   that	   challenges	   the	   Quinean	  critique	  by	  arguing	   that	  Russell	   too	  was	  not	  a	  reductive	  empiricist,	   see	  Pincock	  [2002]	  and	  [2007].	  For	  an	  account	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  Russell’s	  and	  Carnap’s	  structuralism	  (as	  opposed	  to	   the	   similarities	   or	   lack	   thereof	   regarding	   phenomenal	   reductionism),	   see	   Demopoulos	   and	  Friedman	  [1985]	  and	  Demopoulos	  [2003a]	  and	  [2003b].	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members	   of	   the	   Vienna	   Circle)	   with	   showing	   that	   the	   Tractatus	   was	   far	   too	  restrictive	  in	  assuming	  that	  there	  must	  be	  (a)	  a	  single	  logical	  language	  (which	  could	  never	  be	  the	  object	  of	  its	  own	  utterances),	  and	  (b)	  that	  there	  was	  one,	  and	  only	  one,	  correct	  logic	  for	  that	  language.	  Of	  course,	  such	  a	  contrary	  view	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  was	  undeniable	   by	   the	   time	   Carnap	   published	   his	   Logical	   Syntax	   and	   Language	  [1934/2002],	  making	  Quine’s	   1936	   remarks	   otiose;	   but,	   even	   in	  1928,	   the	  Aufbau	  makes	   clear	   it	   is	   not	   concerned	   with	   establishing	   the	   correct	   logic,	   or	   the	  unmistakable	  simple	  atoms	  of	  a	  single	  logically	  perspicuous	  language.	  	  	  In	   regard	   to	   our	   empirical	   knowledge,	   Cartesianism	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	  operating	  in	  Carnap’s	  work	  in	  both	  what	  Quine	  calls	  a	  “conceptual”	  sense	  (reducing	  all	  material	  concepts	  to	  concepts	  of	  experience)	  and	  a	  “doctrinal”	  sense	  (offering	  an	  experiential	   justification	   for	   all	   of	   our	   substantive	   knowledge).	   The	  Aufbau,	   Quine	  tells	   us,	   attempts	   to	   reduce	   all	   physical	   statements	   to	   statements	   couched	   in	   a	  language	  of	  observation,	  logic,	  and	  set	  theory.	  (We	  have	  already	  seen	  here	  that	  such	  a	  “reduction”	  need	  not	  imply	  foundationalism	  or	  reductionism,	  and	  also	  that	  Carnap	  was	  not	  utilising	  an	  “observation	  language”,	  but	  we	  can	  set	  such	  matters	  to	  the	  side	  for	  now.)	  For	  Quine,	  the	  conceptual	  ingenuity	  exhibited	  by	  the	  Aufbau	  means	  little,	  however,	   since	   there	   is	   no	   way	   to	   follow	   through	   with	   the	   doctrinal	   side	   of	  Cartesianism:	  	  	  …	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  a	  sentence	  is	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  observation,	  logic,	  and	  set	  theory	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  can	  be	  proved	  from	  observation	  sentences	  by	  logic	   and	   set	   theory.	   The	  most	  modest	   of	   generalizations	   about	   observable	  traits	  will	  cover	  more	  cases	  than	  its	  utterer	  can	  have	  had	  occasion	  to	  actually	  observe.	   The	   hopelessness	   of	   grounding	   natural	   science	   upon	   immediate	  experience	   in	   a	   firmly	   logical	  way	  was	   acknowledged.	   (Quine	   [1969/2004],	  262-­‐263)	  	  	  Quine	   then	   asks	   what	   “could	   have	   motivated	   Carnap’s	   heroic	   efforts	   on	   the	  conceptual	  side	  of	  epistemology,	  when	  hope	  of	  certainty	  on	  the	  doctrinal	  side	  was	  abandoned?”	   (ibid)	   But	   this	   only	   shows	   Quine’s	   confusion	   about	   Carnap’s	   aims.	  Carnap	  was	  not	   concerned	  with	  offering	  a	   justification	   (or	  proof)	  of	  our	  empirical	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	   in	   the	  Aufbau.	  No	  such	   justification	   is	  required.	  He	  didn’t	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see	  his	  new	  development	  of	  construction	  theory	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  Cartesianism,	  as	  a	   way	   of	   overcoming	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   earlier	   forms	   of	   empiricism.	   He	   saw	  construction	  theory	  as	  a	  way	  of	  making	  philosophy	  more	  scientific,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  showing	   how	   the	   basic	   concepts	   of	   what	   was	   once	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   purely	  philosophical	   domain	   (the	   auto-­‐psychological)	   could	   be	   reconstructed	   using	   the	  “system	  form”	  of	  physics.	  Carnap	  still	  maintained	  that	  it	  was	  an	  interesting	  question	  as	  to	  how	  the	  physical	  world	  could	  be	  constructed	  from	  the	  solipsistic	  experiences	  of	  a	  single	  cogniser,	  but	  such	  a	  basis	  was	  no	  longer	  thrust	  upon	  the	  philosopher	  as	  a	  necessary	   starting	   point	   for	   all	   conceptual	   inquiry.	   Many	   of	   the	   old	   empiricist	  concerns	  about	  the	  “problem	  of	  the	  external	  world”,	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  subjective	  and	  the	  objective,	  evaporate;	  what	  is	  left	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  best	  psychology	  of	  the	  day	  to	  characterise	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “basic	  element	  of	  experience”,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  best	  logic	  of	  the	  day	  to	  explain	  how	  our	  received	  physical	  view	  of	  the	  world	  may	  be	  constituted	   by	   such	   elementary	   experiences.	   Little	   of	   “first	   philosophy”	   or	  “philosophy-­‐first”	  thinking	  remains.	  The	  ghosts	  of	  Cartesianism	  have	  been	  banished.	  	  If	   Carnap	   were	   Cartesian	   in	   the	   requisite	   sense,	   he	   would	   never	   have	  acknowledged	   that	   the	  order	  of	   constitution	   could	  be	   reversed.	  He	  was	   interested	  rather	   in	  exhibiting	  the	  flexibility	  of	  our	  concepts	  and	  conceptual	  systems,	  and	  the	  mutual	  ways	   in	  which	  such	  systems	  could	  be	  put	   into	  relations	  of	   translation	  with	  one	   another—to	   show	   that	   there	   is	   no	   special	   division	   between	   the	   concepts	   of	  science,	  the	  concepts	  of	  elementary	  experience,	  the	  concepts	  of	  partially	  constituted	  experience,	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  “hetero-­‐phenomenology”.	  Stating	  the	  project	  in	  light	  of	   Cartesian	   concerns,	   and	   asking	   what	   Carnap’s	   motivation	   could	   have	   been	   to	  develop	   such	   an	   empiricism	  after	  Humean	   scepticism	   showed	   such	  pursuits	   to	   be	  quixotic,	  only	  misses	  the	  point	  we	  have	  laboured	  here:	  that	  Carnap	  was	  indeed	  not	  concerned	   in	   the	   slightest	   with	   Cartesian	   foundational	   certitude,	   but	   with	  developing	   a	   new	   scientific	   philosophy	   quite	   removed	   from	   the	   concerns	   of	  Cartesianism.	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§V:	  Concluding	  Remarks	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  MSE	  to	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  But	  what	   can	  we	   say	  now	  of	  Gupta’s	  view	   that	   “classical	   empiricism”	   suffers	   from	  the	   Cartesian	   idea	   that	   experience	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   direct	   awareness	   of	   facts	   of	   an	  undeniably	   certain	   and	   subjective	   sort?	   Our	   examinations	   in	   this	   chapter,	  preliminary	  as	  they	  may	  be,	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  multiplicity	  of	   interpretations	   of	   empiricism,	   and	   that	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   these	  different	  interpretations	  is	  required	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  how	  new	  proposals	  for	  empiricism	  (like	  Gupta’s)	   fit	   into	   the	   tradition,	  and	  what	  set	  of	  commitments	   from	  previous	   forms	   of	   empiricism	   are	  worthy	   of	   keeping,	   and	  which	  we	  may	   have	   to	  discard	  as	  inessential,	  technically	  or	  conceptually	  confused,	  or	  just	  simply	  wrong.	  However,	  this	  chapter	  had	  another	  purpose;	  to	  isolate	  a	  key	  historical	  shift	  in	  the	   meaning	   of	   “empiricism”,	   from	   the	   philosophy-­‐first	   views	   of	   Classical	   British	  Empiricism	   to	   the	   commitments	   and	   concerns	   of	   post-­‐Kantian	   Modern	   Scientific	  Empiricism.	  Much	  of	  what	  Gupta	  says	  regarding	  the	  methods,	  theses,	  and	  errors	  of	  the	  former	  cannot	  be	  truthfully	  said	  of	  the	  latter.	  At	  this	  point,	  Gupta	  could	  simply	  claim	  that	  his	  target	  is	  limited,	  and	  that	  his	  relative	  lack	  of	  reference	  to	  MSE	  thinkers	  exhibits	  this	  focus.	  However,	  such	  a	  move	  would	  be	  unwise,	  both	  for	  methodological	  and	   strategic	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   regarding	  methodology,	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   does	  itself	  a	  disservice	  if	  it	  only	  speaks	  to	  the	  general	  epistemological	  concerns	  of	  the	  CBE	  tradition,	   for	   the	  MSE	  tradition	  shows	  a	  desire	   to	  put	  empiricism	  in	  congress	  with	  the	  best	  sciences	  of	  the	  day.	  Also,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  existing	  literature,	  too	  heavily	   informed	   by	   Quine,	   to	   take	   for	   granted	   connections	   between	   themes	   in	  general	  epistemology	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science;	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  can	  act	  as	  an	  inoculation	  to	  such	  tendencies.	  	  An	   empiricism	   which	   speaks	   only	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	   principal	   CBE	  thinkers	   fails	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  various	  ways	   in	  which	  a	   serious	   attempt	   to	  incorporate	   our	   scientific	   knowledge	   into	   empiricism	   offers	   empiricism	   its	   most	  interesting	  moments	  for	  reform	  and	  revision,	  be	  it	  the	  non-­‐Euclidean	  geometries	  of	  the	   19th	   century,	   the	   non-­‐classical	   physics	   of	   the	   early	   20th	   century,	   or,	   in	   our	  present	   day,	   the	   constant	   integration	   of	   knowledge	   from	   relativistic	   and	  quantum	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physics,	   biology,	   chemistry,	   the	   social	   sciences,	   and	   medicine	   which	   invite	   us	   to	  challenge	  our	  received	  view	  of	  knowledge.	  If	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  only	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  CBE,	  it	  need	  say	  nothing	  about	  the	  sciences	  or	  the	  problems	  posed	   by	   the	   sorts	   of	   formal	   knowledge	   that	   the	   sciences	   at	   least	   seem	   to	  presuppose.	   But	   it	   is	   the	   discussion	   of	   such	   matters	   that	   has	   given	   us	   the	   most	  reason	   to	   suppose	   that	   our	   pre-­‐conceived	   notions	   of	   the	   self	   and	   the	   world	   are	  indeed	   mistaken.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   question	   of	   how	   our	   scientific	   theories	   and	  concepts	  relate	  to	  experience,	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  revised	  by	  experience,	  will	  be	  a	  major	  topic	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  Secondly,	  regarding	  strategy,	  there	  is	  many	  an	  ally	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  canon	  of	  the	  MSE	  tradition.	  Many	  of	  the	  key	  tenets	  and	  theses	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  find	  prototypes	   within	   this	   tradition.	   Let	   us	   examine	   but	   a	   few	   here.	   (1)	   Reformed	  Empiricism	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   brand	   of	   empiricism	   that	   takes	   the	   Insight	   and	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   seriously.	   Unlike	   CBE,	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   does	   not	  attempt	   to	   fix	   a	   notion	  of	   the	   self	   (as	   privileged	   authority	   over	   its	   current	  mental	  states	   and	   their	  objects)	   so	   that	   the	   Insight	  may	  be	  preserved.	  But	   this	  means	  we	  must	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  experiences	  that	  are,	  in	  a	  certain	  sense,	  underdetermined.	   Experience	   by	   itself,	   we	   will	   recall,	   does	   not	   give	   epistemic	  license	  to	  any	  set	  of	  judgments.	  However,	  such	  a	  view	  already	  shares	  much	  with	  the	  logical	  empiricist’s	  idea	  that	  experience	  itself	  is	  in	  need	  of	  coordination	  if	  we	  are	  to	  use	   it	   to	   generate	   and	   justify	   substantive	   judgments.	   The	   relativised	   a	   priori	  frameworks	  of	  Schlick,	  Reichenbach,	  and	  Carnap	  are	  all	  instances	  of	  the	  central,	  yet	  limited,	   role	   given	   to	   experience	   in	   the	   logical	   empiricist	   tradition.	   The	  interdependence	  between	  experience	  and	  view	  overcomes	  many	  of	  the	  restrictions	  of	  this	  relativised	  a	  priorism,	  but	  it	  also,	  we	  argue,	  has	  something	  to	  learn	  from	  this	  strand	  of	  post-­‐Kantian	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  (2)	   Carnap’s	   voluntarism,	   of	   which	   we	   have	   seen	   an	   early	   example	   in	   the	  
Aufbau,	  holds	  that	  there	  are	  no	  rational	  grounds	  on	  which	  to	  preclude	  the	  sorts	  of	  formal	   commitments	   that	   are	  necessary	   to	   account	   for	  our	   theoretical	   knowledge.	  While	   “tolerance”	   operates	   in	   Carnap’s	   work	   in	   a	   way	   that	   finds	   no	   technical	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analogue	  in	  Gupta’s	  work,	  the	  spirit	  of	  tolerance	  (if	  we	  may	  be	  so	  bold)	  is	  certainly	  shared.	   For	  Carnap,	   there	   is	  no	  principled	  way	  of	  precluding	  one	   choice	  of	   formal	  system	   over	   another,	   though	   the	   choice	   of	   some	   formal	   system	   or	   another	   is	  required	  as	  the	  relativised	  a	  priori	  framework	  from	  within	  which	  we	  may	  attribute	  content	   to	   empirical	   (synthetic)	   claims.	   (We	   explore	   Carnap’s	   notion	   of	   tolerance,	  including	   the	   Principle	   of	   Tolerance,	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.)	   For	   Gupta,	   there	   is	   no	  argument	   to	   be	   given	   regarding	   the	   starting	   points	   of	   our	   empirical	   inquiry,	   no	  “right”	  or	  “wrong”	  choice	  in	  world-­‐view,	  though	  some	  choice	  of	  view	  must	  be	  made	  to	  begin	  inquiry	  (to	  make	  empirical	  judgments	  possible)	  within	  his	  interdependent	  system.	  The	   spirit	   of	   tolerance	   is	   found	   in	  Gupta’s	   commitment	   that	   any	  view	   is	   a	  respectable	  starting	  point	  for	  inquiry,	  provided	  that	  the	  view	  is	  reasonably	  open	  to	  revision.	  For	  both	  Carnap	  and	  Gupta,	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  rightness	  or	  wrongness	   of	   said	   views	   until	   they	   are	   chosen	   and	   utilised.	   A	  merit	   in	   Gupta’s	  work	   is	   his	   offering	   a	   perspicuous	   logic	   for	   how	   such	   revision	  may	   go,	   a	   process	  which	  remains	  ill-­‐defined	  in	  Carnap’s	  philosophy.	  	  (3)	   Whereas	   Carnap	   held	   in	   the	   Aufbau	   that	   a	   plurality	   of	   construction	  systems	  are	  permissible,	   and	  whereas	  he	  held	   in	  his	   later	  work	   that	   a	  plurality	  of	  syntactical	  system	  (during	  his	  syntax	  phase)	  or	  language	  forms	  (during	  his	  mature	  phase)	   are	   admissible	   based	   on	   one’s	   interests	   in	   inquiry,	   Gupta	   recognises	   the	  
prima	  facie	  rationality	  of	  an	  infinity	  of	  possible	  views,	  precluding	  on	  a	  priori	  ground	  only	   those	   views	   that	   are	   pathological.	   This	   plurality	   of	   possible	   systems	   of	  coordination	   is	   certainly	   a	   similarity	   between	   the	   logical	   empiricists	   and	   Gupta,	  though	  it	   is	  obvious,	  especially	  given	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	   last	  chapter,	   that	  a	  great	  merit	   in	   Gupta’s	  work	   is	   in	  making	   the	   revisions	   from	   one	   view	   to	   another	  itself	  sensitive	   to	  experience.	  The	   logical	  empiricists	  held	   that	  such	  a	  change,	  even	  though	   perhaps	   motivated	   by	   an	   epistemological	   critique,	   was	   ultimately	  conventional	  (according	  to	  Schlick	  and	  Reichenbach),	  or	  a	  pragmatically	  motivated	  shift	   in	   view	   (according	   to	   Carnap).	   We	   don’t	   pretend	   here	   that	   the	   logical	  empiricists	   had	   the	   requisite	   logic	   necessary	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   complete	  interdependence	  of	  experience	  and	  view,	  only	  that	  they	  attempted	  to	  make	  sense	  of	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such	   an	   interdependence	   as	   far	   as	   their	   logic	   allowed.	   Reformed	   Empiricism	  may	  offer	   us	   a	  way	   of	   completing	   the	   logical	   empiricist	   program	   of	   accounting	   for	   the	  interdependence	   of	   experience	   and	   view	  without	   defaulting	   to	   an	   extra-­‐empirical	  (and	  extra-­‐epistemological)	  notion	  of	  voluntarism.	  	  (4)	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  Gupta	  finds	  a	  prototypical	  version	  of	  his	   view	   that	   privileged	   access	   to	   one’s	   subjectivity	   plays	   no	   role	   in	   generating	  knowledge.	  Even	  as	  early	  as	  the	  Aufbau,	  Carnap	  moved	  away	  from	  what	  he	  clearly	  saw	   as	   a	   troublesome	   claim—that	   the	   theory	   of	   knowledge	   was	   equivalent	   to	  offering	   a	   justification	   of	   our	   knowledge	   based	   on	   experience.	   If	   anything,	  epistemology	  (in	  the	  Aufbau)	  is	  about	  conceptual	  clarification,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	   ask	   (with	   something	   like	   scientific	   precision)	   the	   right	   sort	   of	   clear	   questions	  because	  we	   can	   see	   how	  all	   sciences,	   even	   solipsistic	   ones	   (like	   auto-­‐psychology),	  might	  fit	  together	  in	  one	  common	  system	  of	  concepts/objects.	  This	  tactic,	  of	  course,	  presupposes	  the	  kind	  of	  unity	  Gupta	  thinks	  we	  will	  find	  regarding	  empirical	  matters	  after	  a	  long	  process	  of	  convergence	  (based	  on	  experience).	  The	  differences	  here	  are	  vast,	   but	   they	   mask	   a	   characteristic	   common	   to	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   and	   MSE,	  setting	   both	   apart	   from	   the	   philosophy-­‐first	   methodology	   of	   the	   CBE.	   For	   both	  Reformed	  Empiricism	   and	  MSE,	   the	   assumption	   is	   that	   no	  matter	  what	   particular	  system	   of	   concepts	   one	   uses	   to	   think	   or	   speak	   about	   the	   world,	   if	   that	   system	  (theory,	  view,	  etc.)	  is	  sufficiently	  rich,	  then	  no	  differences	  between	  system	  (theory,	  view,	   etc.)	   will	   block	   communication	   among	   practitioners,	   or	   the	   eventual	  understanding	   based	   on	   access	   to	   a	   shared	   domain	   of	   interest.	   For	   Carnap,	   this	  eventual	  agreement	  resided	  in	  what	  he	  supposed	  to	  be	  facts	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	   world,	   a	   structure	   which	   exceeded	   any	   differences	   or	   particularities	   of	   view.	  With	  Gupta,	  we	  have	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  how	  convergence	  and	  agreement	  can	  be	  found	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  this	  troublesome	  supposition.	  But	   possible	   allies	   always	   come	   to	   the	   table	   with	   their	   own	   battles	   and	  strategies.	  The	  more	  connections	  we	  find	  between	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  and	  MSE,	  the	  more	  we	  are	   led	  to	  think	  that	  perhaps	  some	  more	  of	  the	  commitments	  of	  MSE	  deserve	  explicit	  mention	   in	  Gupta’s	  work.	  As	  we	  shall	  explore	   in	   the	  next	   chapter,	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Empiricism,	  Formal	  Knowledge,	  and	  Communicability	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  attempted	  to	  show	  the	  increased	  importance	  of	  accounting	  for	  our	   theoretical	   and	   formal	   knowledge	   in	   the	   development	   of	   empiricism	   from	   its	  British	  roots	  to	  the	  post-­‐Kantian	  projects	  of	  Helmholtz,	  Mach,	  and	  (partially	  through	  Poincaré)	   the	   logical	   empiricists,	   principally	   Schlick	   and	   the	   early	   Carnap.	   As	  will	  hopefully	  be	  clear,	  the	  history	  glossed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  thought	  to	  contain	  several	   desiderata	   that	   may	   inform	   more	   contemporary	   interpretations	   of	  empiricism,	  especially	  Gupta’s	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  (as	  the	  nexus	  of	  our	  discussion	  here).	   We	   saw	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   particular	   problems	   with	   particular	   methods	   and	  theses	  of	  MSE,	  many	  central	  concerns	  of	  enduring	  interest	  remain	  and	  are	  worthy	  of	  attention.	  We	  also	  saw	  that	  a	  certain	  Quinean	  critique	  of	   the	  empiricist	   tradition’s	  “problem	  of	   the	   external	  world”	   (focused	  on	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau)	  was	   the	   result	   of	   a	  mis-­‐reading,	   not	   only	   of	   the	   rich	   history	   examined	   in	   outline	   in	   Chapter	  Two,	   but	  also	  of	  the	  role	  Cartesian	  themes	  played	  in	  the	  latter	  stages	  of	  MSE;	  in	  further	  detail,	  we	  saw	  that	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau	   is	  actually	  better	  read	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	   the	  Cartesian	  picture	  (a)	  that	  we	  are	  only	  ever	  acquainted	  with	  essentially	  private	  data	  of	  sense,	  (b)	   that	   all	   knowledge	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	  phenomenal	  experience,	   and	   (c)	   that	   foundationalism	   is	   therefore	   the	  only	  proper	  method	   for	   philosophy.	   All	   of	   the	  modern	   empiricists	   we	   examined	   in	   some	  way	  threw	   off	   at	   least	   one	   of	   these	   shackles;	   Carnap	   was	   merely	   in	   the	   favourable	  position	  of	  doing	  away	  with	  all	  of	   them,	  replacing	   traditional	   theory	  of	  knowledge	  with	  the	  constructional	  system	  (“constitutional	  theory”)	  of	  his	  Aufbau.	  	   That	   such	   a	   project	   was	   ultimately	   untenable	   is	   not	   of	   our	   immediate	  concern.	   As	   Goodman	   [1951/1977]	   argued,	   the	   notion	   of	   analysis	   (both	   “proper”	  and	   “quasi”)	   employed	   in	   the	  Aufbau	   suffers	   from	   ineliminable	   problems.48	  Quine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Goodman	  [1951/1977]	  showed	  that	  there	  were	  two	  distinct	  technical	  problems	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	   the	  Aufbau’s	   notion	   of	   analysis.	   For	   Carnap,	   quality	   classes	   are	   analysed	   via	   proper-­‐analysis	   or	  constituted	  via	  quasi-­‐analysis	  based	  on	  “part-­‐identity”	  for	  members	  of	  a	  group.	  We	  depart	  here	  from	  Goodman’s	   analysis	   in	   slight	   detail,	   though	   not	   spirit.	   Imagine	   being	   given	   a	   set	   of	   “erlebs”	  (momentary	   time-­‐slices	  of	  an	   individual	  cogniser’s	  experience),	  each	  possessing	  some	  combination	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[1951/1961],	  on	  top	  of	  his	  more	  broad	  concerns	  with	  Carnap’s	  empiricism,	  argued	  that	   sentences	   of	   the	   form	   “Quality	   q	   is	   at	   x;y;z;t”	   can	   never	   be	   translated	   into	  “Carnap’s	   initial	   language	   of	   sense-­‐data	   and	   logic.”	   (40)49	  Friedman	   [1987/1999]	  questions	   whether	   the	   only	   primitive	   logical	   relation	   of	   the	   Aufbau,	   namely	   Rs	  (“recollection	  of	  similarity”)	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  relation	  (or	  relation	  variable)	  that	  is	  both	  “objective”	  and	  “founded”,	  i.e.	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  Aufbau	  cannot	  capture	  the	  empirical	   relations	   of	   science	   in	   a	   purely	   structural	  way.50	  In	   the	   last	   chapter,	  we	  saw	   that	   such	   technical	   problems	   were	   indeed	   divorceable	   from	   the	   Cartesian	  commitments	  that	  Quine	  (and	  others)	  thought	  dogmatic	  to	  empiricism.	  Thus,	  we	  are	  in	  the	  unique	  position	  here,	  having	  joined	  the	  chorus	  of	  voices	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature	  which	  challenge	  the	  Quinean	  wisdom,	  to	  see	  if	  some	  of	  the	  central	  themes,	  concerns,	  commitments,	  and	  desiderata	  of	  MSE	  can	  be	  integrated	  into	  more	  recent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  elements	  (call	  the	  elements	  a,	  b,	  and	  c).	  We	  want	  to	  know	  these	  elements,	  and	  how	  they	  function	  as	  constituent	  parts	  of	   the	  erlebs.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	  critique,	   take	   these	   five	  entities:	  ac,	  a,	  b,	  ab,	  and	  
abc.	  Because	  c	  is	  systematically	  related	  to	  a	  (wherever	  c	  occurs,	  a	  occurs),	  we	  cannot	  (at	  least	  in	  such	  contexts)	  know	  what	  c	   is.	   (Goodman	  calls	   this	   the	  “companionship	  problem”.)	  Goodman	  also	  raises	  the	  “problem	  of	  imperfect	  community”.	  This	  occurs	  when	  we	  look	  at	  a	  set	  of	  erlebs,	  each	  related	  to	  the	  others	  in	  the	  set,	  but	  no	  element	  running	  through	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  set.	  Such	  a	  set	  will	  constitute	  a	  quality	   class	   by	   Carnap’s	   system,	   though	   such	   a	   quality	   class	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   map	   onto	   any	  intuitively	  known	  quality.	  (See	  §§V.3,	  V.5	  of	  Goodman	  [1951/1977].)	  	  For	  an	  argument	  that	  Goodman’s	  critique	  can	  actually	  be	  used	  to	  strengthen	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau	  (by	  supplying	  the	  work	  with	  a	  formal	  characterisation	  of	  empirical	  phenomena	  such	  as	  illusion	  and	  under-­‐determination)	   see	  Paprzycka	   [1994],	   especially	   section	  3.	  Mormann	   [2003]	   also	   challenges	  Goodman,	  arguing	  that	  he	  (Goodman)	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  geometrical	  background	  of	  the	  Aufbau,	  against	  which	  many	  of	  the	  technical	  “problems”	  of	  analysis	  disappear.	  Also,	  just	  as	  Proust	  [1989]	  had	  showed,	  Mormann	  contends	  that	  quasi-­‐analysis	  remains	  useful	  as	  a	  general	  method	  of	  constitution,	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  shortcomings	  of	   its	  application	   in	  the	  constitution	  of	  external	  space	  based	  on	  phenomenal	  elements.	  	  49	  Mormann	  [2004]	  offers	  just	  such	  a	  translation	  of	  the	  “is	  at”	  relation,	  calling	  into	  question	  Quine’s	  claims.	  50	  Such	  structural	  definite	  descriptions	  replace	  Rs	  with	  a	  variable	  ranging	  over	  relations,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  non-­‐arbitrary	  way	   to	   limit	   the	   range	  of	   the	   variable,	   i.e.	   no	  way	  of	   determining	   a	   set	   of	   unique	  relations	  holding	  between	  empirical	  facts.	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  arises	  for	  how	  to	  limit	  the	  range	  of	  the	  variable;	   but	   here,	   we	   seem	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   procedure	   which	   privileges	   “experienceable,	   ‘natural’	  relations”	   (Aufbau,	   §154).	   The	   objectivity	   of	   the	   sciences	   is	   in	   no	   way	   secured	   for	   us,	   since	   the	  reconstruction	   of	   the	   relevant	   relations	   still	   requires	   an	   appeal	   to	   foundedness,	   and	   thus	   relies	  ineliminably	   on	   individual	   intuition.	   Friedman	   puts	   the	   problem	   the	   following	   way:	   “We	   are	  motivated	  to	  pursue	  a	  program	  of	  complete	  formalisation	  by	  a	  conception	  of	  scientific	  objectivity	  that	  seeks	  to	  disengage	  objective	  meaning	  entirely	  from	  ostension.	  We	  now	  find	  that	  to	  reach	  our	  goal	  we	  need	   to	   introduce	   the	   class	   of	   founded	   relations	   as	   a	   primitive	   notion	   of	   logic,	  where	   the	   founded	  relations	   are	   just	   the	   ‘experienceable,	   “natural”	   relations.’	   But	   what	   can	   ‘experienceable,	   “natural”	  relations’	   be	   except	   precisely	   those	   relations	   somehow	   available	   for	   ostension?	   Our	   original	  motivations,	   in	   other	   words,	   have	   been	   totally	   undermined	   by	   Carnap’s	   final	   move.”	   (Friedman	  [1987/1999],	  103)	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interpretations	  of	  empiricism,	  sans	  the	  technical	  difficulties.	  It	  will	  be	  our	  contention	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  such	  integration	  of	  MSE	  desiderata	  with	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  not	   only	   possible	   but	   also	   fruitful.	   It	   extends	   Gupta’s	   novel	   view	   for	   general	  epistemology	   to	   a	   set	   of	   recalcitrant	   problems	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   often	  with	  surprising	  and	  satisfying	  results.	  However,	  we	  come	  to	  such	  an	  extension	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  only	  by	  way	  of	  a	  critical	  exposition	  of	  Gupta’s	   reticence	   to	  discuss	   in	  detail	  matters	   formal	  and	  scientific	   in	   his	   [2006a].	   In	   §I,	   we	   will	   explore	   some	   of	   the	   existing	   critiques	   of	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  in	  the	  literature.	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  Gupta’s	  empiricism,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  novel	  approach	  to	  re-­‐thinking	  the	  rational	  contribution	  of	  experience	  to	  knowledge,	  masks	  rationalist	  presuppositions	  and	  a	  priori	  distinctions,	  betraying	  its	  purported	  commitment	  to	  the	  Insight.	  We	  will	  argue	  against	  such	  critiques.	  We	  will	  pay	   special	   attention	   to	   Schafer’s	   [2011]	   contention	   that	   Gupta	   views	   experience	  less	  on	   the	  model	  of	   empiricism,	   and	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Kantian	   tradition.	  Yes,	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  has	  some	  elements	  in	  common	  with	  Kantianism,	  but	  only	  those	  that	  were	  found	  useful	  by	  the	  MSE	  tradition.	  Gupta	  does	  not	  hold	  that	  experience	  is	  a	   product	   of	   the	   understanding	   and	   the	   sensibility,	   nor	   does	   he	   think	   there	   a	  transcendental	  argument	  to	  be	  given	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  He	  does	  hold	  with	  Kant	  (and	  most	  of	  the	  principal	   logical	  empiricists)	  that	  experience	  alone	   does	   not	   give	   us	   epistemic	   license	   to	   a	   set	   of	   judgments.	   Here,	   the	   false	  dichotomy	  between	  Kantianism	  and	  empiricism	  (construed	  broadly	  to	  include	  MSE)	  begins	  to	  evaporate.	  	  In	  §II,	  we	  will	  explore	  Gupta’s	  discussion	  of	  our	  formal	  knowledge.	  Because	  Gupta	   attempts	   to	   obviate	   all	   general	   discussion	   of	   mathematics	   until	   certain	  foundational	   issues	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mathematics	   are	   settled,	   he	   does	   not	  recognise	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   mathematical	   and	   mechanical	   assumptions	   are	  operating	  in	  our	  normal	  judgments	  about	  extensive	  magnitudes.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  classical	  empiricism	  to	  view	  mathematics	  as	  separable	  from	  empirical	  judgment,	  and	  that	  Gupta’s	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  should	  avoid	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  such	  a	  view	  if	  at	  all	  possible,	  perhaps	  by	  examining	  possible	  revisions	  to	  the	  theory	  which	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find	   their	   inspiration	   in	   the	   nuanced	   ways	   scientific	   empiricists	   attempted	   to	  account	  for	  our	  geometrical	  assumptions	  about	  space.	  	  	  	   In	  §III,	  we	  will	  assess	  a	  central	  problem	  with	  Gupta’s	  logical	  re-­‐categorisation	  of	   the	   given	   as	   a	   function.	   This	   categorisation	   is	   of	   utmost	   importance	   for	   the	  successful	   defense	   of	   empiricism	   against	   the	  myth	   of	   the	   propositional	   given	   and	  other	  related	  problems.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  central	  to	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  undesired	  ramifications	  when	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  experimental	  sciences,	  and,	  we	  argue,	  has	  difficulty	  accounting	  for	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  the	  communicability	  of	  observation.	   If	  experience	  operates	   like	  a	   function,	   then	   it	   remains	  unclear	  how	  different	   scientific	  practitioners	  might	  engage	   in	   co-­‐operative	  experiment,	   i.e.	  how	  they	   might	   organise	   their	   observation	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   their	   findings	   are	  communicable	   to	  one	  another.	  The	   issue	   is	  not	  dissimilar	   to	   the	   sorts	  of	   concerns	  within	   the	   classical	   empiricist	   tradition	   about	   the	   underdetermined	   relationship	  between	   experience	   and,	   as	   Russell	   put	   it,	   a	   world	   of	   “public	   neutral	   objects”.	  (Russell	   [1912/1997],	   20-­‐21)	  While	   it	   is	   certainly	   no	   empiricist’s	   duty	   to	   offer	   a	  proof	  of	  the	  external	  world,	  any	  empiricism	  that	  accounts	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  our	  common	  sense	  beliefs	  must	  have	  something	  to	  say	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  come	  to	   assess	   empirical	   judgments	   about	   ordinary	   states	   of	   affair	   in	   our	   environment,	  and	   how	   such	   an	   assessment	   informs	   (and	   is	   informed	   by)	   common	   sense	   and	  scientific	  discourse.	  Gupta	  does	  not	  explicate	  how	  such	  an	  account	  may	  proceed.	  We	  will	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  Gupta	  might	  respond	  to	  this	  problem.	  	   In	  §IV,	  we	  will	  offer	  a	  slight	  revision	  of	  Gupta’s	  system,	  which,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  historical	   taxonomy	   of	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   will	   argue	   that	   all	   admissible	   initial	  views	   must	   be	   able	   to	   formulate,	   with	   the	   right	   experiences	   of	   course,	   a	   set	   of	  ordinary	   empirical	   judgments	   about	   magnitude,	   position,	   orientation,	   and	  displacement.	   Such	   judgments,	  while	   they	  do	  not	   force	  any	  substantive	  account	  of	  geometry,	  presuppose	  a	  revisable	  public	  space	  of	   interaction.	  We	  call	  the	  principle	  which	  governs	   admissibility	   in	   this	  way	   the	  Principle	  of	   Scientific	  Empiricism.	  We	  will	  then	  explore	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  too	  substantive	  a	  principle,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  account	  that	  imposes	  it	  as	  an	  admissibility	  criterion	  on	  initial	  views	  can	  really	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be	  considered	  “empiricist”.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  does	  not	  upset	  the	  Insight,	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	   or	   any	   of	   the	   constraints	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   so	   that	   if	   these	  principles	   and	   constraints	   really	   do	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	   normative	   empiricism,	  then	   our	   revision	   of	   Gupta’s	   empiricism	   is	   also	   empiricist.	   While	   no	   formal	  equiconsistency	   proof	   will	   be	   offered,	   the	   dependence	   between	   the	   system	   of	  principles	   and	   constraints	   offered	   by	   Gupta	   and	   his	   system	   plus	   the	   Principle	   of	  Scientific	  Empiricism	  will	  be	  shown.	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  our	  Principle	  of	  Scientific	  Empiricism,	  which	  demands	  that	  all	  initial	  views	  possess	  at	  least	  a	  primitive,	  weak,	  and	  revisable	  conception	  of	  public,	  objective	  space,	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  particular	  characterisation	   of	   Gupta’s	   initial	   condition	   that	   no	   solipsistic	   views	   be	   allowed	  (because	   of	   their	   pathological	   nature)	   as	   starting	   points	   in	   a	   revision	   process,	  though	  characterising	  the	  Principle	  of	  Scientific	  Empiricism	  as	  such	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  its	  defense.	  	  	  
§I:	  The	  Role	  of	  Reason	  in	  Gupta’s	  Empiricism	  Critiques	  of	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  have	   largely	  been	  concerned	  with	  three	  aspects	  of	  his	  work.	  The	  first	  set	  of	  critiques	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  it	  can	  be	  that	  convergence	  of	  views	  delivers	  us	  a	  true	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  and	  world.	  These	  criticisms	  come	  in	  two	  varieties.	  The	  first	  variety	  claims	  that	  even	  if	  a	  set	  of	  disparate	  initial	  views	  do	  converge	  on	   the	  same	  view	   in	   light	  of	  a	   series	  of	  experiences	  E,	   such	  convergence	  fails	  to	  deliver	  us	  the	  uniquely	  true	  and	  non-­‐circuitously	  justified	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  and	  world	  we	  want	  (Martínez	  Fernández	  [2009];	  Valor	  Abad	  [2009]).	  Call	  such	  criticisms	  of	  convergence	  “strong	  convergence	  criticisms”,	  since	  they	  hold	  that	  even	  if	  convergence	  does	  occur,	  it	  does	  not	  grant	  any	  epistemic	  entitlements.	  The	  second	  variety	  of	  critiques	  of	  convergence	  argues	   that	   that	   there	   is	  no	  way	  to	  block	  (on	  a	  
priori	  grounds)	  a	  set	  of	  initial	  views	  which	  are	  solipsistic	  or	  sceptical.	  (Neta	  [2009];	  Berker	   [2011];	   Schafer	   [2011])	   Call	   such	   critiques	   “weak	   convergence	   criticisms”,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  call	   into	  question	  the	  entitlements	  that	  convergence	  would	  grant	  the	  epistemic	  agent	  were	  convergence	  actually	  to	  occur—they	  merely	  question	  the	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possibility	  of	  such	  an	  occurrence	  given	  the	  rationality	  and	  admissibility	  of	  (at	  least	  some	  modified)	  solipsistic	  and	  sceptical	  initial	  views.	  	  Secondly,	   there	   are	   critiques	   that	   focus	   on	   alleged	   infelicities	   with	   one	   or	  more	  of	  Gupta’s	  constraints,	  usually	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  the	  rationality	   of	   our	   perceptual	   judgments.	   Call	   such	   critiques	   “architectonic	  criticisms”,	   since	   they	   argue	   against	   the	   very	   formulation	   of	   Gupta’s	   empiricism	  relative	  to	  the	  constraints.	  	  Thirdly	   and	   lastly,	   there	   are	   a	   group	   of	   criticisms	   that	   accept	   Gupta’s	  constraints	  and	  his	  account	  of	   convergence,	  but	  argue	   that	   the	  system	   itself	   is	  not	  faithful	   to	   empiricism.	   This	   family	   of	   critiques	   questions	   the	   substantial	   role	   for	  rationalism	   within	   Reformed	   Empiricism.	   Call	   these	   the	   criticisms	   “rationalism	  criticisms”.	  	  	  
I.1	  Weak	  Convergence	  Criticisms	  We	  begin	   this	   subsection	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  Neta’s	   [2009]	  critique	  of	  Gupta’s	  notion	   of	   convergence.	   Neta	   argues	   that	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   cannot	   adequately	  ground	   Gupta’s	   notion	   of	   unconditional	   rational	   entitlements	   because	   there	   is	   a	  class	   of	   sceptical	   positions	   that	   will	   always	   upset	   convergence.	   Here	   is	   Gupta’s	  definition	  of	  convergence:	  	  
V	  and	  V’	  converge	  iff	  there	  is	  a	  stage	  n	  [of	  the	  revision	  process]	  such	  that,	  for	  all	   stages	  m	  ≥	  n,	  Vm	  	   is	  virtually	   identical	   to	  V’m	  –	   that	   is,	  Vm	   ≈	  V’m;	   the	   least	  such	  n	  will	  be	  called	  the	  convergence	  point	  of	  V	  and	  V’.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  93)	  	  Convergence	   is	   thought	   to	   give	   us	   unconditional	   entitlement/obligation	   if	   the	  empiricist	   can	   (i)	   “formulate	   and	   justify	   specific	   requirements	   of	   admissibility	   on	  [initial]	   views”	   and	   (ii)	   “maintain	   that	   views	   that	   meet	   these	   requirements	   will	  converge	  under	  the	  force	  of	  experience.”	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  160)	  Neta	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  (ii)	   in	   light	  of	   the	   failure	  of	  (i),	  and	  Gupta	  has	  not	  come	  up	  with	   adequate	   admissibility	   requirements	   that	   will	   block	   the	   relevant	   class	   of	  solipsistic	  and	  sceptical	  views.	  In	  short,	  not	  all	  admissible	  views	  will	  converge,	  and	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therefore	   convergence	   cannot	  be	   taken	   to	  provide	  us	  with	   a	   core	   of	   judgments	   to	  which	   we	   have	   unconditional	   epistemic	   entitlements.	   This	   is	   because	   not	   all	  solipsistic	  and	  sceptical	  views	  are	  pathological.	  Recall	  that	  Gupta	  rejects	  solipsism	  and	  scepticism	  as	  initial	  starting	  points	  for	  revision	   since,	   he	   argues,	   both	   are	   thought	   to	   be	   rigid	   and	   insensitive:	   no	  matter	  what	   the	  course	  of	  experience,	   such	  views	  will	  not	   change	   in	  any	  substantial	  way.	  Nothing	  can	  convince	  the	  solipsist	  that	  the	  world	  she	  sees	  is	  anything	  but	  a	  creature	  of	  her	  own	  mind;	  nothing	  can	  convince	  the	  sceptic	  that	  there	  is	  a	  real	  world	  acting	  on	  her	  senses.	  However,	  Neta	  argues	  that	  Gupta	  has	  too	  narrowly	  defined	  solipsism	  and	  scepticism	  for	  his	  purposes.	  Solipsistic	  and	  sceptical	  views	  come	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  and	  some	  are	  not	  insensitive	  to	  empirical	  revision	  based	  on	  experience.	  Take	  a	  classical	  solipsistic	  view.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  world	  is	  nothing	  except	  what	  exists	   in	   my	   own	   conscious	   experience.	   There	   are	   no	   external	   objects,	   no	   other	  persons,	   and	   no	   other	   minds:	   only	   phantasms	   of	   my	   own	   imagination	   (or	   some	  other	   mental	   faculty).	   Call	   this	   view	   S.	   By	   Gupta’s	   standards,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   no	  experience	   (or	   chain	   of	   experiences)	   can	   upset	   S.	   It	   is	   rigid,	   and	   therefore	  inadmissible	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   a	   revision	   process,	   since,	   no	  matter	  what	   the	  sequence	   of	   experience,	   all	   views	   in	   the	   revision	   process	   will	   be	   fundamentally	  similar	   to	  one	  another.	  But,	  Neta	  argues,	   the	  solipsist	  may	  modify	  her	  position.	  He	  gives	  the	  following	  two	  possible	  modifications,	  S’	  and	  S’’	  (Neta	  [2009],	  485-­‐486):	  	  Let	   S’	   be	   a	   view	   that	   says	   the	   following:	   if	   I	   have	   a	   visual	   experience	   of	   a	  particular	  shade	  of	  orange	  uninterrupted	  for	  precisely	  10	  seconds,	  then	  there	  is	  an	  omnipresent,	  sempiternal	  divine	  being,	  and	  otherwise	  there	  is	  nothing	  but	  my	  own	  experiences.	  	  Let	   S’’	   be	   a	   view	   that	   says	   the	   following:	   if	   I	   have	   a	   visual	   experience	   of	   a	  particular	   shade	   of	   orange	   uninterrupted	   for	   10	   seconds,	   then	   there	   are	  things	   distinct	   from	   my	   experiences	   that	   are	   causing	   me	   to	   have	   those	  experiences;	   if	   I	   have	   a	   visual	   experience	   of	   a	   particular	   shade	   of	   orange	  uninterrupted	  for	  20	  seconds,	  then	  the	  only	  things	  that	  exist	  are	  my	  present	  experiences;	  and	  otherwise,	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  deciding	  between	  these	  two	  possibilities.	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Both	  S’	  and	  S’’	  are	  revisable	  in	  light	  of	  experience,	  and	  therefore	  count	  as	  admissible	  views.	  However,	  their	  existence	  now	  ensures	  that	  not	  all	  antecedently	  rational	  views	  will	   converge	   given	   a	   sequence	   of	   experiences.	   This	   puts	   in	   jeopardy	   the	  convergence	  of	  all	  possible	  initial	  views	  given	  a	  series	  of	  normal	  experiences	  E,	  and	  thus	  calls	  into	  question	  Gupta’s	  move	  from	  the	  conditional	  entitlements	  of	  any	  view	  whatsoever	   to	   the	   unconditional	   entitlements	   licensed	   by	   convergence.	  Convergence	  fails,	  and	  so	  does	  Reformed	  Empiricism:	  experience	  does	  not	  privilege	  any	  view	  as	  unconditionally	  rational.	  	   Neta’s	  criticisms	  are	  strong,	  for	  they	  put	  Gupta	  into	  something	  of	  a	  dilemma.	  Either	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   admits	   of	   modified	   solipsistic	   views,	   making	  categorical	   judgments	  impossible,	  or	   it	  blocks	  such	  modifications.	  If	  Gupta	  chooses	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  then	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  only	  gives	  us	  hypothetical	  entitlements,	  not	  knowledge;	   if	  he	  chooses	   the	  second,	   then	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  seems	   arbitrary,	   since	   there	   are	   no	   principled	   grounds	   for	   preventing	   such	   views	  from	  entering	  into	  possible	  revision	  processes	  as	  initial	  views.	  Neta	  has	  been	  careful	  to	   show	   that	   S’	   and	   S’’	   are	   sensitive	   to	   experience,	   that	   experience	   can	  occasion	   a	  change	  in	  view	  with	  the	  consequence	  that	  the	  view	  after	  experience	  e	  (the	  10	  second	  sensation	   of	   orange)	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   view	  before	   e.	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  in	  the	  unenviable	  position	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  arrive	  at	  unconditional	  entitlements	   without	   some	   empirically	   unmotivated	   decision	   to	  make	   such	   views	  inadmissible.	  	  But	  have	  the	  modified	  solipsist	  views	  S’	  and	  S’’	  shown	  what	  Neta	  thinks	  they	  have	  shown?	  Gupta	  thinks	  not.	  In	  his	  [2009b],	  Gupta	  argues	  that	  Neta	  shows	  S’	  and	  S’’	   to	   be	   non-­‐rigid	   (sensitive	   to	   experience);	   however	   the	   views	   are	   still	   non-­‐
receptive.	   A	   view	   is	   receptive	   only	   when	   it	   yields	   different	   perceptual	   judgments	  when	  experiences	  are	  subjectively	  distinct.	  S’	  and	  S’’	  are	  non-­‐receptive	  since	  there	  are	   still	   a	   large	   class	   of	   subjectively	   distinct	   experiences	   which	   do	   not	   yield	  substantially	   different	   judgments.	   Gupta	   can	   block	   any	   non-­‐receptive	   views	   as	  inadmissible,	  therefore	  convergence	  is	  not	  jeopardised	  by	  S’	  and	  S’’,	  unless	  Neta	  has	  some	   independent	   problem	   with	   the	   receptivity	   admissibility	   criterion.	   Further,	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these	  sorts	  of	  view	  are	  more	   than	  merely	   “silly”	   (as	  Neta	  grants)	   they	  are	  actually	  incoherent,	   and	   Gupta	   holds	   that	   internal	   coherence	   is	   also	   an	   admissibility	  criterion.	  That	  S'	  and	  S''	  are	  incoherent	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  we	  note	  that	  they	  both	  fail	  to	  provide	  an	  epistemic	  means	  of	  individuating	  temporal	  experiences	  of	  the	  right	  shade	  of	  orange	  and	  other	  experiences.	  Such	  a	  view	  can	  provide	  no	  reason	  to	  think	   that,	   in	   some	   instances,	   this	   shade	   of	   orange	   has	   such	   and	   such	   epistemic	  consequences,	  while	  slightly	  different	  shades	  of	  orange	  (or	  even	  different	  colours)	  do	  not,	  and	  why	  20	  second	  bursts	  of	  orange	  are	  epistemically	  so	  different	  from	  19.9	  second	  bursts.	  	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   Gupta	   will	   not	   accept	   any	   view,	   therefore,	   which	   does	   not	  respect	  Manifestation.	  Neta’s	  examples	  of	  S’	  and	  S’’	  fail	  in	  this	  regard,	  for	  they	  do	  not	  respect	   the	   phenomenological	   character	   of	   the	   given;	   views	   such	   as	   these	   are	  equivalent	   to	   assigning	   some	   propositional	   content	   to	   a	   sensation	   on	   purely	  arbitrary	  grounds.	  They	  are	  held	  together	  by	  fiat,	  not	  by	  internal	  coherence.	  Both	  S’	  and	   S’’	   offer	   no	   distinction	   as	   to	   why	   sensations	   of	   colour	   are	   sometimes	  epistemically	  weighty,	  and	  other	  times	  not,	  so	  they	  lead	  to	  a	  set	  of	  judgments	  of	  the	  following	   sort	   (using	   S’	   as	   our	   basic	   view):	   “Colour	   sensations	   of	   orange	   are	   both	  grounds	  and	  not	  grounds	  for	  believing	  in	  a	  deity.”	  But	  the	  view	  can	  offer	  no	  reasons	  as	  to	  how	  or	  why	  such	  differences	  depend	  on	  the	  subjective	  character	  of	  the	  given.	  The	  coherence	  of	  a	  view	  which	  thinks	  sensation	  of	  a	  particular	  shade	  of	  orange	  for	  10	   seconds	   obliges	   one	   to	   believe	   in	   a	   deity,	   while	   the	   same	   sensations	   for	   9.9	  seconds	  oblige	  one	  to	   its	  contradictory,	  and	  which	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  reason	  why	  the	  slight	  difference	  in	  time-­‐interval	  would	  matter,	  are	  incoherent	  not	  because	  small	  phenomenological	   differences	   can’t	   make	   big	   epistemological	   differences;	   lots	   of	  times,	   especially	   in	   the	   sciences,	   the	   smallest	  of	  phenomenological	  differences	   can	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  theories	  and	  views.	  (One	  need	  only	  think	  of	  one	  of	  countless	  examples,	  perhaps	  Brownian	  motion.)	  However,	  there	  are	  reasons	  offered	  by	   the	   view.	   In	   such	   a	   case	   as	   S’,	  we	  would	   need	   to	   develop	   a	   theory	   of	  why	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  deity	  (or	  at	   least	  belief	   in	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  deity)	  should	  find	  some	  functional	   correspondence	   with	   phenomenal	   experiences	   of	   colour,	   and	   also	   why	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minute	   differences	   in	   shade	   of	   orange	   and	   minute	   differences	   in	   duration	   of	  sensation	  would	   correspond	   to	   such	   big	   differences	   in	   epistemic	   entitlement	   and	  obligation.	  	  If	   we	   start	   to	   flesh	   out	   these	   functional	   dependencies,	   S’	   (and	   by	   parity	   of	  reasoning,	  S’’	  and	  all	  such	  “silly”	  views)	  will	  either	  be	  incoherent	  (and	  inadmissible),	  or	   they	   will	   start	   to	   be	   robust	   enough	   to	   converge	   with	   non-­‐solipsistic	   views	   in	  regards	   to	   judgments	  about	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  matters.	  Neta’s	   critical	   examples	  only	  work	   because	   they	   show	   so	   little	   content	   that	   they	   do	   not,	   on	   their	   face,	   seem	  incoherent,	  nor	  do	  they	  seem	  robust	  enough	  to	  ever	  oblige	  the	  view	  holder	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  solipsistic	  view.	  When	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  central	  parts	  of	  a	  view,	  including	  beliefs	  about	  the	  differences	  between	  colour	  sensations,	  the	  related	  beliefs	  one	  may	  have	  about	  deities	  and	  their	  natures,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  abilities	  to	  know	  them	  based	  on	  sensation,	  and	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  other	  framework	  beliefs,	  S’	  becomes	  either	  incoherent	  or	  plausibly	  capable	  of	  convergence.	  	  	  
	  
I.2	  Strong	  Convergence	  Criticisms	  Strong	   convergence	   criticisms	   argue	   against	   Gupta’s	   notion	   of	   convergence	   on	  purely	   logical	   grounds.	   They	   argue	   that	   even	   if	   Gupta	   establishes	   (i)	   and	   (ii),	  convergence	   does	   not	   bring	  with	   it	   rational	   entitlement	   or	   obligation.	   It	   is	   simply	  not	   up	   to	   the	   task.	   This	   is	   because	   there	   is	   a	   much	  more	   severe	   sceptical	   worry	  Gupta	   has	   not	   addressed:	   scepticism	   about	   the	   epistemic	   entitlement	   one	   has	   to	  perceptual	  judgments	  Γe(v)	  even	  if	  we	  can	  establish	  the	  truth	  of	  v	  and	  can	  establish	  the	   rational	   connection	   between	   v,	   e,	   and	   Γe(v).	   This	   is	   because	   the	   rational	  entitlement	  to	  Γe(v)	  is	  licensed	  only	  when	  the	  Insight	  is	  established,	  but,	  says	  Valor	  Abad,	  there	  is	  no	  empirically	  rational	  support	  for	  the	  Insight	  that	  is	  non-­‐circular.	  All	  proofs	  of	  the	  Insight	  presuppose	  the	  Insight.	  Valor	  Abad	  argues	  that	  Gupta’s	  account	  fails	   to	  provide	  a	   justification	   for	   the	  claim	   that	   the	  given	  has	  normative	  weight—that	  	  Γe	  imposes	  rational	  constraints	  on	  us	  no	  matter	  what	  we	  may	  say	  about	  some	  particular	  view	  which	  it	  takes	  as	  argument.	  He	  argues	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  experience	  imposes	  upon	  us	  a	  rational	  constraint	  will	  presuppose	  the	  very	  fact.	  His	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comparison	   is	   with	   the	   circularity	   of	   justification	   for	   the	   rational	   force	   of	  modus	  
ponens:	  	   The	  modus	  ponens	   (MP)	   schema	  –	   like	  any	  other	  valid	   argument	   schema	  –	  seems	   to	   impose	  rational	   constraints	  on	  us.	   If	   S	  holds	  A	  and	  A	  →	  B,	  S	  must	  accept	  B.	  According	  to	  Gupta,	  something	  similar	  occurs	  with	  Γe,	  the	  given	  in	  e:	  If	   S	   holds	   a	   view	   v	   while	   having	   an	   experience	   e,	   S	   must	   accept	   the	  propositions	  in	  Γe(v).	  But,	  do	  MP	  and	  Γe	  really	  impose	  rational	  constraints	  on	  us?	  Why	  is	  it	  reasonable	  or	  normatively	  compelling	  to	  follow	  MP	  and	  Γe?	  We	  could	   say	   that	   all	   instances	   of	  MP	   are	   valid	   and	   that	   all	   conditionals	   of	   the	  form	  ‘If	  S	  holds	  v	  while	  suffering	  e,	  then	  S	  must	  accept	  Γe	  (v)’	  are	  true,	  but	  the	  worry	   still	   remains:	   how	   can	  we	   establish	   this?	   In	   the	   first	   case,	  we	  would	  need	  to	  argue	  for	  MP	  without	  using	  or	  assuming	  MP,	  otherwise	  we	  would	  fall	  into	  a	  vicious	  circle.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  seems	  impossible	  to	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  MP	  without	  assuming	  it	  at	  some	  point.	  (Valor	  Abad	  [2009],	  326)	  	  We	   have	   two	   options:	   if	   we	   assume	   a	   transcendental	   argument	   that	   shows	   the	  normativity	   of	   the	   given,	   then	   we	   have	   transgressed	   the	   Insight.	   If	   we	   turn	   to	  experience,	   then	   we	   merely	   assume	   the	   Insight.	   The	   Insight	   is	   either	   false,	   or	  viciously	   circular;	   “it	   seems	   impossible	   to	   avoid	   this	   dilemma	   in	   justifying	   the	  normativity	  of	  Γe.”	  (Ibid.)	  However,	   Valor	   Abad	   has	  missed	   the	   dialectic	   in	   which	   Gupta	   is	   involving	  himself.	  The	  sceptical	  standard	  here	  is	  rather	  high;	  if	  we	  allow	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	   the	   sceptic	   to	   call	   into	   question	   patterns	   of	   logical	   inference	   because	   they	   are	  merely	   axiomatic,	   and	   cannot	  be	   supported	  by	  non-­‐circular	   justifications,	   then	  we	  have	  simply	  given	  the	  sceptic	  too	  much.	  The	  Humean	  sceptic	  who	  asks	  how	  we	  think	  we	  know	  p	  when	  the	  logical	  connections	  between	  what	  we	  actually	  know	  and	  p	  are	  tenuous,	  poses	  a	  concern	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed;	   the	  sceptic	  who	  tells	  us	   that	  the	   Insight	   is	   unjustified	   need	   not	   be	   addressed	   for	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   Gupta	  proposes	   the	   Insight	   as	   a	   truism,	   which,	   if	   we	   develop	   our	   account	   of	   perceptual	  knowledge	   correctly,	   can	   be	   preserved;	   he	   nowhere	   speaks	   of	   the	   Insight	   as	  something	  in	  need	  of	  proof,	  but	  rather	  something	  that	   is	  central	  to,	  or	  constitutive	  of,	   empiricism.	  Secondly,	   the	   Insight	  need	  not	  be	  given	   in	  experience	   to	  be	  known	  true.	   The	   old	   dichotomy	   that	   every	   proposition	  we	   hold	   true	   is	   either	   verified	   by	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some	  experience	  or	  is	  itself	  a	  logical	  truth	  is	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  classical	  empiricist	  doctrine	   that	  Gupta	   seeks	   to	   replace.	   The	   Insight	   is	   rational	   because	   of	   its	   central	  role	   in	   empiricism—because	   a	   consistent	   form	   of	   empiricism	   can	   be	   established	  which	   preserves	   it.	   Valor	   Abad	   has	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   analogy	   with	   modus	  
ponens	  wrong.	  He	  should	  argue	  that	   just	  as	  modus	  ponens	  is	  rational	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  circularity	   of	   explicit	   justifications	   of	   it,	   the	   Insight	   is	   rational	   in	   spite	   of	   the	  circularity	   of	   explicit	   justifications	   of	   it.	   What	   this	   shows	   is	   that	   the	   Insight,	   like	  
modus	  ponens,	  is	  not	  something	  for	  which	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  demand	  the	  sort	  of	  proof	  that	  would	  quiet	  the	  sceptic.	  This	  last	  point	  should	  make	  clear	  one	  of	  the	  key	  distinctions	  between	  Gupta’s	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  and	   its	   classical	  predecessors,	  at	   least	   its	  CBE	  predecessors.	  While	   previous	   empiricists	   held	   that	   all	   of	   our	   knowledge	   should	   be	   based	   on,	  grounded	   in,	   or	   verified	   by	   experience,	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   is	   committed	   to	   no	  such	  absolute	  claim.	  Gupta	  holds	  rather	  that	   it	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  an	  agent’s	  belief	  set	   (or,	   more	   generally,	   her	   view)	   can	   be	   rendered	   rational	   by	   some	   sequence	   of	  experiences.	  This	  means	  that	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  need	  not	  avail	  itself	  of	  anything	  like	   a	   classical	   principle	   of	   verification,	   and	   all	   of	   the	   technical	   and	   conceptual	  problems	  associated	  with	  our	  knowledge	  of	  said	  principle.	  Valor	  Abad	  seems	  to	  be	  confusing	  the	  Insight	  with	  such	  a	  basic	  principle	  (indeed,	  his	  characterisation	  of	  it	  as	  “basic”	  and	  as	  a	  “principle”	  betrays	  his	  confusion),	  but	  this	  is	  to	  confuse	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  project	  with	  the	  sorts	  of	  problematic	  empiricisms	  to	  which	  Gupta	  is	  offering	  an	  alternative.	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  neither	  takes	  the	  bald	  sceptic	  seriously,	  nor	  does	  he	  construct	  an	  account	  of	  experience	  as	  offering	  a	  verification	  of	  every	  belief,	  as	  if	  we	   may	   turn	   to	   some	   particular	   experience	   (or	   set	   of	   experiences)	   as	   the	  justification	  for,	  and	  meaning	  of,	  each	  belief/judgment	  in	  our	  view.	  The	  mistake	  is	  to	  think	   that	   just	   because	  we	   cannot	   do	   this	   for	   some	   particular	   belief	   (even	   one	   so	  central	  as	  the	  Insight),	  that	  the	  belief	  is	  not	  rendered	  rational	  (as	  part	  of	  a	  belief	  set	  or	  view)	  by	  experience	  as	  our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide.	  It	  is	  to	  (a)	  not	  think	  of	  experience	  as	   functioning	  holistically,	  and	  (b)	  not	   think	  of	   justification	  via	  experience	  as	  something	  that	  is	  dynamical	  and	  diachronic.	  The	  Insight	  is	  not	  a	  “basic	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principle”	  at	  all,	  and	  it	  is	  certainly	  (as	  Gupta	  would	  admit)	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  “grounded”	  in	  the	  classical	  sense—but	  no	  belief/claim	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  classical	  sense	  according	  to	  Gupta,	  so	  this	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise.	  	  	  
I.3:	  Architectonic	  Criticisms	  A	   second	   set	   of	   criticisms	   focuses	   on	   the	   constraints	   for	   normative	   empiricism	  which	   Gupta	   takes	   as	   guiding	   the	   development	   of	   his	   Reformed	   Empiricism.	   John	  McDowell,	   for	   example,	   has	   argued	   that	   Gupta	   offers	   us	   no	   reason	   to	   adopt	   the	  
Equivalence	   constraint,	   since	   it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   that	   subjectively	   identical	  experiences	  can	  have	  differing	  content.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  a	  central	  tenet	  of	  McDowell’s	  disjunctivism.	  For	  McDowell,	  we	  begin	  by	  accepting	   that	  experience	  can	  rationally	  and	  normatively	   support	  perceptual	  beliefs.	   In	  order	   to	  maintain	   this	  position,	  we	  must	   divorce	   our	   account	   of	   experience	   from	   mere	   sensibility	   as	   it	   has	   been	  traditionally	   construed—that	   is,	   experience	   as	   non-­‐conceptual.	   Experience	   is,	  according	  to	  McDowell,	  our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide,	  but	  only	  when	  construed	   as	   involving	   conceptual	   capacities	   that	   one	   normally	   associates	   (to	   use	  the	   Kantian	   vocabulary)	   with	   the	   understanding,	   not	   receptivity.	   Conceptual	  capacities	   belonging	   to	   a	   faculty	   of	   reason	   (McDowell	   [2008],	   2)	   operate	   in	  experience	  itself.51	  As	  McDowell	  once	  put	   it,	   “we	  can	  coherently	  credit	  experiences	  with	  rational	  relations	  to	  judgment	  and	  belief…	  only	  if	  we	  take	  it	  that	  spontaneity	  is	  already	   implicated	   in	   receptivity;	   that	   is,	   only	   if	   we	   take	   it	   that	   experiences	   have	  conceptual	  content.”	  (McDowell	  [1996],	  162)	  These	  concepts	  are	  the	  very	  concepts	  that	  operate	  in	  judgments	  also.	  	   Such	  a	  view	  can	  only	  remain	  tenable	  if	  one	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  experiences:	  ones	  which	  represent	  the	  world	  thus	  and	  so,	  and	  ones	  which	  only	  seem	  to	  represent	  the	  world	  thus	  and	  so.	  The	  difference	  is	  between	  veridical	  perception	  and	   real	   content,	   and	   a	   mere	   seeming	   content	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   non-­‐veridical	  perception.	  This	  disjunctivism	  only	  becomes	  tenable	  if	  one	  rejects	  Equivalence,	  since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  McDowell	  once	  held	  the	  view	  that	  experience,	  already	  conceptualised,	  provided	  one	  with	  all	  of	  the	  
propositional	  content	  required	  to	  account	  (non-­‐inferentially)	  for	  a	  subject’s	  experiential	  knowledge.	  McDowell	  now	  rejects	  this	  view.	  See	  his	  [2008].	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subjectively	  identical	  experiences	  may	  not	  have	  the	  same	  rational	  contents,	  though,	  according	  to	  McDowell,	  they	  can	  both	  make	  a	  subject’s	  belief	  (that	  the	  world	  is	  thus	  and	   so)	   rational.	   For	  McDowell,	   the	  mental	   states	  which	   accompany	   veridical	   and	  non-­‐veridical	  perceptions	  differ	  because	  of	   their	  connections	  to	   the	  world—this	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  experiences	  themselves	  being	  indistinguishable.	  	   Gupta	  asks	  the	  following	  question:	  “…	  how	  do	  we	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  both	   cases,	   veridical	   and	   illusory,	   the	   subject	   is	   equally	   rational	   in	  her	  belief	   [that	  
p]?”	   (Gupta	   [2009b],	   491)	   McDowell	   grants	   that	   both	   veridical	   and	   illusory	  experiences	  are	  rational	  (McDowell	  [1009],	  470),	  but	  given	  that	  he	  has	  granted	  this,	  Gupta	   asks	   “how	   do	   we	   move…	   from	   seeming	   givenness	   to	   actual	   rationality?”	  (Gupta	   [2009b],	   491)	   In	   other	   words,	   what	   is	   it	   about	   seeming	   that	   provides	   the	  epistemic	  agent	  with	  a	  different	  proposition/conceptual	  content	  than	  the	  one	  she	  is	  provided	  with	  in	  veridical	  cases?	  	  Either	  McDowell	  has	  an	  account,	  in	  which	  case	  he	  will	   need	   to	   avail	   himself	   of	   Equivalence	   (perhaps	   the	   equivalence	   of	  propositional/conceptual	  contents),	  or	  he	  denies	  that	  there	  is	  anything	  similar	  given	  in	   experience	   in	   veridical	   and	   illusory	   cases,	   in	  which	   case	   he	   fails	   to	   account	   for	  how	   they	   both	   entitle	   an	   epistemic	   agent	   to	   a	   set	   of	   judgments.	   Recall	   that	  Gupta	  characterises	  Equivalence	  in	  just	  this	  way:	  if	  e	  	  and	  e’	  	  are	  subjectively	  identical,	  then	  the	  given	  in	  e	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  given	  and	  e’	  (where	  the	  given	  is	  merely	  the	  rational	  contribution	  of	  experience	  to	  knowledge).	  McDowell	  may	  want	  to	  define	  the	  given	  in	  more	  robust	  terms,	  but	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  why	  he	  wants	  to	  do	  so,	  especially	  given	  that	   he	   already	   yields	   the	   point	   that	   what	   really	   matters	   to	   the	   rationality	   of	  experience	  is	  how	  it	  seems	  to	  the	  epistemic	  agent.	  	  	  	   Further,	   even	   though	  McDowell’s	   brand	   of	   disjunctivism	  may	   preserve	   the	  Insight,	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  is	  jeopardised	  by	  his	  account,	  giving	  us	  independent	  grounds	   on	   which	   to	   find	   his	   disjunctivism	   unattractive.	   Like	   Sellars,	   McDowell	  believes	   that	   the	   concepts	   in	   our	   language	   are	  what	   allow	  us	   to	   have	   the	   sorts	   of	  perceptual	  judgments	  we	  do,	  i.e.	  these	  concepts	  allow	  us	  to	  take	  the	  content	  we	  do	  from	   experience,	  which	   is	   some	   kind	   of	   conceptual	   (if	   not	   propositional)	   content.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  privileged	  a	  set	  of	  inherited	  concepts,	  but	  it	  seems	  we	  have	  done	  so	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for	  no	  good	  reason.	  We	  have	  given	  experience	  its	  rational	  weight,	  but	  either	  (a)	  we	  argue,	  with	  Kant,	  that	  we	  must	  remain	  with	  this	  set	  of	  concepts	  come	  what	  may	  or	  (b)	   we	   argue,	   with	   Sellars,	   that	   changes	   in	   our	   concepts	   occur,	   but	   how	   these	  changes	  are	  attached	  to	  experience	  is	  not	  clear.	  If	  we	  pursue	  (a),	  we	  do	  not	  preserve	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	  If	  we	  pursue	  (b),	  we	  do	  great	  damage	  to	  the	  Insight,	  damage	  that	  McDowell	   thought	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	  his	  disjunctivism,	   for	  experience	   is	  no	  longer	  the	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  regarding	  the	  development	  of	  our	  concepts.	  Sellars	  makes	  no	  claim	  that	  experience	  plays	  such	  a	  role,	  but,	  McDowell	  is	  very	  much	  committed	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  experience	  offers	  rational	  support	   for	  our	  beliefs,	  even	  though	  his	  disjunctivism	  seems	  unable	  to	  preserve	  it.	  	  Perhaps	   the	   view	   can	   be	   salvaged	   so	   as	   to	   do	   justice	   to	   the	   truisms,	   or	  perhaps	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	   can	  be	   shown	   to	  be	   flawed	   in	   some	  way,	   and	  not	  worthy	  of	  its	  lofty	  truism	  status.	  This	  is	  not	  our	  concern,	  for	  even	  if	  the	  truisms	  are	  honored,	  McDowell’s	  position	  runs	  aground	  on	  Reliability.	  Take	  his	  example	  of	  non-­‐inferentially	   seeing	  a	   cardinal.	   (McDowell	   [2008],	   §4)	  While	  he	  admits	   that	  not	  all	  people	   have	   the	   conceptual	   capacity	   to	   make	   perceptual	   judgments	   of	   the	   sort,	  “That’s	  a	  cardinal,”	  many	  do,	  and	  the	  CARDINAL	  concept	  is	  operating	  at	  the	  level	  of	  experience	  itself.	  (Here	  we	  see	  the	  spontaneity	  in	  receptivity	  mentioned	  earlier.)	  But	  now,	  experience	  can	  yield	  (for	  such	  a	  person)	  a	  conceptual	  content	   that	   is	   false	  (if	  propositional	   or	   proposition-­‐like)	   or	   erroneous	   (if	   merely	   a	   conceptual	   content).	  
Reliability	  captures	  the	  fact	  that	  what	  we	  would	  like	  to	  say	  is	  that	  experience	  isn’t	  to	  blame	   in	   such	   cases	   (for	   example,	   if	   I	   am	   seeing	   a	   Blue	   Jay	   in	   poor	   lighting	  conditions);	   what	   is	   to	   blame	   is	   my	   view	   of	   the	   world.	   However,	   according	   to	  McDowell,	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding	   (for	   beings	   like	   us)	   inextricably	  operate	  in	  experience;	  experience	  takes	  on	  all	  of	  the	  many	  faults	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  our	  position	  in	  it,	  and	  the	  given	  therein	  can,	  as	  a	  result,	  yield	  false	  propositions	  (or	  erroneous	  contents).	  Of	  course,	  McDowell	  is	  always	  free	  to	  take	  recourse	  in	  his	  bifurcation	  between	  the	  given	  in	  veridical	  experience	  versus	  the	  given	  in	  illusory	  experience.	  However,	  such	  a	  move,	  in	  light	  of	  what	  we	  have	  just	  seen	  in	  the	  last	  paragraph,	  is	  illicit.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  reject	  Gupta’s	  Equivalence	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constraint,	   and	   therefore	   no	   way	   for	   McDowell’s	   disjunctivism	   to	   preserve	  
Reliability.	  	  Further,	   there	   are	  no	   grounds	   to	   accept	   any	  of	   the	   other	   constraints	   if	   one	  adopts	   McDowell’s	   disjunctivism:	   Existence	   is	   rejected	   since	   in	   illusory	   cases,	  nothing	   is	   given	   in	   experience;	   Equivalence	   and	   Reliability	   are	   rejected	   for	   the	  reasons	   given	   above;	   finally,	   Manifestation	   is	   rejected,	   since	   the	   given	   does	   not	  systematically	   depend	   on	   the	   subjective	   character	   of	   experience,	   but	   on	   the	  connections	  between	  some	  experiences	  (veridical	  ones)	  and	  the	  world.	  McDowell	  is	  thus	  merely	  speaking	  past	  Gupta;	  the	  two	  have	  very	  different	  notions	  of	  the	  given,	  but	   Gupta’s	   seems	   to	   better	   accord	   with	   the	   Insight	   and	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	  while	  McDowell’s	  seems	  to	  only	  accord	  with	  his	  disjunctivism.	  In	  any	  case,	  Gupta	  is	  free	   to	   set	   up	   any	   constraints	   he	   likes.	   The	   strength	   of	   the	   view	   is	   that	   it	   accords	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  constraints	  that	  empiricists	  have	  hitherto	  taken	  to	  be	  true.	  Gupta	  wants	   to	   show	   that	   he	   can	   develop	   a	   defensible	   empiricism	   that	   preserves	   the	  plausibility	   of	   these	   constraints	   without	   falling	   into	   the	   propositional	   given	   and	  Cartesian	  conceptions	  of	  experience.	  McDowell	  has	  also	  missed	  the	  dialectic	  of	   the	  work	  if	  he	  thinks	  anything	  else	  is	  at	  stake.	  Another	  architectonic	  critique	  comes	  from	  Peacocke	  [2009].	  Peacocke	  argues	  that	  Gupta	  has	  not	  adequately	  characterised	  his	  Reliability	  constraint.52	  According	  to	  Gupta,	   experience	   never	   yields	   anything	   false	   or	   erroneous.	   Where	   there	   is	  something	   wrong	   about	   our	   perceptual	   judgments,	   it	   is	   not	   experience	   that	   is	   to	  blame,	  but	  some	  defect	  in	  our	  view.	  Peacocke	  says	  that	  	  	   …this	  position	  is	  false	  to	  the	  phenomenology,	  to	  the	  epistemic	  status,	  and	  to	  the	   metaphysics	   of	   experience.	   The	   content	   of	   apparently	   misleading	  experiences	   cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   perceptual	   judgements	   or	   beliefs,	  because	   in	  some	  cases	   the	  subject	  knows	  he	   is	  experiencing	  an	   illusion;	  yet	  the	  experience	  still	  has	  the	  false	  content.	  (Peacocke	  [2009],	  477)	  	  Peacocke’s	  example	  of	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  illusion	  makes	  the	  point	  more	  salient.	  In	  this	  case,	   we	   know	   that	   the	   lines	   are	   of	   the	   same	   length,	   yet	   this	   does	   not	   prevent	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  Schafer	  [2011]	  also	  offers	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  Reliability	  constraint,	  though	  we	  will	  not	  address	  it	  here.	  
	  	  	  127	  
	  
	  
experience	   from	   offering	   representational	   content	   to	   the	   contrary.	   Here,	   it	   would	  seem,	  our	  view	   is	  perfectly	  well	   established	  and	   it	   is	   experience	   that	   continues	   to	  impart	  false	  or	  erroneous	  contents.	  	  	   Further,	   if	   Gupta’s	   view	   is	   adopted,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   sense	   in	   which	  experiential	   contents	   can	   ever	   be	   taken	   at	   “face-­‐value”,	   to	   use	   Peacocke’s	   term.	  Undergoing	  an	  experience	  would	  be	  divorced	   from	  having	   the	  world	  presented	   to	  you	   as	   being	   a	   certain	  way.	   All	   of	  my	   judgments	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   the	  world	   is	   a	  certain	   way	   would	   either	   be	   “an	   irrational	   leap	   in	   the	   dark,	   or	   something	  inferential.”	   (Peacocke	   [2009],	   478)	   Gupta	   will	   have	   lost	   the	   rational	   connection	  between	   experience	   and	   judgment.	   However,	   here	   Peacocke	   is	   mistaken.	   He	  construes	  the	  hypothetical	  given	  as	  requiring	  some	  inference	  to	  impart	  its	  contents.	  This	   is	  not	  the	  case.	  There	   is,	   for	  Gupta,	  spontaneity	  of	  experience.	  Given	  a	  view	  v,	  experience	   operates	   as	   a	   function,	   which	   takes	   us	   (immediately,	   intuitively,	  naturally,	   and	   spontaneously)	   to	   a	   judgment.	   It	   is	   not	   as	   if	  we	   ever	   encounter	   the	  neutrality	   of	   the	   given	   in	   experience	   itself	   (say	   in	   accordance	   with	   Husserlian	  phenomenological	  epoché)	   in	   spite	   of	   its	   logical	   categorisation.	  We	   experience	   the	  world	   as	   thus-­‐and-­‐so	   immediately	   in	   experience,	   but	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   the	  given	   in	  experience	  does	  the	  conceptual	  heavy	   lifting.	  Thus,	   the	  hypothetical	  given	  does	  not	  put	  in	  danger	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  experience,	  nor	  its	  epistemic	  status.	  A	  hypothetical	  given	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  phenomenology,	  especially	  when	  we	  take	   into	   account	   Gupta’s	   explicit	   inclusion	   of	   the	  Manifestation	   constraint.	   (As	   to	  being	  true	  to	  the	  metaphysical	  nature	  of	  experience,	  Gupta	  is	  wisely	  silent.)	  But	   even	   if	   experience	   is	   spontaneous,	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   offers	   no	  account	  of	  how	  transitions	   from	  one	  view	  to	  another	   in	   light	  of	  experience	  can	  be	  rational.	  Surely	  there	  has	  been	  a	  change	   in	  our	  mentality	  (our	  belief	  system	  at	   the	  very	   least)	   in	   so	   far	   as	   two	   views,	   v	   and	   v*,	   are	   not	   the	   same.	   And	   certainly	   this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  intervening	  experience	  e.	  But	  what	  makes	  such	  a	  change	  in	   view	   rational?	   Peacocke	   introduces	   the	   “Ratifiability	   Condition”	  which	  must	   be	  met	  if	  such	  transitions	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  rational:	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Ratifiability:	  Whenever	  a	  mental	  transition	  is	  rational,	  there	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  soundness	   that	   it	   meets.	   This	   soundness	   condition	   involves	   the	   notion	   of	  truth,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  condition	  that	  concerns	  the	  correctness	  or	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  contents	   of	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   mental	   states	   involved	   in	   the	   transition.	  (Peacocke	  [2009],	  478-­‐479)	  	  But	  this	  notion	  of	  truth	  presupposes	  a	  more	  robust	  account	  of	  content	  than	  Gupta	  is	  willing	  to	  countenance	  in	  his	  hypothetical	  account	  of	  the	  given.	  It	  presupposes	  that	  at	  least	  some	  experiences	  have	  a	  “face-­‐value”	  content,	  and	  that	  such	  contents	  can	  be	  true:	  what	  Peacocke	  calls	  “content	  as	  required	  to	  elucidate	  rationality”.	  Without	   it,	  we	  are	   left	  with	  no	  way	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  transition	   is	  rational,	  since	  no	  step	   in	  the	   transition	   has	   a	   content	   that	   is	   true.	   Gupta,	   after	   all,	   likens	   his	   hypothetical	  model	   of	   the	   given	   to	   an	   argument	   schema,	   which	   takes	   us	   from	   a	   view	   to	   a	  proposition	  (or	  set	  of	  propositions).	  But,	  unlike	  the	  example	  of	  modus	  ponens,	  which	  is	   a	   valid	   inference	   form,	   and	  which	   therefore	   has	   truth-­‐evaluable	   premises	   (and	  thus	   is	  able	   to	  be	   ratified—it	   is	   truth	  preserving),	   the	   transition	   from	  one	  view	   to	  another	  based	  on	  a	  non-­‐propositional	  given	  cannot	  be	  ratified.	  (Similar	  arguments	  have	   been	  made	   by	   Berker	   [2011],	   who	   argues	   that	   you	   can	   only	   get	   categorical	  entitlements	   out	   of	   revision	   if	   categorical	   entitlements	   are	   put	   into	   the	   revision	  process;	  otherwise,	   there	   is	  no	  way	  to	  secure	   the	  rationality	  of	   the	  move	   from	  the	  hypothetical	  to	  the	  categorical.)	  It	   seems	   that	   Peacocke’s	   analysis	   has	   not	   taken	   full	   account	   of	   the	   logical	  reforms	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism.	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  does	  not	  show	  how	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  and	  world	  can	  be	  considered	  true,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  harshest	   sceptical	   criticism;	   any	   empiricism	   that	   accepts	   this	   task	   is	   playing	   a	  fool’s	  game.	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  show	  how,	  using	  only	  empiricist	  principles,	  one	  might	   justify	  her	  current	  set	  of	  beliefs,	   exhibiting	   that	   the	  set	   is	  by	  and	   large	   rational	   because	   she	  has	  met	   certain	   reasonable	   conditions	   for	   thinking	  so—because	  her	  view	  has	  converged	  with	  other	  very	  different	  views,	  perhaps	  those	  of	   her	   community	  members,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   experience.	   It	   answers	   the	   sceptic,	   but	  only	  after	  the	  sceptic	  has	  been	  neutralised.	  It	  shows	  the	  sceptic	  that	  experience	  can	  rationally	  force	  a	  change	  in	  view,	  and	  asks	  the	  sceptic	  to	  now	  formulate	  her	  doctrine	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in	  light	  of	  this	  epistemic	  fact.	  Gupta	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  offering	  an	  account	  of	  how	  an	   individual	  shift	   in	  view,	   irrespective	  of	   the	  possible	  convergence	  of	  all	  views	   in	  light	  of	  experiences	  E,	  might	  satisfy	  Ratifiability.	  Gupta	  holds	  that	  the	  rationality	  of	  any	  shift	  in	  view	  is	  established	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  converge	  with	  other	  views,	  no	  matter	  how	  radically	  different	  they	  may	  have	  been	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	   inquiry	  (so	   long	  as	  admissibility	   criteria	   have	   been	   met).	   Of	   course,	   there	   are	   no	   guarantees	   that	  convergence	   will	   occur,	   but	   only	   relative	   to	   even	   merely	   possible	   or	   idealised	  convergence	   can	   we	   “ratify”	   shifts	   in	   view.	   Peacocke’s	   criticism	   does	   not	   set	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  in	  this	  broader	  perspective,	  and	  thus	  loses	  some	  of	  its	  sting	  as	  a	   result,	   for	   it	   is	   in	   this	   broader	  perspective	   that	  Gupta’s	   account	  of	   ratification	   is	  formulated:	   as	  dependent	  on	   the	  essentially	  dynamical	   character	  of	   view	   revision.	  This	  is	  why	  Gupta	  can	  admit	  that	  there	  is	  perhaps	  no	  individual	  stage	  of	  a	  revision	  process	  that	  will	  meet	  Ratifiability,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  prevent	  revision	  prcoess	  from	  being	  ratifiably	  rational.	  	  	  
I.4:	  Rationalism	  Critiques	  The	   third	   and	  most	   interesting	   family	   of	   criticisms	   challenge	   Gupta	   on	  what	   they	  take	   to	  be	   the	  overly	   rationalist	  assumptions	   in	  his	  position,	  and,	  more	  often	   than	  not,	  focus	  their	  attention	  on	  Gupta’s	  admissibility	  criteria	  glossed	  in	  §I.1	  above.	  The	  argument	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   those	   expressed	   by	   Neta	   and	   Valor	   Abad,	   though	  rationalism	  critiques	  follow	  the	  reasoning	  exhibited	  in	  those	  critiques	  to	  its	  natural	  end:	  Gupta’s	  reforms	  are	  merely	  rationalism	  in	  empiricism’s	  clothing.	  Berker	  [2011]	  and	  Schafer	   [2011]	  both	  argue	   for	   this	   thesis,	   though	   in	   slightly	  different	  ways.	   In	  this	  subsection,	  we	  will	  explore	  their	  criticisms,	  and	  then	  show	  how	  such	  criticisms	  miss	  the	  mark:	  Gupta’s	  empiricism	  deserves	  to	  go	  by	  that	  name.	  Nonetheless,	  such	  criticisms	   have	   hit	   upon,	   if	   only	   obliquely,	   an	   underlying	   deficiency	   in	   Gupta’s	  account	   of	   the	   antecedent	   rationality	   of	   initial	   views	   and	   the	   set	   of	   admissibility	  conditions	  which	  we	  may	  need	  to	  expand	  upon	  to	  solve	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  solipsistic	  views	   from	   upsetting	   convergence.	   In	   sections	   2-­‐4	   below,	  we	  will	   propose	   a	  way	  that	   we	   may	   enrich	   Reformed	   Empiricism’s	   conception	   of	   what	   counts	   as	   a	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pathological	   view:	   its	   limited	   set	   of	   conditions,	   including	   receptivity,	   internal	  coherence,	  and	  non-­‐rigidity,	  are	  not	  jointly	  sufficient	  to	  block	  all	  forms	  of	  solipsism.	  For	  now,	  however,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  charge	  that	  Gupta’s	  admissibility	  criteria	  are	  too	  rationalistic,	  and	  that	  they	  betray	  his	  empiricism.53	  	   Berker	   argues	   that	   Gupta	   has	   not	   done	   an	   adequate	   job	   dispelling	   the	  solipsist	   or	   the	   sceptic.	   He	   introduces	   a	   bit	   of	   formalism	   to	   help	   him	   develop	   the	  point.	   Take	   the	   set	   of	   propositions	   possessed	   by	   all	   convergent	   views	   after	   being	  revised	  in	  light	  of	  any	  given	  finite	  sequence	  of	  experiences	  E:	  	  	   ΩE	  =	  {P	  :	  (∀	  admissible	  view	  v)	  (P	  ∈	  ρE(v))}	  	  where	  ρE(v)	   is	   the	   convergence	  point	   for	   all	   admissible	   views	   given	  E.	   The	   set	  ΩE	  contains	  all	  of	  those	  propositions	  upon	  which	  all	  of	  the	  admissible	  views	  will	  come	  to	   agree	   given	   E,	   so	   Berker	   calls	   it	   “the	   common	   core	   of	   admissible	   outcomes	  generated	  by	  E”.	  (Berker	  [2011],	  24)	  Any	  proposition	  that	  is	  a	  member	  of	  ΩE	  is	  one	  to	  which	  we	   have	   unconditional	   entitlement.	   Of	   course,	  we	   can	   only	   preserve	   the	  viability	   of	  ΩE	   if	  we	  preclude	   from	  our	   set	   of	   starting	  points	   those	   views	   that	   put	  such	  convergence	  in	  question.	  This,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  must	  be	  done	  on	  some	  principled	  ground	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  empiricism,	  i.e.	  must	  preclude	  unacceptable	  views	  as	  initial	  starting	  points	  in	  revision	  by	  some	  relatively	  innocent	  admissibility	  criteria.	  Gupta,	  as	  we	  know	  from	  our	  concluding	  remarks	  in	  the	  previous	  subsection,	  has	   three	   such	   criteria:	   receptivity,	   internal	   coherence,	   and	   non-­‐rigidity.	   Utilising	  these	  criteria,	  Gupta	  can	  block	  the	  sorts	  of	  solipsistic	  and	  sceptical	  views	  which	  put	  in	   danger	   the	   viability	   of	  ΩE	   as	   a	   common	   core	   of	   propositions,	   and	   thus	   put	   in	  danger	   the	   set	   of	   propositions	   to	  which	  we	   have	   unconditional	   entitlements.	   The	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  For	  a	  distinction	  between	  rationalist	  and	  empiricist	  a	  priori	  commitments,	  see	  Gupta	  [2009b],	  334:	  “The	   general	   ‘revision-­‐and-­‐convergence	   picture’	   is	   neutral,	   it	   should	   be	   observed,	   on	   the	   debate	  between	   the	   empiricists	   and	   the	   rationalists…Both	   parties	   can	   accept	   the	   general	   picture;	   their	  disagreement	  centers	  on	  requirements	  of	  admissibility.	  Rationalists	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  know	  a	  priori	  some	  substantive	  truths	  about	  the	  world;	  that	  these	  truths	  constrain	  admissibility;	  and	  that	  without	  this	   additional	   constraint,	  we	   cannot	  make	   sense	  of	   empirical	   rationality.	  Empiricists,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  will	  deny	  that	  we	  have	  any	  a	  priori	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world.	  They	  will	  insist	  that	  all	  admissibility	  constraints	  must	  be	  grounded	  solely	   in	  epistemological	   considerations	   (such	  as	   those	  motivating	  non-­‐rigidity).”	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project	  of	  giving	  an	  empiricist	  account	  of	  the	  rationality	  of	  our	  common	  sense	  view	  of	  the	  world	  would	  be	  completed:	  based	  only	  on	  the	  hypothetical	  given	  we	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  a	  set	  of	  categorical	  judgments.	  	   But	  Berker	  is	  not	  convinced.	  He	  argues	  that	  Gupta’s	  notion	  of	  experience	  may	  not	  actually	  respect	  the	  Insight.	  	  	   Gupta	  has	  certainly	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  categorical	  justification	  in	  which	  experience	   plays	   an	   important	   role.	   However,	   in	   order	   to	   vindicate	  empiricism	   we	   don’t	   just	   need	   experience	   to	   play	   some	   role	   in	   the	  justification	  of	  our	  beliefs;	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  see	  how	  any	  plausible	  account	  of	  justification,	  whether	  rationalist	  or	  empiricist,	  could	  deny	  that.	  Rather,	  what	  we	   need	   is	   for	   experience	   to	   play	   an	   exclusive	   or	   primary	   role	   in	   the	  justification	   of	   our	   beliefs.	   And	   it	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   experience	  bears	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  normative	  work	  in	  Gupta’s	  proposal.	  In	  particular,	  we	  need	   to	   ask	   whether	   there	   are	   places	   in	   Gupta’s	   account	   where	   reason	  (rather	  than	  experience	  on	  its	  own)	  makes	  a	  substantial	  contribution	  to	  the	  justification	  that	  we	  have	  for	  our	  beliefs.	  (Berker	  [2011],	  26)	  	  Berker	   argues	   that	   reason	   plays	   three	   substantial	   roles	   in	   Gupta’s	   Reformed	  Empiricism,	  and	  only	  one	  of	  these	  roles	  is	  recognised	  by	  Gupta.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  the	  a	  
priori	  use	  of	  reason	  to	  discern	  the	  admissible	  from	  the	  non-­‐admissible	  views.	  (This	  is	   the	  use	  of	   reason	   that	  Gupta	  does	   acknowledge,	   and	   I	  will	   not	   address	   it	   here.)	  Secondly	  and	  thirdly,	  Gupta	  uses	  reason	  to	  demarcate	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  Γe(v)	  and	  
ρE(v)	  functions	  respectively.	  	  	   For	   Berker,	   Gupta	   must	   use	   reason	   to	   determine	   a	   priori	   the	   proper	  extension	   of	   the	   Γe(v)	   function.	   In	   fact,	   Berker	   calls	   such	   statements	   about	   the	  extension	  of	  Γe(v)	  synthetic	  a	  priori.	  The	  charge	  is	  strong	  indeed,	  for	  Gupta	  needs	  to	  prevent	   his	   hypothetical	   account	   of	   the	   given,	   and	   the	   interdependence	   of	  experience	  and	  view,	  from	  suffering	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  Kant’s	  similar	  project.	  This	  is	  only	  possible	  if	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  can	  generate,	  using	  only	  experience	  and	  view,	  the	  sorts	   of	   judgments	   about	   the	   self	   and	   the	   world	   that	   were	   thought	   to	   require	   a	  transcendental	  source	   in	  Kant’s	  system.	   If	  Berker’s	  criticism	   is	  apt,	   then	  Gupta	   too	  has	   proposed	   an	   account	   of	   the	   rationality	   of	   experience	   that	   presupposes	   too	  significant	   a	   role	   for	   reason.	   Assume,	   with	   Gupta,	   that	   the	   first	   use	   of	   reason	   (to	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determine	   which	   views	   are	   admissible	   and	   which	   are	   not	   via	   convergence)	   is	  legitimate.	  Even	  so,	  convergence	  will	  not	  help	  us	  determine	  the	  proper	  extension	  of	  
Γe(v).	   Because	   convergence	   requires	   specific	   values	   for	   the	   Γe(v)	   function,	   this	  criticism	  comes	  prior	  to	  convergence.	  But,	  having	  precluded	  convergence	  as	  a	  useful	  tool	  to	  establish	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  Γe(v)	  function,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  Gupta	  to	  prevent	  someone	  from	  embedding	  into	  the	  Γe(v)	  function	  any	  theory	  of	  the	  given	  they	  so	  choose,	  even	  a	  propositional	  account	  of	  the	  given.	  This	  is	  because	  we	  can	  use	   the	   two-­‐argument	   function	  Γe(v)	   (which	   takes	   experiences	   and	  views	  and	  maps	  them	  onto	  perceptual	  judgments)	  to	  construct	  a	  one-­‐argument	  function	  from	  experiences	  to	  classes	  of	  propositions	  (as	  with	  sense-­‐datum	  theory).	  Berker	  argues	  that	   Gupta	   can	   only	   rule	   out	   such	   a	   possibility	   through	   some	   illicit	   use	   of	   reason.	  Gupta	  can	  try	  to	  take	  refuge	  in	  the	  constraints,	  but	  he	  can	  only	  determine	  whether	  the	  constraints	  hold	  via	  some	  illicit	  use	  of	  reason	  too.	  	  	   Reason	   is	   also	   operating	   to	   determine	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   ρE(v)	   function.	  Berker	   asks	   us	   to	   suppose	   a	   rather	   simple	   case	   of	   revision:	   a	   rational	   agent	  with	  view	   v	  undergoes	   experience	   e,	   and	   Q	  ∈	   Γe(v).	   (Berker	   is	   here	   assuming	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   argument	   that	   Γe(v)	   has	   been	   unproblematically	   fixed,	   contra	   his	  previous	  criticism.)	  Perhaps	  Q	  merely	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  to	  v	  to	  generate	  some	  new	  view	  v*,	   but,	   the	  more	   interesting	   cases	  are	  when	  v*	   is	   a	   substantial	   revision	  of	  v.	  How	   are	   we	   to	   determine	   when	   a	   substantial	   revision	   is	   to	   occur,	   and	   how	   that	  substantial	   revision	   should	   occur?	   In	   other	   words,	   how	   can	   we	   preclude	   the	  possibility	   that	   one	   can	  begin	  her	   epistemic	   life	  with	   a	   completely	   common	   sense	  view,	  and,	  in	  light	  of	  some	  experience,	  simply	  revise	  her	  position	  to	  a	  solipsistic	  or	  sceptical	  one?	  Either	  Gupta	  offers	  no	  principled	  reason	  why	  such	  revisions	  ought	  to	  be	  precluded,	  in	  which	  case	  even	  the	  initial	  blocking	  of	  rigid	  views	  does	  not	  save	  the	  day	  against	  solipsism	  or	  scepticism,	  or	  Gupta	  does	  offer	  principled	  reasons,	  but	  of	  an	  illicit	   and	   rationalist	   sort	   (since	   no	   appeal	   to	   convergence	   can	   prevent	   such	   a	  possibility,	  given	  that	  such	  possibilities	  do	   irreparable	  harm	  to	  the	  epistemic	  force	  of	  convergence).	  	   	  Before	  examining	  Berker’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Γe(v)	  function	  (which	  we	  shall	  do	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after	  examining	  similarities	  between	  his	  critique	  and	  Shafer’s	  critique),	  let	  us	  pose	  a	  problem	   for	  his	  analysis	  of	  ρE(v).	   It	   is	  unclear	  why	  Gupta	  must	  be	   in	  a	  position	   to	  block	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  given	  view	  being	  revised	  in	  light	  of	  a	  given	  experience	  into	  a	   radically	   different,	   even	   sceptical	   view,	   because	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   this	   poses	   a	  problem	   for	   said	   sceptical	   view,	   so	   arrived	   at,	   from	   partaking	   in	   the	   categorical	  judgments	  contained	  in	  Ω.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  seems	  impossible	  for	  a	  severe	  form	  of	  scepticism	   to	   be	   formulated	   in	   light	   of	   experience,	   and	   this	   is	   independent	   of	   any	  admissibility	  constraint	  whatsoever.	  The	  sceptical	  view	  in	  question,	  no	  matter	  what	  sort	  of	  lunacy	  it	  may	  profess,	  has	  built	  into	  itself	  a	  rational	  role	  for	  experience	  based	  on	  the	  revision	  process	  (here	  a	  rather	  short	  one,	  containing	  only	  one	  experience	  and	  two	   views,	   one	   input	   and	  one	   output).	   Imagine	   agent	  A	   possessing	   initial	   view	  v0.	  Pretend	  that	  this	  view	  is	  similar	   in	  nature	  to	  our	  normal	  common	  sense	  picture	  of	  the	  world.	  Now	  imagine	  A	  undergoes	  experience	  e1,	  which	  (ex	  hypothesi)	   leads	  her	  to	  revise	  v0	  into	  a	  harsh	  Pyrrhonian	  “view”	  of	  the	  world	  (in	  as	  much	  as	  a	  Pyrrhonian	  sceptic	   can	   have	   a	   view	  of	   the	  world)—call	   it	   vp.	   This	   view	   includes	   the	   minimal	  sceptical	   commitment	   to	  Diaphônia	   (the	   mode	   from	   disagreement),	   including	   the	  accompanying	  belief	  that	  one	  should	  suspend	  all	  belief.	  (Allow	  this	   in	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  consistent	   position	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument.)	  However,	   the	   rationality	   of	   view	  vp	  rests	  on	  the	  revision	  process	  from	  v0	  in	  light	  of	  the	  rational	  contribution	  of	  e1.	  Thus	  the	  holder	  of	  vp	  either	  admits	  (a)	  that	  experience	  can	  rationally	  motivate	  a	  change	  in	  view	   (calling	   into	   question	   the	   coherence	   of	   the	   view,	   in	  which	   case	   it	   should	   be	  rejected	  by	  A,	  whom	  we	  assume	  rational),	  or	  (b)	  A	  modifies	  her	  scepticism	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  milder	  form	  of	  scepticism,	  allowing	  for	  at	  least	  the	  occasional	  rational	  revision	  in	  light	  of	  experience.	  But	  now	  what	  exactly	  is	  so	  scary	  about	  such	  a	  view,	  and	  why	  is	  it	  necessarily	   the	   case	   that	   vp	   does	   not	   partake	   in	  Ω	   at	   ρE(v)?	   The	   only	   condition	  operating	  on	   revision	   in	   this	   case,	  which	  Gupta	  does	  not	  make	   explicit,	   is	   this:	   no	  revision	  from	  a	  coherent	  view	  to	  an	  incoherent	  view	  can	  be	  licensed	  by	  experience.	  (This	   is	  more	  or	   less	  a	  corollary	   to	   the	  Reliability	   constraint,	   since	  we	  must	  blame	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  not	  experience,	  if	  we	  find	  ourselves	  involved	  in	  incoherence.)	  	   Before	   we	   look	   at	   a	   rely	   to	   Berker’s	   criticism	   that	   Gupta	   has	   no	   non-­‐
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rationalist	  way	  of	  delineating	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  Γe(v)	  function,	  we	  should	  pause	  to	  looks	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  charge	  of	  rationalism	  is	  developed	  by	  another	  critic:	  Schafer.	  Schafer	  [2011]	  also	  argues	  that	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  appeals	  to	  reason	  in	  ways	  that	  betray	  the	  Insight.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  admissibility	  constraints	  placed	  on	  initial	   views	   	   “seem	   to	  give	  us	  a	  basis	   for	   at	   least	   some	  deeply	   contingent	  a	  priori	  knowledge”	  (§3),	  specifically	  the	  substantive	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  that	  none	  of	  these	  inadmissible	   views	   obtains	   (i.e.	   is	   antecedentally	   rational).	   For	   such	   reasons,	   we	  should	  think	  of	  Gupta’s	  project	  as	  more	   indebted	  to	  the	  Kantian	  tradition	  than	  the	  empiricist	  tradition:	  	   …	   Perhaps	   the	   real	   lesson	   for	   someone	   like	   Gupta	   to	   draw	   from	   these	  concerns	   is	   that	   empiricism	   is	   only	   sustainable	   when	   combined	   with	   a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  rationalism.	  For	  perhaps	  we	  can	  only	  do	   justice	  to	  the	  empiricist’s	   ideal	   of	   experience	   as	   the	   highest	   epistemic	   authority	   by	  accepting	  a	  set	  of	  a	  priori	  constraints	  that	  amount	  to	  a	  tacit	  endorsement	  of	  a	  fairly	   robust	   form	   of	   rationalism.	   If	   so,	   it	   might	   be	   best	   to	   regard	   Gupta’s	  response	   to	   skepticism	   as	   most	   similar,	   not	   to	   traditional	   forms	   of	  empiricism,	   but	   instead	   to	   the	   sort	   of	   combination	   of	   empiricism	   and	  rationalism	  that	  we	  encounter	  in	  work	  in	  the	  Kantian	  tradition.	  	  This,	   according	   to	   Schafer,	   is	   for	   two	   reasons.	   Like	   Kant,	   Gupta	   thinks	   the	   only	  successful	   response	   to	   the	   sceptic	   accepts	   constraints	   that	   are	  both	   empirical	   and	  rational	  in	  nature.	  Secondly,	   if	  Gupta	  is	  a	  rationalist	  (which	  Schafer	  thinks	  he	  must	  be),	  it	  is	  clear	  he	  is	  of	  a	  Kantian	  sort.	  As	  Schafer	  recognises,	  theoretical	  reason	  in	  and	  of	   itself	   can	   grant	   us	   no	   positive	   view	   of	   the	   world,	   no	   a	   priori	   insight	   into	   the	  structure	  of	  reality:	  a	  commitment	  Gupta	  shares	  with	  Kant.	  	  According	  to	  Berker	  and	  Schafer,	  we	  may	  grant	  that	  Gupta	  offers	  an	  adequate	  response	   to	   the	   sceptic,	   and	   that	   his	   system	   gives	   experience	   an	   important	   and	  ineliminable	   epistemic	   role.	   However,	   the	   system	   only	   works	   because	   he	   avails	  himself,	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  of	  certain	  illicit	  rationalist	  elements.	  His	  view	  is	  novel,	  though	  not	  empiricist.	  However,	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  such	  a	  criticism.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  Schafer’s	  main	  point,	  that	  Gupta	  commits	  himself	  to	  a	  Kantian	  sort	  of	  view	  by	  holding	  that	  reason	  can	  adjudicate	  between	  admissible	  and	  inadmissible	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views	   prior	   to	   experience.	   As	   we	   saw,	   Schafer	   thinks	   this	   amounts	   to	   deeply	  
contingent	  knowledge	  regarding	  which	  views	  do	  or	  do	  not	  obtain.	  However,	   this	   is	  not	  the	  case.	  Gupta	  offers	  no	  grounds	  on	  which	  an	  internally	  coherent	  view	  can	  be	  rejected	  as	  an	  inaccurate	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  he	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  show,	  we	  can	  arrive	  at	   solipsistic	   or	   sceptical	   views	   of	   the	   world	   as	   the	   result	   of	   experience;	   the	  prohibitions	  on	  solipsism,	  scepticism,	  or	  any	  other	  rigid	  view	  only	  have	  jurisdiction	  at	  the	  initial	  stage	  of	  a	  revision	  process:	  	  …	   the	   rigidity	   constraint	   rules	   out	   solipsism	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   of	   revision.	  But	   this	   leaves	   it	  completely	  open	  whether	   the	  revision	  of	  a	  view—even	  an	  admissible	  view—can	  result	  in	  solipsism.	  So	  admissibility	  constraints	  do	  not	  yield	   a	   priori	   knowledge	   that	   solipsism	   is	   false.	   They	   do	   not	   even	   yield	   a	  priori	   directives	   on	   belief,	   e.g.,	   that	   one	   ought	   to	   believe	   that	   solipsism	   is	  false.	  (Gupta	  [2011],	  49)	  	  Also,	  as	  Gupta	  argues,	  the	  affinities	  between	  his	  view	  and	  Kant’s	  should	  not	  be	  over-­‐stated.	  Critically,	  Kant’s	  “empiricism”	  (if	  we	  may	  call	  it	  that)	  argues	  that	  experience	  is	   a	  product	  of	   the	  understanding	  and	  sensibility.	  For	  Gupta,	   experience	   is	   (to	  use	  the	   Kantian	   terminology)	   pure	   receptivity.	   (Gupta	   [2011],	   50)	  While	   Gupta,	   Kant,	  and	   Neo-­‐Kantians	   all	   agree	   that	   mere	   receptivity	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   grant	   one	  epistemic	  license	  to	  a	  set	  of	  claims,	  they	  disagree	  about	  whether	  this	  fact	  precludes	  experience	   from	   being	   mere	   receptivity.	   Gupta’s	   functional	   account	   of	   the	   given	  makes	  this	  clear.	  	   Gupta’s	   response	   to	   Berker	   is	   less	   straightforward.	   Gupta	   argues	   that	   his	  
Γe(v)	   function	   is	   fully	   determined	   by	   its	   arguments	   (experience	   and	   view).	   As	   he	  makes	   clear,	   views	   are	  more	   than	   just	   collections	   of	   judgments	   or	   beliefs;	   a	   view	  contains	   not	   only	   a	   set	   of	   judgments,	   but	   “also	   links	   between	   experiences	   and	  perceptual	   judgments:	   the	   view	   determines	   how	   the	   subject	   is	   to	   respond	   to	   an	  experience.”	   (Gupta	   [2001],	  49)	  Berker’s	  criticism	  that	  one	  can	  represent	   (or	  even	  reconstruct)	  the	  dreaded	  sense-­‐datum	  model	  of	  experience	  by	  fixing	  the	  extension	  of	  Γe(v)	  as	  a	  one	  argument	  function	  that	  maps	  experience	  to	  perceptual	  judgment	  is	  not	  troubling,	  since	  we	  can	  also	  fix	  the	  extension	  of	  Γe(v)	  as	  a	  two-­‐variable	  function	  which	  takes	  us	  from	  sense-­‐datum	  theorists’	  view	  of	  the	  self	  as	  argument	  to	  a	  class	  of	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perceptual	   judgments.	  While	  Gupta	   is	  not	  so	  explicit	   in	  his	  own	  defense,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	   he	   does	   not	  want	   to	   preclude	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   sense-­‐datum	  view.	   That	  would	  be	  unwarranted.	  He	  wants	   to	  show	  that	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  why	  one	  should	  view	   the	   extension	   of	  Γe(v)	   as	   a	   one-­‐variable	   function,	   and	   no	   reason	  why	   sense-­‐datum	  theory	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  merely	  one	  particular	  view	  which	  experience	  can	  map	  onto	  a	  set	  of	  perceptual	   judgments.	  There	   is	  nothing	  antecedently	  wrong	  with	  the	  sense-­‐datum	  view,	  so	  we	  shouldn’t	  want	  to	  block	  its	  construction	  based	  on	  the	   formal	   structure	   of	   the	   theory;	   we	  merely	  want	   to	   say,	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  
Γe(v)	   function,	   that	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   possible	   ways	   of	   filling	   in	   the	   view-­‐variable—and	  that	  experience	  need	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  licensing	  only	  a	  set	  of	  very	  restricted	   statements	   about	   sense-­‐data	  or	   our	  present	  mental	   states.	  That	  Gupta’s	  function	  can	  allow	  for	  the	  non-­‐privileged	  and	  non-­‐unique	  construction	  of	  the	  sense-­‐datum	  view	  is	  a	  boon,	  not	  a	  flaw	  of	  the	  function.	  	   In	   as	  much	   as	  Gupta	  maintains	   a	   central	   role	   for	   reason	   in	   his	   empiricism,	  and	  in	  as	  much	  as	  he	  thinks	  experience	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  our	  beliefs	   on	   its	   own,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   he	   has	  moved	   far	   away	   from	   the	   CBE	   tradition	  (including	   the	   simple	   sense-­‐datum	   theories	   that	   are	   its	  most	   recent	   incarnation).	  However,	  the	  dichotomous	  choice,	  CBE	  or	  Kant,	  is	  far	  too	  coarse,	  as	  is	  the	  dichotomy	  between	   the	   view	   of	   reason	   as	   purely	   analytic	   (and	   therefore	   trivial)	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   or	   as	   a	   form	   of	   synthetic	   a	   priorism	   on	   the	   other.	   Reason	   can	   play	   a	  substantive	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   admissibility	   of	   initial	   views,	   or	   in	   testing	   the	  coherence	   of	   revised	   views,	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   Insight	   is	   not	   violated;	   it	   is	   a	  rather	  old	  view	  of	  the	  a	  priori	  that	  holds	  reason	  can	  only	  make	  contributions	  to	  our	  knowledge	   by	   explicating	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   concept,	   or	   by	   showing	   how	   certain	  concepts	   might	   be	   said	   to	   “contain”	   others,	   as	   bachelor	   contains	   the	   concepts	  
unmarried	  and	  adult	  man.	  Gupta	  is	  right	  to	  move	  beyond	  this	  limited	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  reason	  within	  empiricism.	  	   Of	   course,	   there	   is	   a	   way	   of	   seeing	   the	   hypothetical	  model	   of	   the	   given	   as	  compatible	  with	   rationalism;	   however,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   this	   is	   a	  deficiency	   of	   the	  model.	   One’s	  model	   of	   experience,	   after	   all,	   shouldn’t	   be	   able	   to	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settle	  the	  debate	  between	  rationalism	  and	  empiricism.	  It	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  strength	  that	  an	  abstract	  model	   of	   the	   given	  be	   compatible	  with	   both.	  Here,	   again,	   it	   is	   quite	   clear	  that	  Berker	  and	  Schafer	  have	  misunderstood	  the	  point	  of	  the	  work,	  which	  is	  not	  to	  prove	   rationalism	   inherently	   flawed,	   incoherent,	   or	   otherwise	   incorrect.	   Gupta’s	  model	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  given	  rather	  	  	   provides	   a	   framework	   for	   conducting	   the	   debate.	   The	   burden	   on	   the	  rationalist	  in	  this	  debate	  is	  to	  produce	  some	  synthetic	  a	  priori	  principles	  and	  show	   that	   they	   are	   essential	   for	   empirical	   rationality.	   The	   burden	   on	   the	  empiricist	   is	   to	  produce	  a	  rich	  and	  well-­‐motivated	  conception	  of	  admissible	  views,	   one	   sufficient	   to	   undergird	   empirical	   rationality.	   (Gupta	   [2011],	   48-­‐49)	  	  And,	  Gupta	  continues,	  “Berker	  is	  right	  that	  the	  abstract	  model,	  when	  taken	  by	  itself,	  does	   not	   rule	   out	   rationalism.	   I	   want	   to	   insist,	   however,	   that	   the	   model	   is	   more	  hospitable	   to	   empiricism	   than	   its	   traditional	   counterpart.”	   (Gupta	   [2011],	   49)	  Further,	   the	   burden	   is	   still	   on	   the	   rationalist	   to	   show	   that	   there	   are	   substantive	  truths	  of	  reason	  (or	  for	  the	  Kantian	  to	  show	  that	  there	  are	  synthetic	  a	  priori	  truths);	  the	  abstract	  formulation	  of	  rationalism	  within	  Gupta’s	  model	  gives	  us	  no	  reason	  to	  suppose	   such	   truths	   can	   be	   found.	   The	   empiricist	   is	   forced	   to	   give	   reason	   only	   a	  formal	  role	  on	  the	  propositional	  model	  of	  the	  given,	  because	  all	  rational	  import	  on	  that	  model	  must	  be	  propositional,	  and	  to	  allow	  for	  non-­‐analytic	  uses	  of	  reason	  is	  to	  countenance	   substantive	   truths	   of	   reason.	   On	   Gupta’s	   model,	   reason	   can	   have	   a	  “robust	   role”	   which	   does	   not	   assign	   to	   reason	   the	   task	   of	   unveiling	  metaphysical	  truths	   required	   to	   explain	   empirical	   rationality.	   (Ibid.)	   Experience	   remains	   our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide:	  reason	  is	  used	  merely	  to	  “remove	  obstacles	  that	  would	  hinder	  experience	   in	   its	  exercise	  of	   its	  epistemic	  authority.	  The	  role	  of	  reason	   is	   to	   serve	   experience.”	   (Gupta	   [2011],	   50)	   Reason	   determines	   the	  admissibility	   of	   initial	   views	   based	   on	   their	   dynamical	   behaviour	   in	   the	   course	   of	  revision	  processes	  under	  different	  possible	  courses	  of	  experience.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  has	   a	   substantial	   role	   to	   play	   in	   explaining	   empirical	   rationality,	   even	   though	  Reformed	  Empiricism	   can	  maintain	   (like	   all	   forms	   of	   empiricism)	   that	   reason	   can	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provide	  us	  with	  no	  substantive	  truths	  about	  the	  world	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  self.	  	  
§II:	  Proto-­‐Mathematical	  Presuppositions	  and	  Experience	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Gupta	  is	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  his	  critics	  by	  arguing	  that	  his	  Reformed	  Empiricism	   draws	   on	   richer	   conceptions	   of	   both	   experience	   and	   reason	   than	  previous	  accounts	  of	  empirical	  knowledge.	  Unlike	  rationalists,	  who	  view	  experience	  as	  subordinate	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  intellect	  or	  some	  other	  non-­‐receptive	  faculty	  when	  characterising	   the	   logical	   import	   of	   experience	   to	   knowledge,	   and	  unlike	  previous	  forms	  of	  classical	  empiricism	  (CBE	  and	  MSE)	  which	  unnecessarily	  denigrate	  reason,	  Reformed	   Empiricism	   maintains	   that	   experience	   can	   be	   our	   principal	   epistemic	  authority	   and	   guide	   (preserving	   the	   Insight)	   and	   also	   that	   reason	   plays	   an	  ineliminable	   and	   nontrivial	   role	   in	   allowing	   for	   experience	   to	   fulfill	   its	   epistemic	  role.	  	   What	  we	  wish	   to	   explore	   in	   the	   section	   is	  whether	  or	  not	   this	  must	  be	   the	  sole	  operation	  of	  reason	  in	  Gupta’s	  model.	  We	  will	  explore	  some	  questions	  about	  the	  formal	   character	   of	   at	   least	   some	   of	   our	   empirical	   judgments	   about	   extensive	  magnitude,	  motion,	  and	  relative	  position.	  We	  also	  question	  whether	  such	  judgments	  do	   not	   necessitate	   that	   reason	   play	   something	   like	   the	   role	   it	   played	   for	   MSE	  thinkers,	  a	   role	  which	  Gupta	  seems	   to	  eschew—a	  rich	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  analysis.	  This	   form	   of	   conceptual	   analysis,	   which	   we	   will	   explore	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   the	  Conclusion,	   examines	   the	   presuppositions	   which	   are	   necessary	   for	   the	   normal	  application	  of	  our	  basic	  pre-­‐scientific-­‐cum-­‐scientific	  concepts	  in	  empirical	  contexts.	  In	  short,	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  reason	  to	  have	  at	  least	  two	  tasks	  within	  our	  empiricism:	  to	  (a)	  adjudicate	  over	  the	  admissibility	  of	  initial	  views	  based	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  dynamical	  behavior	   they	   will	   exhibit	   in	   light	   of	   empirical	   revision,	   and	   (b)	   to	   discern	   what	  assumptions	  are	  at	  play	  in	  even	  the	  most	  minimal	  pre-­‐scientific	  view	  when	  we	  make	  judgments	   about	   extensive	   magnitudes,	   spatial	   position,	   orientation,	   and	  displacement?	   It	   will	   be	   our	   contention	   that	   these	   two	   tasks	   are	   reason’s,	   and	  reason’s	  alone;	  further,	  the	  second	  task	  is	  nothing	  but	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  first	  task,	  since	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  greatest	  obstacle	  for	  an	  empirical	  understanding	  of	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the	   world	   is	   confronted	   unless	   reason	   can	   play	   a	   nontrivial	   role	   in	   revising	   our	  views.	   Reason	   is	   thus	   responsible	   to	   remove	   those	   initial	   views	   that	   are	   not	  amenable	  to	  revision	  in	  light	  of	  various	  possible	  “normal”	  courses	  of	  experience.	  This	   is	   a	   novel	   analysis	   of	   Reformed	   Empiricism.	   Unlike	   the	   existing	  criticisms,	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  that	  there	  are	  any	  flaws	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism	   as	   an	   account	   in	   general	   epistemology,	   only	   that	   the	   view	   may	  encounter	  trouble	  when	  extended	  to	  certain	  topics	  and	  problems	  in	  the	  sciences	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science—problems	  which	  call	  into	  question	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Introduction.	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  has	   no	   problems	   accounting	   for	   how	   our	   common	   sense	   view	   of	   the	   world	   is	   a	  convergent	   core	   shared	  by	  various	   revision	  processes	   from	  disparate	   initial	   views	  based	  on	  experience.	  We	  will	  argue	  here,	  however,	  that	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  in	  need	  of	  slight	  reform	  itself	  if	  it	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  development	  of	  scientific	  theory	  as	  contiguous	   with	   pre-­‐scientific,	   yet	   systematic,	   views	   of	   space.	   We	   hold	   that	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  with	   the	   amendments	   offered	   here,	   is	  more	   than	   up	   to	   the	  task,	   and	   that	   the	  amendments	  offered	   in	  no	  way	   transgress	   the	   Insight,	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	  or	  the	  constraints.	  	  
II.1:	  Mathematics	  in	  Gupta’s	  Empiricism	  Gupta	  very	  clearly	  states,	  early	  in	  his	  [2006a],	  that	  he	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  giving	  an	   account	   of	  mathematics,	   unless	   it	   can	   reasonably	   be	   shown	   that	  mathematical	  truths	  are	  about	  the	  world:	  	   I	   will	   set	   aside	   mathematics	   in	   this	   discussion.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	  plausible	  to	  include	  mathematical	  claims	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  experience	  insofar	   as	   they	   are	   genuinely	   about	   the	   world.	   The	   difficult	   philosophical	  questions	   about	  mathematics	   concern	   the	   contents	   of	   its	   claims.	   Are	   these	  claims	  vacuous	  in	  the	  way	  certain	  logical	  claims	  are?	  Or	  are	  they	  about	  broad	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  world,	  or	  perhaps	  of	  language?	  Or	  are	  they	  about	  a	  special	   Platonic	   realm	   that	   is	   a	   genuine	   part	   of	   our	   world?	   Whether	   the	  jurisdiction	   of	   experience	   extends	   to	   mathematics	   depends	   on	   how	   such	  questions	  are	  answered.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  4fn)	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Gupta	   is	   within	   his	   rights,	   and	   very	   likely	   right,	   to	   set	   aside	   such	   issues.	   No	  empiricist	  need	  talk	  about	  the	  reference,	  truth,	  or	  meaning	  of	  mathematical	  claims	  unless	  certain	  foundational	  matters	  are	  settled.	  Any	  form	  of	  empiricism	  that	  avoids	  such	   thorny	   issues	   is	   likely	   more	   than	   justified	   in	   this	   regard.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  decision	  to	  set	  aside	  foundational	  concerns	  in	  mathematics	  still	  leaves	  a	  further	  task,	  one	  motivated	  by	  the	  assessment	  of	  geometrical	  and	  mechanical	  concerns	  in	  the	  late	  MSE	  tradition:	  the	  role	  of	  mathematical	  assumptions	  in	  normal	  empirical	  judgments.	  We	  hope	   to	   show	   that	  questions	  about	  our	   formal	  knowledge	   (as	   implied	  by	   such	  simple	   judgments)	   are	   relevant	   to	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   and	   that	   they	  illuminate	   the	   connection	   between	   general	   epistemology	   and	   the	   philosophy	   of	  science.	  	  As	  we	  saw,	  this	  kind	  of	  role	  for	  mathematical	  assumption	  was	  recognised	  by	  Helmholtz	   and	   Poincaré,	   though	   perhaps	   best	   highlighted	   by	   Carnap.	   For	   Carnap,	  mathematical	  claims	  are	  not	  descriptive	  in	  the	  way	  that	  would	  force	  an	  empiricist	  to	  show	  how	  our	  knowledge	  of	  mathematics	  is	  experiential;	  rather	  some	  mathematical	  claims	  are	  interpretations	  of	  mathematical	  theories	  that,	  because	  they	  are	  empirical	  interpretations,	  describe	  the	  world	  and	  are	  open	  to	  empirical	  investigation.	  None	  of	  this	  Carnapian	  approach	  has	  any	  bearing	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  mathematical	  claims,	  but	  it	  is	  closer	  to	  our	  concerns	  here:	  that	  certain	  elementary	  empirical	  judgments	  employ	  primitive	  mathematical	  (or	  at	  least	  proto-­‐mathematical)	  assumptions.	  For	  example,	  ordinary	  empirical	  reasoning	  assumes	  a	  certain	  additivity	  in	  many	  typical	  judgments	  about	  spatial	  relations,	  and	  this	  is	  independent	  of	  a	  view	  about	  why	  or	  whether	  the	  principles	  of	  arithmetic	  are	  true.	  These	  judgments	  employ	  implicit	  formal	  principles	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  logic,	  yet	  seem	  to	  operate	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  logical	  principles	  do.	  Two	   observations	  must	   be	  made.	   Firstly,	   as	   the	   taxonomy	  will	   have	  made	  clear,	   the	  ontology	  of	  mathematical	   objects	   is	   (for	   the	  most	  part)	   a	   separate	   issue	  from	  how	  we	  view	  the	  truth	  of	  mathematical	  claims,	  and	  this	   is	  separate	  still	   from	  the	   role	   mathematics	   plays	   in	   science	   and	   the	   very	   central	   role	   it	   has	   in	   our	  epistemology	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  This	  much	  was	  made	  very	  clear	  by	  Carnap	  in	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his	  [1934/2002],	  and	  emphatically	  maintained	  even	  once	  the	  move	  was	  made	  from	  syntax	   to	   semantics	   (see	   his	   [1950]),	   but	   it	   finds	   its	   origins	   much	   earlier	   in	  Poincaré’s	  conventionalism.	  Even	  if	  the	  foundational	  questions	  find	  no	  answers,	  and	  even	   if	  we	  cannot	  settle	  on	  a	  specific	  scheme	  (platonism,	   logicism,	   intuitionism,	  or	  formalism)	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   truth	   of	   mathematical	   claims,	   the	  epistemological	  significance	  of	  mathematics	  still	  stands.	  What	  was	  new,	  after	  all,	  in	  Carnap’s	   researches	  on	   “foundational”	  matters	  was	   the	   importance	  he	  gave	   to	   the	  formal	   differences	   and	   similarities	   between	   differing	   foundationalist	   camps	  regarding	  mathematical	  concepts	  and	  theorems.	  His	  work	  expressly	  focuses	  on	  what	  can	   be	   done	   in	   philosophy	   and	   mathematics	   without	   definitive	   answers	   to	   the	  questions	  of	  mathematical	  ontology	  or	  truth.	  We	  hold	  that	  is	  too	  strong	  in	  his	  claim	  that	   such	   matters	   cannot	   ever	   be	   settled,	   save	   by	   some	   kind	   of	   pragmatic	  assessment,	   but	   the	   picture	   is	   mostly	   correct:	   whether	   we	   have	   an	   answer	   to	  foundational	   questions	   is	   largely	   independent	   of	   the	   role	   of	   mathematical	  assumptions	  in	  empirical	  reasoning.54	  	  We	   do	   well	   to	   pause	   on	   this	   issue.	   In	   the	   early	   1930s,	   the	   foundations	   of	  mathematics	  were	   still	  mired	   in	   crisis.	   Firstly,	   as	  Ricketts	   [2007]	  has	  noted,	   there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  different	  (and	  competing)	  solutions	  to	  the	  logical	  (and	  semantic)	  paradoxes,	   including	   both	   impredicative	   and	   predicative	   type-­‐theoretical	  approaches,	   and	   various	   axiomatic	   set-­‐theoretical	   approaches.	   The	   wrangling	  between	  philosophers	  and	  mathematicians	  representing	  these	  different	  approaches	  risked	  slipping	  into	  empty	  and	  regressive	  debate.	  Secondly,	  Gödel’s	  Incompleteness	  Theorems	  had	  shown	   that	  any	  consistent	   formalisation	  of	  arithmetic	   (save	   for	   the	  formalisation	  of	  very	  trivial	  systems)	  is	  necessarily	  syntactically	  incomplete,	  calling	  into	   question	  Hilbert’s	   attempt	   to	   find	   a	   complete	   set	   of	   axioms	   for	  mathematics.	  Lastly,	  there	  were	  disputes	  over	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐constructive	  proof	  in	  mathematics.	  Intuitionists	  like	  Brouwer,	  and	  then	  Heyting,	  defended	  the	  position	  that	  only	  those	  mathematical	   proofs	   that	   take	   us	   from	   simpler	   mental	   constructions	   to	   more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  The	  post-­‐Kantian	  stipulation	  that	  mathematical	  structure	  can	  be	  divorced	  from	  mathematical	  content	  makes	  such	  considerations	  possible.	  Of	  course,	  on	  the	  Kantian	  view,	  the	  application	  of	  mathematics	  to	  sensibility	  does	  bear	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  mathematical	  principles.	  
	  	  	  142	  
	  
	  
complex	  mental	  constructions	  are	   legitimate.	  Logicists	  and	   formalists	   rejected	   this	  restriction.	   Logicists	   held	   that	   all	   logical	   laws	   and	   mathematical	   principles	   were	  either	   “laws	   of	   thought”	   or	   derived	   from	   laws	   of	   thought,	   and	   even	   the	   notion	   of	  number	  followed	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  thought.	  They	  eschewed	  the	  role	  of	  any	  intuition	  whatsoever	  in	  arithmetic	  (and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Russell,	  Whitehead,	  and	  Wittgenstein,	  though	  not	  Frege,	  geometry	  as	  well).	  Formalists	  held	  that	  mathematics	  was	  merely	  concerned	  with	   the	   consequences	  of	   certain	   strings	  of	   symbols	  based	  on	   rules	   for	  manipulating	   those	   symbols,	   with	   no	   regard	   to	   any	   possible	   content	   (intuitive	   or	  otherwise)	  that	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  formalism.	  Logical	  empiricists	  were	   in	   the	  unenviable	  position	  of	   taking	  stock	  of	   these	  seemingly	   intractable	   disputes,	   given	   that	   their	   philosophical	   position	   (following	  first	  Russell	  and	  Whitehead	  and	  then,	  increasingly,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus)	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  associate	  all	  of	  our	  substantive	  knowledge	  with	  experience,	  and	  all	  of	  our	  formal	   knowledge	  with	   empty	   and	   tautological	   symbol	   systems.	   Intuitionism	  gave	  too	  much	  content	  to	  mathematics	  (and	  restricted	  the	  application	  of	  mathematics	  to	  strictly	  human	  forms	  of	  representation);	  naïve	  logicism	  was	  susceptible	  to	  paradox;	  and	   Russell’s	   type	   theoretical	   logicism	   (like	   various	   set-­‐theoretical	   approaches)	  required	  that	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  countenance	  substantive	  existence	  axioms	  which	  themselves	   were	   not	   experiential	   or	   tautological	   in	   nature.55	  By	   default,	   Hilbert's	  formalism	  seemed	  the	  most	  plausible	  approach	  (or,	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Carnap’s	  pre-­‐Gödel	   researches,	   a	   mixture	   of	   Russell’s	   and	   Whitehead’s	   logical	   apparatus	   and	  Hilbert’s	  metamathemtics).	  With	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  Incompleteness	  Theorems,	  logical	  empiricism	   seemed	   on	   the	   precipice.	   The	  mixture	   of	   classical	   empiricism’s	   regard	  for	  experience	  as	  our	  sole	  source	  of	  substantive	  knowledge	  and	  Tractarian	  logicism	  was	  untenable.	  Carnap	   sought	   to	   solve	   (or	   rather	  dissolve)	   these	   foundational	  problems	   in	  his	  [1934/2002]	  (hereafter	  simply	  LSL	  for	  the	  Logical	  Syntax	  of	  Language).	  As	  with	  our	  analysis	  of	  Carnap’s	  Aufbau	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  our	  concern	  is	  not	  with	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	   in	  LSL	   is	   ultimately	   tenable.	  We	   are	  merely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  In	  Russell’s	  type	  theory,	  the	  axioms	  of	  infinity,	  choice,	  and	  reducibility	  were	  of	  this	  character.	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concerned	   here	   with	   the	   method	   by	   which	   Carnap	   sought	   to	   prevent	   these	  foundational	   concerns	   from	   interrupting	   the	   progress	   of	   mathematics	   and	   our	  broader	  philosophical	  understanding	  of	  its	  role	  in	  scientific	  knowledge.	  The	  method	  is	   to	  propose	  a	   logical	  pluralism	  (or	  rather	  a	  pluralism	  of	  possible	   languages,	  each	  with	   its	   own	   vocabulary,	   formation	   rules,	   and	   transformation	   rules)	   along	  with	   a	  voluntaristic	  pragmatism	  which	  holds	  that	  different	  language	  forms	  serve	  different	  purposes,	  though	  no	  such	  language	  proposal	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  having	  hit	  upon	  “the	  correct”	  or	  “the	  true”	  logic	  sought	  by	  Frege,	  Russell,	  and	  Wittgenstein.	  	  These	   innovations	   (a	   pluralism	   of	   as-­‐of-­‐yet	   uninterpreted	   calculi,	   and	   a	  purely	   pragmatic	   means	   of	   choosing	   between	   them)	   form	   the	   core	   of	   Carnap’s	  notion	   of	   tolerance:	   the	   next	   big	   step	   for	   logic	   (and,	   by	   extension,	   for	   philosophy,	  which,	   for	   Carnap,	   was	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   nothing	   but	   the	   “logic	   of	   science”	   or	   the	  “logical	  syntax	  of	  the	  language	  of	  science”).	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  “eliminate”	  the	  standpoint	  that	  new	  logics	  which	  deviate	  from	  their	  classical	  cousins	  “must	  be	  justified—that	  is,	  that	   the	   new	   language-­‐form	   must	   be	   proved	   to	   be	   ‘correct’	   and	   to	   constitute	   a	  faithful	  rendering	  of	  the	  ‘true	  logic’.”	  (Carnap	  [1934/2002],	  xiv)	  Tolerance	  allows	  for	  this:	   	  …	   we	   have	   in	   every	   respect	   complete	   liberty	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   forms	   of	  language;	  that	  both	  the	  forms	  of	  construction	  for	  sentences	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  transformation…	  may	  be	  chosen	  quite	  arbitrarily.	  (Carnap	  [1934/2002],	  xv)	  	  This	   liberty	   is	  best	  expressed	  by	  what	  Carnap	  sees	  as	  the	  reversal	  of	   the	  order	  for	  language	  construction.	  In	  the	  tradition	  of	  Frege,	  one	  begins	  by	  assigning	  a	  meaning	  to	  the	  logical	  symbols	  of	  the	  language	  and	  then	  sanctions	  only	  those	  inference	  forms	  that	   preserve	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   fundamental	   sentences	   of	   the	   language.	   The	  construction	  approach	  from	  the	  “opposite	  direction”	  is	  this:	  	   let	  any	  postulates	  and	  any	  rules	  of	  inference	  be	  chosen	  arbitrarily;	  then	  this	  choice,	  whatever	  it	  may	  be,	  will	  determine	  what	  meaning	  is	  to	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	   fundamental	   logical	   symbols.	  By	   this	  method,	  also,	   the	   conflict	  between	  the	   divergent	   points	   of	   view	   on	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   foundations	   of	  mathematics	   disappears.	   For	   language,	   in	   its	   mathematical	   form,	   can	   be	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constructed	   according	   to	   the	   preferences	   of	   any	   one	   of	   the	   points	   of	   view	  represented;	   so	   that	   no	   question	   of	   justification	   arises	   at	   all,	   but	   only	   the	  question	  of	  the	  syntactical	  consequences	  to	  which	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  choices	  leads…”	  (Ibid.)	  	  What	  governs	  this	  method?	  The	  Principle	  of	  Tolerance:	  “it	  is	  not	  our	  business	  to	  set	  up	   prohibitions,	   but	   to	   arrive	   at	   conventions.”	   (Carnap	   [1934/2002],	   51—italics	  removed	  from	  original)	  Carnap	  further	  explains	  the	  methodology	  of	  this	  principle:	  	  
In	  logic,	  there	  are	  no	  morals.	  Everyone	  is	  at	  liberty	  to	  build	  up	  his	  own	  logic,	  i.e.	  his	  own	  form	  of	  language,	  as	  he	  wishes.	  All	  that	  is	  required	  of	  him	  is	  that,	  if	   he	   wishes	   to	   discuss	   it,	   he	   must	   state	   his	   methods	   clearly,	   and	   give	  syntactical	   rules	   instead	   of	   philosophical	   arguments.	   (Carnap	   [1934/2002],	  52)	  
	   Mathematics	   is	   viewed	  as	   central	   to	   such	   language	   forms	   (not	   surprisingly,	  since	  each	  possible	  language	  form,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  syntax,	   is	  nothing	  but	  the	   proposal	   of	   a	   calculus,	   and	   the	   exploration	   of	   its	   logico-­‐mathematical	  properties).	  Even	  empiricism	  itself	   is	  affected	  by	  Tolerance,	   since	   it	   is	   transformed	  from	   a	   substantive	   thesis	   about	   the	   origins	   of	   knowledge	   to	   a	   mere	   family	   of	  proposed	   language	   forms	   for	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   in	   which	   the	   relation	   of	  logical	  consequence	  for	  the	  language	  (“L-­‐consequence”)	  will	  determine	  all	  sentences	  which	  utilise	  only	  logical	  and	  mathematical	  terms	  as	  either	  logically	  valid	  within	  the	  language	   (“L-­‐valid”)	   or	   contravalid	   (“L-­‐contravalid”),	   meaning	   that	   Carnap	   has	  basically	  supplied	  the	  empiricist	  with	  a	  family	  of	  languages	  in	  which	  bivalent	  truth-­‐values	   apply	   determinately	   to	   all	   logical,	   mathematical,	   and	   logico-­‐mathematical	  sentences	   (assuming	   that	   sentences	   containing	   observation	   terms	   are	   “L-­‐indeterminate”).	  Logic	  and	  mathematics	  are	  nothing	  but	   “notational	  auxiliaries”	   to	  the	  substantive	  L-­‐indeterminate	  (empirical)	  sentences.56	  Given	  our	  substantial	  agreement	  with	  Gupta,	  it	  will	  perhaps	  be	  obvious	  that	  such	  an	  account	  of	  empiricism	  is	  undesirable.	  This	  is	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Whether	   or	   not	   such	   a	   project	   is	   tenable	   is,	   once	   again,	   not	   of	   our	   concern.	   There	   is	   obvious	  concern	   that	   such	   a	   partition	   of	   the	   language	   between	   its	   logico-­‐mathematical	   and	   empirical	   part	  cannot	  survive	  Gödel’s	  researches,	  but	  we	  will	  not	  examine	  such	  matters	  here.	  For	  accounts	  of	  LSL’s	  relationship	  to	  incompleteness,	  see	  Awodey	  and	  Carus	  [2001;	  2004]	  and	  Goldfarb	  [2005].	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empiricism	  as	  a	  general	  commitment	  to	  only	  use	  those	   languages	  that	  treat	   logical	  and	  mathematical	  sentences	  as	  L-­‐valid	  or	  L-­‐contravalid	  entails	  that	  such	  sentences	  can	   never	   be	   revised	   in	   light	   of	   experience,	  which	   seems	   to	   do	   great	   harm	   to	   the	  Insight	   of	   Empiricism.57	  There	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   we	   shouldn’t	   expect	   that	   some	  experience	  might	   upset	   our	   conception	   of	   the	  world	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   cause	   a	  rational	   revision,	   even	   regarding	   logic	   and	   mathematics	   (and	   even	   if	   logic	   and	  mathematics	   are	   considered	   non-­‐factual).	   This	   view	   shares	   some	   superficial	  affinities	  with	   Quine’s	   account	   in	   his	   [1951/1961],	   but	   it	   should	   not	   be	   conflated	  with	  Quine’s	  confused	  and	  mistaken	  imagery	  of	  the	  “core”	  and	  “periphery”,	  nor	  his	  confused	  notion	  that	  “total	  science	  is	  like	  a	  field	  of	  force	  whose	  boundary	  conditions	  are	   experience”.	   Quine	   is	   right	   to	   hold	   that	   “[a]	   conflict	   with	   experience	   at	   the	  periphery	  occasions	  readjustments	   in	   the	   interior	  of	   the	   field,”	  but	  wrong	   to	   think	  that	  such	  a	  field	  only	  meets	  with	  experience	  at	  the	  periphery.	  Quite	  often,	  what	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  when	  we	  engage	  in	  scientific	  experimentation	  is	  just	  how	  experience	  impacts	  the	  core,	  come	  what	  may	  at	  the	  periphery.	  	  Secondly,	   the	   inflexibility	   of	   the	   language	   in	   its	   logico-­‐mathematical	   part	   is	  also	  a	  feature	  (more	  troublingly)	  of	  its	  empirical	  part.	  Carnap’s	  language	  forms	  offer	  us	  a	  way	  to	  engage	  in	  empirical	  testing	  of	  physical	  theories,	  but	  seemingly	  no	  way	  of	  rationally	   revising	   said	   theories	   in	   light	   of	   our	   tests	   (even	   though	   the	   outcome	   of	  such	   a	   test	  might,	   for	   Carnap,	   inform	   a	   switch	   from	   one	   theory	   to	   another,	  when	  experience	  makes	   it	   convenient).	   Thus,	   the	   syntax	   project	   (and	   its	   later	   semantic	  variant)	   is	   far	   too	   arbitrary	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   viable	   form	   of	   empiricism	   for	   our	  purposes,	   if	   only	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   leaves	   far	   too	  much	   to	   choice.	   Pluralism	   and	  voluntarism	  may	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  of	  Experience,	  but	  they	  fail	   to	  give	  proper	  weight	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  at	   least	  seem	  to	  rationally	  revise	  our	  scientific	  theories	  in	  light	  of	  experience	  (and	  that	  one	  of	  experience’s	  key	  epistemic	  purposes	   is	   to	   motivate	   and	   guide	   such	   changes).	   In	   short,	   Carnap’s	   theory	   of	  theories	  (both	  the	  LSL	  and	  mature	  variants)	  jeopardises	  the	  Insight.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Carnap	  does	  think	  that	  experience	  can	  give	  you	  some	  pragmatic	  reason	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  language	  form	  with	  new	  L-­‐rules,	  but	  this	  is	  different	  than	  the	  empirical	  revision	  of	  such	  rules—for	  which	  Carnap	  makes	  no	  allowances.	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What	   these	   cursory	   remarks	   are	   meant	   to	   show	   is	   not	   that	   any	   such	  arbitrariness	   should	   be	   added	   back	   into	   the	   mix.	   One	   of	   the	   main	   strengths	   of	  Gupta’s	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  can	  account	  for	  changes	  (often	  very	  substantial	  changes)	  in	  view	  based	  on	  experience,	  not	  the	  arbitrary	  choice	  of	  new	  formal	  system.	  Nor	  is	  it	  our	  desire	  to	  reduce	  empiricism	  to	  an	  ethos	  or	  commitment.	  It	  is	  more	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  free	  choice	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  adopts	  the	  Insight.	  No	  view	  purged	  of	  the	  Insight	  would	   be	   worth	   calling	   “empiricism”,	   nor	   would	   it	   be	   a	   proper	   philosophy	   of	  empirical	  science.	  So	  why	  the	  excursion	  into	  this	  very	  late	  project	  of	  MSE;	  what	  is	  it	  we	  can	  take	  from	  Carnap’s	  discussion	  of	  matters	  logical	  and	  mathematical?	  Carnap’s	  work	  (first	  during	  his	  syntactical	  phase,	  and	  then	  his	  post-­‐Tarski	  shift	  to	  semantics)	  is	  significant	  to	  our	  study	  because	  it	  is	  continuous	  with	  the	  MSE	  tradition	  studied	  in	  the	   previous	   chapter—the	   outcome	   of	   an	   historical	   progression	   of	   thought	  which	  recognised	   (a)	   that	   a	   key	   obstacle	   for	   empiricism	   was	   accounting	   for	   our	  mathematical	   knowledge	   in	   a	   way	   that	   showed	   how	   it	   could	   be	   a	   priori	   and	  generally	  applicable,	   and	   (b)	   that	   some	  of	  our	  basic	  empirical	   judgments	   required	  some	   kind	   of	   formal	   framework	   within	   which	   judgments	   about	   extensive	  magnitudes	   could	   be	   made	   (i.e.	   frameworks	   which	   make	   possible	   the	   empirical	  testing	  of	  theories).	  These	  are	  themes	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  
II.2:	  Simple	  Empirical	  Judgments	  and	  Proto-­‐Mathematical	  Presuppositions	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   above,	   no	   empiricist	   should	   think	   it	   is	   her	   duty	   to	   make	  pronouncements	   regarding	   the	   truth	   of	   mathematical	   claims.	   Our	   concern	   is	  different,	   and	   it	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   still	   something	   mathematical	   to	   say	   about	  experience,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  nothing	  empirical	  about	  mathematics.	  Setting	  aside	  the	  thorny	   issues	  of	  mathematical	   truth,	   the	  ontology	  of	  mathematics,	  and	   the	  general	  nature	   of	   our	  mathematical	   knowledge,	   we	   are	   still	   left	   with	   empirical	   principles	  that	   have	   some	   mathematical	   content,	   or	   at	   least	   avail	   themselves	   of	   primitive,	  proto-­‐mathematical	   assumptions:	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   a	   conceptual	   structure	   that,	  while	   perhaps	   quite	   elementary,	   posseses	   formal	   aspects	   that	   implicitly	   involve	   a	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mathematical	   idea.	   Let	  us	   take	   a	   simple	   claim	  about	   the	  movement	  of	   people	   in	   a	  shared	  environment:	  	  (†)	  	   “John	  ran	   to	  his	   left	  because	  Bill	  was	  gaining	  on	  him	   faster	   from	  the	  right	  than	  was	  Sandy	  from	  behind	  him.”	  	  Let	  us	  assume	   that	   the	  speaker	  who	  utters	   (†)	  has	  a	  view	  (v*)	  very	  much	   like	  our	  own,	   and	   that	   the	   experience	   that	   generated	   the	   belief	   (e*)	  whose	   propositional	  content	   is	  expressed	  by	  (†)	  are	  of	  having	  watched	  John	  change	  the	  direction	  of	  his	  run	  as	  the	  result	  of	  Bill	  closing	  in	  on	  him,	  so	  that	  	  	   (†)	  ∈	  (Γe*	  	  (v*)).	  	  Let	  us	  also	  suppose	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  an	  utterer	  who	  has	  a	  perceptual	  system	  that	  has	  been	  reliable	  in	  making	  such	  judgments	  about	  relative	  distances	  in	  the	  past.	  Also	   assume	   that	   there	   are	   a	  number	  of	   spectators	  who	  have	   also	  watched	   John’s	  run	  from	  Bill	  and	  Sandy,	  and	  that	  all	  spectators	  agree	  with	  the	  propositional	  content	  expressed	   by	   (†).	   Talk	   of	   “other	   spectators”	   is	   meant	   to	   imply	   that	   the	   space	   in	  which	  (†)	  is	  embedded	  admits	  of	  an	  infinity	  of	  possible	  points	  of	  view	  or	  perspective	  from	  which	   (†)	   can	   be	   observed,	   and	   does	   not	   commit	   us	   to	   any	   kind	   of	   bizarre	  communalism—e.g.	   the	  view	  that	  our	  conception	  of	  space	  relies	  on	  intersubjective	  agreement.	   We	   do	   hold	   the	   much	   weaker,	   logically	   distinct,	   claim:	   that	   quasi-­‐mathematical	   assumptions	   make	   possible	   intersubjective	   agreement	   on	   a	   certain	  class	  of	  (spatial)	  judgments.	  	  However,	  the	  spontaneous	  generation	  of	  (†)	  in	  light	  of	  experience	  e*	   is	  only	  possible	  if	  certain	  features	  hold	  of	  view	  v*.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  utterer	  having	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  (which,	  because	  v*	  is	  very	  much	  like	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  we	  may	  assume	  she	  has	  ex	  hypothesi),	  (†)	  relies	  on	  many	  tacit	  assumptions	  about	  the	  shared	  space	  of	  the	   spectators.	   One	   such	   assumption	   is	   that	   the	   space	   in	  which	   the	   pursuit	   takes	  place	   is	   uniform,	   i.e.	   there	   can	   be	   a	   family	   of	   seamless	   translations	   of	   position	   as	  John,	   Bill,	   and	   Sandy	   move	   through	   it.	   Another	   assumption	   is	   that	   topological	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structure	   is	   preserved:	   Bill	   and	   Sandy	   cannot	   converge	   upon	   John	   without	   also	  converging	   on	   one	   another,	   and	   differences	   in	   perspective	   do	   not	   upset	   (†).	   In	  general,	   the	   space	   is	   such	   that	   it	   allows	   for	   the	   sorts	   of	   judgments	   about	   relative	  distance	   that	   we	   may	   make	   when	   describing	   the	   pursuit.	   The	   space	   is	   uniform,	  homogenous,	   and	   isotropic—or	   at	   least	   locally	   so.	   Here	   we	   can	   see	   how	   quasi-­‐mathematical	  assumptions	  operate	  in	  even	  very	  simple	  judgments,	   including	  those	  that	  do	  not	  call	  for	  specific	  and	  quantified	  measurements.	  	  This	   is	   significant	  because	   these	   sorts	  of	   judgments	  are	  exactly	   the	   sort	  we	  make	   in	   even	   the	  most	   primitive	   of	   settings.	   They	   are	   the	   sorts	   of	   judgments	   one	  could	  see	  a	  primitive	  human	  making	  about	  his	  or	  her	  surroundings	  while	   foraging	  for	   food,	  engaging	   in	  the	  collective	  hunt,	  running	  from	  predators	  or	  enemies,	  or	   in	  following	   simple	   directions	   to	   get	   from	   one	   place	   to	   another.	   They	   may	   even	   be	  consistent	  with	  the	  high	  priest’s	  proclamations	  about	  gods	  in	  the	  heavens,	  and	  their	  interactions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  flights	  of	  fancy	  we	  entertain	  in	  dreams	  and	  imagination.	  We	  want	  our	  empiricism	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  such	  worldviews	  and	  such	  sets	  of	  perceptual	  judgments,	  even	  if	  they	  employ	  naïvely	  unscientific	  notions	  like	  “left”,	  “right”,	  and	  “behind”.	  Even	  though	  some	  views	  may	  include	  the	  misconception	  that	  space	  has	  a	  privileged	  set	  of	  such	  directions	  (just	  as	  Aristotle’s	  physics	  thought	  that	  “up”	  and	  “down”	  were	  genuine,	  physical	  qualities	  of	  movements),	  this	  does	  nothing	  to	  mitigate	  the	  wealth	  of	  information	  we	  possess,	  even	  in	  such	  primitive	  examples,	  about	  the	  spaces	  we	  inhabit.	  This	  much	  is	  clear	  from	  even	  a	  cursory	  analysis	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  make	  such	  judgments	  possible.	  	   A	   second	   observation	   deals	   with	   these	   implied	   mathematical	   assumptions	  that	  are	  presupposed	  by	  such	  judgments.	  There	  exists	  a	  set	  of	  empirical	  principles	  in	  which	  some	  mathematical	  structure	  is	  implicit.	  Such	  principles,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	  not	   set	   aside	  with	   the	   foundational	  worries	   Gupta	   rightfully	   hopes	   to	   bypass.	  We	  here	   make	   a	   further	   and	   stronger	   claim,	   however:	   without	   considering	   these	  principles,	   an	   extension	   of	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   to	   relevant	   issues	   in	   the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  impossible.	  Recall	  that,	  given	  the	  commitments	  of	  MSE,	  our	  main	   concern	   is	   with	   the	   mathematical	   content	   of	   at	   least	   some	   of	   our	   ordinary	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empirical	  claims	  about	  magnitude,	  position,	  and	  relative	  motion.	  Thus,	  we	  hold	  with	  a	   preponderance	   of	   thinkers	   in	   the	   MSE	   tradition	   (in	   opposition	   to	   the	   CBE	  tradition)	  that	  such	  assumptions	  must	  be	  accounted	  for,	  and	  that	  such	  an	  account	  is	  conceptually	   prior	   to	   even	   those	   simple	   claims	   that	   the	   CBE	   tradition	   thought	  we	  could	  make	  about	  our	  “ideas”	  (impressions,	  sense-­‐data)	  of	  moving	  objects.58	  	   The	  distinction	  is	  made	  most	  clear	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  Russell	  and	  Poincaré	  regarding	  the	  meanings	  of	  geometrical	  primitives.	  The	  debate	  began	   with	   Russell’s	   [1897],	   in	   which	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   principles	   shared	   by	  Euclidean	   and	   non-­‐Euclidean	   geometries	   are	   a	   priori,	   but	   that	   those	   uniquely	  Euclidean	   principles	   are	   empirical.	   The	   first	   to	   respond	   to	   this	   position	   was	   not	  Poincaré,	   but	   Louis	   Couturat	   in	   his	   critical	   review	   of	   Russell	   [1897]	   (Couturat	  [1898]).	  The	  review	  was	  quite	  positive.	  Couturat	  praised	  Russell’s	  careful	  treatment	  of	  Euclidean	  and	  non-­‐Euclidean	  geometries,	  especially	  his	  account	  of	  the	  aprioricity	  of	   geometry	   (and	   the	   useful	   ways	   in	   which	   symbolic	   logic	   might	   be	   applied	   to	  traditional	  philosophical	  questions	  about	  our	  knowledge	  of	  geometrical	  axioms)	  but	  did	   not	   think	   Russell	   had	   established	   that	   Euclidean	   geometry	   was	   empirical.	  Russell	  [1898]	  is	  a	  response,	  mostly	  cordial,	  explicating	  the	  difficulties	  with	  offering	  a	   complete	   account	   of	   the	   empirical	   nature	   of	   Euclid’s	   axioms.	   However,	   it	   is	   a	  passage	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  piece	  that	  led	  to	  the	  debate	  proper—a	  claim	  Russell	  makes	  against	  the	  conventionalism	  of	  Poincaré:	  	   Are	   Euclid’s	   axioms	   capable	   of	   being	   verified	   or	   refuted	   empirically?	   In	  order	   to	   discuss	   this	   question,	   we	   must	   first	   of	   all	   reject	   completely	   the	  theory	   of	   M.	   Poincaré,	   according	   to	   which	   these	   axioms	   are	   pure	  conventions	   like	   the	   metric	   system,	   and	   consequently	   are	   not	   capable	   of	  being	  true	  or	  false,	  verified	  or	  refuted…	  I	  shall	  suppose…	  that	  the	  Euclidean	  axioms	   are	   either	   true	   or	   false.	   The	   question	   is	   then	   of	   determining	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   reasons	   which	   we	   have	   for	   accepting	   them.	   (Russell	  [1989/1990],	  325)	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  There	  are	  elementary	  experiences,	  perhaps	  of	  pain	  or	  of	  relative	  intensive	  magnitudes	  like	  warmth,	  which	  may	  not	  require	  us	  to	  have	  prior	  quasi-­‐mathematical	  notions.	  These	  differences	  may	  very	  well	  be	  “given”	  in	  experience.	  I	  do	  not	  address	  such	  issues.	  I	  am	  concerned	  only	  with	  those	  experiences	  of	  spatial	  magnitude,	  position,	  orientation	  and	  displacement.	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Russell	  held	  that	  if	  a	  geometrical	  proposition	  was	  meaningful,	  then	  we	  understood	  this	   meaning	   by	   grasping	   each	   of	   its	   constituent	   terms.59	  But	   this	   assumes	   some	  cognitive	  access	  (let’s	  assume	  acquaintance	  through	  experience)	  to	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  a	  geometrical	  proposition.	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  an	  example	  that	  calls	  into	  question	  such	  empiricism	  about	  geometrical	  propositions.	  Take	   a	   general	   sentence	   that	   makes	   clear	   some	   of	   the	   conceptual	  commitments	   required	   to	   assert	   a	   judgment	   about	   a	   geometrical	   observation,	   e.g.	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  mobility:	  	  	   (∆)	   “Rigid	  bodies	  can	  be	  moved	  in	  space	  without	  change	  in	  shape.”	  	  According	  to	  Russell,	  for	  one	  to	  grasp	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  proposition	  expressed	  by	  (∆)	   would	   require	   one	   to	   grasp	   each	   of	   the	   terms	   in	   (∆)	   independently	   of	   one	  another.	   Let	   us	   assume	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   argument	   that	  Russell’s	   theory	  of	  meaning	  gives	   us	   acquaintance	   with	   all	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   proposition	   expressed	   by	   (∆),	  except	   for	   the	   final	   term:	   shape.	   Russell	   will	   say	   that	   shape	   is	   gotten	   by	   direct	  acquaintance	   too:	   it	   is	   the	   simple	   (unanalysable)	   datum	   that	  we	   grasp,	   giving	   the	  proposition	   its	   sense.	  But,	   argues	  Poincaré,	   this	   cannot	   be	   the	   term	  as	   it	   arises	   in	  geometry,	   for	   geometrical	   principles	   have	   a	   publicity	   which	   allows	   them	   to	   be	  grasped	  by	  all	   those	  who	  can	   reason	  with	   the	  principles,	   and	  no	   two	  persons	  will	  have	  the	  same	  datum	  of	  sense	  (such	  as	  a	  yellow	  triangle)	  before	  them,	  so	  this	  is	  not	  what	   “shape”	   can	  mean.	  Different	   intuitive	   access	   to	   a	   concept	   cannot	   explain	  our	  uniform	  use	  of	  the	  concept,	  which	  relies	  on	  all	  users	  to	  have	  the	  same	  formal	  criteria	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  concept.	  What	  is	  required,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  be	  given	   a	   more	   precise	   formulation—that	   formulation	   is	   given	   by	   (∆)	   itself,	   which	  ought	   to	  be	   read	  not	   as	   a	   substantive	  general	   claim	  about	   the	  actual	  behaviour	  of	  bodies	  in	  motion	  (or	  our	  intuition	  of	  same),	  but	  as	  an	  implicit	  definition	  (“definition	  in	   disguise”)	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   shape	   (or,	   arguably,	   the	   concept	   of	   space,	   or	   the	  concept	  of	  rigid	  body).	  In	  other	  words,	  (∆)	  shows	  us	  how	  the	  concepts	  employed	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  This	   follows	   from	  Russell’s	   general	   theory	   of	   propositional	   understanding,	  which	   argues	   that	   to	  understand	  a	  proposition	  is	  to	  be	  acquainted	  with	  its	  constituents.	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(∆)	   are	   systematically	   related,	   so	   that	   if	  we	   take	   a	   class	   of	   objects	   to	   be	   our	   rigid	  bodies	  (say	  measuring	  rods),	  then	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “space”	  and	  “shape”	  (and	  here,	  the	  we	  of	  communal	  knowledge	  is	  key).	  	   Another	  way	  to	  think	  of	  the	  issue	  is	  this:	  if	  Russell	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  report	  about	  his	  occurrent	  visual	  sensation,	  and	  he	  says	  that	  he	  is	  currently	  experiencing	  a	  triangle	  moving	  from	  left	  to	  right	  in	  his	  visual	  field,	  then	  Poincaré	  can	  say,	  “How	  do	  you	   know	   it	   to	   be	   a	   triangle	   at	   all,	   unless	   you	   assume	   it	   is	   a	   rigid	   body	   moving	  through	   a	   uniform	   space	   and	   not	   some	   non-­‐rigid	   entity	   undergoing	   systematic	  spatial	   distortions	   of	   the	   sort	   that	  make	   it	   appear	   as	   if	   a	   triangle	  moving	   through	  uniform	  space?”	  This	  question	  is	  enough	  to	  upset	  Russell’s	  position.	  All	  of	  our	  formal	  principles,	  including	  the	  principles	  of	  geometry	  or	  even	  of	  physical	  theory,	  have	  this	  character:	  they	  seem	  empirical,	  but	  really	  are	  not—at	  least	  not	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  normal	  empirical	  claims.60	  While	   they	  have	  the	  syntactical	  appearance	  of	  synthetic	  claims,	   they	   do	   not	   express	   what	   we	   have	   come	   to	   know	   empirically	   about	   the	  concepts	   they	  contain,	  but	  rather	  such	  concepts	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  very	  principles	  themselves:	   they	   determine	   for	   us	   how	   precise	   and	   formal	   concepts	   are	   to	   be	  empirically	   interpreted.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   may	   be	   empirical,	   since	   they	   are	   only	  understood	  through	  their	  empirical	  content;	  but	  what	  they	  are	  not	  are	  substantive	  claims	  about	  the	  world.	  Here	  is	  the	  dilemma	  for	  the	  (classical)	  empiricist:	  they	  are	  not	  purely	  formal,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  lumped	  together	  with	  logical	  principles;	  but	  (as	  we	  have	  seen)	  they	  are	  also	  not	  empirical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  given	  in	  the	  unanalysable	  data	  of	  sense.	  If	  they	  are	  empirical	  in	  some	  sense,	  that	  sense	  is	  not	  Russell’s.	  So	  the	  worry	  is	  this:	  our	  formal	  principles	  are	  tied	  to	  their	  empirical	  content	  in	  systematic	  ways	  that	  we	  may	  reason	  about	  said	  concepts	  collectively	  and	  arrive	  at	  agreement	   about	   our	   empirical	   judgments.	   Such	   principles,	   for	   Poincaré,	   take	   the	  place	  of	  Kant’s	  “forms	  of	  intuition”	  precisely	  because	  they	  allow	  for	  the	  formulation	  of,	   and	   agreement	   about,	   such	   simple	   judgments.	   What	   remains	   unclear	   is	   how	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  Here,	   “empirical”	   should	   be	   read	   in	   its	   more	   classical	   sense,	   i.e.	   empirical	   statements	   are	  statements	  that	  are	  synthetic	  (at	  least	  in	  appearance)	  and	  empirically	  verifiable	  or	  falsifiable.	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  such	  claims	  may	  be	  revised	  in	  light	  of	  experience.	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Gupta’s	  view	  accounts	  for	  such	  agreement	  if	  mathematical	  assumptions	  and	  formal	  principles	  are	  not	  given	  more	  attention	  in	  his	  account.	  In	  §IV	  we	  will	  argue	  for	  a	  way	  in	  which	  he	  can	  address	  some	  of	  these	  concerns	  about	  formal	  principles.	  But	  before	  we	   look	   at	   the	   issue	   in	   more	   detail	   an	   equally	   pressing	   problem	   must	   first	   be	  tackled.	  	  
§III:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Communication	  and	  Communal	  Knowledge	  The	  basic	  problem	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  section	  has	  already	  been	  motivated	  by	  our	  discussion	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   so	   our	   remarks	  will	   be	   brief.	   One	   of	   the	  most	  pressing	   issues	   for	   the	   empiricist	   tradition,	   as	  made	   clear	   in	   the	  Russell/Poincaré	  debate,	   concerns	   the	   very	   real	   problem	   of	   inter-­‐personal	   communication.	   If	   our	  claims	  about	  an	  external	  world	  of	  objects	  embedded	  in	  space	  are	  all	  actually	  claims	  about	   subjective	   entities	   in	   psychological	   space,	   then	  how	   could	   it	   be	  possible	   for	  different	   people	   to	   converse	   about	   the	   same	   matters?	   How	   do	   we	   coordinate	  abstract	   formal	  concepts	  (say,	  those	  of	  geometry)	  with	  spatial	   intuition	  (assuming,	  contrary	   to	   Kant,	   that	   geometrical	   structure	   is	   not	   necessarily	   determined	   by	   the	  structure	  of	   intuition)?	   Later	   empiricist	   thinkers,	   including	  Russell	   and	   the	   logical	  empiricists,	   thought	   the	   problem	   could	   be	   overcome	   by	   focusing	   on	   structure.	  Schlick	   is	   a	   good	   example.	   We	   do	   not	   (and	   cannot)	   communicate	   about	   the	  subjective	   contents	   of	  mind,	   according	   to	   Schlick.	   However,	   we	   can	   communicate	  about	   the	   implicitly	  defined	  abstract	  concepts	  of	   formal	  science.	  Whereas	  we	  have	  “acquaintance”	   (Kennen)	   with	   sensory	   images,	   we	   have	   “knowledge”	   (Erkennen)	  through	  concepts.61	  We	  are	  said	  to	  know	  only	  when	  we	  have	  produced	  “a	  successful	  designation	   of	   reality”	   by	   means	   of	   concepts.	   Rather	   oddly	   (for	   an	   empiricist),	  Schlick	  holds	  that	  we	  have	  genuine	  empirical	  knowledge	  via	  sophisticated	  scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Schlick	   thought	   it	   a	   confusion	   of	   the	   “philosophy	   of	   intuition”	   to	   conflate	   acquaintance	   and	  knowledge.	   Here,	   Schlick	   is	   offering	   a	   more	   Kantian	   analysis	   than	   Russell’s	   classically	   empiricist	  account	   of	   knowledge,	   which	   is	   centred	   upon	   knowledge	   by	   acquaintance.	   “Intuition	   is	   mere	  experience,	   but	   cognition	   is	   something	   quite	   different,	   something	   more.	   Intuitive	   knowledge	   is	   a	  
contradictio	  in	  adjecto.	  Even	  if	  there	  were	  an	  intuition	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  could	  insert	  ourselves	  into	   things,	   or	   things	   into	   us,	   it	   would	   still	   not	   constitute	   knowledge…	  What	   we	   obtain	   [through	  intuition]	  is	  an	  acquaintance	  with	  things,	  but	  never	  an	  understanding	  of	  things.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  alone	  that	  we	  aim	  at	  when	  we	  search	  for	  knowledge	  in	  science	  and	  in	  philosophy.”	  (Schlick	  [1925/1974],	  83)	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theory	  precisely	  because	   such	   theories	  are	   conceptual	   and	  non-­‐intuitive.	   Scientific	  knowledge	   counts	   as	   knowledge	   because	   it	   is	   formal,	   and	   this	   is	   what	   makes	  scientific	  theories	  communicable.	  (The	  influence	  of	  Poincaré	  is	  obvious.)	  	   But	   in	   what	   sense	   are	   scientific	   theories	   empirical	   if	   they	   are	   so	   non-­‐intuitive?	  Here	   Schlick	   relies	   on	  what	   he	   calls	   “the	  method	   of	   coincidences”.	   Take	  various	  intuitive	  spaces	  of	  an	  experiencer	  (co-­‐numerous	  with	  the	  number	  of	  sense	  modalities	   of	   the	   experiencer).	   Each	  will	   have	   its	   own	   qualitative	   character,	   such	  that	   one	   cannot	   compare	   a	   smell	   with	   a	   touch,	   or	   a	   visual	   sense	   image	   with	   an	  auditory	  sense	  image.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  can	  experience	  a	  “singularity”	  in	  two	  sense-­‐modalities.	  To	  use	  Schlick’s	  example,	  I	  can	  touch	  and	  see	  the	  point	  of	  a	  pencil.	  This	  produces	   for	   us	   a	   “coincidence”	   which	   can	   be	   embedded	   in	   objective	   space	   by	  abstracting	   away	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   tactile	   and	   visual	   intuitions.	   When	   we	  piece	  together	  these	  coincidences	  (when	  we	  have	  enough	  singularities)	  a	  system	  of	  points	  in	  objective	  space	  is	  produced.	  We	  can	  communicate	  with	  one	  another	  about	  the	   structure	   of	   this	   objective	   space	   (the	   structure	   of	   point-­‐coincidences)—specifically	   its	   topological	   structure.	   This	   topological	   space	   is	   a	   projection	   of	  intuitive	   (or	   psychological)	   space—the	   former	   dispensing	   entirely	   with	   the	  incommunicable	  subjective	  content	  of	  acquaintance.	  	   Everything	  in	  our	  world-­‐picture	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  these	  coincidences	  is	   deprived	   of	   physical	   objectivity	   and	   can	   just	   as	   well	   be	   replaced	   by	  something	   else.	   All	   world-­‐pictures	   that	   agree	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   laws	   of	  these	   point	   coincidences	   are	   physically	   absolutely	   equivalent.	   (Schlick	  [1917/1978],	  241)	  	  It	   is	   to	   the	   structural	   aspects	   of	   experience	   that	   we	   refer	  when	  we	   communicate	  with	  one	  another,	  allowing	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  science.	  	   This	   general	   line	   of	   thought	   was	   also	   employed	   by	   Carnap	   in	   his	   Aufbau,	  though	  here	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  physical	  system	  of	  concepts	   is	  not	  a	  projection	  of	  intuitive	  space	  on	  an	  objective	  space,	  rather	  external	  three	  dimensional	  spatiality	  is	  constructed	   (via	   quasi-­‐analysis)	   from	   colour	   sensation,	   which	   is	   itself	   quasi-­‐analytically	   constituted	   by	   the	   construction	   of	   colour	   subspace,	   which	   is	   itself	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constituted	   by	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   different	   sense-­‐modalities	   based	   on	   their	  dimensionality	   differences	   (e.g.	   visual	   sense	   modality	   is	   the	   only	   one	   with	   five	  dimensions),	  which	  is	  constituted	  by	  “sense	  classes”,	  which	  are	  further	  constituted	  by	  quality	  classes,	  which	  are	  defined	  as	  those	  cross-­‐sections	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  single	  cogniser	  that	  agree	  on	  some	  particular	  sensation.	  	  	  We	  do	  not	  have	  the	  space	  here	  to	  offer	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  Schlick’s	  method	  of	   coincidences.	   We	   have	   already	   discussed	   the	   problematic	   move	   from	   the	  structure	   of	   auto-­‐psychology	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   physics	   in	   the	   Aufbau	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  though	  not	  in	  great	  depth.	  Thankfully,	  no	  such	  analysis	  is	  required.	  This	  is	  because	  Gupta	  sidesteps	  the	  problem	  of	  giving	  a	  structural	  account	  of	   communication.	   This	   reliance	   on	   structure	   is	   a	   result	   of	   viewing	   experience	   as	  having	  itself	  a	  structure	  and	  an	  intuitive	  part,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  spoken	  of	  in	   public	   language	   save	   via	   coincidences.	   The	   worry	   is	   one	   of	   making	   a	   private	  language	  (a	  sense-­‐datum	  language,	  say)	  correspond	  to	  a	  public	   language,	  and	  here	  there	   seems	   no	   satisfactory	   way	   of	   progressing.	   Gupta	   avoids	   this	   problem	  altogether	   by	   showing	   that	   experience	   has	   no	   proposition-­‐like	   structure,	   and	   that	  experience	  itself	  can	  be	  of	  public	  objects.	  However,	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  done	  away	  with	  Poincaré’s	   problem.	   Unless	   we	   assume	   that	   we	   all	   possess	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	  primitive	   geometrical	   principles	   operating	   in	   normal	   judgment,	   an	   equally	  frustrating	   obstacle	   to	   communicability	   is	   encountered:	   because	   perceptual	  judgments	   are	   a	   function	   of	   experience	   and	   view,	   either	   we	   assume	   some	   basic	  similarity	  in	  view	  or	  lose	  any	  hope	  of	  conveying	  to	  others	  what	  it	  is	  we	  are	  given	  in	  experience.	  Agreement	   regarding	  perceptual	   judgments	   is	  not	   enough	   in	   itself,	   for	  two	  epistemic	  agents,	  A	  and	  B,	  could	  agree	  on	  perceptual	  judgments	  Γ	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  not	  systematically	  attached	  to	  the	  same	  course	  of	  experience	  E:	  where	  A	  has	  license	   to	  Γ	   as	   the	   output	   of	   his	   view	   and	   course	   of	   experience,	   and	  B	   has	  Γ	   as	   a	  result	   of	   a	   very	  different	   view	  and	   a	   completely	  different	   set	   of	   experiences.	   Such	  problems	   are	   only	   removed	   if	   we	   can	   presuppose	   that	   A	   and	   B	   have	   the	   same	  experiences	  or	  considerable	  overlap	  in	  their	  views.	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As	  will	  easily	  be	  granted,	  the	  empirical	  sciences	  require	  the	  comparison	  and	  integration	  of	  reports	  of	  empirical	  judgments	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  personal	  and	  spatio-­‐temporal	   perspectives.	   Science,	   at	   least	   its	   experimental	   arm,	   is	   therefore	   a	  communal	  enterprise.	   If	  experience	   is	  viewed	  propositionally,	   there	  are	  no	  special	  concerns	  about	  how	  observation	  judgments	  may	  be	  conveyed	  between	  practitioners	  (though	   empiricists,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   may	   encounter	   difficulties	   with	   the	   non-­‐publicity	  of	  reports	  of	  private	  sensation).	  We	  may	  have	  to	  suss	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  scientific	  “protocol	  sentences”,	  and	  such	  issues	  can	  get	  quite	  messy,	  but	  the	  program	  itself	   is	   straightforward	   enough.	   There	   are	   collections	   of	   scientific	   judgments	   that	  are	   public	   and	   communicable.	   This	   was	   indeed	   how	   the	   left	   wing	   of	   the	   Vienna	  Circle,	  especially	  Neurath	  and	  Carnap,	  conceived	  of	  “physicalism”—not	  expressly	  as	  a	  reduction	  of	  all	  subject	  matter	  to	  physics	  in	  accordance	  with	  an	  abusive	  scientism,	  but	   as	   a	  way	   for	   practitioners	   in	   sundry	   fields	   to	   communicate	  with	   one	   another.	  Physicalism	   was	   a	   first	   (flawed)	   attempt	   by	   the	   left	   wing	   of	   the	   Vienna	   Circle	   at	  producing	  an	   interdisciplinary	  approach	   to	   the	  sciences,	   to	  overcome	  unnecessary	  wrangling	   through	   genuine	   communicative	   practice.	   Protocols	   (couched	   in	   the	  vocabulary	  of	  formal	  science)	  were	  thought	  so	  valuable	  because	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  guarantee	  that	  discussion	  could	  take	  place:	  a	  neutral	  language	  within	  which	  all	  other	  sciences	  can	  congregate.	  	  	  However,	   those	   (like	   us)	  who	   agree	  with	  Gupta	   that	   the	  whole	   business	   of	  assigning	  propositional	  contents	  to	  experience	  should	  be	  avoided	  must	  replace	  this	  program,	  and	  that	  means	  losing	  a	  straightforward	  model	  for	  the	  communicability	  of	  observation.	   But,	   then	   we	   must	   contend	   with	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   logical	  recategorisation	   Gupta	   proposes:	   the	   functional	   given	   makes	   inter-­‐practitioner	  communication—so	   central	   to	   experimental	   science—if	   successful,	   entirely	  mysterious	   unless	   the	   practitioners	   share	   substantial	   overlap	   in	   courses	   of	  experience	   or	   views.	   If	   practitioners	   were	   to	   drop	   the	   propositional	   given	   they	  would	  also	  drop	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  directly	  about	  experience	  (i.e.	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	   produce	   neutral	   observation	   reports).	   They	   can	   still	   produce	   theory-­‐laden	  judgments,	   but	   how	   they	   might	   know	   they	   are	   using	   the	   same	   theory	   is	   not	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explained,	  and	  where	  such	  a	  theory	  came	  from	  is	  also	  of	  concern:	  if	  it	  is	  historically	  given,	   or	   arbitrarily	   chosen,	   then	   it	   seems	   to	   lack	   the	   kind	   of	   justification	   (via	  experiential	  revision)	  which	  Gupta	  demands	  of	  views.	  The	  only	  other	  option,	  that	  it	  is	   a	   product	   of	   observation,	   fails	   to	  make	   sense	   in	   light	   of	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  (which,	   if	   it	   is	   to	   make	   communicable	   pronouncements	   at	   all,	   must	   already	   be	  functionally	  paired	  with	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world).	  	  Gupta	  may	   respond	   to	   such	   a	   claim	  by	   arguing	   that	   scientists	   are	   far	  more	  likely	   than	   the	   average	   group	   to	   share	   a	   theoretical	   perspective	   (a	  worldview).	   In	  fact,	  he	  says	  almost	  as	  much,	  arguing	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  his	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  to	   questions	   about	   scientific	   knowledge	   is	   unproblematic	   once	   scientists	   share	   a	  “core”	  of	  beliefs	  (we	  may	  suppose	  something	  like	  Ω	  above).	  Here	  is	  what	  Gupta	  says:	  	  There	  is	  a	   further	  idea	  here	  with	  which	  I	  shall	  not	  be	  much	  concerned:	  that	  the	  succession	  [of	  experience]	  renders	  reasonable	  our	  scientific	  conceptions	  also.	  The	  philosophical	  problems	  posed	  by	  our	  empirical	  knowledge	  concern	  the	   very	   core	   of	   our	   ordinary	   conception—a	   core	   that	   humans	   acquired	  before	   they	   began	   inscribing	  marks	   on	   clay	   tablets	   and	   that	  most	   children	  acquire	  before	  reaching	  the	  age	  of	  three.	  Once	  the	  core	  is	  secured,	  the	  further	  idea	   that	   experience	   renders	   reasonable	   the	   refinements	   of	   the	   sciences	  presents	   few	   fundamental	   difficulties.	   The	   bearing	   of	   experience	   on	   the	  sciences	   (and	   other	   disciplines)	   can	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   standard	   way:	  experience	  issues	  perceptual	  judgments	  and	  can	  thus	  serve	  as	  a	  tribunal	  for	  them.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  103-­‐104)	  	  But	  more	  needs	   to	  be	   said	  about	  how	   this	   common	  core	   is	   sufficient	   to	  guarantee	  that	   perceptual	   judgments	   are	   adequate	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   tribunal	   for	   the	   sciences.	  From	  what	  we	  have	  examined,	  that	  seems	  at	  least	  to	  be	  an	  open	  question.	  Without	  such	  an	  account,	  we	  are	  left	  wondering	  how	  we	  can	  justify	  our	  scientific	  theories.	  	  	   Here	   is	   another	  way	   to	   conceive	   of	   the	   problem.	  We	   can	   only	   know	   that	  we	  share	   a	   view	   if	   we	   fix	   either	   experience	   or	   view—i.e.	   if	   we	   can	   show	   that	   the	  sequence	  of	  experiences	  endured	  by	  one	  cognitive	  agent	  are	  the	  same	  as	  another’s	  (or	   at	   least	   they	   have	   the	   same	   subjective	   character),	   or	   if	   we	   can	   show	   that	   a	  number	   of	   cognitive	   agents	   have	   fundamentally	   similar	   views.	   So,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  communal	  observation,	  either	  (a)	  we	  fix	  experience,	  or	  (b)	  we	  fix	  views.	  But	  now	  we	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encounter	  a	  dilemma.	  We	  cannot	   fix	   the	   relevant	   set	  of	  experiences	   in	  accordance	  with	  (a)	  if	  the	  given	  in	  experience	  is	  a	  function,	  since	  (ex	  hypothesi	  for	  the	  cases	  of	  communal	   observation)	   such	   a	   move	   would	   require	   inter-­‐practitioner	  communication	   and	   practitioners	   cannot	   communicate	   their	   experiences	   without	  assuming	  some	  view	  first.	  (Recall	  the	  central	  assumption	  here	  is	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  set	  of	  relevant	  observations	  that	  escape	  any	  single	  observer,	  and	  are	  only	  arrived	  at	  by	   coordinated,	   communal	   practice.)	   We	   can	   only	   communicate	   our	   experiences,	  therefore,	   if	  we	   fix	   the	  view	  being	  used	  by	  all	   relevant	  practitioners	   in	  accordance	  with	   (b)—but	   here,	   since	   by	   (a)	   experience	   cannot	   be	  what	   fixes	   views,	  we	  must	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  view	  via	  some	  other	  faculty	  than	  experience,	  doing	  great	  damage	  to	  the	  Insight.	  If	  horn	  (a),	  then	  the	  essentially	  communal	  character	  of	  the	  empirical	  sciences	  seems	  to	  be	  jeopardised,	  since	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  scientists	  could	   engage	   in	   the	   requisite	   communication	   (about	   observation)	   to	   engage	   in	  theory	  development.	   If	   horn	   (b),	   then	   in	  what	   sense	   is	   the	   existing	   scientific	   view	  
justified?	  	  	   To	  be	  clear,	  we	  do	  agree	  with	  Gupta	  that	  the	  common	  sense	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  scientific	  view	  of	  the	  world	  are	  not	  two	  separate	  views,	  rather	  that	  they	  are	  intimately	  intertwined;	  but	  his	  cursory	  remarks	  about	  how	  a	  common	  sense	  core	  of	  beliefs,	   commitments,	   and	   anticipations	   will	   lead	   (via	   experience)	   to	   the	  “refinements	  of	   the	  sciences”	  with	  “few	  fundamental	  difficulties”	   leaves	   the	  reader	  in	  want	  of	  further	  explanation.	  The	  problem	  is	  even	  more	  pronounced	  if	  the	  reader	  does	   not	   share	   his	   view	   that	   common	   sense	   views	   and	   scientific	   theories	   share	   a	  core.	  	   Take	   Newton’s	   second	   law	   of	   motion	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	   difficulty:	   the	  acceleration	   of	   a	   body	   is	   parallel	   and	   proportional	   to	   net	   force	   F,	   and	   inversely	  proportional	   to	   the	  mass.	   Is	   this	   an	  empirical	   generalisation?	  Arguably,	   yes.	  But	   it	  and	  the	  other	  two	  laws	  of	  motion	  together	  constitute	  a	  coherent	  framework	  within	  which	  empirical	  judgments	  about	  force	  and	  motion	  can	  be	  made.	  This	  was	  an	  insight	  taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   Newton	   himself,	   Kant,	   Poincaré,	   and	   the	   logical	  empiricists.	   They	   all	   held	   (in	   some	  way)	   that	   certain	   principles	   are	   constitutive	   of	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scientific	   theory,	  even	   though	  there	   is	  some	  disagreement	  about	   the	  necessity	  and	  apodictic	   certainty	   of	   such	   principles.	   As	   with	   the	   law	   of	   free	   mobility	   discussed	  earlier,	  the	  second	  law	  of	  motion	  is	  an	  implicit	  definition	  (a	  “definition	  in	  disguise”),	  in	   this	   case	   of	   a	   new	   Newtonian	   concept:	   force.	   One	   can	   utilise	   such	   a	   rich	  conception	   to	   criticise	   other	   incoherent	   accounts	   of	   force	   and	   motion,	   as,	   for	  example,	   Newton	   criticises	   the	   Cartesian	   distinction	   between	   “proper	   motion”	  (motion	  viewed	  as	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  neighbourhood	  of	  contiguous	  bodies)	  from	  “vulgar	   motion”	   (motion	   as	   change	   of	   internal	   place),	   and	   he	   can	   point	   to	   the	  “normal	  experience”	  of	  water	  in	  a	  rotating	  bucket	  to	  point	  out	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  Cartesian	  position	  (the	  so	  called	  “Bucket	  Experiment”).	  But	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  how	  one	  could	   come	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   motion	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   series	   of	   experiences	   without	  highlighting	   the	   presuppositions	   of	   Descartes’	   physics,	   and	   showing	   the	   ways	   in	  which	   those	   presuppositions	   (to	   the	   chagrin	   of	   Cartesians)	   already	   hand	   to	   the	  Newtonian	  much	   of	   her	   conception	   of	  motion	   in	   light	   of	   the	   relevant	   experiences	  (experiments).	   It	   is	   not	   enough	   merely	   to	   point	   to	   experience,	   though	   it	   plays	   a	  central	   role;	   Newton	   also	   shows	   that	   all	   of	   the	   historical	   discussants,	   including	  Galileo,	   Descartes,	   Leibniz,	   and	  Huygens,	   presuppose	   the	   laws	   in	  making	   sense	   of	  elementary	   dynamical	   problems,	   even	   if	   they	   don’t	   think	   they	   do.	   Such	   theorising	  requires	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  refinement	  in	  conceptual	  system,	  and	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	   how	   such	   a	   system	   could,	   on	   Gupta’s	   model,	   come	   about	   as	   a	   result	   of	  experiential	   revision	   unless	   the	   role	   of	   mathematical	   assumptions	   is	   made	   more	  central.	  	  	   Firstly,	   there	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   indeterminacy,	   though,	   since	   this	   is	   not	   a	  problem	   solely	   for	   Gupta,	   and	   since	   he	   seems	  more	   able	   than	  most	   to	   cope	  with	  indeterminacy	   (given	   that	   convergence	   overcomes	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   more	  primitive	   problem	   of	   the	   relativity	   wrought	   by	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability),	   our	  remarks	   will	   be	   brief.	   Recall	   that	   perceptual	   judgments	   are	   of	   the	   form	   Γe(v).	  Therefore,	   empirical	   claims	   of	   a	   theory	   (if	   we	   may	   be	   permitted	   some	   new	  formalism)	  can	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  following	  way:	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   Γ(T)	  =	  ϕ(O)	  	  where	  Γ(T)	  is	  the	  empirical	  claims	  of	  the	  theory	  (a	  class	  of	  systematised	  sentences);	  
ϕ	   is	   the	   theory	   itself	   (a	   class	   of	   systematised	   sentences	   that	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	  equivalent	   to	   	  Γ(T),	  but	  also	  anticipations—i.e.	  hypotheses—and	  perhaps	  rules	   for	  conducting	  experiments,	  and	  what	  may	  count	  as	  evidence	  as	  opposed	  to	  mere	  data,	  etc.);	  and	  O	  the	  observation	  (or	  set	  of	  observations)	  of	  a	  practitioner.	  Now,	  assume	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	   It	   is	  entirely	  possible—i.e.	  not	  determinately	  precluded	  by	  
Γ(T)—that	  Γ(T)	  is	  the	  result	  of	  other	  theory/observation	  combinations,	  so	  that	  (for	  example)	  	  	  
◊	  (Γ(T)	  =	  φ(O*)).	  	  An	   historical	   example	  might	   be	   Lorentzian	   electrodynamics	   and	   special	   relativity,	  both	   of	   which	   were	   compatible	   with	   evidence	   available	   in	   1905	   (e.g.	   Michelson-­‐Morley),	   but	  we	   set	   aside	   the	   particularities	   of	   examples	   to	   get	   at	   the	   crux	   of	   the	  matter:	   scientific	  views	  are	  not	  determined	  by	  experience	  or	  observation.	   (This	   in	  itself	   is	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  Gupta	  since	  he	  merely	  wants	   to	  account	   for	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   experience	   can	   rationally	   inform	   a	   view,	   not	   uniquely	   determine	   a	   correct	  view.	  However,	  these	  considerations	  enter	  into	  the	  following	  argument.)	  	   The	   real	   problem	   for	   Gupta	   comes	   by	   way	   of	   what	   may	   be	   considered	   a	  quantum	   leap	   from	   common	   sense	   conceptions	   of	   the	   world	   to	   the	   sorts	   of	  sophisticated	   scientific	   views	   of	   the	   world	   we	   currently	   possess.	   Taking	   the	  judgments	  of	  our	   leading	  views	  on	  space,	   time,	   and	  motion	  as	  a	   central	  part	  of	  Ω,	  will	   all	   admissible	   views	   converge	   on	   Ω?	   What	   about	   views	   that	   do	   not	   even	  countenance	   at	   least	   a	   primitive	   notion	   of	   external	   space	   in	   which	   empirical	  judgments	  may	  be	  embedded?	  Can	  Gupta’s	  existing	  admissibility	  criteria	  license,	  for	  example,	   the	  blocking	  of	  phenomenal	  accounts	  of	  experience,	   like	  Husserl’s,	  which	  leave	   no	   room	   for	   such	   judgments	   (as	   a	   result	   of	   sustained	   epoché)—a	   view	   that	  interprets	   all	   experience	   as	   intensive	  magnitudes—as	   feelings	   and	   sensations	   not	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even	   directed	   at	   themselves	   as	   intentional	   objects?	   What	   about	   Heideggerian	  conceptions	  of	  time?	  (Examples	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  further	  multiplied.)	  If	  these	  views	  are	   admissible,	   then	   there	   will	   be	   no	   convergence	   point	   at	   which	   all	   admissible	  views	  will	  agree	  upon	  Ωϕ	  (Ω	  enriched	  to	  include	  not	  only	  common	  sense	  judgments,	  but	  scientific	  judgments	  about	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion).	  	   Science	   requires	   communication	   between	   practitioners	   about	   observation.	  Because	   observation	   is	   theory-­‐laden	   (as	   we	   have	   shown	   to	   be	   a	   corollary	   of	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability),	   communication	   requires	   that	   we	   have	   in	   place	   views	  which	  are	  either	  (a)	  already	  commensurable	  with	  one	  another,	  or	  which	  (b)	  can	  be	  revised	  to	  be	  commensurable	  with	  one	  another.	  Assuming	  that	  practitioners	  already	  share	  a	  substantive	  scientific	  view	  prior	  to	  observation	  means	  that	  we	  do	  damage	  to	  the	   Insight,	   for	   the	   origin	   of	   our	   scientific	   world	   conception	   will	   be	   merely	  accidental,	   historical,	   or	   arbitrary.	   For	   (b)	   to	   be	   possible,	   a	   rational	   scientific	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  must	  be	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  Ωϕ,	  and	  all	  admissible	  views	  must	   converge	   on	  Ωϕ	   (lest	   practitioners	   only	   possess	   conditional	   entitlements).	  Scientific	   knowledge	   would	   be	   either	   arbitrary	   or	   merely	   conditional	   (and	   likely	  both).	  Unlike	  our	  nicely	  convergent	  common	  sense	  views	  of	  the	  world,	  our	  scientific	  views	  of	  the	  world	  would	  grant	  us	  no	  categorical	  knowledge.	  	  
§IV:	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  as	  a	  Model	  of	  Scientific	  Knowledge	  There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   plausible	   ways	   Gupta	   could	   reply	   to	   such	   results.	   I	   will	  examine	  both.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  bifurcation	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  his	  view,	  and	   limit	   the	   applicability	   of	   his	  model	   to	   general	   epistemology	   only.	   This	  would	  amount	   to	   saying	   that	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   is	   not	   a	   replacement	   of	   classical	  empiricism	   full	   stop,	  but	  only	  of	  CBE	  and	   its	  more	  modern	  variants—for	  example,	  sense-­‐datum	  theories	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  While	  this	  move	  saves	  the	  position,	  it	  blocks	   the	  view	   from	  having	  a	   fruitful	  applicability	   to	   the	  philosophy	  of	   science,	  which	   would	   constitute	   a	   great	   loss.	   This	   would	   be	   to	   admit	   that	   Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  not	  a	  possible	  candidate	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism.	  As	  we	  have	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made	   clear,	   this	   dissertation	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   defend	   the	   opposing	   thesis:	   that	  Gupta’s	  framework	  is	  an	  ideal	  candidate	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism.62	  	   A	  second	  tactic	  allows	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  to	  overcome	  the	  deficiencies	  we	  have	  isolated	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  MSE.	  Nothing	  in	  the	  way	  of	  technical	  change	  is	  proposed	   (we	   do	   not,	   for	   example,	   revert	   back	   to	   a	   propositional	   model	   of	   the	  given),	  but	  stronger	  conditions	  on	  an	  acceptable	  view	  must	  be	  imposed	  in	  order	  for	  the	  connection	  to	  be	  possible	  between	  ordinary	  views	  and	  scientific	  ones.	  	  Gupta	  tells	  us	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  prior	  restrictions	  on	  the	  initial	  view	  of	  a	   revision	   process	   except	   that	   any	   initial	   view	   should	   not	   be	   pathological/rigid,	  insensitive,	  or	  internally	  incoherent.	  By	  this	  he	  means	  that	  we	  should	  preclude	  any	  initial	  view	  that	  has	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  an	  inability	  to	  be	  revised	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  
course	  of	  experience	  may	  be.	  Which	  views	  are	  not	  acceptable	  as	  initial	  starting	  points	  and	   why	   are	   they	   precluded?	   Of	   course,	   we	   know	   by	   now	   that	   Gupta’s	   early	  examples	   are	   solipsistic	   and/or	   sceptical	   views,	   but	   he	   also	   explores	   ([2006a],	  Chapter	   Four)	   other	   types	   of	   unrevisable	   views,	   such	   as	   certain	   religious	   views,	  chauvinistic	  views	  which	  shun	  outsiders	  and	  prevent	  experiences	  of/with	  outsiders	  from	   taking	   place,	  mystical	   views	  which	   hold	   that	   “normal”	   experiences	   carry	   no	  epistemic	  weight,	   or	   the	   sorts	   of	   views	  held	   by	  drug	   addicts	  who	   think	   they	  have	  fulfilled	  their	  epistemic	  obligations	  only	  when	  engaging	  in	  “enhanced	  experiences”.	  (Gupta	  [2006a],	  205)	  	  	   These	   a	   priori	   restrictions,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   noted,	   do	   not	   preclude	  pathological	  or	  insensitive	  views	  from	  forming	  as	  a	  result	  of	  revision.	  One	  can	  come,	  via	  a	  course	  of	  experience,	  to	  recalcitrant	  religious	  beliefs,	  or	  to	  reasonably	  consider	  herself	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat,	  or	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  all	  others	  she	  encounters	  are	  un-­‐minded	  phantasms	   of	   a	   fantastical	   hoax	   by	   some	   deceiving	   demon	   or	   evil	   scientist.	   These	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Empiricists	  may	   decide	   to	   hold	   the	   view	   that	   science	   is	   different	   from,	   and	   discontinuous	  with,	  common	   sense.	   In	   fact,	   many	   empiricists	   have	   done	   this.	   The	   dialectic	   I	   wish	   to	   pursue	   will	   not	  address	   those	  who	   think	   there	   is	   such	   a	   discontinuity.	   It	   seems	   at	   least	   prima	   facie	   plausible	   that	  common	   sense	   informs	   our	   scientific	  worldview,	   and	  nearly	   absurd	   to	   think	   that	   science	   does	   not	  have	   congress	   with	   our	   common	   sense.	   To	   use	   Sellars’	   terminology,	   the	  Manifest	   Image	   and	   the	  
Scientific	  Image	   interact	  with	  one	  another	   in	  ways	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  deny.	   In	  any	  case,	  those	  who	  do	  not	   share	   the	   desire	   for	   what	   we	   here	   call	   a	   “comprehensive	   empiricism”,	   what	   Sellars	   called	  “synoptic	  philosophy”,	  are	  not	  the	  direct	  audience	  for	  such	  a	  study.	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positions	  may	  be	  reasonable	  in	  light	  of	  experience,	  though	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  for	  us	  to	  see	  (from	  our	  current	  epistemic	  position)	  what	  sorts	  of	  experiences	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  such	  beliefs	  and	  how	  they	  may	  survive	  subsequent	  experience.	  But	  a	  boon	  for	  this	  tactic	  is	  already	  quite	  clear.	  For	  Gupta,	  it	  is	  completely	  unnecessary	  to	  engage	  in	  one	  or	  another	  philosophical	  argument	  against	  scepticism	  or	  solipsism,	  given	  that	  they	  are	  (strictly	  speaking)	  allowed.	  The	  stronger	  claims	  that	  scepticism	  is	  committed	  to	  a	   larger	   set	  of	  unproven	  assumptions	   than	   is	   common	  sense	   (Moore),	   or	   that	   it	   is	  conceptually/semantically	   confused	   (Austin,	   Putnam,	   etcetera),	   or	   unworthy	   of	  epistemic	  consideration	  (Davidson,	  Rorty,	  etcetera)	  are	   irrelevant.	  Scepticism	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  “blocked”—we	  merely	  need	  to	  point	  out	  to	  the	  sceptic	  that	  she	  may	  not	  propose	  her	  view	  as	  a	  genuine	  starting	  point	  in	  a	  revision	  process.	  (How,	  before	  experience	  after	  all,	  are	  we	  to	  accept	  a	  view	  that	  says	  that	  experience	  can	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  epistemic	  revision?	  There	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  such	  a	  claim,	  and	  the	  empiricist	  need	  not	  accept	  it.)	  	  But	  are	  these	  the	  only	  sorts	  of	  views	  that	  are	  inappropriate	  as	  starting	  points	  for	   revision?	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   class	   of	   views	   that	   will	   fail	   to	   extend	   to	   a	  scientific	   picture;	   the	   kinds	   of	   views	   with	   which	   there	   cannot	   even	   be	   Galilean	  dialogue,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  which	  will	  not	  converge	  with	  our	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion.	  These	  unacceptable	  initial	  views	  must	  be	  barred,	  even	  if	  they	   are	   not	   (strictly	   speaking)	   rigid,	   insensitive,	   or	   incoherent.	   Any	   view,	   in	   fact,	  which	  does	  not	  have	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  some	  primitive	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  common	   and	   objectifiable	   realm	   in	   which	   empirical	   judgments	   can	   be	   embedded	  cannot	  be	  accepted.	   If	  we	  accept	   that	  Gupta’s	  model	  can	  account	   for	   the	  step-­‐wise	  development	  of	  our	  beliefs	  from	  the	  primitive	  and	  incorrect	  “lore	  of	  our	  fathers”	  to	  the	   sophisticated	   and	   true	   conceptions	   of	   spacetime	   we	   currently	   possess,	   then	  empirical	   fact	   alone	   will	   not	   be	   enough.	   What	   is	   required	   is	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  presuppositions	   that	   accompany	   even	   our	  most	   primitive	   views	   of	   the	  world	   as	   a	  shared	  arena	  of	  interaction.	  	  As	   we	   have	   already	   seen,	   what	   is	   required	   is	   an	   application	   of	   conceptual	  analysis—a	   conceptual	   analysis	   which	   shows	   the	   essential	   agreement	   we	   have	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regarding	  presuppositions	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  empirical	  application	  of	  spatial	  and	   temporal	   concepts.63	  Such	   presuppositions	   may	   include	   primitive	   versions	   of	  some	  minimal,	   irreducible	   conception	   of	   elementary	   spatial	   operations	   (and	   their	  relations	   to	   one’s	   own	   perspective)—e.g.	   iteration,	   subtraction,	   and	   composition.	  Any	  failure	  to	  countenance	  the	  applicability	  of	  at	  least	  these	  elementary	  operations	  would	  indeed	  be	  “pathological”	   in	  the	  specific	  sense	  that	  such	  a	  view	  would	  find	  it	  impossible	   to	   provide	   any	   extension	   of	   the	   personal	   to	   the	   communal	   (and,	  eventually,	   the	   scientific).	   But	   now	   we	   demand	   more	   than	   that	   a	   view	   be	   non-­‐pathological;	  we	  demand	  also	  that	   it	  countenance	  a	  common	  arena	  for	  experience.	  (Perhaps	  we	  can	  construe	  Gupta	  as	  meaning	  nothing	  more	  when	  blocking	  solipsism	  as	   an	   initial	   view;	   if	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   here	   we	   are	   giving	   a	   more	   complete	  characterisation	  of	  why	  solipsist	  views	  are	  pathological.)	  	   If	   all	   initial	   views	   possess	   at	   least	   this	  minimal	   commitment	   to	   a	   revisable	  view	  of	  an	  arena	  of	  communal	   interaction,	   then	   it	   is	  plausible	  we	  can	  explain	  how	  experience	   (along	   with	   the	   occasional	   ingenious	   bit	   of	   conceptual	   analysis)	   can	  account	   for	   the	   development	   of	   more	   sophisticated	   theories	   of	   space,	   time,	   and	  motion.	  We	  have	  examined	  (in	  a	  rough	  way)	  some	  of	  the	  key	  points	  in	  the	  history	  of	  such	  developments,	  and	  a	  more	  complete	  (though	  brief)	  discussion	  will	  take	  place	  in	  the	  concluding	  remarks.	  For	  now,	  we	  should	  see	  that	  such	  a	  minimal	  conception	  of	  a	  shared	  arena	  of	   interaction	   serves	   the	  purpose	  of	  blocking	   those	  views	   that	   could	  never	  allow	  us	  to	  converge	  upon	  sophisticated	  physical	  theories.	  Further,	  this	  seems	  legitimate,	   for	   all	   proper	   scientific	   thought	   should,	   as	   Gupta	  might	   agree,	   remove	  those	   obstacles	   which	   prevent	   experience	   from	   playing	   its	   essential	   role	   as	   our	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  guide.	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  We	   intend	   our	   account	   of	   conceptual	   prerequisites	   to	   be	   quite	   general	   indeed,	   maybe	   even	  allowing	   for	   all	   kinds	   of	   “communal	   spaces”	   which	   appear	   quite	   unscientific,	   such	   as	   grand	  theological	  pictures	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  reality,	  or	  even	  “new	  wave”	  conceptions	  of	  the	  ultimate	  nature	  of	  reality.	  Such	  system	  building,	  we	  argue,	  should	  not	  be	  blocked.	  However,	  we	  argue	  that	  such	  views	  are	  revisable,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  not	  rigid,	  insensitive,	  or	  incoherent	  (which	  they	  very	  well	  may	  be,	  and	   in	  which	   cases	   they	   should	  be	  blocked	  by	  Gupta’s	   original	   criteria).	   It	   is	   our	   contention	   that	   a	  great	   many	   of	   their	   metaphysical	   commitments	   will	   find	   no	   purchase	   at	   our	   hypothetical	  convergence	  point,	  and	  the	  set	  of	  judgments	  Ωϕ.	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But	   a	   question	   remains:	   is	   the	   enrichment	   of	   acceptable	   initial	   views	   here	  proposed	  amenable	  to	  empiricism?	  We	  argue	  that	  enrichment	  must	  not	  transgress	  the	  Insight	  or	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  or	  any	  of	  the	  constraints.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  accept	  this	  enrichment	  only	  insofar	  as	  such	  principles	  that	  may	  be	  found	  within	  our	  initial	  views	  are	  revisable	  in	  light	  of	  experience.	  Also,	  we	  think	  we	  are	  capturing	  both	  a	  methodological	  commitment	  of	  scientific	  empiricism	  and	  a	  substantive	  claim	  about	   the	   historical	   development	   and	   justification	   of	   our	   understanding	   of	   space,	  time	  and	  motion.	  On	  the	  methodological	  side	  of	  things,	  we	  are	  saying	  that	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  consider	  oneself	  a	  scientific	  empiricist	  if	  one	  does	  not	  at	  least	  agree	  that	  there	   is	  a	  common	  arena	   in	  which	  empirical	   judgments	  can	  be	  made	  and	   in	  which	  judgments	  about	  extensive	  magnitudes	  can	  be	  assessed.	  On	  the	  substantive	  side	  of	  things,	   we	   hold	   that	   our	   current	   sophisticated	   understanding	   of	   space,	   time,	   and	  motion	   could	   not	   have	   come	   to	   be	   if	   not	   for	   some	   initial	   conditions	   that	  made	   it	  possible	  for	  subjects	  in	  a	  community	  to	  understand	  one	  another	  and	  point	  to	  salient	  features	   in	   the	   environment	   which	   gave	   physical	   theorising	   (even	   very	   primitive	  versions	   of	   it)	   some	   purchase.	   The	   following	   thesis	   can	   thus	   be	   read	   both	  methodologically	  or	  historically:	  	  
The	   Principle	   of	   Scientific	   Empiricism	   (SE	   Principle):	   All	   initial	   views	   must	  admit	  of	  a	  minimal	  conception	  of	  a	  shared,	  objective	  arena	  of	  interaction.	  	  	  The	  SE	  Principle	  thus	  amounts	  to	  a	  commitment	  that	  all	  initial	  views	  must	  allow	  and	  account	  for	  basic	  interaction.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  all	  such	  views	  can	  be	  made	  scientific,	  only	   that	  all	   scientific	  views	  possess	   this	  kind	  of	   structure.	  Advanced	  physical	  science,	  not	  epistemology,	  must	  decide	  which	  views	  may	  end	  up	  counting	  as	  scientific—our	  job	  in	  epistemology	  is	  merely	  to	  block	  those	  views	  which	  are	  necessarily	  destructive	  to	  convergence	  on	  a	  scientific	  conception.	  	   The	  SE	  Principle	  is	  weak	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  makes	  no	  commitments	  to	  what	  sort	   of	   physical	   processes	   may	   be	   referenced	   when	   establishing	   this	   or	   that	  geometrical	   notion.	   For	   example,	   the	   SE	   Principle	   makes	   no	   commitment,	   as	  Helmholtz	   did,	   to	   congruence	   as	   the	   basic	   geometrical	   notion	   for	   spaces	   like	   the	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ones	   we	   are	   thought	   to	   inhabit.	   The	   SE	   Principle	   is	   strong,	   however,	   in	   that	   it	  demands	  that	  empiricism	  give	  us	  an	  account	  of	  what	  presuppositions	  are	  operating	  in	  our	  empirical	  application	  of	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  concepts	  (even	  if	  we	  are	  not	  yet	  knowingly	  employing	  “spatial”	  and	  “temporal”	  concepts).	   	  	   The	   SE	   Principle	   also	   does	   not	   commit	   us	   to	   a	   kind	   of	   rationalism,	   if	  “rationalism”	  means	   there	  exists	  some	   faculty	  other	   than	  experience	   that	  provides	  us	   with	   insight	   into	   which	   geometrical	   conception	   is	   true	   of	   the	   world	   or	   any	  theoretical	  insight	  into	  how	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  must	  be,	  including	  its	  geometry.	  Notice	   that,	   aside	   from	   saying	   that	   we	   cannot	   consider	   ourselves	   scientific	  empiricists	   without	   countenancing	   an	   arena	   of	   interaction,	   the	   SE	   Principle	   says	  nothing	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  visual	  or	  physical	  space,	  much	  less	  does	  it	  place	  upon	  us	  some	  fixed	  conception	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is.	  We	  are	  not	  born,	  as	  it	  were,	  with	  innate	  geometrical	  structures	  to	  which	  all	  experience	  must	  conform—or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	   SE	   Principle	   supposes	   nothing	   of	   the	   sort.	   This	   is	   a	   matter	   for	   cognitive	   or	  developmental	   psychology	   to	   study,	   and	   not	   something	   imposed	   on	   us	   by	  epistemology	  through	  the	  SE	  Principle.	  All	  of	  these	  assumptions,	  typically	  tied	  to	  a	  notion	   of	   the	   a	   priori,	   are	   here	   seen	   as	   further	   issues	   to	   be	   settled	   by	   a	   normal	  sequence	   of	   experiences	   (coupled	   with	   the	   tools	   of	   conceptual	   analysis).	   The	   SE	  Principle	   should	   thus	  be	   read	   as	   the	  most	  minimal	   of	   constraints	   on	   adopting	   the	  view	   that	   our	   scientific	   knowledge	   can	   be	   empirically	   justified.	   If	   one	   were	   to	  consider	  it	  a	  priori—a	  characterisation	  we	  do	  not	  promote—then	  one	  would	  have	  to	  admit	   that	   it	   is	   the	   most	   minimal	   and	   malleable	   of	   a	   priori	   principles	   one	   could	  imagine.	  	   The	  SE	  Principle	   is	  therefore	  consistent	  with	  a	  vast	  number	  of	   initial	  views,	  and	  also	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  those	  views	  can	  be	  enriched.	  Imagine	  starting	  with	  a	  primitive	  view	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  judgments	  of	  a	  sort	  like	  (†).	  As	  we	  discussed,	  such	   a	   judgment	   carries	   with	   it	   presuppositions	   about	   the	   (local)	   uniformity,	  homogeneity,	   and	   isotropy	   of	   space.	   Though	   our	   primitive	   speakers	   would	   very	  likely	  not	  be	  able	  to	  characterise	  their	  presuppositions	  in	  these	  ways,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  at	   least	  proto-­‐mathematical	   variants	  of	  principles	  we	   commonly	  use	   in	  mechanics	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are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   communal	   life	   for	   such	   people,	   exhibited	   by	   the	   successful	  negotiation	   of	   the	   environment	   by	   such	   folk.	   The	   principle	   of	   free	   mobility	   (the	  modern,	   mathematical	   principle)	   tells	   us	   that	   arbitrary	   continuous	   motions	  (transformations)	  can	  occur	  without	  distortions	  in	  a	  body.	  But	  something	  like	  this	  is	  already	   assumed	  when	  we	   attempt	   to	  manipulate	   objects	   in	   our	   environment,	   or	  when	  we	  provide	  directions	  to	  a	  traveler	  (which	  presuppose	  elementary	  variants	  of	  basic	   group-­‐theoretic	   transformations).	   Such	   simple	   exercises	   exhibit	   a	   tacit	  understanding	   of	   our	   environment,	   functioning	   as	   an	   initial	   view	   of	   our	  world	   as	  extended	  (in	  more	  or	  less	  locally	  uniform	  space),	  an	  initial	  view	  that	  can	  reasonably	  be	  thought	  an	  ancestor	  of	  our	  current	  conceptions	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  via	  a	  (long	   and	   very	   complicated)	   series	   of	   empirical	   and	   formal	   revisions,	   especially	  when	   those	  revisions	  result	   from	  seeing	  how	  this	   local	   conception	   fares	  when	  put	  into	  new	  and	  surprising	  contexts	  (such	  as	  the	  celestial	  realm,	  high-­‐energy	  fields,	  or	  at	  velocities	  approaching	  the	  speed	  of	  light).	  	   Similar	   points	   have	   already	   been	   made	   in	   the	   literature,	   though	   they	   are	  decidedly	  more	  dialectical	   in	   character	   than	   the	   purely	   empirical	   project	  we	   have	  examined	  here.	  DiSalle	   and	  Friedman	  have	  offered	   the	  best	  dialectical	   accounts	  of	  theoretical	   and	   conceptual	   progress	   in	   the	   sciences	   (especially	   theories	   of	   space,	  time,	   and	   motion).	   By	   way	   of	   explication	   of	   some	   of	   the	   merits	   of	   an	   empirical	  approach	   to	   such	   questions,	   I	   will	   examine	   their	   dialectical	   positions	   in	   my	  concluding	   remarks.	  What	   are	   the	   differences	   between	   empirical	   revisionism	   and	  dialectical	   revisionism?	   How	   close	   might	   the	   two	   be	   in	   their	   historical	   and	  philosophical	   claims?	  We	  will	   argue	   that	   the	   gap	   is	   not	  wide	   at	   all,	   and	   extending	  Gupta’s	  logical	  apparatus	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  theories	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion	  might	  not	  only	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  distinctions	  between	  two	  broad	  types	  of	  dialecticism	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  but	  might	  also	  characterise	  (with	   more	   formal	   precision)	   some	   of	   the	   key	   transitions	   in	   the	   development	   of	  physical	  theory.	  	  





An	  Essay	  on	  Empiricism	  and	  Dialecticism	  As	   we	   hope	   is	   made	   clear	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapters,	   this	   dissertation	   has	   two	  substantial	   parts.	   The	   first	   is	   critical,	   the	   second	  more	   constructive.	   In	   its	   critical	  part,	   we	   argue	   that	   two	   incompatible	   views	   emerge	   from	   Gupta’s	   Reformed	  Empiricism.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   his	   view	   is	   an	   alternative	   to	   “classical	   empiricism”	  (construed	  as	  a	  tradition	  which	  includes	  not	  only	  CBE,	  but	  also	  MSE);	  the	  second	  is	  that	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  account	  for	  our	  scientific	  knowledge	  without	   issue.	   The	   exegetical	   work	   and	   taxonomy	   are	   thought	   to	   motivate	   this	  critical	   thesis.	   The	   constructive	   part	   of	   the	   project	   proposes	   a	   way	   that	   we	   may	  amend	  Gupta’s	  framework	  so	  as	  to	  make	  it	  more	  sensitive	  to	  questions	  of	  a	  formal	  and	  conceptual	  character,	  especially	  regarding	  how	  we	  may	  have	  license	  to	  a	  class	  of	  perceptual	   judgments	  which	   seem	   to	   rely,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   on	   proto-­‐mathematical	  presuppositions.	  We	  argue	  that	  initial	  views	  must	  satisfy	  the	  SE	  Principle	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  admissible	  initial	  views.	  We	  thus	  show	  that	  proto-­‐mathematical	  commitments	  of	  a	  very	  elementary	  sort	  operate	  in	  our	  normal	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  space	  of	   interaction—i.e.	   that	   certain	   elementary	   proto-­‐mathematical	   principles	  (empirical	   principles	   or	   physical	   principles	   with	   an	   elementary	   mathematical	  structure)	   are	   presupposed	   in	   views	   that	   allow	   for	   a	   (perhaps	   only	   loosely)	  structured	   space	  of	   experience.	  While	  we	  agree	  with	  Gupta	   that	  we	  may	   set	   aside	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  our	  mathematical	  knowledge	  (and	  the	   classical	   foundational	   questions	   about	   how	   such	   interpretation	   is	   to	   go),	   we	  identify	   principles	   (or,	   rather,	   a	   set	   of	   possible	   elementary	   proto-­‐mathematical	  principles	   consistent	   with	   the	   SE	   Principle)	   which	   are	   relevant	   to	   empirical	  judgment	  (especially	  judgments	  involving	  spatiality).	  According	  to	  such	  an	  account,	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  we	  argue,	  is	  preserved.	  Also,	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  has	   the	   resources	   to	   resolve	   some	   classical	  difficulties	  with	   MSE.	   For	   example,	   because	   we	   have	   maintained	   with	   our	   amendments	   the	  logical	  recategorisation	  of	  experience,	   the	   famous	  protocol-­‐sentence	  debate	  within	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the	   Vienna	   Circle,	   with	   its	   secondary	   hypotheses	   about	   physicalism	   (to	   facilitate	  communication	   amongst	   scientists)	   and	   corresponding	   epistemological	   theses	  regarding	   the	   fallibility	   of	   such	   statements,	   is	   now	   entirely	   avoided.	   Another	  example,	   namely	   empirically	   motivated	   theoretical	   revision	   and	   theoretical	  development	  in	  the	  sciences,	  will	  be	  our	  main	  focus	  below.	  	  For	   now,	   a	   general	   remark	   about	   the	   wide	   applicability	   of	   Reformed	  Empiricism	   is	   in	   order.	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   gives	   an	   account	   of	   empirical	  judgments,	  which	  means	  it	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  (with	  only	  slight	  modification).	  In	  short:	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  empiricism;	  it	  makes	  clear	  the	  ramifications	  of	  adopting	  a	  comprehensive	  framework	  to	  explain	  all	  of	  our	  knowledge.	  	  Like	  empiricists	  before	  him,	  Gupta	  utilises	  all	  of	   the	  most	  modern	  technical	  tools	   to	   address	   epistemological	   questions,	   preserving	   the	   merits	   of	   previous	  empiricist	   projects	   without	   succumbing	   to	   the	   folly	   hidden	   in	   their	   logical	  assumptions.	  Where	  this	  dissertation	  differs	  with	  Gupta’s	  own	  account	  of	  his	  theory	  is	   in	  emphasis.	  What	   is	  new	  in	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  not	   its	  critical	  suspicion	  of	  Cartesian	   foundationalism,	   as	   Gupta	   thinks	   (though	   his	   particular	   critiques	   of	  Cartesianism	   are	   innovative);	   nor	   is	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   the	   first	   to	   think	   that	  experience	  by	  itself	   is	  epistemically	  neutral	  (i.e.	  experience	  alone	  does	  not	  provide	  us	  with	   epistemic	   license	   to	   a	   set	   of	   perceptual	   judgments).	   Anti-­‐foundationalism	  and	   the	   neutrality	   of	   experience	  were	   theses	   already	   held	   by	  many	   of	   the	   logical	  empiricists,	   and	   (before	   them)	   Poincaré	   (to	   the	   extent	   that	   he	   fits	   into	   the	   MSE	  tradition).	   As	   the	   remarks	   in	   Chapters	   Two	   and	   Three	   will	   have	   made	   clear,	  Reformed	   Empiricism	   is	   not	   the	   first	   normative	   empiricism	   to	   question	   these	  Cartesian	  theses	  and	  themes,	  and	  thus	  Gupta	  may	  find	  fellow	  travellers	  amongst	  the	  MSE	   tradition,	  with	   its	   focus	  on	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  empiricism:	  one	  which	  had	  already	  adopted	  as	  a	  central	  desideratum	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  most	  pressing	  concerns	  in	  the	  formal	   and	   physical	   sciences,	   and	   which	   set	   itself	   the	   task	   of	   developing	   new	  frameworks	   within	   which	   these	   concerns	   (as	   well	   as	   those	   concerns	   of	   classical	  British	  empiricism	  worth	  saving)	  could	  be	  fruitfully	  addressed.	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So,	  then,	  what	  is	  truly	  sui	  generis	  in	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  and	  why,	  over	  the	  past	   five	   years,	   has	   it	   become	   the	   focus	   of	   so	  much	   scholarship?	   Firstly,	   as	  many	  critics	  have	  noted,	  even	  if	   it	   fails	  as	  an	  empiricist	  account	  of	  knowledge	  (which	  we	  have	   argued	   in	   Chapters	   One	   and	   Three	   is	   an	   incorrect	   view),	   it	   will	   have	  nonetheless	   offered	   us	   a	   novel	   way	   of	   conceiving	   the	   relationship	   between	  experience	   and	   knowledge,	   one	   hitherto	   hidden	   from	   the	   view	   of	   normative	  epistemologists	  entrenched	  in	  their	  assumption	  of	  the	  propositional	  character	  of	  the	  given.	   Secondly	   (though	   relatedly),	   Reformed	   Empiricism	   shows	   the	   cleavage	  between	   incidental	   features	   of	   particular	   brands	   of	   empiricism	   and	  what	  we	  may	  consider	  a	  minimal	   form	  of	   empiricism—the	   type	  of	   empiricism	   that	   follows	   from	  the	   truisms	   (minimally	   construed)	  and	   the	  constraints.	  Gupta	  allows	  us	   to	   see	   the	  various	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Insight,	   Multiple-­‐Factorizability,	   and	   the	   constraints	  (especially	   Reliability)	   have	   been	   too	   strongly	   interpreted	   (based	   on	   a	   Cartesian	  conception	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  way	  of	  ideas).	  This	  negative	  part	  of	  Gupta’s	  work	  is	  itself	  of	   great	   importance	   for	  epistemology	  and	   the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  Thirdly,	  Gupta	   is	   able	   to	   uncover	   the	   very	   intricate	   ways	   in	   which	   our	   existing	   beliefs	  organise	  our	  enquiry,	  and	  establish	  our	  expectations	  for	  experience,	  thus	  preserving	  what	   is	   true	   in	   the	   theses	   of	   doxastic	   holism	   and	   the	   “theory-­‐ladenness”	   of	  perception—without	   assuming	   that	   experience	   itself	   is	   infiltrated	   by	   (and	   thus	  subordinate	  to)	  our	  existing	  conceptual	  frameworks—though,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  with	  the	   SE	   Principle,	   this	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   necessity	   to	   factorise	   experience	   in	  accordance	  with	  some	  reasonably	  rich,	  though	  not	  determined	  or	  fixed,	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  But	  very	  importantly,	  Gupta’s	  most	  significant	  contribution	  to	  empiricism	  is	  found	   in	   his	   utilisation	   of	   contemporary	   logic.	   The	   logical	   framework	   is	   that	   of	  interdependence,	  sketched	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  for	  which	  Belnap	  and	  Gupta	  have	  made	  the	   most	   significant	   contributions.	   The	   logic	   of	   interdependence,	   we	   have	  maintained,	   is	   a	   technical	   innovation	  which	  marks	   a	   sea-­‐change	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  experience,	   and	   a	   sea-­‐change	   in	   empiricism—it,	   more	   than	   any	   other	   technical	  innovation	   in	   the	   past	   century,	   allows	   for	   a	   proper	   logical	   account	   of	   experience,	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which	   (when	  wedded	   to	   the	   chorus	   of	   anti-­‐Cartesianism	   already	   alive	   in	   the	  MSE	  tradition)	   marks	   exciting	   new	   territory	   for	   the	   empiricist	   to	   explore,	   and	   a	   new	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  empiricist/rationalist	  debate	  can	  be	  conducted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  rationalist	  doesn’t	  simply	  win	  the	  day	  because	  of	  the	  way	  empiricism	  is	   interpreted.	   (This,	   more	   than	   anything,	   is	   the	   true	   virtue	   of	   the	   work:	   one	   on	  which	  Gupta	  continues	   to	  place	  his	   focus,	  but	  which,	  as	  we	  saw	   in	   the	   first	  half	  of	  Chapter	  Three,	  critics	  continue	  to	  overlook.)	  	  	  	  	  
§I:	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  and	  the	  Sciences	  The	  promise	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  not	  a	  general	  defense	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism,	  but	  an	  attempt	   to	   extend	   the	   view	   to	   recalcitrant	   problems	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science.	  The	  general	  extension	  of	  the	  theory	  has	  already	  been	  framed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  two	   such	   problems,	   as	   we	   explored	   them	   in	   Chapter	   Three:	   the	   problem	   of	   our	  
formal	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   communicability	   of	   observation.	   The	  problem	   of	   formal	   knowledge	   is	   this:	   at	   least	   some	   revisable	   proto-­‐mathematical	  principles	  of	  spatio-­‐temporality,	  motion,	  and	  iteration	  (of	  a	  completely	  elementary	  sort)	  must	  be	  part	  of	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world	  in	  order	  for	  experience	  to	  converge	  upon	  normal	   and	   scientific	   judgments	   about	   spatial	   position,	   orientation,	   and	  displacement—indeed,	  must	  be	   in	  place	   for	  us	   to	   even	  be	   in	   a	  position	   to	  make	   a	  large	   class	   of	   judgments	   about	   spatial	   position,	   orientation,	   and	   displacement	  whatsoever.	  We	  saw	  that	  something	  like	  a	  primitive	  version	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  mobility,	  perhaps	  we	  could	  call	   it	   “quasi-­‐free	  mobility”,	  provides	   for	  us	  a	  revisable	  notion	  of	  space	  that,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  enquiry,	  is	  homogenous,	  with	  some	  vague	  idea	  of	  size	  constancy.	  The	  problem	  of	  communicability	  of	  observation	  is	  far	  more	  complex.	  Stability	  and	  convergence	  are	   the	   sorts	  of	  properties	  we	  hope	   to	   see	   in	   the	   revision	  of	  our	  scientific	  concepts	  and	  theories,	  not	  just	  in	  our	  common	  sense	  concepts	  and	  views	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   although	  Gupta	   is	   largely	   silent	  on	   the	   issue,	  he	  does	  hint	   that	   his	   account	   for	   general	   epistemology	  would	   be	   applicable	   to	   conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  changes	   in	   the	  sciences.	  As	  we	  also	  have	  seen,	   the	  extension	  of	  his	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account	   from	   general	   epistemology	   to	   the	   epistemology	   of	   science	   is	   not	  immediately	   clear.	   It	   would	   be	   fortunate	   if	   there	   were	   a	   clear	   correspondence	  between	   the	   general	   epistemological	   case	   and	   the	   scientific	   case	   (between	  experience	   and	   view	   as	   they	   are	   in	   general	   epistemology,	   and	   observation	   and	  theory	   as	   they	   are	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science).	   There	   is	   a	  prima	   facie	   similarity	  between	  scientific	  observation	  and	  normal	  experience,	  but	  observation	  is	  often	  far	  more	   restricted	   than	   normal	   experience.	   (One	   need	   only	   think	   of	   even	   the	   most	  basic	  methodological	   restraints	   on	  observation,	   like	   those	   of	  Bacon	  or	  Mill,	   to	   see	  that	  experience	  and	  observation	  are	  not	  equivalent.)	  Also,	  experience	  belongs	   to	  a	  single	   cogniser—though,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	  Chapter	  One,	   §I.2,	   two	   (or	  more)	  epistemic	  agents	   may	   have	   subjectively	   identical	   beliefs.	   This	   is	   different	   from	   scientific	  “observation”,	  where	  often	  observational	  data	  are	  collected	  by	  a	  number	  of	  different	  practitioners,	   working	   over	   extended	   periods	   of	   time.	   What	   about	   views	   and	  theories?	   They	   too	   seem	   to	   have	   a	   prima	   facie	   similarity	   that	   fades	   on	   further	  reflection.	  View	  are	  not	  communal	  things	  by	  their	  nature,	  even	  though	  many	  agents	  can	   come	   to	   have	   fundamentally	   similar	   views.	   However,	   theories	   are	   communal.	  This	  is	  because	  all	  but	  the	  most	  toy	  theories	  quickly	  become	  extremely	  complicated.	  Unless	  we	  assume	  scientists	  are	  perfectly	  rational	  agents	  with	  infinite	  imaginations,	  no	   restrictions	   on	   memory,	   etc.,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   a	   working	   scientific	   theory	   will	  require	   social	   coordination	   of	   data	   gathering,	   interpretation,	   and	   theoretical	  revision.	  As	  a	   result	  of	   the	  complexity	  of	   scientific	   theories,	  we	  cannot	   rely	  on	   the	  experience	  of	  one	  cogniser,	  nor	  can	  we	  think	  it	  adequate	  to	  view	  theories	  as	  things	  possessed	  by	  individual	  practitioners	  (in	  the	  way	  that	  a	  view	  may	  be	  so	  construed).	  This	   means	   that	   we	   need	   to	   describe	   observation	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   its	   rational	  significance	   is	   communicable	   to	   others,	   precisely	   what	   Gupta	   says	   we	   cannot	   do	  (since	  the	  given	  in	  experience	  is	  a	  function,	  not	  a	  proposition).	  	   The	  SE	  Principle	  helps	  overcome	  both	  of	  these	  difficulties	  when	  added	  to	  the	  truisms,	   constraints,	   and	   admissibility	   conditions	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  proper.	  Because	  it	  demands	  that	  every	  admissible	  view	  include	  at	  least	  the	  prerequisites	  for	  some	  space	  of	  interaction	  within	  which	  empirical	  judgments	  may	  be	  embedded,	  all	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views	   have	   at	   least	   some	   minimal	   and	   revisable	   proto-­‐mathematical	  presuppositions.	  Even	  the	  most	  primitive	  local	  perspectives	  define	  an	  objective	  local	  space	  that	  allows	  for	  interaction	  with	  other	  perspectives	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  something	  that	  begins	  to	  look	  like	  a	  theory	  of	  space.	  What	  matters	  most,	  is	  that	  we	  are	  all	  able	  to	  have	  a	  spatial	  perspective	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  those	  we	  communicate	  with	  (that	  we	   are	   able	   to	   make	   judgments	   about	   how	   the	   world	   must	   appear	   to	   them).	   Of	  course,	   they	   must	   be	   able	   to	   consider	   our	   experience	   in	   the	   same	   way	   for	  communication	   to	   be	   possible.	   In	   this	  way,	   our	   understanding	   of	   space	   (even	   our	  primitive	  understanding)	   is	   communicable	   in	  a	  way	   that	  perhaps	   the	   rudimentary	  experiences	   of	   space	  we	   share	  with	   animals	   is	   not—in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   some	  animals	  also	  surely	  anticipate	  the	  experience	  of	  others,	  e.g.	  predators,	  though	  not	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  be	  marked	  and	  codified.	  	  In	   this	  way,	  we	   can	   see	  how	   local	   judgments	   about	   the	   tendency	   for	  heavy	  objects	  to	  move	  downward	  and	  for	  fire	  to	  move	  upward	  may	  have	  come	  to	  converge	  on	  something	  like	  the	  Aristotelian	  conception	  of	  the	  universe,	  where	  earthen	  bodies	  are	  attracted	  to	  like	  substance	  (with	  its	  natural	  elemental	  place	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  universe),	  and	  for	   fire	  to	  move	  upward	  to	   its	  rightful	  place	  between	  the	  Earth	  and	  the	  Moon.	  It	  is	  barely	  a	  jump	  from	  this	  point	  to	  assume	  that,	  because	  the	  stars	  don’t	  fall	  toward	  us,	  then	  they	  must	  be	  made	  of	  a	  different	  element:	  not	  Earth,	  Air,	  Fire,	  or	  Water.	   Such	   judgments	   become	   public	   without	   difficulty,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	  misconceptions.	   These	   normal,	   intuitive	   judgments	   are	   then	   called	   into	   question	  when	   local	   perspectives	   are	   compared	   to	   relative	   motions.	   Under	   such	   an	  examination,	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  motion	  (and	  its	  causes)	  breaks	  down.	  If	  Aristotle	  is	   correct,	   then	   we	   should	   not	   observe	   relative	   motions	   as	   we	   do.	   This	   much	   is	  shown	  in	  Galileo’s	  exposition	  of	  the	  classical	  notion	  of	  an	  inertial	  frame	  of	  reference	  in	  his	   famous	  thought	  experiment	  of	  an	  observer	  below	  deck	  of	  a	  ship,	   in	  which	   it	  makes	   no	   difference	   to	   the	   relative	   motion	   of	   free-­‐falling	   bodies—or	   other	  accelerating	   systems—whether	   the	   ship	   is	   at	   rest	   or	   in	   uniform	  motion.	   Because	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  motion	  was	  central	  to	  bringing	  together	  local	  perspectives	  into	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one	  worldview,	  that	  worldview	  is	  now	  in	  question,	  or	  at	  least	  unmotivated,	  lacking	  the	  metaphysics	  that	  gives	  it	  sense.	  As	  such	  preliminary	  considerations	  show,	  the	  communication	  of	  observation	  does	  not	  require	  any	  specific	  physical	  theory	  be	  agreed	  upon	  (before	  hand)	  because	  of	  such	  empirical	  considerations.	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	   theories	  can	  be	   tested	   like	   this;	  however,	  our	  concern	  is	  merely	  with	  how	  experimental	  science	  may	  impact	  theory	  revision	  without	  having	  to	  first	  assume	  the	  theory	  which	  will	  be	  the	  output	  of	  said	  revision,	  not	  that	  all	  theories	  are	  in	  fact	  empirically	  testable.64	  
A	   further	   remark	   on	   common	   sense	   views	   and	   scientific	   theories:	   Views	   and	  theoretical	  perspectives	  also	  seem	  to	  differ	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  are	  extended	  to	  new	  (and	  possibly	  surprising)	  contexts.	  Whereas	  we	  are	  often	  surprised	  by	  our	  normal	  course	  of	  experience,	   finding	  that	   it	  guides	  us	  to	  revise	  our	  common	  sense	  view	  of	   the	  world	   in	   this	  or	   that	  way,	   it	   is	  not	  normally	  a	  part	  of	  our	  views	  (or,	  at	  least,	   not	   most	   views)	   that	   we	   direct	   our	   experience	   with	   the	   active,	   conscious	  intention	  of	  extending	  our	  current	  view	  to	  different	  contexts	  (be	  such	  contexts	  new	  regions	   of	   space,	   high	   energy	   fields,	   the	   very	   small	   world	   of	   the	   quanta,	   or	   ever	  larger	   reference	   frames	  beyond	  our	   locality,	  our	  planet,	  our	   solar	   system,	  and	  our	  galaxy).	   This	   is	   exactly	   what	   scientific	   experiment	   (and	   critical	   examination	   of	  scientific	   concepts)	   is	   meant	   to	   do—to	   design	   scenarios	   that	   extend	   scientific	  concepts	   to	  new	  domains	   that	  may	  be	  quite	  different	   than	  the	  domain(s)	   in	  which	  the	  theory	  was	  developed.	  Whereas	  experience	  always	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  alter	  our	  views	  of	  the	  world,	  our	  views	  are	  very	  rarely	  directed	  at	  such	  extensions.	  	  This	   is	  not	   to	  be	  confused	  with	  “falsification”;	   that	  specific	   thesis	  holds	  that	  we	  produce	  meaningful	  and	  useful	  theories	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  (if	  only	  implicit)	  indication	  of	  how	  such	  claims	  may	  be	  defeated	  by	  experience.	  Our	  claim	  here	  shares	  with	  that	  claim	  the	  idea	  that	  scientific	  theories	  are	  only	  acceptable	  if	  defeasible,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Some	   theories	   may	   not	   be	   empirically	   testable	   for	   practical	   reasons	   (e.g.	   cosmological	   theories	  which	   cannot	   fix	   variables	   in	   the	   right	   way	   so	   as	   to	   be	   amenable	   to	   any	   kind	   of	   experiment),	   or	  different	  theories	  about	  the	  basic	  constitution	  of	  matter	  (which	  can	  perhaps	  only	  be	  “tested”	  based	  on	   their	   internal	   logical	   consistency,	   and	  other	   regulative	  principles	   like	   simplicity).	   Some	   theories	  may	  only	  differ	  counterfactually,	  and	  they	  may	  be	  empirically	  equivalent	  as	  an	  accident	  of	  how	  our	  world	  happened	  to	  turn	  out.	  These	  sorts	  of	  issues	  are	  not	  of	  our	  concern	  here.	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it	   does	   not	   share	   any	   specific	   doctrine	   of	   meaning	   or	   epistemic	   significance.	   The	  present	   claim	   is	   rather	   a	  methodological	   one,	   inherited	   from	  Newton:	   one	   should	  develop	  a	   framework	  within	  which	  the	  phenomena	  can	  be	  properly	  characterised;	  the	  true	  value	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  found	  in	  its	  stability	  as	  it	  is	  applied	  to	  more	  and	  more	  contexts	  for	  which	  it	  was	  not	  designed.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  scientific	  theories	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  attempts	  to	  preserve	  our	  common	  sense	  perspectives,	  or,	  better	  still,	  attempts	  to	  make	  such	  perspectives	   fit	  into	   new	   scientific	   conceptions.	   Theories	   show	   how	   such	   intuitive	   views,	   while	  locally	   plausible,	   may	   not	   extend	   to	   all	   circumstances	   and	   all	   cases	   without	  alteration.	  They	  show	  how	  our	  naïve	  conceptions	  about	  space	  have	  remained	  locally	  plausible	   (space	   as	   having	   privileged	   “places”,	   and	   privileged	   directions	   like	   “up”	  and	   “down”)	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   often	   revolutionary	   re-­‐contextualisation	  within	   ever	  more	   sophisticated	   theories	   (like	   Newton’s	   physics,	   or	   even	   special	   and	   general	  relativity)	   that	   reject	   such	   concepts	   because	   they	   have	   no	   physical	   application.	  Normal	  views	  are	  notorious	  for	  employing	  such	  local	  and	  perspectival	  concepts	  as	  if	  they	  have	  a	  more	   than	   local	  and	  perspectival	  character.	  More	  often	   than	  not,	   such	  assumptions	   are	   innocent.	   These	   views	   will	   still	   allow	   us	   to	   generate	   perceptual	  judgments	   with	   no	   real	   difficulty—judgments	   about	   which	   we	   can	   have	   much	  agreement.	  (Teammates	  of	  a	  football	  player	  who	  are	  watching	  him	  attempt	  to	  beat	  defenders	   and	  pass	   the	   ball	  will	   do	  well	   to	   anticipate	   his	   perspectival	   experience,	  even	  if	  modern	  physics	  tells	  us	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  misconception	  at	  work	  in	  thinking	   that	   “up”,	   “down”,	   “left”,	   “right”,	   “behind”,	   and	   “forward”	   are	   real	   things.)	  Theories	  set	   themselves	  apart	  by	   imposing	  a	  rigorous	   framework	   that	  attempts	   to	  rid	   itself	   of	   these	   parochial	   vestiges,	   applying	   in	   a	   unified	   and	   systematic	   way	   to	  more	  and	  more	  phenomena,	  though	  much	  information	  about	  the	  world	  we	  inhabit	  can	  be	  got	  at,	  in	  spite	  of	  (and	  often	  even	  because	  of)	  the	  misconceptions.	  	  
§II:	  The	  Arbitrariness	  Problem	  and	  the	  Progress	  of	  Scientific	  Theory	  In	  what	  is	  to	  follow,	  we	  will	  extend	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  to	  another	  problem	  that	  has	   plagued	   post-­‐positivist	   philosophers	   of	   science:	   a	   conception	   of	   rational	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progress	   in	   the	   sciences,	   especially	   in	   theories	   of	   space,	   time,	   and	  motion.	   As	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	   logical	   empiricist	   theory	   of	   theories	   attempts	   to	   account	   for	   the	  flexibility	  of	  our	  scientific	  knowledge,	  but	  at	  a	  high	  cost.	  Logical	  empiricism	  accounts	  for	  the	  radical	  changes	   in	  19th	  century	  geometry	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  physics	  by	  positing	  theories	  as	  relative	  a	  priori	  frameworks	  against	  which	  “internal”	  questions	  can	  be	  asked.	  The	  move	  from	  one	  framework	  to	  another	  becomes	  an	  arbitrary,	  free	  choice.	   This	   account	   of	   our	   theoretical	   knowledge	   shows	   it	   to	   be	   analytic	   (i.e.	   an	  innocent	  by-­‐product	  of	  our	  choice	  of	  formal	  framework),	  but	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  choice	  of	   formal	   framework	  belies	   the	  historical	  development	  of	   the	   sciences.	  Call	  this	  the	  “arbitrariness	  problem”—there	  can	  be	  given	  no	  empirical	  justification	  for	  the	  
move	   from	  one	   theory	   to	  another,	   since	   such	   justifications	  are	  always	   specific	   to	   the	  
formal	  framework	  of	  a	  given	  theory.65	  	  	  
II.1:	  Arbitrariness	  Expounded	  In	  connection	  with	  theory	  change	  in	  science,	  much	  has	  been	  said	  about	  the	  testing	  of	  rival	  theories	  by	  observation	  and	  experiment.	   	  However,	  the	  generation	  of	  new	  (or	  substantially	   revised)	   concepts	   was	   largely	   relegated	   by	   traditional	   logical	  empiricism	  to	  psychology.	  Using	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  as	  our	  guide,	  we	  argue	  that	  something	   philosophically	   interesting	   can	   be	   said	   about	   conceptual	   change	   that	  accompanies	  theory	  change	  in	  the	  sciences,	  and	  that	  such	  matters	  have	  much	  more	  to	  do	  with	  empirical	  justification	  than	  the	  psychology	  of	  practitioners.	  An	  account	  of	  conceptual	   change	   in	   the	   sciences	   that	   attempts	   to	   capture	   our	   generation	   (or	  substantial	  revision)	  of	  concepts	   in	  a	  way	  that	  allows	   for	  conceptual	   innovation	  to	  be	  empirically	  justified	  can	  be	  offered—one	  that	  is	  both	  historically	  accurate	  to	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  physics	  and	  which	  follows	  the	  logic	  of	  interdependence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Whereas	  Kuhn	  interprets	  the	  arbitrariness	  problem	  as	  “inter-­‐paradigm	  incommensurability”,	  one	  need	   not	   read	   it	   so	   strongly.	   In	   fact,	   the	   logical	   empiricist	   tradition	   viewed	   the	   choice	   between	  theories	   as	   a	   pragmatic	   choice,	   one	   for	   which	   arguments	   could	   be	   made	   for	   the	   choice	   of	   theory	  relative	  to	  one’s	  aims,	  and	  relative	  to	  epistemological	  considerations;	  however,	  such	  arguments	  did	  not	   have	   the	   kind	   of	   rigor	   exhibited	   by	   properly	   theoretical	   justifications.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   logical	  empiricists	   held	   that	   theory	   choice	  was	   arbitrary	   by	   our	   definition,	   since	   there	  were	   no	   empirical	  considerations	  that	  could	  rationally	  force	  such	  a	  choice.	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  The	  problem	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  in	  science	  has	  a	  history	  that	  goes	  back	  to	   the	   roots	   of	   logical	   empiricism.	   It	   was	   given	   form	   in	   Reichenbach’s	   distinction	  between	   the	   context	   of	   discovery	   and	   the	   context	   of	   justification.	   Theoretical	  principles	   impose	  an	   interpretation	  of	   a	  given	  concept	   (e.g.	   “straight	   line”)	   even	   if	  that	   concept	   already	   has	   a	   received,	   intuitive	  meaning.	   The	   principles	   (implicitly)	  define	   a	   given	   concept,	   but	   only	   relative	   to	   a	   theoretical	   framework;	   the	   task	   of	  epistemology	  is,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  the	  isolation	  of	  those	  theoretical	  principles	  that	  allow	  one	  to	  employ	  the	  theory	  to	  make	  empirical	  predictions	  and	  explanations	  of	  natural	  phenomena.	  One	   can	  empirically	   justify	   a	   concept,	   but	  only	   relative	   to	   the	  overall	   empirical	   success	   of	   the	   theory	   as	   a	   whole.	   This	   presupposes	   that	   the	  concept	   in	   question	   can	   be	   completely	   defined	   relative	   to	   the	   theory	   itself,	   and	  therefore	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  already	  complete.	  This	  is	  surely	  one	  way	  of	  empirically	  justifying	  a	  concept.	  However,	  this	  procedure	  is	  inadequate	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  analyse	  the	  empirical	   application	   of	   a	   concept	   (or	   set	   of	   concepts)	   without	   the	   aid	   of	   a	  completed	   theory.	  An	   explanation	  of	   how	   such	   a	   concept	  might	   be	   arrived	   at	  was	  thought	   by	   the	   logical	   empiricists	   to	   exceed	   epistemology,	   at	   least	   partially—requiring	   recourse	   to	   some	   psychological	   faculty	   such	   as	   imagination,	  representation,	  intuition,	  etc.	  Such	  an	  account	  would	  necessitate	  a	  move	  beyond	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  given	  theory—since	  we	  attempt	  to	  justify	  the	  generation	  or	  revision	  of	  a	  concept,	  say,	  before	  a	  theory	  in	  which	  it	  features	  is	  complete—and	  thus	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  epistemic	  justification	  via	  theory	  application.	  	  	   Thus,	  while	  we	  can	  show	  that	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  developed	  an	  extremely	  insightful	  and	  nuanced	  theory	  of	  theories,	  their	  focus	  was	  mainly	  placed	  on	  the	  role	  of	   a	   given	   theory	   as	   constituting	   the	  object	   of	   said	   theory,	   so	   that	   epistemological	  questions	   become	   significant	   relative	   to	   a	   choice	   of	   what	   Reichenbach	   termed	  “axioms	   of	   connection”	   and	   “axioms	   of	   coordination.”66	  Such	   choices	   ought	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Reichenbach	  first	  introduced	  these	  notions	  in	  his	  [1920/1965].	  Axioms	  of	  connection	  are	  empirical	  laws	   that	   employ	   empirically	   well-­‐defined	   concepts.	   Axioms	   of	   coordination	   are	   principles	   which	  offer	   an	  empirical	   interpretation	  of	   the	   theory.	  Thus,	  what	   is	   assumed	  a	  priori	   valid	  by	  one	   theory	  may	  be	  an	  empirical	  question	  in	  another.	  In	  classical	  mechanics	  and	  special	  relativity,	  the	  metric	  of	  space-­‐time	   is	  Euclidean,	   and	  assumed	  as	  an	  axiom	  of	   coordination.	   In	  general	   relativity,	   the	   space-­‐time	  metric	   is	   empirically	   verifiable,	   and	   it	   is	   an	   empirical	   question,	   based	   on	  matter	   and	   energy	  distribution,	  whether	  space	  is	  flat	  or	  not.	  	  
	  	  	  177	  
	  
	  
seen	   as	   constituting	   the	   relativised	  a	  priori	   against	  which	   empirical	   claims	   can	  be	  justified.	  Similarly,	  Schlick	  held	  that	  certain	  conventional	  choices	  needed	  to	  be	  made	  regarding	   constitutive	   a	   priori	   principles	   of	   a	   given	   theory.67	  Thus,	   the	   logical	  empiricists,	   contrary	   to	   many	   of	   their	   critics,	   did	   develop	   a	   comprehensive	  epistemological	   account	   of	   scientific	   theories	   and	   their	   relevant	   differences,	   but	  such	   an	   account	   is	   inadequate	   as	   an	   empirical	   account	   of	   theory	   change.	   Logical	  empiricists	  held	  that	  concepts	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  in	  vacuo,	  rather	  only	  as	  part	  of	  a	  change	   in	   theoretical	   framework,	   and	  changes	  between	   theoretical	   framework	  are	  never	  rationally	  forced	  by	  experience.	  	  	   Given	  that	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  held	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  of	  a	  theory	  to	  be	  defined	   only	   relative	   to	   that	   theory,	   we	   should	   suspect	   this	   result.	   However,	   we	  argue	   that	   this	   is	   a	   false	   dichotomy—there	   are	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   concept	   can	   be	  applied	  to	  generate	  empirical	  judgments	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  owe	  anything	  to	  an	  already	  completed	  theory,	  but	  which	  are	  also	  not	  the	  mere	  sui	  generis	  intuition	  of	  an	  otherwise	   inspired	  mind.	  We	  argue	  that	  dialecticism	  offers	   just	  such	  a	  middle-­‐way	  between	  completed	  theory	  and	  no	  theory	  at	  all.	  	  
II.2:	  Obstacles	  to	  a	  Conception	  of	  Rational	  Theory	  Change	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  propose	  an	  account	  of	  how	  we	  develop	  some	  of	  our	  scientific	  concepts,	  at	   least	   two	  obstacles	  must	  be	  overcome.	  The	   first	   obstacle	  has	  often	  been	   falsely	  identified	  with	  theoretical	  “incommensurability”.	  The	  difficulty	  it	  proposes	  is	  better	  captured	  by	  what	  we	  call	  the	  Non-­‐Evaluability	  Thesis:	  	  
	  
Non-­‐Evaluability	  Thesis	  (NE	  thesis):	  there	  are	  no	  rational	  grounds	  on	  which	  to	  compare	  empirical	  theories.	  	  This	  obstacle	  is	  largely	  a	  chimera.	  The	  problem	  posed	  by	  the	  NE	  thesis	  is	  negotiated	  by	  the	  logical	  empiricists	  via	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  coordinations	  on	  which	  differing	  theories	  rest.	  Also,	  Confirmation	  Theoretical	  accounts	  of	  the	  relative	  impact	  of	  evidence	  on	  disparate	  theories	  have	  not	  only	  shown	  that	  theories	  can	  be	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  See	  Friedman	  [1994/1999]	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  Reichenbach’s	  relativised	  a	  priori	  and	  Schlick’s	  conventionalism.	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mutually	  evaluated,	  but	  that	  differences	  in	  evidence	  can	  even	  be	  quantitatively	  (i.e.	  probabilistically)	   measured.	   Some	   theories	   accord	   better	   with	   the	   evidence	   than	  others,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  fact.	  Such	  comparisons	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  dealing	  only	   with	   the	   rational	   apparatus	   provided	   by	   this	   or	   that	   theory,	   but	   rather	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  empirical	  views.	  	  	   Even	   though	   logical	   empiricist	   and	   Confirmation	   Theoretic	   accounts	   of	  theory	  choice	  offer	  us	  empiricist	  justifications	  of	  concepts	  given	  a	  complete	  theory,	  neither	   overcomes	   our	   second	   obstacle.	   This	   obstacle	   is	   best	   expressed	   by	   the	  following	  thesis:	  	  
Conceptual	   Application	   Thesis	   (CA	   thesis):	   the	   application	   and	   empirical	  revision	   of	   existing	   concepts	   can	   never	   be	   justified	   outside	   of	   a	   theoretical	  framework.	  	  	  Comparison	  of	  views	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  recover	  for	  us	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  revise	  some	  of	   the	  most	   central	   concepts	   of	   the	   theories	  under	   comparison.	   If	  we	   are	   to	  have	   an	   empiricist	   account	   that	   responds	   to	   both	   theses,	   then	   a	   view	   that	  complements	   logical	   empiricist	   and	  Confirmation	  Theoretical	   responses	   to	   the	  NE	  thesis	  must	  be	  found.	  In	  short,	  we	  must	  have	  an	  adequate	  empiricist	  response	  to	  the	  CA	   thesis,	   an	  obstacle	   to	   any	  account	  of	  how	  concepts	   can	  be	  empirically	   justified	  outside	  of	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  theory.	  	   Thus,	  we	  see	  that	  arbitrariness	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  problem	  about	  the	  rationality	  of	   theoretical	   progress,	   but	   also	   a	   putative	   limitation	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   our	  conceptual	  abilities,	   and	  a	   related	  severe	   limitation	  regarding	   the	   flexibility	  of	  our	  concepts.	   Empiricism	   has	   always	   had	   such	   a	   tendency—to	   explain	   our	   great	  conceptual	  flexibility	  in	  matters	  common	  sensical	  and	  scientific	  by	  fixing	  the	  set	  of	  concepts	  given	   in	  experience.	  This	  tendency	  became	  manifest	   in	  Russell’s	  concept-­‐empiricism,	   the	   view	   that	   central	   concepts	   of	   physics—space,	   time,	   matter,	   and	  causality—can	   be	   logically	   constructed	   using	   concepts	   pertaining	   to	   sense-­‐data.68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  For	   a	   distinction	   on	   Russell’s	   epistemological	   aims,	   see	   Grayling	   [2003].	   Grayling	   draws	   the	  distinction	  between	  epistemology	  as	  a	  task	  of	  justifying	  knowledge	  claims	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  “as	  being	  an	  explication	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  what	  the	  claims	  are	  about	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  experience.”	  (450)	  Russell,	  according	  to	  Grayling,	  was	  much	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  latter	  task.	  	  
	  	  	  179	  
	  
	  
Notions	   such	   as	   space,	   time,	   matter,	   and	   causality	   are	   not	   transcendentally	  presupposed	   in	   order	   to	   make	   possible	   any	   empirical	   knowledge,	   in	   fact	   such	  concepts	  are	  actually	  “constructed”.	  For	  example,	  while	  we	  may	  never	  be	  acquainted	  with	  matter	   in	   its	  metaphysical	   reality,	  we	  need	  not	   dogmatically	   assume	   it	   to	   be	  real	   in	  order	   to	  do	  physics.	   Instead	  of	   such	  dogmatic	   assumption	  of	   “real”	  matter,	  one	   	  can	  construct	  a	  logical	  fiction	  having	  the	  same	  formal	  properties,	  or	  rather	  having	   formally	   analogous	   formal	   properties	   to	   those	   of	   the	   supposed	  metaphysical	   entity	   and	   itself	   composed	   of	   empirically	   given	   things,	   and	  that	  logical	  fiction	  can	  be	  substituted	  for	  your	  supposed	  metaphysical	  entity	  and	  will	   fulfill	   all	   the	  scientific	  purposes	   that	  anybody	  can	  desire.	   (Russell	  [1918/1998],	  144)69	  	  In	   this	   way,	   Russell	   believes	   philosophy	   can	   do	   away	   with	   the	   assumptions	   of	  dogmatic	  metaphysics	   as	  well	   as	  Kant’s	   Transcendental	  Aesthetic:	   space	   and	   time	  become	   empirically	   constructible	   concepts.	   Our	   experiences	   of	   sense-­‐data,	   which	  are	   immediate	  and	  therefore	  have	  a	  “primitive	  certainty”,	  can	  then	  be	  coordinated	  with	   physical	   objects	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   our	   coordinations	   can	   be	   mistaken,	   re-­‐thought,	  or	  at	   least	   further	  examined	  (tasks	   that	  modern	  physical	   theory	  may	  do),	  while	  still	  being	  grounded	  in	  an	  act	  of	  sensation	  which	  secures	  for	  us	  objects	  about	  which	  we	  cannot	  be	  mistaken.70	  	   But	   such	   an	   empiricism	   does	   great	   harm	   to	   both	   the	   Insight	   and	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability.	   It	   transgresses	   the	   Insight	  because	   it	  assumes	   that	   there	   is	  a	  set	  of	  basic	  concepts	  that	  cannot	  be	  revised	  in	  light	  of	  experience	  (since	  they	  are	  provided	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  This	  basic	   idea	  was	  proposed	   in	  a	  number	  of	  essays	  produced	  by	  Russell	  after	  1910.	  See	  Russell	  [1912/1997],	  especially	  “the	  Existence	  of	  Matter”	  and	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Matter;	  Russell	   [1914/1963];	  Russell	  [1914/2009];	  and	  Russell	  [1915/1963].	  	  70	  As	   we	   saw	   in	   our	   discussion	   of	   the	   Russell/Poincaré	   debate	   (Chapter	   Three,	   the	   end	   of	   §II),	  Russell’s	  view	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  conventionalist	  accounts	  of	  geometry.	  Russell	  thinks	  that	  one	  of	  the	  things	  we	  can	  be	  acquainted	  with	  are	  specific	  objects	  (sense-­‐data),	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  a	  geometry	  in	   the	   given	   of	   experience.	   Poincaré	   thought	   that	   sense-­‐data	   had	   no	   such	   epistemic	   primacy;	   even	  given	   a	   manifold	   of	   experience,	   certain	   assumptions	   needed	   to	   be	   made,	   most	   significantly	   the	  principle	  of	   free	  mobility.	  We	  also	  saw	  that	  Schlick,	  adopting	  Poincaré’s	  conventionalism,	  criticised	  Russell’s	   “knowledge	   by	   acquaintance”	   for	   assuming	   a	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   that	   did	   not	   need	   to	   be	  subsumed	   under	   concepts	   that	   only	   get	   their	  meaning	   in	   a	   system	  of	   inter-­‐related	   judgments.	   See	  Chapter	  Three,	  §III.	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by	  experience	  itself).	  It	  transgresses	  Multiple-­‐Factorizability	  since	  it	  holds	  that	  there	  is	   a	   privileged	   factorisation	   of	   experience—the	   necessarily	   incorrigible	   and	  immediate	  data	  of	  sense.	  While	  such	  a	  picture	  may	  explain	  how	  we	  apply	  concepts	  without	  a	  particular	  theory	  at	  hand	  (in	  fact,	  it	  shows	  us	  how	  we	  can	  use	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  immediately	  given	  to	  construct	  the	  concepts	  of	  physical	  theory,	  one-­‐by-­‐one),	  it	   does	   not	   do	   so	   in	   a	   way	   consistent	   with	   our	   project	   here	   because	   of	   the	  transgression	   of	   the	   truisms.	  We	  will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   section	   that	   only	   a	  move	   to	  dialectical	  accounts	  of	  conceptual	  application	  and	  conceptual	  revision	  can	  satisfy	  the	  truisms	  (and	  constraints)	  whilst	  also	  offering	  a	  response	  to	  the	  NE	  and	  CA	  theses.	  	  
§III:	  Dialecticism	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  A	   dialectical	   approach	   to	   theory	   change	   in	   the	   exact	   sciences	   holds	   that	   the	  arbitrariness	  problem	  is	  misconstrued.	  Arbitrariness	  follows	  from	  a	  far	  too	  rigid	  and	  formal	   account	   of	  what	   a	   given	   scientific	   theory	   is:	   a	   collection	  of	   sentences,	   each	  with	   a	   distinct	   role.	   Some	   sentences	   express	   the	   underlying	   logico-­‐mathematical	  assumptions	   (and	   may	   be	   common	   to	   theories	   with	   different	   empirical	  interpretations).	   Such	   sentences	   are	   analytic.	   Other	   sentences	   determine	   the	  empirical	   application	   of	   the	   theory.	   These	   are	   likewise	   analytic	   (the	   so-­‐called	  “formal	   auxiliaries”	   of	   one’s	   preferred	   framework	   or	   language),	   though	   they	   are	  coordinated	   with	   properly	   empirical	   sentences.	   Lastly,	   there	   are	   those	   sentences	  which	  are	  truly	  empirical—those	  statements	  which	  are	  discovered	  true	  or	  false	  by	  observation.	  This	  view	  of	  theories	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  logical	  empiricist’s	  commitment	  (especially	  amongst	   the	   left	  wing	  of	   the	  Vienna	  Circle)	   to	  remove	   from	  philosophy	  fruitless	   debate	   on	   metaphysical	   matters	   by	   replacing	   philosophy	   (as	   it	   had	  traditionally	   been	   practiced)	   with	   the	   program	   of	   rational	   reconstruction—the	  construction	   of	   formal	   systems	  which	   could	   then	   be	   proposed	   as	   the	   language	   of	  science.	  All	  scientific	  languages	  have	  these	  three	  parts.	  	   Rather	  than	  engaging	  in	  the	  rational	  reconstruction	  of	  theories	  (in	  the	  logical	  empiricist	   sense	   of	   “reconstruction”),	   dialectical	   approaches	   seek	   to	   establish	   the	  sorts	  of	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  arguments	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  (and	  perhaps	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beyond)	   the	   sciences—to	   show	   the	   various	  ways	   in	  which	   scientists	   (and	   others)	  have	  engaged	  in	  conceptual	  analysis,	  philosophical	  debate,	  and	  empirical	  enquiry	  to	  the	   end	   of	   reaching	   some	   kind	   of	   rational	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   structure	   of	  theories	   and	   concepts	   and	   the	   applicability	   of	   formal	   systems	   to	   physical	  phenomena.	   Far	   from	   there	   being	   some	   sort	   of	   incommensurability	   between	  theoretical	   frameworks,	   the	   history	   shows	   the	   nuanced	   ways	   in	   which	   reflection	  upon	  empirical	  evidence,	  thought-­‐experiments,	  and	  fundamental	  concepts	  has	  been	  the	  cause	  for	  conceptual	  change	  in	  the	  sciences—even	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  sort.	  Here,	  we	  wish	  to	  explore	  two	  very	  different	  ways	  of	  carrying	  out	  this	  project:	  Friedman’s	  neo-­‐Kantian	  dialecticism	  and	  DiSalle’s	  more	  narrow	  dialecticism.	  We	  will	  hold	  that	  while	  both	  adequately	  address	  the	  arbitrariness	  problem,	  speaking	  to	  the	  NE	  and	  CA	  theses,	  only	  DiSalle’s	  more	  empirically	  sensitive	  form	  of	  dialecticism	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  satisfy	  the	  truisms	  and	  minimal	  constraints	  of	  Gupta’s	  empiricism.	  In	  fact,	  we	  will	  argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   very	   happy	   congress	   between	  Gupta’s	   Reformed	   Empiricism	  and	  DiSalle’s	  account	  of	  the	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  modern	  theories	  of	  space	  and	  time—Reformed	   Empiricism	   actually	   makes	   perspicuous	   the	   logic	   underlying	  empirically	  sensitive	  dialecticism.	  This	  means	  that	  insofar	  as	  DiSalle	  offers	  a	  correct	  picture	   of	   the	   dialectically	   rational	   progression	   of	  modern	  physics,	   Gupta’s	   logical	  machinery	  can	  be	  used	  to	  account	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  said	  progress.	  	  
III.1:	  Friedman’s	  Wide	  Dialecticism	  In	  his	  [2001],	  Friedman	  argues	  that	  philosophy	  of	  science	  acts	  as	  a	  dialectical	  space	  in	   which	   discussants	   (both	   scientists	   and	   philosophers)	   can	   propose	   different	   a	  
priori	   principles	   (and	   thus,	   theoretical	   frameworks)	   for	   the	   study	   of	   nature.	  Friedman	  argues	   that	   the	   traditional	   role	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  as	  exhibited	  by	  Kant’s	   adherence	   to	   constitutive	   a	   priori	   principles	   and	   the	   logical	   empiricists’	  adherence	  to	  conventionalism	  and	  Tolerance,	  served	  a	  similar	  purpose:	   to	  provide	  meta-­‐level	   discussion	   on	   a	   number	   of	   salient	   topics	   in	   the	   history	   of	   a	   given	  discipline	   in	   order	   that	   one	   can	   evaluate	   proposals	   of	   constitutive,	   coordinating	  principles	   that	   give	   physical	   theory	   (for	   Kant)	   or	   theories	   (for	   the	   logical	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empiricists)	   an	   empirical	   interpretation.	   Kant	   thought	   the	   matter	   settled	   with	   a	  thorough	  account	  of	  the	  transcendental	  conditions	  which	  give	  Newton’s	  physics	  its	  object,	  but	  such	  conditions	  were	  found	  to	  be	  too	  restrictive	  given	  the	  mathematical	  and	   physical	   developments	   of	   the	   late	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	   centuries	   (surveyed	   in	  Chapter	   Two).	   The	   logical	   empiricists,	   while	   more	   flexible	   than	   Kant,	   also	  confronted	   intractable	   difficulty.	   Schlick’s	   conventionalism,	   Reichenbach’s	  relativised	  a	  priori,	  and	  the	  Carnapian	  notion	  of	  Tolerance,	  while	  possible	  accounts	  of	   the	   dialectical	   space	   in	   which	   conceptual	   debates	   can	   occur,	   are	   not	   strong	  enough	   to	   definitively	   block	   worries,	   says	   Friedman,	   about	   Kuhnian	  incommensurability.71	  But	  according	  to	  Friedman,	  we	  need	  not	  surrender	  to	  Kuhn	  so	  easily.	  We	  can	  challenge	  Kuhn	  on	  his	  insistence	  that	  no	  intellectual	  discipline	  can	  be	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  hosting	  meta-­‐level	  discussion	  of	  central	  theoretical	  concepts.	  Kuhn	  held	  that	  the	  sciences	  are	  exemplars	  amongst	  all	  intellectual	  disciplines	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  achieve	  “paradigm	   stability”.	   Yet,	   this	   paradigm	   stability	   also	   entails	   paradigm	   rigidity,	  leading	  to	  the	  problem	  of	   incommensurability.	  Kuhn’s	  reasoning	   is	  represented	  by	  the	  following	  simple	  argument:	  	  	  (1) If	   any	   disciplines	   are	   capable	   of	   quelling	   the	   instability	   of	   revolutionary	  moments,	  it	  is	  those	  that	  do	  not	  themselves	  exhibit	  paradigm	  instability.	  	  (2) The	  most	   stable	   sciences	   are	   unable	   to	   discuss	  meta-­‐level	   questions	   about	  their	  conceptual	  differences;	  	  (C) Therefore,	  such	  questions	  are	  not	  answerable.	  	  Friedman	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  an	  invalid	  inference.	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sciences	  are	  the	   most	   stable	   sorts	   of	   intellectual	   enterprise	   we	   have,	   we	   ought	   not	   infer	   they	  should	   be	   up	   to	   the	   task	   of	   showing	   how	   theoretical	   progress	   and	   conceptual	  revision	   are	   possible.	   Rather,	   the	   lack	   of	   paradigm	   stability	   in	   a	   discipline	   like	  philosophy	  makes	   it	   (not	   the	   stable	   sciences)	   a	  more	   likely	   candidate	   to	   revise	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Kuhn’s	   notion	   of	   incommensurability	   is	   actually	   a	   semantic	   variant	   of	   arbitrariness	   and	   the	   NE	  thesis.	  For	  Kuhn,	  radically	  different	  scientific	  theories	  model	  the	  world	  in	  different	  ways,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  paradigm	  neutral	  space	  for	   inter-­‐communication	  between	  these	  theories,	  since	  there	   is	  no	  basis	  on	   which	   we	   can	   translate	   one	   theory	   into	   the	   terms	   of	   another.	   (The	   actual	   employment	   of	   this	  concept	  in	  Kuhn’s	  work	  is	  not	  nearly	  so	  coherent	  as	  Friedman	  assumes	  it	  to	  be.)	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generate	  central	  theoretical	  concepts.	  Philosophy	  provides	  the	  space	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	   where	   philosophical	   arguments	   are	   provided	   for	   the	   development	   of	  concepts	   that	   are	   outside	   of	   prevailing	   scientific	   theory	   and	   practice	   (at	   least	  explicitly).	  Science	  is	  then	  free	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  rigid	  theory	  around	  the	  concepts	  once	  they	  have	  been	  proposed.	  	  The	   existence	   of	   such	   philosophical	   dialogue	   provides	   a	   kind	   of	  communicative	   rationality	   that	   refutes	   the	   CA	   thesis	   and	   its	   Kuhnian	   cousin:	  incommensurability.72	  For	  Kuhn,	  debates	  on	  matters	  of	  deep	  principle	  are	  inevitable	  and	  necessarily	  inconclusive,	  since	  one’s	  attitudes	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  philosophy	  in	  question	  (along	  with	  other	  “subjective”	   factors).	  Friedman’s	  view	  sheds	   light	  on	  why	   this	   Kuhnian	   account	   is	   not	   true.	   The	   development	   of	   some	   of	   our	   central	  theoretical	   concepts	   is	   done	   outside	   of	   rigid	   theoretical	   frameworks,	   but	   it	   is	   (at	  least	  in	  some	  sense)	  rational—it	  inherits	  the	  communicative	  rationality	  of	  the	  meta-­‐level	   debates	   between	   “philosophically-­‐minded	   scientists”	   and	   “scientifically-­‐minded	  philosophers”.	  This	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   rationality	   that	  Kuhn	  does	  not	  adequately	  address,	  but	  it	  does	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  heavy	  lifting	  in	  Friedman’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  rational	  character	  of	  scientific	  progress.	  Philosophy	   of	   science	   (though	   philosophy	   more	   generally,	   and	   even	   the	  humanities	   and	   social	   sciences	  more	   generally	   than	   that)	   thus	   have	   a	   key	   role	   to	  play	  in	  ensuring	  that	  scientific	  progress	  can	  occur	  (that	  scientific	  “paradigms”	  do	  not	  become	   too	   stagnant),	   and	   that	   such	   progress	   is	   organised	   by	   the	   regulative	  demands	   of	   reason	   to	   always	   be	   engaged	   in	   a	   revision	   of	   one’s	   scientific	   theory	  (once	  again,	  to	  avoid	  stagnation).	  The	  following	  passage	  sums	  up	  the	  wide	  dialectic	  that	  continually	  occurs	  between	  philosophy	  and	  science:	  	  Science,	   if	   it	   is	   to	   continue	   to	   progress	   through	   revolutions…	   needs	   a	   new	  source	  of	   ideas,	  alternative	  programs,	  and	  expanded	  possibilities	  that	   is	  not	  itself	   scientific	   in	   the	   same	   sense—that	   does	   not,	   as	   do	   the	   sciences	  themselves,	  operate	  within	  a	  generally	  agreed	  upon	  framework	  of	  taken	  for	  granted	   rules.	   For	   what	   is	   needed	   here	   is	   precisely	   the	   creation	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Of	  course,	  Friedman	  believes	  he	  is	  responding	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  incommensurability,	  not	  the	  more	  precisely	  formulated	  NE	  and	  CA	  theses.	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stimulation	  of	  new	  frameworks	  or	  paradigms,	  together	  with	  what	  we	  might	  call	   meta-­‐frameworks	   or	   meta-­‐paradigms—new	   conceptions	   of	   what	   a	  coherent	   rational	   understanding	   of	   nature	   might	   amount	   to—capable	   of	  motivating	  and	  sustaining	  the	  revolutionary	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  first-­‐level	  or	  scientific	   paradigm.	   Philosophy,	   throughout	   its	   close	   association	   with	   the	  sciences,	  has	  functioned	  in	  precisely	  this	  way.	  (Friedman	  [2001],	  23)	  	  Under	   such	   a	   picture,	   central	   parts	   of	   Reichenbach’s	   context	   of	   discovery	  (specifically	   the	   parts	   which	   require	   the	   free	   play	   of	   inspiration	   from	   some	   non-­‐epistemic	   source	   to	   explain	   conceptual	   innovation	   and	   revision)	   are	   replaced	   by	  philosophy	   itself,	  which	   structures	   “discovery”	   as	   the	   product	   of	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	  debate	  that	  follows	  certain	  strictures	  of	  communicative	  rationality.	  	  Friedman	   here	   exploits	   the	   cleavage	   between	   Kant’s	   conception	   of	  constitutive	   a	   priori	   principles	   and	   merely	   regulative	   principles.	   For	   Kant,	  constitutive	   a	   priori	   principles	   offer	   “rules	   of	   synthesis”	   which	   determine	   the	  apprehension	   of	   an	   object	   in	   appearance,	   and	   which	   also	   fix	   for	   us	   the	   object	   of	  science.	   Constitutive	   principles	   supply	   a	   concept	   of	   a	   real	   object.	   (Kant	  [1781/1787/1998],	  A306/B363;	  A648/B676)	  In	  this	  way,	  Newton’s	  laws	  of	  motion	  determine	   the	  object	  of	  Newtonian	  physics;	   the	   laws	  are	   the	  necessary	   conditions	  for	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  objective	  knowledge.	  However	  Kant	  also	  held	  that	  reason	  also	  makes	  demands	  upon	  us	  of	  a	  non-­‐determinative	  or	  non-­‐constitutive	  sort:	  what	  Kant	  called	  regulative	  principles.	  Regulative	  principles	  (which	  Kant	  introduces	  in	  the	  Appendix	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  Dialectic)	  are	  those	  principles	  (or	  ideals)	  of	  reason	  that	   demand	   a	   “systematic	   unity”.	   Here,	   Kant	   is	   arguing	   that	   the	   understanding’s	  ability	   to	   think	   of	   an	   object	   owes	  much	   to	   reason’s	   demand	   that	   such	   thought	   be	  unified,	  especially	  if	  such	  thought	  is	  supposed	  to	  proceed	  from	  an	  unsystematic	  sort	  to	   scientific	   theory.	   (Kant	   [1781/1787/1998],	   A651-­‐52/B679-­‐80)	   Knowledge	   is	  unified	  systematically	  by	  reason’s	  demand	  that	  we	  find	  fewer	  and	  fewer	  laws	  under	  which	  empirical	  phenomena	  can	  be	  subsumed.	  The	  ideal	  of	  reason	  here	  is	  a	  unified	  knowledge,	   or	   a	   “whole	   of	   knowledge”,	   which	   will	   systematise	   all	   contingent	  judgments	  about	  matters	  of	   fact	  (supplied	  by	  the	  understanding)	  so	  that	  they	  may	  be	  coherently	  held	  together,	  as	  branches	  of	  the	  same	  science,	  nomically	  connected.	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Of	   course,	   for	   Kant	   (and	   later	   neo-­‐Kantian	   thinkers	   like	   Cassirer),	   such	   an	  ideal	   can	   never	   be	   reached.	   Its	   value	   lies	   in	   ensuring	   that	   science	   is	   always	   in	   a	  position	   to	  progress,	   not	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   constitutive	  principles,	  which	   are	   entirely	  fixed	   as	  we	   have	   observed,	   but	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   regulative	   principles	   bring	  with	  them	   a	   kind	   of	   theoretical	   convenience.	   Without	   unification,	   and	   the	   related	  assumption	   that	   nature	   conforms	   to	   our	   demands	   for	   unification,	   our	   scientific	  researches	  would	  lack	  focus	  and	  direction,	  and,	  as	  Friedman	  points	  out,	  they	  would	  quickly	   become	   stagnant	   or	   impossible.	   Regulative	   principles	   are	   even	   more	  important	   in	   those	   sciences	   which	   Kant	   thought	   to	   lack	   constitutive	   principles,	  especially	  chemistry	  and	  biology—here,	   it	   is	  the	  unification	  of	  theory	  that	  not	  only	  gives	  such	  studies	  direction,	  but	  forms	  for	  them	  a	  revisable	  understanding	  of	  their	  objects.	  What	   Friedman	   proposes	   is	   this:	   reject	   constitutive	   principles	   (in	   Kant’s	  sense)	  altogether,	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  regulative	  principles	  when	  thinking	  about	  the	   sciences.	   No	   longer	   is	   physics	   beholden	   to	   a	   determinate	   object	   based	   on	  Newton’s	  laws,	  rather	  science	  becomes	  a	  succession	  of	  historically	  related	  revisions	  of	   physical	   theory	   convergent	   upon	   regulative	   ideals	   of	   simplicity,	   unity,	   and	  systematicity.	  (Friedman	  [2001],	  64)	  This	  account	  of	  theoretical	  progress	  takes	  it	  as	  wrote	  that	  deep	  conceptual	  revolutions	  or	  “paradigm-­‐shifts”	  occur	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Kuhn	  thought	  them	  to;	   it	  adopts	  as	   its	   task	  the	  offering	  of	  some	  account	  of	  why	  such	  shifts	  in	  paradigm	  do	  not	  lead	  directly	  to	  the	  arbitrariness	  problem—why	  such	   shifts	   aren’t	   merely	   instances	   of	   “conversion”.	   It	   admits	   that	   there	   are	   no	  constitutive	  principles	  in	  Kant’s	  sense—no	  necessary,	  apodictic,	  universal	  principles	  which	   determine	   (once	   and	   for	   all)	   the	   features	   of	   objects	   (or	   of	   the	   necessary	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  background	  in	  which	  we	  come	  to	  represent	  said	  objects).	  	  But	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  such	  necessities	  also	  comes	  relativism	  (or	  so	  the	  worry	  goes).	  Friedman’s	  solution:	  in	  place	  of	  constitutive	  principles	  of	  the	  Kantian	  sort,	  we	  substitute	   the	   regulative	   principle	   that	   the	   evolution	   of	   scientific	   thought	   itself	   is	  approaching	   an	   ideal,	   and	   that	   at	   each	   stage	   we	   may	   revise	   those	   principles	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constitutive	  of	  our	  current	  outlook.	  Friedman	  phrases	  it	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  convergence	  (though	  in	  a	  very	  different	  sense	  from	  Gupta’s	  notion	  of	  convergence):	  	  	   We	  can	  imagine...	  that	  our	  present	  constitutive	  principles	  represent	  one	  stage	  of	   a	   convergent	   process,	   as	   it	   were,	   in	   that	   they	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	  approximations	   to	   more	   general	   and	   adequate	   constitutive	   principles	   that	  will	   only	   be	   articulated	   at	   a	   later	   stage.	   We	   can	   thus	   view	   our	   present	  scientific	   community,	   which	   has	   achieved	   temporary	   consensus	   based	   on	  communicative	   rationality	   erected	   on	   its	   present	   constitutive	   principles,	   as	  an	  approximation	  to	  a	  final,	  ideal	  community	  of	  inquiry	  (to	  use	  an	  obviously	  Peircian	  figure)	  that	  has	  achieved	  a	  universal,	  trans-­‐historical	  communicative	  rationality	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   fully	   general	   and	   adequate	   constitutive	  principles	  reached	  in	  the	  ideal	  limit	  of	  scientific	  progress.	  (ibid)	  	  In	  fact,	  we	  must	  employ	  this	  regulative	  use	  of	  reason	  “for	  only	  so	  can	  the	  required	  inter-­‐paradigm	   notion	   of	   communicative	   rationality	   be	   sustained”.	   (Friedman	  [2001],	  65)	  	   According	  to	  Friedman,	  this	  regulative	  ideal	  should	  be	  manifest	  in	  historical	  instances	   of	   paradigm-­‐shift,	   so	   that	   it	   satisfies	   three	   criteria.	   Firstly,	   the	   new	  conceptual	   framework	  should	  contain	   the	  conceptual	   framework	  of	   the	  old	   theory	  “as	  an	  approximate	  limiting	  case”.	  (An	  example	  is	  the	  way	  that	  Newton’s	  system	  is	  the	  limiting	  case	  of	  taking	  invariant	  velocity	  c	  to	  infinity,	  or	  collapsing	  the	  past	  and	  future	  light-­‐cones	  together	  as	  surfaces	  of	  absolute	  simultaneity.)	  Secondly,	  “that	  the	  new	   constitutive	   principles	   should	   also	   evolve	   continuously	   out	   of	   the	   old	  constitutive	  principles,	  by	  a	  series	  of	  transformations”;	  and	  thirdly,	  “this	  process	  of	  continuous	   conceptual	   transformation	   should	   be	   motivated	   and	   sustained	   by	   an	  appropriate	  new	  philosophical	  meta-­‐framework...”	  (Friedman	  [2001],	  6)	  Since	  there	  are	  any	  number	  of	  possible	  transformations	  at	  any	  point	  in	  this	  convergent	  process,	  and	  since	  many	  roads	  may	  approach	  the	  ideal,	  there	  is	  nothing	  necessary	  about	  the	  nature	   of	   our	   scientific	   development.	   (Friedman	   [2001],	   68)	   The	   progress	   of	   the	  sciences	   is	  perfectly	  contingent,	  and	  we	  cannot	  read	  off	  of	  our	  currently	  dominant	  conceptual	  frameworks	  and	  philosophical	  debates	  what	  the	  new	  transitions	  will	  be;	  at	  best	  we	  have	  “educated	  guesses”	  for	  how	  the	  next	  step	  will	  look.	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   It	  is	  clear	  that	  Friedman	  keeps	  the	  arbitrariness	  problem	  at	  bay,	  and	  that	  he	  argues	   successfully	   against	   the	   NE	   and	   CA	   theses.	   The	   NE	   thesis	   is	   successfully	  refuted	   because	   all	   new	   conceptual	   frameworks	   contain	   the	   old	   conceptual	  framework	   at	   some	   well-­‐specified	   and	   defined	   limit.	   Not	   only	   can	   different	  conceptual	   frameworks	   be	   compared,	   but,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   new	   conceptual	  frameworks	  must	  always	  possess	   the	  ability	   to	  construct	   the	   frameworks	   they	  are	  replacing	  within	  their	  own	  systems.	  What	  such	  findings	  show	  is	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  no	   such	   thing	   as	   what	   Friedman	   calls	   “retrospective	   irrationality”	   (one	   half	   of	  Kuhn’s	   notion	   of	   incommensurability):	   there	   are	   no	   new	   scientific	   conceptions	   of	  the	  world	  which	  make	   the	  understanding	  of	   a	   previous	  paradigm	   impossible.	   The	  other	   half	   of	   Kuhnian	   incommensurability,	   what	   Friedman	   calls	   “prospective	  irrationality”	   (how	   those	   working	   within	   a	   previous	   paradigm	  might	   view	   a	   new	  paradigm)	   is	   refuted	   because	   new	   conceptual	   frameworks	   grow	   out	   of	   (are	   a	  continuous	  transformation	  of)	  old	  conceptual	  systems.	  Here,	  Friedman	  gives	  as	  his	  example	  Einstein’s	   formulation	  of	   the	  principle	   of	   the	   constancy	  of	   the	   velocity	   of	  light	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  indistinguishability	  of	  different	  inertial	  frames	  via	  optical	   and	   electrodynamical	   considerations.	  As	   Friedman	   argues,	   Einstein	  merely	  raises	  it	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	  “coordinating	  principle”,	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  classical	  coordination	  based	  on	  the	  laws	  of	  motion	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  propagation	  of	  a	  causal	  signal	  with	  no	  upper	  limit.	  (Friedman	  [2001],	  102)	  	  Friedman	   also	   claims	   that	   Einstein	   did	   something	   very	   similar	   with	   the	  principle	  of	  equivalence.	  All	  physical	  theories	  going	  back	  as	  far	  as	  Aristotle	  held	  that	  it	   was	   a	   very	  well-­‐established	   fact	   that	   there	  must	   be	   some	   fundamental	   state	   of	  natural	  motion,	  and	  that	  deviations	  from	  that	  motion	  must	  be	  caused	  by	  some	  force.	  (ibid)	   	   Galileo	   transformed	   Aristotle’s	   natural	   place	   and	   natural	   motion	   with	   a	  conception	   of	   inertia;	   the	   precise	   mathematical	   concept	   of	   force	   was	   then	  articulated	  by	  Newton	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	   laws	  of	  motion	  (as	  a	  privileged	  inertial	  frame).	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   experiment,	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   between	   inertial	   and	  gravitational	  mass.	  Once	  again,	  Einstein	  “elevates”	  this	  empirical	  fact	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	   coordinative	   principle.	   The	   gravitational	   field	   is	   physically	   equivalent	   to	   a	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corresponding	  acceleration	  of	  the	  reference	  frame	  (and	  thus	  gravitation	  is	  no	  longer	  considered	   an	   external	   force).	   This	   radically	   transforms	   what	   may	   count	   as	   a	  “natural	   motion”—which	   is	   now	   uniquely	   determined	   for	   a	   given	   space	   by	   the	  trajectory	  followed	  by	  a	  particle	  in	  free	  fall,	  i.e.	  a	  “geodesic”.	  But,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	   a	   particle	   in	   free	   fall	   cannot	   constitute	   a	   natural	  motion	   in	   classical	   physics,	  Einstein	   has	   framed	   his	   coordinative	   principle	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   practitioners	  starting	   from	  a	  classical	  model	  could	  make	  perfect	  sense	  of	  general	  relativity	  (and	  be	  in	  the	  position	  to	  adopt	  it	  not	  merely	  as	  an	  excellent	  black-­‐box	  predictor,	  but	  as	  a	  physical	  theory	  they	  grasp	  as	  having	  evolved	  from	  their	  classical	  model).	  The	  above	  considerations	  offer	  a	  refutation	  of	   the	  CA	  thesis	  as	  well,	   for	   the	  development	   of	   some	   particular	   concepts	   may	   very	   well	   be	   theory-­‐bound,	   but	   a	  great	   many	   concepts	   (such	   as	   natural	   motion)	   are	   not	   bound	   to	   any	   theoretical	  framework—they	   rather	   characterise	   the	   neutral	   “facts”	   countenanced	   by	   all	  relevant	   theories,	   including	   those	   with	   radically	   different	   domains.	   We	   develop	  these	   concepts	   in	   an	   evolutionary	   way,	   building	   meaning	   upon	   them	   as	   we	   go,	  always	   striving	   toward	   some	   ideal	   and	  always	   respecting	  previous	   applications	  of	  the	   concept.	   Convergence	   on	   a	   common	   picture	   of	   the	   world	   is	   thus	   the	   never	  completable	   telos	   of	   theoretical	   science—including,	   we	   may	   assume,	   consilience	  amongst	   different	   domains,	   should	   they	   employ	   some	   of	   the	   same	   concepts.	  Agreement	  increases	  certainty.	  	  Torretti	   has	   built	   upon	   this	   general	   account	   of	   consilience,	   arguing	   that	   it	  produces	  effects	  beyond	  the	  mere	  belief	  that	  some	  inductions	  may	  be	  more	  certain	  than	  others.	  Torretti	  conceives	  of	  consilience	  as	  a	  convergence	  process	  of	  different	  domains,	   the	   effects	   of	  which	   seem	   irreversible.	   (Torretti	   [1999],	   222)	  Consilience	  brings	  unifications	   that	   collect	   and	   explain	   the	  phenomena	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  “go	  back”	  to	  a	  time	  before	  such	  systematisation,	  nor	  can	  we	  imagine	  introducing	  an	  entirely	  new	  concept	  (in	  an	  entirely	  new	  theory)	  which	  did	  not	  cover	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  concept	  as	  convergence	  has	  established	  it	  to	  this	  point.	  Torretti	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  gravitation:	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...	   no	   one	   today	   would	   dream	   of	   placing	   different	   subsets	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  gravitational	   phenomena	  under	   disparate	   conceptions.	  We	  naturally	   expect	  every	  purported	  successor	   to	  Newton’s	   theory	  of	  gravity	   to	  account	   for	   the	  fall	  of	  heavy	  bodies	  and	  the	  circulation	  of	  the	  planets,	  not	  forgetting	  the	  tides	  and	  the	  precession	  of	  the	  equinoxes...	  (ibid)73	  	  However,	  one	  rather	  large	  disanalogy	  between	  Torretti’s	  neo-­‐consilience	  conception	  of	   convergence	   and	   Friedman’s	   neo-­‐Kantian	   use	   of	   regulative	   ideals	   is	   that	  Friedman’s	   project	   is,	   as	  we	   have	   indicated,	   teleological,	  whereas	   Torretti’s	   avails	  itself	   only	   of	   conceptual	   critique	   and	   inductive	   consilience.	   The	   rationality	   of	  progress	  in	  the	  sciences	  is	  anticipatory,	  not	  regulative;	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	   seen	   unifications	   bring	   more	   and	   more	   phenomena	   under	   a	   smaller	   and	  smaller	   set	  of	  principles	   and	   concepts,	  not	   a	  by-­‐product	  of	   some	   regulative	  use	  of	  reason	   and	   its	   accompanying	  model	   of	   communicative	   rationality	   that	   holds	   that	  such	  unifications	  must	  be	  sought.	  	  	   Torretti	  does	  not	  (to	  our	  knowledge)	  explore	  this	  non-­‐teleological	  model	  of	  consilience	   in	   detail.	   However,	   DiSalle	   proposes	   what	   we	   take	   to	   be	   a	   cognate	  theory—a	  dialectical	  account	  which	  dispenses	  with	  reference	  to	  regulative	  ideals	  by	  showing	  that	  “revolutionary”	  moments	  in	  the	  history	  of	  physics	  have	  actually	  been	  well-­‐founded	  responses	  to	  existing	  (though	  perhaps	  not	  yet	  well-­‐defined)	  problems	  based	  on	  uncontested	   empirical	   claims	   and	   the	  presuppositions	  of	   those	   concepts	  required	   by	   physics.	   By	   taking	   focus	   away	   from	   the	   historically	   distorting	   grand	  narratives	  and	  their	  endless	  quarrels	  (e.g.	  the	  absolute-­‐relational	  debate),	  DiSalle	  is	  able	  to	  focus	  his	  approach	  on	  showing	  that	  dialectical	  arguments	  (in	  the	  philosophy	  of	   science)	   start	   with	   a	   principle	   that	   is	   in	   use,	   even	   if	   only	   implicitly,	   in	   the	   old	  scheme,	  only	   to	  show	  that	   the	  principle	   is	   incompatible	  with	   fundamental	  parts	  of	  that	   scheme.	   This	  more	  minimal	   dialecticism	   (or	   “narrow	  dialecticism”,	   as	  we	   are	  calling	  it)	  offers	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  arbitrariness	  problem	  and	  a	  rebuke	  of	  the	  NE	  and	  CA	  theses	  (as	  did	  Friedman’s	  wide	  dialecticism),	  but	  it	  does	  so	  without	  the	  excessive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Of	  course,	  some	  quantum	  theories	  of	  gravity	  that	  use	  a	  flat	  background	  metric	  do	  attempt	  to	  undo	  the	   unification	   of	   inertia	   and	   gravity.	   The	   general	   rule	   still	   applies,	   even	   if	   Torretti’s	   absolute	  language	  finds	  a	  counter-­‐instance	  or	  two.	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Kantianism	   that	   precludes	   Friedman’s	   approach	   from	   preserving	   the	   Insight	   of	  Empiricism	   (since	   his	   view	   of	   rational	   progress	   does	   not	   provide	   the	   given	   in	  experience	   any	   rational	   role	   at	   all).	  We	  hold	   that	   this	  minimalism	  makes	  DiSalle’s	  position	   amenable	   to	   a	   more	   formal	   presentation	   using	   the	   logical	   framework	   of	  Reformed	  Empiricism.	  	  
III.2:	  DiSalle’s	  Narrow	  Dialecticism	  and	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  Friedman’s	  wide	   dialecticism	   is,	   as	  we	   have	   just	   seen,	   not	   only	   an	   account	   of	   the	  rationality	   of	   theoretical	   progress,	   but	   also	   an	   account	   of	   how	   it	   is	   philosophy	  factors	   into	   the	   historical	   and	   conceptual	   development	   of	   the	   sciences.	   DiSalle	  preserves	   the	   first	   desideratum,	   but	   not	   the	   second.	   For	   DiSalle,	   we	   have	   a	  “philosophy	  of	  space	  and	  time”	  not	  because	  philosophy	  operates	  as	  a	  more	  or	   less	  autonomous	   discipline	   in	   which	   grand	   debates	   about	   age-­‐old	   questions	   can	   take	  place	   (as	  Friedman	  holds),	  offering	  us	   the	  kind	  of	   conceptual	   freedom	  required	   to	  bring	   about	   the	   next	   revolution	   in	   theoretical	   physics.	   DiSalle	   argues	   that	   the	  absolute-­‐relational	  debate	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  “motivating	  principles	  of	  physical	   speculation”.	   However,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   central	   concern	   (much	   less	   the	   only	  concern)	   for	   DiSalle’s	   researches.	   The	   debate	   plays	   a	   far	   more	   limited	   role	   in	  DiSalle’s	   dialecticism	   than	   it	   does	   in	  Friedman’s,	   due	   in	  no	   small	   part	   to	   a	   further	  concern:	  that	  a	  too	  narrow	  focus	  on	  this	  question	  alone	  has	  obscured	  much	  of	  20th	  century	  philosophy	  of	  physics,	  and	  “clouded”	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  historical	   development	   of	   philosophical	   and	   scientific	   thought	   regarding	   the	  concepts	  of	  space	  and	  time.	  (DiSalle	  [2006a],	  1-­‐2)	  	  Those	  debates	  don’t	  explain	  the	  significant	  developments	  of	  theories	  of	  space	  and	   time.	   Firstly,	   they	   do	   not	   motivate	   theoretical	   progress,	   at	   least	   not	   directly,	  because	  (as	  Friedman	  shows)	   they	  stand	  outside	  of	   the	  physical	  application	  of	   the	  relevant	   concepts	   in	   question.	   The	   development	   of	   this	   or	   that	   concept	   does	   not	  itself	  motivate	  anything	  like	  a	  change	  in	  theory.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  some	  application	  of	  the	  concept—or	  some	  indication	  that	  the	  concept	  cannot	  be	  applied	  as	  assumed	  by	   the	  old	   scheme	   (such	  as	   the	  application	  of	   the	   implied	  Newtonian	  definition	  of	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simultaneity	  in	  light	  of	  concerns	  about	  light	  signaling).	  Secondly,	  those	  debates	  are	  not,	  by	  their	  very	  nature,	  sensitive	  to	  empirical	  evidence.	  If	  Friedman	  is	  correct,	  then	  such	  debates	  must	  be	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	   interlocutors	   in	  such	  debates	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  empirical	  application	  of	  concepts	  in	  particular	  physical	  theories.	  By	   framing	   philosophy	   of	   physics	   through	   the	   absolute-­‐relational	   debate,	  analyses	  (like	  Friedman’s)	  have	  put	  far	  too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  autonomous	  philosophical	  discussion	  as	  determinant	   in	  a	   field	  of	  study	  which	  has	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  recent	  and	  not-­‐so-­‐recent	  historical	  fact)	  become	  more	  and	  more	  indebted	  to	  physical	  modes	  of	  thinking.74	  (We	  saw	  an	  early	  push	  in	  this	  direction	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  where	  we	  quoted	  Mach’s	  anti-­‐metaphysical	   introductory	   remarks	   to	  his	   [1886/1887].)	   Our	   main	   focus	   is	   not,	   however,	   to	   make	   claims	   about	   the	  direction	  of	  20th	   century	  philosophy	  of	   science,	  but	   to	  argue	   (pace	   Friedman)	   that	  changes	   in	   scientific	   theories	   are	   instances	   of	   empirically-­‐driven	   conceptual	  revision,	  not	  an	  application	  of	  general	  philosophical	  principles.	  	  Friedman	  has	  missed	  a	  critical	  point	  to	  which	  DiSalle	  draws	  our	  attention:	  we	  have	  a	  philosophy	  of	  space	  and	  time	  not	  because	  philosophers	  made	  physics	  more	  philosophical,	   but	   because	   physicists	   (over	   the	   course	   of	   500	   years)	   made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  For	  this	  reason,	  some	  of	  the	  remarks	  in	  Nick	  Huggett	  [2009]	  seem	  to	  miss	  the	  mark.	  Huggett	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	   the	   very	   real	   differences	   in	   the	   use	   of	   Kantian	   and	   positivistic	   themes	   regarding	   a	  prioricity	  in	  Friedman’s	  and	  DiSalle’s	  accounts,	  thinking	  them	  to	  be	  entirely	  complementary.	  Here	  is	  an	  example:	  	   In	  this	  project	  DiSalle	  is	  closely	  in	  step	  with	  Friedman’s	  [2001]	  neo-­‐Kantian	  program,	  which	  also	  seeks	  to	  show	  how	  changes	  in	  the	  most	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  mathematical	  physics	  can	  [be]	  made	  by	  a	  process	  of	  rational	  deliberation–indeed	  exactly	  the	  process	  described	  by	  DiSalle.	  (The	  connection	  is	  no	  coincidence;	  both	  authors	  cite	  the	  other’s	  influence.)	  (Huggett	  [2009],	  414)	  	  While	  the	  connection	  is	  certainly	  not	  coincidental,	  we	  must	  not	  let	  it	  draw	  our	  attention	  away	  from	  the	   fact	   that	   DiSalle	   avails	   himself	   of	   much	   less	   of	   the	   Kantian	   framework,	   and	   much	   less	   of	  Reichenbach’s	  idea	  of	  a	  relativised	  a	  priori	  than	  does	  Friedman.	  A	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  Huggett’s	  part	  also	  means	   he	   conflates	  DiSalle’s	   narrow	  dialecticism	  with	   Friedman’s	  wide	  dialecticism,	   asserting	   that	  DiSalle	   is	   proposing	   (like	  Friedman)	   that	   the	  primary	  dialectic	   is	   between	  physics	   and	  philosophy.	  (Huggett	  [2009],	  405)	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  DiSalle	  holds	  that	  science	  fruitfully	  engages	  in	  a	  dialectic	  with	   empirical	   discovery	   by	   using	   some	   philosophical	   tools	   (i.e.	   conceptual	   analysis),	   but	   this	   is	   a	  very	  different	  position,	  as	  we	  hope	  to	  make	  clear	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section.	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philosophy	   more	   sensitive	   to	   empirical	   and	   physical	   concerns	   (especially	   those	  regarding	  measurement).	  	   ...	   the	   physics	   of	   space	   and	   time	   has	   not	   earned	   its	   place	   in	   philosophy	   by	  suggesting	   empirical	   answers	   to	   standing	   philosophical	   questions	   about	  space	   and	   time.	   Instead,	   it	   has	   succeeded	   in	   redefining	   the	   questions	  themselves	   in	   its	   own	   empirical	   terms.	   The	   struggle	   to	   articulate	   these	  definitions,	  and	  to	  re-­‐assess	  and	  revise	  them	  in	  the	  face	  of	  changing	  empirical	  circumstances,	   is	   the	   history	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   space	   and	   time	   from	  Newton	  to	  Einstein.	  (DiSalle	  [2006a],	  1)	  	  	  For	  DiSalle,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  changes	  we	  saw	  in	  physics	  during	  this	  modern	  period	  owes	  much	  to	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  analysis.75	  This	  variety	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  starts	  by	  analysing	  what	  physics	  presupposes	  about	  space	  and	  time,	   and	   then	   “how	   these	   presuppositions	   must	   confront	   the	   changes	   in	   our	  empirical	   knowledge	   and	   practice.”	   (DiSalle	   [2006a],	   2)	   Overlooking	   this	   role	   for	  conceptual	  analysis	  (and	  the	  philosophical	  arguments	  pertaining	  to	  such	  analyses)	  has	   obscured	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   rational	   change	   in	   physical	   theory	   has	  occurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   empirical	   findings.	   Whereas	   philosophical	   hypotheses,	  speculation,	  and	  even	  grand-­‐system	  building	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  development	  of	  physics,	  such	  a	  role	  is	  far	  less	  significant	  than	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  of	  concepts	  of	  space	  and	  time.76	  	  	  
III.3:	  Einstein’s	  Analysis	  of	  Simultaneity	  	  We	   have	   already	   seen	   above	   Friedman’s	   brief	   account	   of	   the	   development	   of	  relativistic	   physics.	   Relativity,	   on	   this	   score,	   has	   two	   constitutive	   principles:	   the	  principle	  of	  light,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  equivalence.	  These	  two	  principles	  (along	  with	  an	   explicated	   principles	   of	   relativity	   in	   special	   and	   general	   relativity)	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  It	  is	  a	  version	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  explicated	  by	  Demopoulos	  in	  his	  [2000]	  and	  [2003a],	  already	   quoted	   in	   the	   Introduction	   to	   this	   paper.	   It	   is	   a	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   “our	   theoretical	  knowledge	   in	  general,	   and	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  physics	   in	  particular,	   one	   that	   clarifies	  and	   reveals	  those	  assumptions	  that	  are	   implicit	   in	  our	  basic	   judgements	   involving	  the	  theoretical	  vocabulary…”	  (Demopoulos	  [2003a],	  399)	  76	  DiSalle	  first	  gave	  an	  account	  of	  this	  new	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  in	  his	  [2002a],	  in	  the	  context	  of	  geometrical	  conventionalism	  in	  the	  Poincaré-­‐cum-­‐logical	  empiricist	  tradition.	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countenanced	   in	  some	  way	  by	  all	  modern	  physicists	  going	  back	   to	  Galileo,	  but	   the	  key	  shift	  in	  Einstein’s	  thinking	  was	  to	  see	  the	  light	  and	  equivalence	  principles	  not	  as	  empirical	   facts,	   but	   to	   “elevate”	   them	   to	   the	   status	   of	   conventions	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  Poincaré	  or	  coordinating	  principles	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  Reichenbach—the	  relativised	  a	  
priori	  constitutive	   principles	  which	   allow	   the	   abstract	  mathematical	   structures	   of	  general	   relativity	   to	   be	   coordinated	   with	   actual	   sensory	   experience.	   While	   both	  principles	  may	  have	  had	  an	  empirical	  origin,	  they	  have	  now	  been	  “exalted”	  (to	  use	  Poincaré’s	  turn	  of	  phrase).	  Once	  such	  coordinations	  are	  made,	  a	  whole	  new	  host	  of	  empirical	   claims	   follow	   (for	   example,	   explaining	   the	   advance	   of	   the	   perihelion	   of	  Mercury	  in	  general	  relativity).	  But	  the	  coordinative	  definitions	  and	  the	  background	  mathematical	   framework	  are	  not	  sensitive	  to	  empirical	  considerations	  in	  the	  same	  way	  because	  of	  their	  exalted	  status;	  they	  make	  empirical	  claims	  possible,	  but	  are	  not	  themselves	  empirical	  in	  the	  same	  sense.	  	  Such	   a	   picture	   looks	   far	   too	   much	   like	   the	   conventionalism	   of	   the	   logical	  positivists	   for	   two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	   it	  gives	   too	   little	  consideration	   to	   the	  empirical	  development	   of	   physical	   geometry,	   even	   though	   it	   may	   account	   for	   the	   rational	  progress	   of	   theory	   change	   in	   physics.	   The	   reasons	   have	   already	   been	   given.	   This	  view	  preserves	  too	  much	  of	  the	  naïve	  Kantian	  picture	  that	  scientific	  progress	  must	  be	  held	  together	  by	  something	  more	  than	   just	  conceptual	  analysis	  and	  experience.	  Of	   course,	   Friedman	   replaces	   the	   rigid	   a	   prioristic	   framework	   of	   Kant	   with	   a	  nuanced	   account	   of	   the	   relativised	  a	  priori,	   but	   such	   a	   project	   only	   preserves	   the	  rationality	   of	   scientific	   progress	   by	   postulating	   a	   regulative	   ideal	   towards	   which	  physics	   strives.	  We	  have	  no	  grounds	  on	  which	   to	   take	  such	  a	   telos	   seriously	   (save	  wishful	   thinking,	   and	   a	   desire	   for	   systematicity	   which,	   as	   we	   saw	  with	   Torretti’s	  notion	  of	  consilience,	  is	  better	  explained	  by	  the	  anticipatory	  nature	  of	  our	  theorising	  than	  by	  an	  orientation	  toward	  some	  always	  moving	  regulative	  ideal).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  DiSalle	  sees	  the	  issue	  quite	  differently.	  For	  him,	  Einstein’s	  transformation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   simultaneity	   was	   not	   a	   result	   (pace	   logical	  empiricism)	  of	  some	  deep	  reflection	  on	  the	  relational	  character	  of	  all	  motion—some	  attempt	   to	   take	   Mach’s	   principle	   and	   transform	   it	   into	   a	   thorough-­‐going	   physics	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which	  had	  relieved	  itself	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  baggage	  of	  spacetime	  structure.	  Such	  a	  positivist	  reading	  ignores	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  both	  special	  and	  general	  relativity	  avail	  themselves	   of	   a	   world	   structure	   no	   more	   nor	   less	   metaphysical	   than	   Newtonian	  spacetime.	  Even	   if	  Einstein	  was	   inspired	  by	  such	  epistemological	   critique,	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient,	   and	  only	  necessary	   in	   an	  historical	   sense,	   for	  his	  development	  of	   either	  the	  special	  or	  the	  general	  theory	  of	  relativity.	  Rather,	  Einstein’s	  development	  of	  the	  theory	   of	   special	   relativity	   came	   about	   as	   a	   sustained	   dialectical	   critique	   of	   the	  implied	   Newtonian	   conception	   of	   absolute	   simultaneity	   based	   on	   instantaneous	  signal	  propagation	   in	  Newton’s	  physics.	  On	  such	  a	  reading,	  Einstein	  did	  not	  attack	  Newton	   based	   on	   the	   philosophical	   need	   for	   a	   clear	   and	   precise	   notion	   of	  simultaneity	  where	  Newton	  had	  no	  conception	  at	  all;	  rather	  Einstein	  engaged	  in	  an	  examination	  of	  what	  Newton	  could	  have	  meant	  by	  “simultaneous”,	  or	  “…	  happened	  at	   the	   same	   time”,	   given	   his	   understanding	   of	   absolute	   time	   and	   the	   use	   of	   light	  signaling	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  instantaneous	  gravitational	  signals,	  given	  gravity’s	  complete	  inadequacy	   as	   practical	   signal	   because	   of	   the	   inverse-­‐square	   law	   (and	   the	   very	  weak,	  almost	  non-­‐existent,	  gravitational	  forces	  operating	  between	  even	  fairly	  large	  masses	   at	   great	   distances,	   in	   other	  words	   at	   precisely	   those	   scales	   for	  which	   one	  would	  want	  to	  exploit	  instantaneous	  signaling),	  and	  because	  it	  is	  a	  bad	  signal	  indeed	  that	  cannot	  be	  turned	  off	  and	  on.	  	   Einstein’s	  analysis	  starts	  rather	  with	  the	  recognition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  in	   the	   theory	   of	   electromagnetism	   of	   moving	   bodies,	   and	   that	   the	   problem	   has	  something	   to	   do	   with	   presuppositions	   about	   time	   and	   length.	   DiSalle	   examines	  Einstein’s	  example	  in	  Einstein	  [1905]	  of	  the	  production	  of	  an	  electric	  current,	  which	  relies	   only	   on	   the	   relative	   motion	   of	   a	   magnet	   and	   a	   conductor	   (the	   so-­‐called	  “magnet/conductor	   problem”).	   The	   phenomenon	   (current)	   can	   be	   represented	   in	  two	  ways:	   if	   the	   conductor	   is	   thought	   at	   rest,	   there	   is	   an	   electric	   field	   around	   the	  magnet;	  if	  the	  magnet	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  at	  rest,	  there	  is	  an	  electromagnetic	  force	  in	  the	  conductor.	  The	  measurable	  magnitude	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  (DiSalle	  [2006a],	  103-­‐104)	  This	  may	  seem	  merely	  as	  if	  it	  is	  an	  innocent	  asymmetry,	  at	  most	  troublesome	  at	   a	   theoretical	   level	   (since	   two	   separate	   descriptions	   can	   be	   given	   for	   the	   same	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phenomenon).	   But	   the	   problem	   is	   one	   of	   an	   “ontological	   asymmetry”	   (ibid)	   that	  accompanies	  the	  theoretical	  asymmetry:	  different	  fields	  exist	  depending	  on	  which	  of	  the	   magnet	   or	   the	   conductor	   is	   considered	   at	   rest,	   and	   therefore	   the	   distinction	  between	   the	   kinds	   of	   field	   is	   actually	   owed	   to	   something	   deeper	   in	   the	   theory	   of	  electromagnetism—that	  electromagnetic	  forces	  are	  mediated	  by	  waves	  in	  the	  ether,	  and,	   therefore,	   the	   structure	   of	   space	   and	   time	   supposed	   by	   the	   ether.	   The	  magnet/conductor	   thought	   experiment	   now	   poses	   a	   major	   problem,	   since	   the	  competing	   descriptions	   call	   into	   question	   the	   (Galilean/Newtonian)	   principle	   of	  relativity.	   (More	  generally,	   as	   Joseph	  Larmor	  and	  Hendrick	  Lorentz	  were	   to	   show,	  Maxwell’s	   equations	   are	   only	   invariant	   if	   time	   dilation	   and	   length	   contraction	   are	  allowed	  for	  at	  relative	  velocities	  approaching	  the	  speed	  of	  light.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Maxwell	   equations	   are	   only	   approximately	   invariant	   at	   low	   speeds,	   where	   the	  Galilean	  transformations	  they	  realise	  approximate	  Lorentz	  invariance.)	  	  	   There	   are	   different	   ways	   of	   framing	   the	   problem.	   The	   Lorentzian	   solution	  argues	  that	  the	  Maxwell	  equations	  do	  privilege	  an	  inertial	  frame—the	  luminiferous	  ether.	  The	  null	  result	  of	  Michelson-­‐Morley	  is	  explained	  by	  holding	  that	  the	  ether	  has	  distorting	   effects	   on	   the	   objects	   which	   pass	   through	   it.	   More	   precisely,	   bodies	  moving	   through	   the	   ether	  with	   velocity	  v	   contract	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  motion	  by	   a	  factor	  of	  	   1− !! !.	  	  When,	  as	  in	  most	  “normal”	  cases,	  c	  is	  much	  larger	  than	  v,	  contraction	  is	  almost	  non-­‐existent,	  as	  in	  such	  cases	  	  	   1− !! !  	  ≈	  1.	  	  This	   is	  now	  called	   the	   “Lorentz-­‐FitzGerald	  contraction”,	   since	  both	  Lorentz	   [1882]	  and	   George	   FitzGerald	   [1889]	   independently	   proposed	   this	   solution	   in	   light	   of	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Michelson-­‐Morley.	   Time	   contractions	  were	   also	  necessary	   (since	  under	  discussion	  were	  motions	   through	   the	   ether),	   so	   Lorentz	   also	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   “local	  time”,	  it	  taking	  	  	  	   11− vc !	  	   	  	  times	  the	  actual	  time	  elapsed	  between	  events.	  What	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  these	  contractions	  (dilations)?	  The	  “molecular	  forces”	  transmitted	  through	  the	  ether	  causing	  uniform	  effects	  on	   the	  microstructural	  properties	  of	   objects	   as	   they	  move	  through	  the	  ether.	  	  Einstein	   takes	   an	   entirely	   different	   tack;	   not	   one	   that	   seeks	   to	   explain	  Michelson-­‐Morley’s	   null	   result	   via	   fine-­‐grain	   distortion	   effects	   on	   bodies	   as	   they	  move	  through	  the	  ether,	  but	  to	  call	   into	  question	  the	  very	  framework	  of	  space	  and	  time	  that	  ether	  theories	  rely	  on.	  But	  we	  can	  see	   from	  such	  considerations	  that	   the	  dialecticism	  operating	  here	  is	  distinct	  from	  Friedman’s.	  Under	  wide	  dialecticism,	  as	  we	   saw,	   philosophers	   (and	   philosophically-­‐minded	   scientists)	   engage	   in	   meta-­‐framework	  debates	  that	  then	  offer	  conceptual	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  new	   scientific	   theories,	   related	   to	   their	   counterparts	   by	   the	   long-­‐standing	   meta-­‐framework	   debates.	   DiSalle	   holds	   the	   alternative	   view,	   that	   “physics	   [itself]	   could	  cause	  us	  to	  reconsider	  the	  very	  principles	  by	  which	  we	  define	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  measurement.”	   (DiSalle	   [2006a],	   154)	   In	   the	   case	   of	   special	   relativity,	   it	  was	   seen	  that	  an	  adequate	  definition	  of	   “simultaneity”	  was	  able	   to	  resolve	  several	  problems	  arising	   from	   the	   shaky	   foundations	   of	   classical	   electromagnetism,	   replacing	   the	  principle	   of	   rigid	   displacement	  with	   dynamical	   principles	   (the	  Maxwell	   equations	  under	  Lorentz	  transformations).	  	  This	  narrow	  form	  of	  dialecticism	  gives	  a	  considerably	  larger	  role	  to	  empirical	  matters—in	   fact,	   empirical	   concerns	  motivate	   and	  guide	   each	   step	   in	   the	  dialectic	  history:	  	  
	  	  	  197	  
	  
	  
for	  the	  revolutions	  we	  have	  considered,	  what	  has	  overthrown	  a	  given	  theory	  of	  space	  and	  time	  has	  been,	  not	  the	  “seeds	  of	  its	  own	  destruction”	  that	  it	  has	  carried	  internally,	  but	  the	  confrontation	  with	  unexpected	  contingent	  facts—facts	  which,	  on	  careful	  analysis,	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  undermine	  the	  concepts	  on	  which	   the	   theory	   had	   staked	   an	   entire	   spatio-­‐temporal	   framework.	   The	  contradictions	   occur	   because	   it	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   such	   theories—as	   Newton	  often	   suggested,	   by	  words	   and	   by	   example—to	   extrapolate	   far	   beyond	   the	  empirical	   evidence	   that	   originally	   motivated	   them,	   and	   so	   to	   expose	  themselves	   as	   contradictions	   that	   arise	   from	   unexpected	   empirical	  circumstances.	  (DiSalle	  [2006a],	  155)	  	  Scientific	   theories,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   can	   go	   beyond	   the	   evidence	   that	   motivates	  them;	  here	   is	   one	   instance	  where	   the	   extension	  of	   the	  Newtonian	   theory	  of	   space	  and	  time	  runs	  afoul	  of	  experience	  and	  experiment	  when	  applied	  back	  to	  empirical	  circumstances.	  This	   is	  not	  particular	   to	  Newton’s	  physics.	   It	   is	   a	   central	   feature	  of	  scientific	   theorising	   (at	   least	   since	   Newton),	   and	   it	   begins	   with	   our	   very	   first	  attempts	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   features	   of	   (firstly)	   our	   own	  world	  of	  experience,	  and	  then	  a	  space	  of	  common	  objects	  (that	  is	  eventually	  seen	  as	  obeying	  mathematically	  precise	  laws).	  	  This	   is	   partly	  why	  we	   posit	   the	   SE	   Principle	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapter	   as	   a	  necessary	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  engaging	  in	  the	  empirical	  revision	  of	  scientific	  theories.	  This	  principle	   captures	   the	  basic	  presuppositions	   that	  operate	   in	   simple	  empirical	  judgments:	   the	   proto-­‐mathematical	   assumptions	   which	   we	   take	   at	   first	   to	   be	  universal	   and	   stable,	   but	   which	   we	   eventually	   find	   to	   be	   limited,	   excessive,	  misconceived,	  and	  in	  need	  of	  revision	  and	  theoretical	  recontextualisation.	  	  	  
§IV:	  Final	  Remarks	  Our	  discussion	  of	  narrow	  dialecticism	  unveiled	   the	  empirical	  nature	  of	   theoretical	  revision	   in	   the	   sciences.	   On	   such	   a	   picture,	   empirical	   considerations	   (such	   as	  Michelson-­‐Morley,	  or	  observations	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  magnets	  and	  conductors)	  can	  rationally	  compel	  a	  revision	   in	  view	  (though	  in	  very	  complex	  ways).	  However,	  our	  considerations	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  such	  revisions	  are	  not	  entirely	  determined	  by	  said	  observations:	  they	  also	  require	  a	  deep	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  motivated	  by	  empirical	  findings—a	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  which	  does	  not	  see	  its	  purpose	  as	  
	  	  	  198	  
	  
	  
the	   prior	   generation	   and	   systematisation	   of	   a	   mathematical	   framework	   yet	   to	   be	  empirically	  applied,	  nor	  an	  impoverished	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  based	  on	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  This	  form	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  does	  not	  start	  off	  in	  
vacuo,	  or	  at	  some	  random	  (arbitrary)	  point	  of	  our	  own	  free	  choosing,	  but	  with	  the	  existing	  views	  we	  employ	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  world.	  Our	  task	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  presuppositions	  are	  in	  place	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  empirical	  enquiry	  we	  engage	   in,	  and	  how	  these	  presuppositions	  might	  need	  to	  be	  revised	   in	  light	   of	   our	   empirical	   findings.	   More	   generally,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Reformed	  Empiricism,	   we	   need	   to	   establish	   an	   adequacy	   condition	   for	   all	   initial	   views	   that	  have	  these	  (or	  similar)	  presuppositions	  regarding	  the	  application	  of	  elementary	  or	  prototypical	  spatio-­‐temporal	  concepts,	  and	  then	  examine	  their	  dynamical	  behaviour	  as	   they	   are	   revised	   in	   light	   of	   empirical	   findings	   and	   further	   theoretical	  developments.	  	  	   The	  logic	  of	  interdependence	  is	  certainly	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  accounting	  for	  such	  changes,	  for	  they	  exhibit	  (in	  a	  more	  complicated	  way)	  the	  kinds	  of	  epistemological	  interdependence	  we	  see	  between	  experience	  and	  view	  in	  the	  pre-­‐scientific	  cases.	  At	  least	   on	   the	   narrow	   dialectical	   account	   of	   DiSalle,	   we	   employ	   theories	   to	   give	  empirical	   meaning	   to	   some	   physical	   process	   or	   concrete	   experience,	   but	   we	   also	  bring	   these	   empirical	   judgments	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   view	   that	   generated	   them.	  Successive	   revisions	   bring	   us	   closer	   and	   closer	   to	   our	   goal	   of	   a	   conception	   of	   the	  world	  that	  both	  shows	  the	  plausibility	  of	  our	  elementary	  conceptions,	  but	  also	  their	  limitations,	  and	  how	  such	  conceptions	  can	  be	  contextualised	  to	  fit	  with	  a	  newer	  and	  more	  sophisticated	  theory	  that	  explains	  what	  experience	  would	  be	   like	   in	  extreme	  contexts	  (even	  though	  “normal”	  experience	  seems	  not	  to	  have	  changed	  much	  at	  all).	  	  But	  this	  merely	  shows	  us	  that	  we	  have	  empirical	  and	  conceptual	  reasons	  to	  revise	   our	   theories.	   This	   does	   not	   yet	   fully	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   how	   such	  revisions	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  offer	  us	  an	  account	  of	  rational	  progress	  in	  the	  sciences,	  i.e.	   we	   have	   not	   fully	   overcome	   the	   arbitrariness	   problem.	   To	   overcome	   that	  problem,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  our	  current	  theories	  do	  not	  merely	  license	  a	   certain	   set	   of	   (theory-­‐laden)	   judgments,	   but	   that	   such	   judgments	   are	   rational.	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Here,	  the	  story	  is	  much	  the	  same	  as	  it	  is	  in	  general	  epistemology:	  convergence	  on	  a	  set	  of	  core	   judgments	  gives	  us	  categorical	  entitlements	  as	  opposed	  to	  mere	  theory	  (or	  “paradigm”)	  dependent	  claims.	  Thus,	  we	  capture	  what	  is	  rational	  about	  scientific	  progress—the	   mostly	   slow,	   though	   periodically	   punctuated,	   development	   of	   our	  theoretical	   concepts	   in	   light	   of	   empirical	   considerations	   generated	   by	   the	   very	  theories	  being	  revised.	  The	  considerations	  we	  have	  supplied	  here	  show	  that	  there	  is	  at	   least	   one	   historically	   contingent	   way	   (and	   maybe	   many	   others)	   by	   which	   any	  view	  with	   the	   kind	   of	   elementary	   principles	   of	   space,	   time,	   and	  motion	   (even	   so	  weak	  and	  ill-­‐defined	  as	  quasi-­‐free	  mobility)	  may	  be	  revised	  and	  corrected	  (through	  empirical	   considerations,	   and	   conceptual	   analysis),	   perhaps	   eventually	   converging	  on	  something	  like	  our	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  space,	  time,	  and	  motion.	  	   But	   what	   justification	   could	   be	   given	   for	   the	   SE	   Principle,	   or	   the	   set	   of	  primitive	   spatio-­‐temporal	   views	   it	   licenses	   as	   initial	   starting	   points?	   What	  justification	   could	   be	   given	   for	   blocking	   the	   class	   of	   views	   that	   it	   blocks	   as	   initial	  starting	   points—those	   views	  which	   lack	   the	   relevant	   spatio-­‐temporal	   structure	   it	  imposes,	   or	   which	   simply	   maintain	   a	   purely	   philosophical	   (metaphysical)	  understanding	  of	  space	  and/or	  time	  which	  cannot,	  even	  putatively,	  be	  coordinated	  with	   any	   physical	   processes?	   Here,	   our	   justification	   follows	   the	   limitations	   set	   by	  Gupta	  for	  any	  initial	  view	  whatsoever.	  Gupta,	  we	  recall,	  maintains	  that	  reason	  has	  a	  nontrivial	  role	  to	  play	  in	  epistemology;	  its	  role	  in	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  is	  far	  more	  robust	  than	  its	  role	  in	  the	  classical	  British	  or	  logical	  empiricist	  traditions	  (with	  their	  consignment	   of	   reason	   to	   the	   merely	   analytic).	   For	   Gupta,	   reason’s	   task	   is	   to	  examine	   the	   dynamical	   properties	   of	   various	   views	   in	   light	   of	   a	   sequence	   of	  experiences	  E,	  and	  admit	  only	  those	  that	  do	  not	  put	  in	  jeopardy	  convergence	  and	  the	  epistemic	   entitlements	   it	   brings.	   The	   SE	   Principle	   thus	   does	   for	   scientific	   world	  conceptions	   what	   non-­‐rigidity,	   receptivity,	   and	   coherence	   do	   for	   common	   sense	  views	   of	   the	  world.	   Non-­‐rigidity,	   receptivity,	   and	   coherence	   remove	   the	   obstacles	  that	  preclude	  experience	  from	  fulfilling	  its	  epistemic	  role	  as	  our	  principal	  epistemic	  authority	   and	   guide,	   and	   the	   SE	   Principle	   does	   the	   same	   for	   scientific	   views:	   it	  ensures	   that	  epistemic	  views	  allow	   for	  a	   shared	  space	  of	   relative	  orientation	   (and	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possible	   orientations)	   for	   infinitely	   many	   perspectives.	   Seen	   in	   this	   way,	   the	   SE	  Principle	  merely	   demands	   that	   theories	   of	   space	   and	   time	   be	   couched	   in	   physical	  terms,	  which	  hardly	  seems	  much	  of	  a	  demand	  at	  all.	  Of	  course,	  in	  science,	  there	  is	  no	  “normal”	  course	  of	  experiences,	  at	  least	  not	  in	   the	   sense	   that	   any	   reasonably	   endowed	   scientific	   community	   ought	   to	   be	  expected	  to	  predict	  what	  sorts	  of	  experimental	  data	  will	  be	  proffered	  at	  some	  future	  point	   (though,	   it	   should	   be	   said,	   there	   are	   no	   such	   guarantees	   that	   “normal”	  experience	  will	  hold	  in	  the	  general	  case	  either).	  Nonetheless,	  scientific	  theories,	  with	  their	   precise	   logico-­‐mathematical	   frameworks,	   have	   implications	   for	   extreme	  situations	  in	  ways	  that	  common	  sense	  views	  do	  not;	  at	  least	  in	  this	  sense,	  scientific	  theories	  are	  much	  better	  prepared	  and	  equipped	  to	  handle	  unexpected	  experience.	  They	  are	   rarely	  upset	  by	   such	  extensions	  of	   their	   framework,	   and,	  when	   they	  are,	  the	   revisions	   they	   undergo	   follow	   a	   logic	   arguably	   even	   more	   clearly	   than	   do	  revisions	  of	  common	  sense	  views	  based	  on	  experience.77	  But	   ultimately	   the	   SE	   Principle	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   are	   right	   to	  demand	  that	  all	  scientific	  theories	  be	  public,	  i.e.	  that	  they	  make	  clear	  the	  ways	  that	  their	  concepts	  and	  principles	  can	  be	  applied	  so	   that	  other	  practitioners	  may	  make	  sense	  of	   them	  in	   light	  of	   their	  empirical	  application.	  This	   is	  why	  much	  of	  what	  we	  have	   said	   here	   focuses	   on	   the	   communal	   practice	   of	   scientific	   investigation.	   This	  communal	   endeavour,	   though	   it	   demands	   restrictions	   like	   the	   SE	   Principle,	   has	   a	  beneficial	   consequence:	   scientific	   communities	   are	   likely	   in	   a	   better	   position	   than	  their	   individual	   epistemic	   counterparts	   to	   overcome	   some	   key	   limitations	   of	  epistemic	  resources.	  Because	  inter-­‐communication	  is	  facilitated	  by	  the	  SE	  Principle,	  knowledge	  production	  falls	  on	  to	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  may	  be	  considered	  a	  boon,	   since	   the	  scientific	   community	  more	  closely	  approaches/approximates	   the	  
Raimex	   in	  Gupta's	  idealisations	  than	  does	  any	  individual	  knower.	  But	  regardless	  of	  how	  such	  scientific	  communities	  work,	  and	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  the	  SE	  Principle	  might	   help	   us	   to	   characterise	   such	   communities,	   these	   are	   completely	   tangential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  We	  think	  such	  a	  picture	  much	  better	  captures	  what	  might	  be	  meant	  by	  “normal	  science”,	  which	  is	  not	   the	   regular	   testing	   of	   theories	   in	   order	   to	   accumulate	   data	   about	   their	   applicability,	   but	   the	  constant	  extension	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  theory	  to	  new	  and	  exciting	  (though	  also	  perhaps	  upsetting)	  terrain.	  This	  conception	  of	  normal	  science	  owes	  much	  to	  Newton’s	  method.	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concerns.	  Our	  main	  concern	  is	  in	  using	  the	  SE	  Principle	  to	  construct	  a	  picture	  of	  how	  scientific	  conceptions	  of	  the	  world	  find	  their	  origin	  in	  primitive	  conceptions	  of	  space	  and	  time	  based	  on	  limited	  and	  parochial	  perspectives;	  in	  fact,	  scientific	  theories	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  such	  primitive	  views,	  and	  thus	  as	  having	  the	  function	  of	  correcting	  earlier	  excesses,	  misconceptions,	  and	  oversimplifications.	  	  This	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  scientific	  theories	  (as	  arising	  more	  or	  less	  contiguously	  from	  pre-­‐scientific	  views)	  preserves	  one	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  Friedman’s	  wide	   dialecticism	   which	   one	   might	   have	   (mistakenly)	   thought	   lost	   by	   moving	   to	  DiSalle’s	   narrow	   dialecticism—a	   special	   role	   for	   philosophers	   in	   advancing	   our	  scientific	  knowledge.	  Here,	  the	  philosopher	  does	  not	  get	  her	  special	  status	  because	  of	  her	  disciplinary	  access	  to	  long-­‐standing	  debates	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  but	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   philosophical	  modes	   of	   argument	   (conceptual	   analysis,	   dialectical	  critique)	  have	  become	  central	  to	  scientific	  practice,	  and	  because	  there	  are	  essential	  and	   interesting	   connections	   between	   her	   traditional	   areas	   of	   study	   (general	  epistemological	   studies	   of	   perceptual	   knowledge)	   and	   scientific	   knowledge.	   The	  philosopher,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  some	  monolithic	  scientism,	  is	  now	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  scientific	  theories,	  especially	  their	  pre-­‐scientific	  origins.	  More	   to	   our	   point	   here,	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Reformed	  Empiricism	  might	   inform	   the	   role	  of	   the	  philosopher	  of	   science—how,	  when	  done	  carefully,	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   (or,	  more	   aptly,	   the	   history	  and	   philosophy	   of	  science)	   can	   be	   motivated	   to	   show	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   our	   scientific	  development	   has	   been	   sensitive	   to	   experience	   and	   its	   more	   structured	   cousins:	  empirical	   observation	   and	   empirical	   evidence.	   That	   the	   view	   (with	   only	   the	  most	  slight	   modification)	   is	   ripe	   for	   application	   to	   matters	   both	   of	   a	   general	  epistemological	   and	   scientific	   nature	   is,	   we	   hope,	   an	   unassailable	   fact.	   While	   the	  extension	  of	   the	  view	  to	  scientific	  matters	  has	  here	  been	  only	  done	   in	  a	  piecemeal	  way,	  we	  hope	  that	  such	  considerations	  are	  at	  least	  enough	  to	  spur	  further	  research,	  and	  that	  the	  examples	  themselves	  are	  only	  secondary	  to	  the	  general	  claim	  that	  the	  logical	  machinery	  of	  Reformed	  Empiricism	  offers	  us	  fresh	  insight	  into	  how	  scientific	  advancement	  may	  be	  accurately	  modeled,	  as	  reliant	  on	  empirical	  considerations	  and	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